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It is my belief that the history of the dogface soldiers, most often blended nebulously 
within the pop history of the much-admired Greatest Generation, forms one of the 
American nation’s most significant instruments of cohesion. In addition, it is a key 
element in the popular origin myth of the American Century. Finally, it also forms the 
basis of a momentous and serious misjudgment in the critical reception and political 
analysis of that period, namely that the conduct of wars on the (infantry) battlefield 
can be bearable for those who are actually involved in it. 
Even if, as is increasingly maintained, the American Century is nearing its end, the 
role of the United States in international cooperation and international conflicts will 
remain highly significant in the foreseeable future and cannot be ignored by serious 
observers. American history thus needs to be included on the reading lists of all 
those who see themselves as observers, analysts, commentators and critics of 
international relations and of the position of the United States in such relations. This 
publication will try to contribute to that aim. 
A simple reckoning of the availability of, and demand for, a wide range and great 
number of infotainment and media products on the American market, whether in 
written text or in audio or video format, will make clear the meaning of the Second 
World War to the American nation. The history of a depression-plagued, isolationist 
and essentially anti-militaristic country, ranking 19th in the 1939 list of the most 
powerful armed forces in the world, behind Portugal and just ahead of Bulgaria, that 
within six years became by far the richest and most powerful nation in human history 
is simply too American at its core not to attract an attentive public in this context. 
Quite in contrast to our Austrian-German history of World War II, it is also an 
experience that, with respect to the war in Europe and the Mediterranean Theater, is 
capable of being empathically viewed without ethical twists and turns as crowned 
with absolute triumph.1 The most salient milestones on the U.S. path to a global two-
front coalition war can be identified as the attack on the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii on 
                                            
1 The history of popular anti-Japanese propaganda and racist war sentiment in the United States and 
the Pacific would have to be considered separately in view of current issues, but this topic lies far 
beyond the focus of the present study. 
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December 7, 1941 and the resulting declaration of war on the United States by Hitler 
on December 11, 1941. The American Century’s Big Bang exploded during these five 
fateful days when the American nation focused for the first time, and by all 
appearances irreversibly, on a global arena. While troops under the command of 
Washington were seen prior to this time as a risk to American freedom and to 
federalism and democracy, after this period they developed into a principal institution 
of the American nation and a first-order agent of the proverbial American enterprise, 
at least up until the abolition of compulsory military service in 1973. This history of the 
dogface soldiers deserves to be treated as a separate study because of its role in 
correcting the fallacies that being committed to (ground) war can be a reasonable 
option for the best-equipped and best-trained soldiers and, by implication, that war 
beyond the clear case of self-defense can be a legitimate instrument of national 
policy. 
After 1945, following years of efficient war censorship and tight and effective 
propaganda by the Office of War Information, most Americans viewed the Armed 
Forces as an integral part of their country and of themselves. It is understandable, as 
a result of the war’s outcome and its economic implications for the United States, 
which maintained its territorial integrity and suffered comparatively minor losses in 
proportion to the sheer scale of the conflict, that a broad section of the American 
population saw the World War II as ‘the good war᾽ (in the sense of ‘just cause᾽ and 
‘good times᾽), as the identically named Studs Terkel oral history of the war years in 
the U.S. has made abundantly clear. Remaining unrepresented in this construct, 
however, are the individual experiences, the indescribable physical and 
psychological suffering endured by those who actually had to wage the war on the 
battlefield. “War is hell. Its glory is all moonshine,” observed William Tecumseh 
Sherman, the prominent Union general in the American Civil War. We would all do 
well to heed his words in this matter. At the end of World War II, a consensus attitude 
emerged among the career military that soldiers, regardless of their personal 
courage, could only serve at the front and in combat operations for a limited time 
before suffering serious, often irreversible psychological damage. Even Gen. George 
S. Patton, intellectually rooted without dispute in the 19th Century, increasingly had to 
tolerate the presence of Army psychologists due to the rising level of mental 
breakdown in his command, though he always denied the very existence of war 
trauma and disavowed the phenomenon itself as cowardice. 
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Since then, the United States has undertaken an alarming series of so-called ‘major 
wars᾽, especially the Korean War, Vietnam War, two Iraq wars from 1991 and 2003, 
and the U.S. hostilities in Afghanistan, begun in 2001 and still ongoing – which 
resemble one another to a significant extent. At the start of all these conflicts, the 
uncomfortable knowledge of the unavoidability of serious psychological war injuries, 
acquired through the martyrdom of broken individuals in previous wars, had faded 
away and become forgotten. Then, during and/or after each of these wars, a stream 
of traumatized war veterans first surprised and then overtaxed the institutions of the 
Armed Forces and the state, and finally the American nation itself.  
One reason among others why this occurs is that the public, media and political 
establishment in the United States are, even today, susceptible to an emotional and 
mutual lowering of their threshold for war tolerance the moment any side brings 
emotive terms like “Pearl Harbor” or “Munich” into the discussion. Similar phenomena 
are in evidence at times when U.S. freedom is seen to be threatened far from the 
country’s borders and/or the export of democracy to undemocratic regions is 
perceived as possible and worthwhile.  
In addition, a significant feature of all American major wars since 1945 is that they 
have been conducted, at least in part, against the backdrop of a steadily evolving 
perspective on World War II and its “Greatest Generation.” Neither the U.S. Armed 
Forces nor large segments of the American nation, but least of all late-20th Century 
and 21st Century war veterans, could stand up under comparison with the censored 
version of a pure ‘good war᾽ put out by the Office of War Information – not because 
they fell short of the measure of the greatest of all American generations, nor 
because the “Greatest Generation” may have been less “great” than it was assumed 
to be. The reason is, rather, that they all were forced into an impossible comparison 
with a generation that increasingly became seen in the late 20th and early 21st 
Centuries as icons and monuments. Dogface Soldiers takes a look behind the 
curtains of this ongoing and growing deification, revealing the individuals behind the 
icons and monuments. In this way, the historic role of this generation, its life and 




This study has come a long way since its inception. It was conceived in spring and 
summer 2009 in Vienna and in the Upper Austrian Salzkammergut area. Most of the 
present text was written between October 2009 and August 2010 in Prizren, Kosovo, 
where I occupied a modest position at the headquarters of NATO/PfP-Multinational 
Battlegroup South. The first print version of the text traveled by train in October and 
November 2010 over the course of a five-month circuit of the Indian subcontinent, 
passing through the states of Maharastra, Gujarat and Rajastan only to be consigned 
finally to the flames near the India-Pakistan border due to its weight. The text’s final 
version was produced between March 2011 and May 2012 in Vienna in the context of 
a university dissertation in the field of history. The dogface soldiers portrayed here 
have accompanied me through the (certainly up to now and in my view) most 
important period of my life. This is marked and circumscribed by my graduation from 
the University of Vienna, the courtship of my current wife, the birth of our son and the 
first years of his life. I want to thank my wife first of all. For six years, she has put up 
with recurring periods in which the dogface soldiers were very much present in our 
daily family life. I thank our son for his patience when I was physically or mentally 
absent. I owe a great debt of thanks as well to Siegfried Mattl, who directed my 
dissertation and passed away much too soon in 2015. His understatement, his kind 
friendship and reserve, and his input at critical stages have contributed a great deal 
to the development, character and publication of this study. I thank Prof. Oliver 
Rathkolb for his benevolent appraisal as the university’s second assessor. I am 
grateful to the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and Böhlau Verlag, my publisher, for the 
financing and support that resulted in this publication. Finally, I wish to extend my 
deepest gratitude to Todd DePastino, without whose on-point research and friendly 




Infantry, he [Eisenhower] realized, would have to bear the ultimate burden, and 
winning the war by that means would be inescapably bloody. 
Paul Fussell2 
When the telephone rang just before four A.M. on May 7, 1945 at the Hotel 
Fürstenhof in Bad Wildungen (halfway between Marburg and Kassel), Omar Bradley 
of Clark, Missouri had been asleep less than four hours. He had been up until almost 
midnight the night before, writing a letter to his wife. Only five years before, as an 
aging Lieutenant Colonel, he had held a position in the Office of the Army Chief of 
Staff and, wearing civilian clothes, had taken the bus daily across Connecticut 
Avenue to his desk in the Munitions Building of the War Department. Now, five years 
later, four silver stars adorned his helmet and he was the commanding general of 
12th Army Group, with its troop strength of approximately 1.7 million the largest force 
ever led into battle by an American commander and the principal American 
contribution to the Allied Northwestern Europe campaign of 1944/45. After he had 
awakened and turned on the light, Bradley recognized the voice of Dwight “Ike” 
Eisenhower from Abilene, Kansas at the other end of the line. World War II had 
catapulted him into an even steeper trajectory. On his way to the American 
presidency, the amiable general now held the critical position of Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe. Then Bradley heard the words that had been hanging in the 
air for weeks: Brad, it’s all over, followed by the bureaucratic adjunct: A TWX is on 
the way.3 At 2:41 a.m. of the same day, Generaloberst Jodl, OKW (Oberkommando 
der Wehrmacht) Chief Operations Officer, representing Substitute Führer Dönitz at 
Eisenhower’s headquarters in Reims, had signed the unconditional surrender of all 
Wehrmacht forces in northern and western Europe. Fifteen months prior to this point, 
on February 12, 1944, Eisenhower had received his formal orders as Supreme Allied 
Commander. 
                                            
2 Paul Fussell, The Boys’ Crusade. The American Infantry in Northwestern Europe, 1944–1945 (New 
York 2005), p. x. 
3 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York 1999), p. 553 ff. 
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You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed 
under your orders for operations for the liberation of Europe from the Germans … 
You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United 
Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction 
of her armed forces.4 
He could now report mission accomplished. With his typical understatement, 
Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs: The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled 
at 0241 local time, May 7th, 1945.5,6 In addition to Bradley, on this momentous day he 
also informed General Jacob Devers, who commanded 6th Army Group in the 
southern reaches of his command, and ordered his operations officer, Major General 
Harold Bull, to issue an announcement to all Allied forces in the European Theater of 
Operations that the surrender had been signed and would take effect at one minute 
past midnight on the night of May 7 to 8, 1945.7 At this time, three million American 
ground troops8 were under his command, 2.6 million of which were on the European 
continent. The opening of a second front in northwestern Europe, demanded by 
Stalin, and the neutralization of the remains of Hitler’s forces in this area between 
June 6, 1944 and May 8, 1945 carried a total cost of 586,628 American casualties, 
135,576 of whom were fatalities.9 
                                            
4 Forrest C. Pogue, United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The 
Supreme Command (Washington, D.C. 1989), p. 53. 
5 Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower. The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, 
USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–1945 (New York 1946), p. 834. 
6 It is not necessary to state that Eisenhower could only fulfill his mission because between 1941 and 
1944 the Wehrmacht had been hemorrhaging while facing Stalin’s Red Army and its maniacal capacity 
for suffering. 
7 Butcher, Three Years, p. 834. 
8 In total, 5.4 million Allied troops shipped out for the European Theater of Operations between June 6, 
1944 and May 8, 1945. During this time, the British, Canadians, French and other Allies suffered 
179,666 casualties, of which around 60,000 were fatal (Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants. 
The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944–1945 [Bloomington 1990], p. 727). 
9 Weigley, Lieutenants, p. 727. 
11 
 
But who were these 135,576 dead? If they could answer that question for 
themselves, the great majority would call themselves dogface soldiers. Why that is 
so, and why their still untold story is a significant piece of the mosaic of American 
history in the 20th Century, will be addressed in this volume. 
Dogface soldiers 
Whom do we include under the term ῾dogface soldiers᾽? In order to explain the origin 
and meaning of this name, it is useful to consider the overriding expression for this 
subject: the GI. Among German speakers, the term ῾GI᾽ is generally understood to 
describe a member of the American Armed Forces, without much differentiation. The 
American etymology of the expression is considerably more specific in this case, but 
it too is insufficient to allow for meaningful distinction. There exist two different and 
contradictory definitions that are not exclusive of each other but rather should be 
understood along a timeline. In the Regular Army10 during the interwar years (and 
even during World War II), the standard everyday objects in an army barracks 
included large drums made of metal and galvanized against rust that held ashes, 
refuse and other materials. The acronym for galvanized iron, GI, was stamped on 
these drums for identification, leading them to be known in Regular Army parlance as 
῾GI cans᾽. Thus to use the adjective ῾GI᾽ to refer to a soldier implied disrespectfully 
that the individual was course, crude or rough.11 
In the course of the activation of the Army of the United States12 and the subsequent 
expansion of American military forces, a shift took place in the way the term is 
                                            
10 The Regular Army was the small, standing professional army of the United States in the interwar 
period. A formidable character study of the Regular Army may be found in James Jones’s novel From 
Here to Eternity. 
11 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., American Army Speech in the European Theater, in: American Speech, Vol. 
21, No. 4 (1946), p. 247 ff. 
12 ῾Army of the United States’ in no way refers simply to the army branch in the United States. It is the 
term describing the organization of U.S. military forces in the event of war according to the National 
Defense Act of 1920. In this sense, the U.S. wartime army consisted of three components: the Regular 
Army, by which term is meant the existing professional army; the National Guard, referring to units 
maintained by individual states for homeland defense in peacetime; and the Organized Reserves. 
(Richard W. Stewart (Ed.), American Military History. Volume II. The United States Army in a Global 
Era, 1917–2003 [Washington, D.C. 2005], p. 57 ff). The organization of the Army of the United States 
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understood. Virtually all everyday objects that members of the Army of the United 
States touched or had anything to do with were marked as Government Issue. GI 
socks, GI soap, GI shoes, GI shirts and countless other things made up the 
equipment issued to the millions of draftees13 who streamed into the reception 
centers beginning in 1941. Over time, it became commonly accepted practice, 
following a pragmatic and multilayered logic, to refer to the wearers themselves of GI 
socks, for example, as GIs, as Government Issue, a standardized article in the 
resource pool of the Army of the United States.14 Lastly, it should be emphasized that 
the term ‘GI’ as it was understood at the time had as well a substantially 
distinguishing function. First, it referred only to enlisted personnel, including NCOs15, 
but not officers. These were called (outside their presence, of course) the brass16 or, 
in the case of high-ranking officers, the top brass.17 A second criterion for exclusion 
is that only draftees, meaning those soldiers inducted under the Selective Service Act 
of 1940, counted as GIs, and not the lifers18 of the Regular Army. It goes without 
saying that the term also distinguished GIs from civilians and Tommies, the British 
soldiers19. With this general characterization of the GIs, it is timely to turn specifically 
to the dogface soldiers. 
While a GI is defined by his position in the hierarchy of the Army of the United States 
and the status of his affiliation, that of draftee, without addressing his assignment 
                                                                                                                                        
is described in greater detail in the section on the interwar era; the more limited description given here 
is only for the purpose of specifying the terminology. 
13 The draft – compulsory military service. Accordingly, draftees were conscripts inducted into military 
service under the Selective Service Act of 1940. 
14 Frederick Elkin, The Soldier’s Language, in: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 5, Human 
Behavior in Military Society (1946), p. 422. 
15 Non-commissioned officers. 
16 ῾Brass᾽ refers to the officers’ metal rank badges worn on the shirt collar and shoulders. Rank 
badges of enlisted personnel or NCOs were cloth patches sewn on the upper arms of the uniform. 
17 Bishop, Army Speech, p. 248. 
18 Lifers – Professional soldiers in the Regular Army. 
19 Elkin, Soldier’s Language, p. 417 ff. 
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within the Army, the term ῾dogface soldier᾽ describes a considerably more tightly 
delimited group of soldiers, namely the infantry riflemen20. A further difference from 
GIs is that the status of their affiliation to the Army of the United States was 
essentially secondary, being more of a company constituted on the basis of a 
collective experience. An exclusion criterion applying to both dogface soldiers and 
GIs was status as a commissioned officer. Membership in both groups was limited to 
enlisted personnel or NCOs. 
Contrary to the common assumption that land forces consisted mainly of riflemen, 
these soldiers made up only a surprisingly small part of the Army of the United 
States. To illustrate these proportions, we need at this point to take a brief look at the 
organizational structure of the American forces in World War II. In May 1945, U.S. 
Army Forces in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) had an assigned troop 
strength of 3,021,483. Of these, 2,639,377 soldiers were stationed on the European 
continent, the rest in the United Kingdom. This number is further broken down into 
Army Air Forces (AAF), Army Ground Forces (AGF) and Army Service Forces (ASF). 
In the AGF, 1,703,613 were stationed on the continent21, where they supplied 61 
combat divisions, among other units, with troops.22 Of these 61 combat divisions, 42 
were infantry divisions totaling 630,000 men with an average TO&E strength23 of 
about 15,000 men. The infantry divisions included, however, a wide range of combat 
service support and service support units such as the division artillery, an engineer 
battalion, a medical battalion, four headquarters companies, a reconnaissance troop, 
a signal company, a quartermaster company, an ordnance company, a military police 
platoon, three service companies, three anti-tank companies and three cannon 
                                            
20 Infantry soldiers typically equipped in this period with rifles or semi-automatic rifles who saw 
themselves as charged with the essential duties of war, to close with, and destroy, the Enemy. 
21 Pogue, United States Army, p. 542. 
22 Divisions were the basic tactical elements of the Armies of the Second World War that, due to their 
composition, were capable of autonomous warfare without substantial external support. Infantry 
divisions, armored divisions (tanks) and airborne divisions (paratroopers) were deployed in the 
European Theater of Operations. 
23 Table of Organization and Equipment: War Department documents for all units of the Army of the 




companies, to mention only the most important elements in the first two 
organizational levels.24 The point should be evident, however. When the manpower 
level of these combat service support and service support units is subtracted from a 
15,000-man infantry division, the result is a rifle strength of 2,916 soldiers for every 
infantry division.25 Extrapolation to the 42 infantry divisions in the ETO results in a 
total rifle strength of 122,472. The specialized term for this proportion of actual front-
line-available to battle-supporting and supply units is the tooth-to-tail ratio. The 
disproportionality of these two constituent elements, in a relation of 25 to 1, makes 
manifest the considerable and constant human resources problem faced by the Army 
of the United States during the Second World War. 
This relatively small number of dogface soldiers in comparison to the total size of the 
Army of the United States had to endure the brunt of the hellish effects of modern 
warfare, something that, as we will see in later chapters, had severe consequences 
for the self-image and self-confidence of this military group. The 1st Infantry Division, 
even today the formation with the richest tradition among American Army formations, 
was at the front and in action from D-Day26 to VE-Day27, almost exactly 11 months or 
337 days. In contrast to the U.S. Vietnam War, in which a tour of duty system was 
practiced and most units or individuals were sent to the front for a year and granted 
regular rest and recuperation leave, units in World War II could not hope to be 
relieved prior to the end of the war due to the precarious staffing situation. During 
these 11 months in the European Theater of Operations, the Big Red One suffered 
between 2000 and 3000 battle and non-battle casualties per month, most of these 
                                            
24 Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe. The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–
1945 (Lawrence 1999), p. 38 ff. 
25 This rifle strength was spread among the 27 infantry companies of one infantry division. The further 
breakdown occurred in the following manner: three infantry companies formed one infantry battalion; 
the battalions, for their part combined in groups of three, formed three infantry regiments along with 
combat support and combat service units, all of these led by the divisional command post. 
26 In principle, D-Day refers to a beginning date that has not yet been determined at the time of 
planning a major military operation. Due to the enormous importance of the Allied amphibious landing 
operation in Normandy on June 6, 1944, this date has come to be known as D-Day except when the 
term is used in an explicit reference to another operation. 
27 Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945. 
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inflicted on its infantry regiments. The 9th Infantry Division, another battle-hardened 
unit that saw action in North Africa, Sicily and on the European continent, suffered a 
total of 22,858 battle casualties in the course of the war, 96 percent of these in the 
division’s three infantry regiments.28 Of the 42 infantry divisions in the ETO, the 21 
that saw the longest service at the front lines lost between 87 and 252 percent of 
their total 15,000-man troop strength due to casualties suffered in the period between 
D-Day and VE-Day.29 In each of these divisions, the infantry regiments, with a troop 
strength not exceeding 20 percent of the full division, bore the brunt of the casualties. 
Numbers like these illustrate and explain the dogfaces᾽conviction that they saw 
themselves challenged to defy the law of averages concerning their survival. 
The origin of the expression ῾dogface soldier᾽ is unknown. It is not a product of the 
war, however. It appears in a Glossary of Army Slang published by the journal 
American Speech in October 1941.30 In contrast, however, its path to popularity is 
easy to determine. At the beginning of 1942, two soldiers from the 3rd Infantry 
Division composed a song called Dogface Soldier as a riposte to the highly 
commercial war songs that had been released up to that point. The song did not 
initially spread beyond these soldiers᾽ immediate environment, and eventually both 
were transferred to other units respectively in South America and the Pacific. When 
3rd Infantry was deployed to North Africa, the song reached the ears of CG31 Major 
General Lucian Truscott, who greatly enjoyed it and named Dogface Soldier as the 
official division battle song. As a result, the song was popularized by word of mouth 
to the extent that during the Allied campaign in Sicily it became a familiar battle 
chant.32 The text is as follows: 
I wouldn’t give a bean 
To be a fancy pants Marine 
                                            
28 Mansoor, GI Offensive, p. 251 ff. 
29 Ibid., p. 252. 
30 Anonymous, Glossary of Army Slang, in: American Speech, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1941), p. 165. 
31 CG – Commanding General. 




I’d rather be a 
Dogface soldier like I am 
 
I wouldn’t trade my old OD’s33 
For all the Navy’s dungarees 
For I’m the walking pride 
Of Uncle Sam 
 
On Army posters that I read 
It says “the Army builds men” 
So they’re tearing me down 
To build me over again 
 
I’m just a dogface soldier 
With a rifle on my shoulder 
And I eat a kraut34 
For breakfast EV’RY day 
 
So feed me ammunition 
Keep me in Third Division 
Your dogface soldier’s A-Okay 
 
In a nutshell: The song contains one of the cultural characteristics that we will 
encounter again as a constituent element in the self-image of the dogface soldiers, 
namely the determined distinction drawn vis-a-vis the other service branches. Apart 
from that, it primarily provides information about the image the composers intended 
to convey regarding their group, and it may also be seen as propaganda. The actual 
psycho-cultural mindset of the dogfaces was certainly more complex than feed me 
ammunition, keep me in Third Division … and eat a kraut for breakfast EV’RY day. 
Philip Leveque, a veteran of 354th Regiment, 89th Infantry Division, who experienced 
                                            
33 OD’s stands for olive drabs, the U.S. Army field uniform. 
34 While soldiers of the German Wehrmacht, in an allusion to the cabbage (Kraut) dishes typical to 
German cooking, were called ῾krauts᾽ by American soldiers, the expression ῾Jerry᾽ was commonly 
employed by the British army. 
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the final phase of the war in the European Theater of Operations from the end of 
January 1945 onward, offers a pragmatic etymology of the expression: 
He lived in “pup tents” and foxholes. We were treated like dogs in training. We 
had dog tags for identification. The basic story is that wounded soldiers in the 
Civil War had tags tied to them with string indicating the nature of their wounds. 
The tags were like those put on a pet dog or horse, but I can’t imagine anybody 
living in a horse tent or being called a horseface. Correctly speaking, only 
infantrymen are called dogfaces. Much of the time, we were filthy, cold and wet 
as a duck-hunting dog and we were ordered around sternly and loudly like a half-
trained dog.35 
In order to provide an adequate description of the research subject, its origins and its 
development, it is necessary to understand the milieu in which it developed. For this 
reason, we will begin with the sociocultural and mass psychological characteristics of 
armies in general and American armies specifically. The U.S. Army, the land force of 
the United States of the 1930s, its position and meaning within American society – all 
these elements become as much a theme as the origins and traditions of this 
organization. 
A longitudinal analysis of the U.S. Army between the World Wars will be a topic of the 
next section of this work. It begins with almost total demobilization immediately 
following the end of the Great War36 in the course of the American retreat into 
isolationist patterns of behavior, followed by the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, 
when U.S. forces, separated geographically from the population to the maximum 
extent possible and both personally and financially reduced to an absolute minimum 
level, led a shadowy existence. The third development phase of the Army of the 
United States between the two World Wars began with an emerging awareness that 
the critical developments on the European continent would lead to military conflict 
sooner or later. The American political leadership saw itself confronted with the reality 
that the United States was in no way adequately prepared in the event that it should 
become (whether of its own accord or not is irrelevant in this context) a party to the 
                                            
35 http://www.89infdivww2.org/memories/levequeastp1.htm (most recent access: April 18, 2010). 
36 Before the 1939 War developed into World War II, World War I was commonly referred to in 
English-speaking countries simply as the Great War or the World War. 
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conflict. This phase is characterized by the reactivation of the Army of the United 
States and by various early mobilization and war plans such as the Protective 
Mobilization Plan or a number of so-called ῾rainbow plans᾽. A critical point in this 
development that should not be underestimated in its significance was the 
appointment of George Catlett Marshall as United States Army Chief of Staff on 
September 1, 1939. Marshall, who would remain Chief of Staff through the end of the 
war, shaped, as scarcely anyone else could, the development of the Army of the 
United States as well as the general conduct of the war through his strategic and 
staffing decisions and his advisory role with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This is the 
reason Winston S. Churchill referred to Marshall after the Allied victory and without 
exaggeration as the true Organizer of Victory. 
The transformation of the Army of the United States from an internationally 
insignificant factor in 1939/40 to the war victor of 1944/45 is the central theme of the 
next section of this volume. At a political level, one of the significant factors in this 
process is American public opinion. It defined Roosevelt’s possibilities and limits as 
shopkeeper and commander in chief of the Arsenal of Democracy. At a technical – 
one could even say metaphysical-cultural – level, the person and character of 
George C. Marshall is the factor that dominates nearly everything, as mentioned 
above. His role as Army Chief of Staff and not least his staffing decisions influenced 
American Ground and Air Forces like no other factor. To cite only a few of these 
decisions, Albert C. Wedemeyer, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley and Mark 
W. Clark were, one and all, individuals who had a critical influence on the structure, 
strategy, tactics and culture of the American Army during World War II. They all owed 
their positions to George C. Marshall. 
In the first section pertaining, as it were, to the central theme of this study, we 
address how an army of almost nine million so-called ῾citizen soldiers᾽ was actually 
created from scratch. The sheer size and technical process of this undertaking 
provide evidence as to why the resulting socio-political and cultural effects on the 
American way of life can safely be described as revolutionary. 
Subsequently, we will leave United States soil, following the footsteps of the later 
dogface solders, and proceed territorially to the second section of this work, which in 
the terminology of those times would be labeled overseas. This begins with the so-
called ῾occupation of Britain᾽ by the Army of the United States. The United Kingdom 
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served the Western Allies as a way station and logistical base for troops arriving from 
the U.S. en route to the North African and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations. For 
the decisive European Theater of Operations, it was used as a jump-off base for the 
invasion of northwestern Europe that was staged in Normandy. During this time, and 
particularly after the winter of 1943/44, as troops massed in southern England for the 
cross-channel invasion at that time still planned for May 1944, the south of Britain 
became a giant army camp where ultimately two million U.S. troops were 
concentrated. For the local population, this GI invasion meant a profound culture 
shock initially, followed by a lively, two-directional cultural transfer that we will trace 
here. 
Following these admittedly extensive preliminary discussions, the content of the 
second part of this volume will address the actual theme, the dogface soldiers in the 
Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations. In this section, we deal first 
with the various conditions that formed the reality of the dogfaces, both supporting 
and determining their emergence as a group with a distinctive consciousness. Then 
the study will take a proverbial pictorial turn and consider the research subject 
through a unique body of work from the perspective of image study: the cartoons of 
two-time Pulitzer prize winner, American infantry soldier and civil rights activist Bill 
Mauldin. 
Mauldin, who took part in the Allied invasion of Sicily as a member of the 45th Infantry 
Division, achieved immortal fame among the GIs of World War II with his cartoons 
published first in the 45th Division News37 and later in Stars and Stripes38, the daily 
newspaper of the Army of the United States. The two protagonists, Willie and Joe, 
war-weary, disillusioned dogfaces, saunter through the turmoil and catastrophes of 
the Second World War. Along their way, they make indirect comments about the 
events of the war, military leadership, weather, food, operations, practices and 
absurdities in the Army of the United States, replacements, the German enemy and 
much more. In short, they describe that which is in some way significant to dogfaces. 
The value of Mauldin’s cartoons for an analysis of this phenomenon can scarcely be 
overstated. Willie and Joe provided a face and a communications platform for the (to 
                                            
37 The 45th Division News was the newspaper of the soldiers of the 45th Infantry Division. 
38 Cf. Chapter 8.4 Journalistic connection: Stars and Stripes. 
20 
 
that point) anonymous dogfaces and converted a set of realities and opinions into a 
quasi-ideology. They are the point of departure for this study and its center of gravity. 
These snapshots and analyses derive their historical significance from a worm’s-eye 
perspective in which we view them living out the sequence of events and decisions 
that constitute the history of the American war in the European and Mediterranean 
Theaters of World War II. 
In this sense, it is necessary to deal with World War II campaigns and operations. 
Only when we have an idea of where the protagonists of our image sources come 
from, both in terms of their location and experientially, are we capable of reclaiming 
the source value of an image. The exclusive analysis of tactical and operational 
maneuvers according to criteria of contemporary and current doctrines would be 
nothing more than twice-told Prussian general staff history. In this deceptive and 
sterile (compared to the true essence of war) mode of historiography, Mauldin’s 
works represent a corrective in the form of an individual horizon of knowledge and 
experience. The combined analysis of these two very dissimilar source materials 
leads subsequently to the distillation of historically relevant information. In a foreword 
to Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Angus Calder sees historiological potential and qualities 
in Lawrence’s text that are transferable to the image materials addressed here: 
Whether or not Lawrence is ‘accurate’ or not in his account of this engagement or 
that is a relatively unimportant matter. Aldington matching Seven Pillars against 
Official Histories was an innocent writing two decades before John Keegan’s 
masterly Face of Battle (1976) brought home to historians the point, which now 
seems obvious, that tidied-up official reports of warfare, commonly a confused 
business, especially on modern battlefields, are most unlikely to deliver truth. If 
Lawrence’s descriptions are plausible – and many soldiers have deemed them so 
– they do represent general ‘truths’ about conditions of battle.39 
In conclusion, just a few words concerning the written sources and literature cited in 
this volume. For a comprehensive assessment of the so-called ῾big picture᾽, a 
number of recollections and memoirs are accessible. Although these volumes 
naturally present a subjective picture, they are of course very helpful to the aim of 
                                            
39 Angus Calder, Introduction, in: Thomas Edward Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London 
1997), p. XV ff. 
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being able to comprehend decisions reached during the period in question. Above all 
and in a class by itself is Winston S. Churchill’s six-volume work The Second World 
War. By its nature, it is extremely subjective40 in its perspective, leaving the 
impression (probably not unintentionally) that Churchill single-handedly won the war 
for Great Britain. Nevertheless, two facts make it an exceedingly valuable source. 
First, it is the only available first-hand account by one of the ῾Big Three᾽ key Allied 
political decision-makers of the Second World War41 and it offers a unique 
perspective on the functional mechanisms of Grand Alliance. Second, the unabridged 
edition contains a wide range of telegrams, memoranda and other documents 
displayed in facsimile form. The extensive appendices of this edition contain another 
several hundred pages featuring this sort of material. This is why The Second World 
War should be viewed as a genuine source as well as a literary work. The archetypal 
or possibly obligatory complement to this volumes would be the diaries of Field 
Marshal Alan Brooke42, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff43, published in 
2001. It stands to reason that these diaries are no less subjective than Churchill’s 
work. They offer, nonetheless, a necessary corrective to Churchill’s portrayals and 
make it possible to find a middle path through parallel study. 
While Churchill offers insights at the strategic level, a series of memoirs and diaries 
by highly ranked Allied military leaders like Eisenhower, Bradley44 and Patton45 gives 
                                            
40 Churchill commented on that matter, History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it myself. 
(http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0301/churchill.html) 
41 The restricted group that included Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. Hitler’s table talks, written down 
from memory, are in the first place not genuinely first-hand, and in the second place constitute little 
more than further evidence of the malevolent-destructive delirium in which the frustrated art student 
from Braunau, his entourage and his entire thousand-year Reich found themselves. 
42 Later Lord Alanbrooke. 
43 CIGS – Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the highest-ranking military officer in the British Empire 
and the chief military advisor to Prime/Defense Minister Winston S. Churchill. 
44 Omar N. Bradley commanded U.S. forces in North Africa, Sicily and Europe. The 12th Army Group 
he commanded in the ETO was, with approximately 1.3 million troops, the largest American military 
force ever sent into battle. 
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a glimpse into the operational and tactical strata. As a meticulous record of all U.S.-
related aspects of the Second World War, the so-called Greenbook Series, The 
United States Army in World War II provides data and detailed information on every 
imaginable topic from mobilization to the victory over Japan in September 1945. 
In addition, for information on the reality of war for the dogface soldiers, various first-
hand accounts are available to us. The wartime columns of Ernie Pyle occupy a 
prominent position in this regard. Pyle had built his reputation as an itinerant 
columnist in the U.S. during the Great Depression, writing about the simple struggle 
of U.S. citizens for survival during those times. His reports from the front lines of 
World War II, which earned him a Pulitzer Prize in 1944, constitute a logical 
sequence by focusing predominantly on the fate of ordinary soldiers, and they 
appeared in over 200 daily newspapers in the U.S. Pyle’s columns were written as 
letters in which he recounted to the American public what he observed and felt. His 
biographer, James Tobin, wrote about the critical role Ernie Pyle played for the 
American people: 
… to Americans the battles could not help but to seem remote. People knew, 
vaguely but with pangs of guilt, their soldiers were undergoing a sacrificial ordeal 
on their behalf. To understand that ordeal, and to convince themselves they were 
sharing in it, they read the war news avidly. And no writer was read more avidly 
than Ernie Pyle. What Pyle felt, the soldier was presumed to feel, and vice versa. 
The public possession known as “Ernie Pyle” was the emotional current running 
between the civilian and the war. He was the interpreter, the medium, the teacher 
who taught Americans what to think and how to feel about their boys overseas.46 
No less important in their informative value are the diaries of Forrest C. Pogue. 
Pogue was an historian working as a sergeant in the Office of the Chief of Military 
History. In the process of collecting material for the abovementioned Greenbook 
Series, he landed on the Normandy coast in France with his small unit on June 7, 
1944 and traveled with the American troops until the end of the war. After the war, 
                                                                                                                                        
45 George S. Patton commanded U.S. forces in North Africa, Sicily and the ETO. He is considered by 
many to be one of the most talented field commanders of the Second World War. His remarkable 
personality and serious shortcomings will be discussed in a later section. 
46 James Tobin, Ernie Pyle’s War. America’s Eyewitness to World War II (New York 2006), p. 117 ff. 
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Pogue wrote one of the main volumes in this series, The Supreme Command, and 
published among other works a four-volume biography of George C. Marshall. His 
annotated diaries from the European Theater of Operations have been published and 
are available. 
Doing Battle: The Making of a Skeptic, the memoirs of the literary scholar Paul 
Fussell, is a revealing volume describing the destructive effect of the war on the 
human psyche and the suffering and bitter absurdities inherent in infantry warfare. 
The Boys’ Crusade, by the same author, deals with the various stages of the war in 
northwestern Europe from the perspective of the infantry. 
Finally, the war recollections of Robert Capa, published under the title Slightly Out of 
Focus, constitute another important work. Like Pyle, Capa was mainly interested in 
life on the front lines. His often laconic prose discloses, in addition to details of 
soldiers’ daily routines, considerable information regarding the numbing and 
brutalization that result from extensive time spent at the front. 
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2 The American Way of War: socio-cultural and mass 
psychological dualisms between the U.S. and its military 
forces 
Political actors are predisposed to learn certain things over others. In the modern 
global system, realist folklore has provided a guide and cultural inheritance for 
Western states that has shaped and patterned the behavior of major states in 
certain situations … War is an institution within the modern global political system 
that serves an important political function – the solution of intractable issues. Until 
there is a functional equivalent to this institution, war will remain a way of handling 
certain situations. War and the steps and practices that lead to it must be seen as a 
part of a culture of violence that has given birth to these practices. 
John A. Vasquez47 
War is a cultural process. The manner in which a nation wages war is an expression 
of its cultural identity. This is why, for the purposes of a history of the dogface 
soldiers, it is indispensable to devote space to the cultural makeup of the United 
States of America, its military forces, and the interactions and relations between 
these two major factors. The production and accumulation of culture is an 
evolutionary process except for a few revolutionary examples. It is therefore 
necessary to view the development of the American armies in the context of the 
history of the American nation and its wars. From the time of George Washington᾽s 
Continental Army up to the present, wars have been much more than simply violent 
political events. Rather, they represent an important source of symbols, celebrations 
and commemorations, art, literature and iconic individuals that had a decisive 
influence on the country, acting – as they still do today – as a cohesive force on the 
society.48  
In the following pages, we will attempt to discuss the cultural essentials of American 
forces based on three sets of dialectical paradigms that determined the nature and 
form of American armies from the founding of the nation into the World War II years. 
While the first two are of an organizational nature and deal with the Army’s methods 
                                            
47 John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York 1993), p. 196 ff. 
48 John Resch / Mark Wetherington / Mark David Sheftall, Memory and War, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of War and American Society (New York 2005), p. 491. 
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of composition and personnel assignment, the third involves its operational culture. It 
starts with the difference between the two armies that is a constant across the history 
of the United States of America.49 
2.1 Regulars – citizen soldiers 
The myth was born in the American Revolution that would characterize the U.S. 
military forces well into the 20th Century: that of the citizen soldiers. The inhabitants of 
the British colonies on the American continent saw in regular armies – in other words, 
tightly organized and led professional armies – a symbol of the oppressive power of 
Great Britain from which they sought freedom. The colonists striving for 
independence harbored great mistrust of the instrument of power of a Regular Army. 
The colonial revolt had been triggered in the 1760s and 1770s by the imposition of 
repressive British laws. As the conflict widened in the spring of 1775 into a war for 
independence, the secessionist side logically perceived an army of citizen soldiers – 
an irregular militia formed more or less ad hoc – as the proper instrument to free 
themselves from British rule. The reality of the war soon revealed, however, that 
these citizen soldiers were no match for the regulars of the British army. As a 
consequence, the Continental Line came into being, a regular army patterned after 
the British military in its training and leadership that would ultimately be responsible 
for victory in the War of Independence. Although the irregular colonial militia of citizen 
soldiers was in fact deployed only in an auxiliary capacity and had no significant 
share in the victory over Great Britain, in the popular mythology of the war they 
became the sole decisive force.50 In succeeding years, whenever the American 
nation prepared for war, it invoked the so-called ῾Spirit of ᾽76᾽. The political and 
cultural elites used the memory of the War of Independence to create social solidarity 
out of the nationalistic spirit that had arisen during the war and in the subsequent 
independence period. Simultaneously, they evoked and exaggerated the legend of 
the citizens, the power of their love of country and idealism to reach for the heights, 
                                            
49 Edward M. Coffman, The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary, in: The Journal 
of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2000), p. 968. 
50 Scott N. Hendrix, The Influence of European Military Culture, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia 
of War and American Society (New York 2005), p. 258. 
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and they settled one of the great cultural debates that would preoccupy the American 
Armed Forces until 1973: regulars or citizen soldiers? 
The decision to resort to an army of citizen soldiers in the event of war does not 
mean, of course, that the United States maintained no regular army at all. There was 
always a Regular Army, although it was a shadow operation at the margin of 
American society. Up to the 1860s, the size of the Regular Army never exceeded 
16,000 men. In the early years of the Republic, a not insignificant number of critics 
saw the Regular Army as a threat to freedom and criticized the officer corps of the 
professional army for its aristocratic value system. As a delegate to the Continental 
Congress, Samuel Adams commented as early as 1776: 
A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always 
dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to consider themselves 
as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens … Such a Power should be 
watched with a jealous Eye.51 
While the enlisted ranks were formed from the least socially influential segments of 
the population as well as a large number of immigrants, officers were recruited from 
the middle class. The Regular Army followed the traditions of the standing armies of 
Europe. Military life revolved around drills, daily routines governed by drums and 
bugles, a wide variety of military ceremonies, and elaborate rituals of military 
courtesy. The uniforms were modeled on those of European armies. Officers were 
expected to be gentlemen and heroic leaders. They wore uniforms that clearly 
distinguished them from enlisted men, with swords or batons depending on the 
occasion, each of these a traditional symbol of authority. While every officer was 
clearly a gentleman in the self-perception of the Regular Army, enlisted men were 
clearly not. Officers were married to ladies, while enlisted men had only wives. 
Soldiers of all ranks were expected to submit to superiors unconditionally, and 
discipline among the troops was maintained through the threat of the most severe 
punishment and regulated by a system derived from the British 18th-Century Articles 
of War. The Regular Army’s self-image was as an entity unto itself, detached both 
socially and culturally from everyday life in the United States. Many officers in the 
Regular Army had acquired from their European counterparts a deeply rooted disdain 
                                            
51 Cited in: Coffman, Duality, p. 970. 
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for all things political. In this state of affairs, members of the military did not 
participate in elections until the eve of World War II.52 This hostile attitude toward the 
political institutions and traditions of the state sometimes reached a level where the 
Regular Army called into question the power of a democratic America to fulfill its 
military needs.53 The isolation of the Regular Army from the culture and society of the 
United States manifested itself most apparently in its geographic remoteness from 
the rest of the country. Until the mobilization of the Army of the United States in the 
lead-up to World War II, the infrastructure of the Army literally consisted of outposts 
in border regions and uninhabited areas in the middle of the United States, relics 
from the days of Indian wars and the border conflict with Mexico.54 
The Regular Army represented only a small part of the U.S. military establishment. 
By far the larger portion was made up of the various state militias, later known as the 
National Guard55, which were seen as corresponding much more closely in their 
philosophy to the democratic ideals of the U.S. In the Guard, organization, discipline 
and leadership tended to be substantially more democratic than in the Regular Army, 
with the militiamen of the 19th Century electing their own commanders, who in turn 
cultivated social contacts with their troops. It was not unusual that a career in the 
state militia or National Guard would form the start of a political career. Above all, 
however, each National Guard entity fell under the command of its respective state, 
not the federal government in Washington. This relationship to authority should be 
understood as the expression of a deeply held mistrust on the part of the American 
states with respect to a central government endowed with too many instruments of 
power. While at first the National Guardsmen had to provide their own equipment and 
materials for their periodic exercises, by the start of the 20th Century, the federal 
government in Washington had allocated financial resources to them. Linked to this 
commitment was an arrangement through which they could be placed under federal 
                                            
52 Hendrix, European Military Culture, p. 259 ff. 
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54 Cf. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy. From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris (New York 1994), 
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command in the event of national emergencies to serve as volunteer reserves of the 
Regular Army.56 
The relationship between Regular Army and National Guard is even today a tense 
one. For long stretches of their common history, at least up until the threshold of the 
Second World War, members of the Regular Army saw the National Guard as an 
incompetent and undisciplined rabble commanded by politically ambitious charlatans. 
Conversely, the Regular Army was viewed as an undemocratic, archaic dictatorship, 
consumed by pointless ritual, made up of individuals who conducted themselves like 
aristocratic tyrants.57 
2.2 Conscription – volunteer service 
The institution of general compulsory service as a method for the state to raise 
needed military manpower offers a number of pragmatic advantages. Through the 
obligation to serve, a potentially large army becomes available at a moderate cost. 
Where the military service is of sufficient length, it becomes possible to train draftees 
to a high level in basic and advanced military skills. Lastly, general conscription 
provides the state with deep reserves of trained soldiers over the long term.58 
Nevertheless, most U.S. political elites, faced with the question whether the Armed 
Forces of the United States should be based on volunteers or general military 
conscription, held the view that a volunteer army reflects the country’s liberal political 
ideals. The power placed in the hands of government by the institution of compulsory 
military service and the associated rights of access to the civilian labor market were 
seen as un-American. In the early days of the Republic, large standing armies were 
considered more a potential danger to civil freedoms than a protection against 
outside threats. The geographic location of the U.S. between two oceans, far 
removed from the standing armies of Europe, was viewed as an argument that 
conscription would bring more risks than advantages. American successes in the 
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War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War, both fought with volunteer troops, 
reinforced the majority opinion that an army of volunteers recruited during times of 
war was fully adequate.59 
It was in the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 when the volunteer army system 
first reached its limits. This domestic American conflict was waged on a European 
scale with respect to the size of the opposing armies, and in short order, the induction 
of volunteers for military service became no longer sufficient. The Southern 
Confederacy finally instituted a military draft in April 1962, the Northern Union a year 
later. In both cases, the implementation of this experiment did not constitute a 
recommendation that future armies should use compulsory service to build up their 
forces. The majority of Southerners were of the opinion that conscription represented 
exactly the sort of centralized power that had led them to secede from the Union. In 
the North, an unfair system of deferments and the hiring of substitutes produced 
social tensions that resulted in the 1862 draft riots in New York with over 100 deaths. 
In both regions, those affected were better off volunteering for local formations than 
being inducted into unfamiliar units. The 1898 Spanish-American War victory by 
volunteer-led forces did its part in continuing to build the argument against 
conscription.60 
World War I forced the U.S. to reconsider its antipathy to compulsory military service. 
The need to wage this war with powerful armies led once again to a turning away 
from a pro-volunteer culture with respect to the policies of the country’s armed forces. 
In the highly industrialized world of the early 20th Century, however, the planners 
found themselves confronted with still other new challenges. At the beginning of the 
war, Great Britain faced the problem that a flood of volunteer signups left the country 
with a critical shortage of skilled workers. Consequently, the Wilson Administration 
created a so-called Selective Service System that awarded exemptions from 
conscription to key workers in the war industry. In addition, it launched a veritable 
public relations campaign dedicated to the spirit of American volunteerism, enjoining 
the male population to enlist rather than be drafted under the threat of punishment. In 
this way, an impression could be created that no general conscription policy was 
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being implemented, but rather that the Selective Service System was recruiting from 
a male population that voluntarily and enthusiastically answered the call. The 
Selective Service System brought in 2.8 million of the 3.5 million American soldiers 
who fought in the First World War. It was eliminated following the armistice of 
November 11, 1918 but served as a forerunner for Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Selective 
Service Act, designed to raise manpower for the Army of the United States in World 
War II.61 
2.3 Mobility – power 
At the level of operational culture, the development of the armies of the United States 
can be described under the concepts of mobility and firepower. Following victory in 
the War of Independence, the U.S. went many years without facing an enemy that 
fielded a mass army. The 1812 War, the so-called Second War of Independence, 
was conducted by Great Britain with limited resources because that country was 
involved in Napoleon’s European wars, at least at the beginning.62 After the War of 
1812, the duties of the Regular Army were reduced all the way down to carrying out 
expeditions in the territories of the indigenous inhabitants of the U.S. and patrolling 
the borders, especially the Mexican border. With respect to these duties as well as 
the Army’s composition, the American military historian Russell F. Weigley 
comments: 
Historically, the American army was not an army in the European fashion, but a 
border constabulary for policing unruly Indians and Mexicans.63 
Applying the premise form follows function to the design and architecture of armies, 
the primary demand on the U.S. Armed Forces was for mobility. In order to patrol the 
vast border areas with limited manpower and to be able to prevail against the 
mounted irregular forces of American Indians, the Army rebuilt itself around a lightly 
armed, highly mobile cavalry. 
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This mobility doctrine reached its limits in the 1861-65 Civil War. The war was fought 
by both sides with mass armies arrayed in line formation on a European model. The 
Union owed its victory over the Confederacy of the Southern states, in the last 
analysis, to the strategy and application of sheer force and firepower. Ulysses S. 
Grant, a Union Army commander, after 1864 its commanding general and later 
President of the United States, took advantage of the superior industrial capacity of 
the Union states to create an army of immense size and firepower. Russell F. 
Weigley explains: 
Both the trading of casualty for casualty to bleed the enemy white and the 
simultaneous offensives on every part of the front were applications of the 
superior raw power of the United States. General Grant and his lieutenants 
defeated the Confederacy by drowning its armies in a flood of overwhelming 
power.64 
Against an operationally superior opponent like General Robert E. Lee, General-in-
Chief of the Confederate forces, Grant’s overwhelming force strategy proved correct. 
Thereafter, American strategists were prone to view the concept of overwhelming 
power as a suitable way to approach every major American conflict. 
U.S. involvement in World War I was of too short a duration to produce a significant 
change in strategic thinking. While Grant’s concept of overwhelming force was 
implemented in 1917/18, the Regular Army returned to the tried-and-true mobility 
approach following demobilization in 1918 in viewing its traditional border security 
role. When the German Wehrmacht rolled across France in 1940 with close to 100 
infantry and 10 tank divisions, two active Regular Army divisions were listed in the 
roster of land forces in the continental United States: the 1st Cavalry Division on 
horse patrol along the Mexican border and the 2nd Infantry Division, likewise based in 
Texas.65 
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3 Between the wars: demobilization, isolationism and 
reactions to the crisis in Europe 
To us there has come a time, in the midst of swift happenings, to pause for a 
moment and take stock – to recall what our place in history has been, and to 
rediscover what we are and what we may be. If we do not, we risk the real peril of 
isolation, the real peril of inaction. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, January 20, 194166 
Shortly after the ceasefire in Europe in November 1918, the War Department 
approached the U.S. Congress to request authorization for a regular peacetime army 
of approximately 500,000 men and a three-month general military service 
requirement. Unsupported by public opinion, this proposal was consequently rejected 
by the legislature.67 Europe had emerged from the Great War so weakened than no 
one could imagine the country being pulled into another armed conflict. A coming war 
with Japan was, to be sure, conceivable for the political and military elites, but it 
would have maritime characteristics. As a result, for the next two decades the focal 
point of American military policy would be the U.S. Navy. The tasks of the land forces 
included defending the continental United States, should the need arise, performing 
occupation duties in Germany, and training volunteer reserve elements.68 
It was the War Department’s responsibility to demobilize the 3.5 million-man wartime 
army as rapidly and harmoniously as possible without creating turbulence for the 
American economy. For this purpose, 30 demobilization centers were set up across 
the United States, deactivating approximately 650,000 officers and enlisted men in 
the first full month of their existence. After nine months, 3.25 million soldiers had 
been demobilized without causing serious difficulties for the national economy. By the 
                                            
66 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Third Inaugural Address (January 20, 1941), 
http://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/speeches/speech-3321 (most recent access: June 10, 
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67 Erik Riker-Coleman, Selective Service System, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia of War and 
American Society (New York 2005), p. 774. 
68 Stewart, American Military History II, p. 53. 
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end of 1919, the active army had been reduced to around 220,000 men and had 
once again become a Regular Army made up of volunteers.69 
The National Defense Act of 1920 and the measures to reorganize the structure and 
organization of the Army of the United States shaped the image of the organization 
that went into action in World War II. Contrary to the classic requirement of a 
professional military, it was determined that the United States would not maintain a 
large professional army equipped to address a major conflict. Instead, the law 
created an army for wartime made up of three subsidiary organizations: the Regular 
Army, the National Guard and the so-called Organized Reserves. The Regular Army, 
authorized for a maximum peacetime size of 280,000, was charged with fulfilling the 
traditional duties of border security and was responsible as well for training the 
reserve components in peacetime. Other tasks included developing mobilization 
plans and keeping them up to date in case a major new war might require the 
formation of an army of citizen soldiers. In the 1920s decade, the U.S. Army founded 
the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War 
College in Washington, where officers were trained to command large troop 
contingents and to perform general staff functions. However, the largest impact on 
the American reaction to the imminent crisis in Europe would arise from the creation 
of the Army Industrial College in Washington, which was made accountable for the 
supremely important issues of industrial mobilization and logistics in a coming major 
war.70 
The National Guard, the first of the two reserve components, was fixed at a maximum 
strength of 436,000 men. In reality, its numbers during the interwar period leveled off 
at 180,000 men, at which strength it was still the largest of the three subsidiary 
organizations of the Army of the United States.71 Guardsmen received their 
equipment and training partially paid for by the War Department, although in 
peacetime such funding was granted to the individual states, amounting to a tenth of 
                                            
69 Ibid., p. 54 ff. 
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71 Although the Regular Army had a maximum authorized strength of 230,000 men, it stabilized after a 
couple years of steadily shrinking budgets at around 160,000, placing it in 1933 as the seventeenth-
largest army in the world, behind Romania. 
34 
 
the departmental budget, on average. In return, they had to complete 15 days of 
maneuvers per year as well as participate in various training activities, and they were 
subject to call-up under national command in the event of a crisis. The third 
component of the Army of the United States was formed by combining the Enlisted 
Reserve Corps and the Officers Reserve Corps. Both organizations had been 
designed for veterans of the First World War whose training in that context qualified 
them to remain in readiness as Army Reserve personnel. While the Enlisted Reserve 
Corps generated practically no interest, the Officers Reserve Corps yielded a pool of 
almost 100,000 reservists. In addition, the Army provided a variety of paramilitary 
training programs for high schools and colleges and also for civilians during the 
1920s and 1930s, further expanding the personnel pool available for possible 
mobilization.72 
In the course of the decade of the 1930s, the War Department commissioned the 
War Plans Division’s Joint Planning Committee to elaborate a number of theoretical 
conflict scenarios in the context of military action plans73. Although, from 1933 
onward, there was at least a partial awareness of European instability stemming from 
Hitler’s accession to power, the staff of the War Plans Division nevertheless 
prioritized plans focused on the Pacific Ocean. The reason for this action, 
incomprehensible only at first glance, was by no means pure ignorance. It was 
instead due firstly to Washington’s conviction that, in the event of a European war, 
France – at that time Europe’s largest army – and Great Britain would be in a position 
over the long term to act as a buffer between Germany and the United States. 
Secondly – and here it is important to reiterate that American war planning was 
exclusively defensive until the late 1930s and was focused on the defense of the 
American continent and the Western Hemisphere74 – it was assumed, in a lack of 
awareness of the coming two-front war, that the U.S Navy would provide an Atlantic 
shield against aggressors.75 
                                            
72 Stewart, American Military History II, p. 61. 
73 These were known as ῾rainbow plans᾽. 
74 Stewart, American Military History II, p. 67. 
75 Stetson Conn / Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World War II. The Western Hemisphere. The 
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Although the American public’s strongly isolationist tenor precluded any sudden 
political changes, U.S. Armed Forces obtained additional resources after 1935. 
Respecting the overwhelmingly isolationist tendencies of the U.S. populace, 
President Roosevelt limited himself to criticizing the military actions taken in Italy’s 
Ethiopian invasion in 1935 and the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, but took no 
further political steps. During the Spanish Civil War, he initiated several neutralist 
laws that made it impossible for the Spanish Republic to purchase arms in the United 
States. During the Sudeten crisis of 1938, Roosevelt called for a negotiated 
solution.76 At the same time, however, from the mid-1930s onward, he ordered the 
formulation of continuously updated Protective Mobilization Plans to prepare the 
Army’s role in an eventual war as well as Industrial Mobilization Plans for the wartime 
mobilization of the American economy,77 and he gradually boosted the maximum 
authorized strength of the Regular Army and the National Guard.78 
The German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939 marked not only the end of a 
period of European ῾peace᾽ that had been no such thing. Across the Atlantic, this 
event signified the end of a period in which at least optimists believed in the 
possibility of American domestic unity surrounding the goals of U.S. foreign policy. 
On one side was the isolationist majority of the American population, who saw in the 
United States a regional power that, as such, should protect only regional interests. 
European affairs and especially European wars were viewed as something from 
which America should stay as far away as possible. Confronting this majority 
pragmatic-isolationist attitude was President Roosevelt, whose views could be 
characterized as moral internationalism. Roosevelt was convinced that the United 
States was a world power due to its size and economic-industrial potential and that, 
as a logical consequence, it needed to assume global responsibility. Moral premises, 
not just the dictum of its own interests, should shape the direction of the United 
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States foreign policy.79 Roosevelt thus introduced a reinforcement of American 
garrisons outside the U.S. and lobbied for a review of the country’s neutrality 
legislation. After spirited debate, laws were amended under pressure from the 
President to allow France and Great Britain to buy weapons on a cash-and-carry 
basis. Specifically, this provision meant that the purchase of armaments did not run 
counter to the neutrality laws if such weaponry was paid for in cash and transported 
aboard British and French ships.80 
With France’s unexpectedly rapid collapse in May and June 1940, the final spiraling 
into war began to pick up speed prior to the ultimately unlimited mobilization of the 
American society and economy in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on the naval 
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.81 Although 80 percent of the American population 
believed at this time that the U.S. would, sooner or later, become involved in the 
European war, a similar proportion was opposed to an immediate entry into combat 
operations.82 Roosevelt finally abandoned the path of feigned neutrality and 
positioned the United States ever more openly on the side of Great Britain.83 With the 
Selective Service and Training Act of September 18, 1940, a draft was imposed for 
the first time in American peacetime history84; the President agreed to an exchange 
arrangement with Great Britain in which 50 American destroyers were traded for use 
of a number of British naval bases in the Western Hemisphere; and lastly, he staked 
his entire authority on launching the so-called ῾Lend-Lease Program᾽ that provided 
first Great Britain and then, after the end of June 1941, the Soviet Union85 with 
armaments at no cost. In August 1941, having become commander in chief of the 
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Arsenal of Democracy through this law, Roosevelt formalized the Grand Alliance by 
signing the Atlantic Charter86 with British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on a 
bay in Newfoundland. 
                                            
86 The Atlantic Charter is a joint statement by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister 
of Great Britain that may be seen as a basic document for world order following World War II. The 
United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the post-war independence of 




4 From defensive to offensive planning 
The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their 
fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes[,] the tanks, the guns, 
the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. 
Emphatically we must get these weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly 
enough; so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war 
which others have had to endure. There is no demand for sending an American 
Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member 
of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about 
sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth. Our national policy is not directed 
toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people. 
We must be the great arsenal of democracy. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, December 29, 194087 
Between mid-1940 and the end of 1941, a change occurred in U.S. foreign and 
military policy from an isolationist strategy of defending the American continent and 
the Western Hemisphere to one of planning an offensive multiple-front coalition war 
against the Axis powers. The main actors in this strategic change were President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the chief of staff of U.S. land and air forces, General George 
Catlett Marshall and a U.S. Army major who had been completely unknown up to that 
time, Albert C. Wedemeyer88. We will now examine the roles of these three players in 
the prelude and genesis of the Victory Program. 
4.1 Political will: Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
I doubt whether we shall ever be able to hold him [Roosevelt] to any very 
systematic relations because that is rather entirely antipathetic to his nature. 
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Diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson 194089 
It must be borne in mind that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the real and not 
merely nominal Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Every President has 
possessed the constitutional authority which that title indicates, but few Presidents 
have shared Mr. Roosevelt’s readiness to exercise it in fact and in detail with such 
determination. 
Mark Skinner Watson90 
To state that the President of the United States holds a position of central importance 
to his country in matters of war and/or peace would seem at first glance to sound like 
a redundant statement. In the case of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, it must be 
stressed that his role in the history of the United States during the run-up to and 
conduct of the war can scarcely be overstated. We have seen how a difference 
existed between Roosevelt and the American people in their views of the role of the 
United States in the world. While the U.S. saw itself as a regional power with regional 
interests, the President believed it to be a global power that consequently needed to 
defend global interests. A further serious difference, not yet mentioned, between FDR 
and his electorate was that the majority of Americans held the pragmatic view that 
the country should remain far removed from the turbulence of Europe in order not to 
have to deal with the amoral power politics of the Old World. The President, in 
contrast, reflected the morally grounded perspective to do the right thing above and 
beyond the nation’s own interests, which was to fight the evil of fascism. He was 
therefore prepared to expand the limits of his constitutional powers to the 
maximum91. 
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Roosevelt’s military policy in the immediate lead-up to the war involved three major 
phases. From the 1938 international negotiations surrounding the fate of 
Czechoslovakia in Munich up to the German assault on Poland, he primarily carried 
out a strategy aimed at deterrence, based more on the appearance of military might 
and declarations of solidarity with the not yet formalized Allies in Europe than on 
military realities. From the beginning of the war in Europe to the completely 
unexpected collapse of French military resistance in June 1940, Roosevelt’s forcible 
rearmament policy was still more of a symbolic signal than an actual and balanced 
rearmament.92 Regarding this policy, William Emerson writes: 
… rightly or wrongly, military strength was not Roosevelt’s sole – or even his 
major – aim at the time. From the beginning of the rearmament program, 
Roosevelt sought, not rearmament, but the appearance of rearmament. He was 
concerned with the “show window,” not the “stock room.”93 
Still, after the German attack on Poland, the War Department was allocated a modest 
increase in financial resources under which it became possible to carry out a 
moderate arms expansion. 
The shock of the unexpected defeat of France represents a dramatic turning point in 
the policies of the Roosevelt administration. The domestic political discussion 
surrounding the need to expand defensive forces came to an abrupt end and 
Congress approved this expansion almost unanimously. The President successfully 
passed the first American peacetime draft and welcomed Republican interventionists 
into his Cabinet. In order not to jeopardize his reelection in the fall of 1940, he 
                                                                                                                                        
reluctant to declare war against the United States at this time, and Roosevelt was aware that it would 
take more than the approximately 100 dead American sailors to convince people of the need to enter 
the war. For this reason, neither the U.S. nor Nazi Germany used these incidents to escalate the 
situation. 
92 While Marshall and the other chiefs wanted to plan for a well-balanced expansion of American 
forces, Roosevelt publicly announced a yearly count of 50,000 aircraft produced. At the same time, the 
Air Corps, under the framework of realistic planning, increased the number of its combat-ready planes 
from 1900 to 2700. Roosevelt’s announcement may be seen as a threatening gesture to the Axis 
powers that did not in fact correspond to the real military situation (Emerson, Roosevelt, p. 186). 
93 Emerson, Roosevelt, p. 187. 
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proclaimed right up to election day his firm intention to use all means to keep 
America out of the war in Europe. Only after his reelection did Roosevelt employ the 
slogan all aid short of war for Great Britain, broadcast his important Arsenal of 
Democracy speech on December 29, 1940, and push through the Lend-Lease Act 
two months later after heated public debate and against heavy Congressional 
opposition, legislation characterized by Secretary of War Henry Stimson as a 
declaration of economic war.94 During this time, the President faced the dual problem 
of convincing a skeptical electorate of the need for intervention in Europe while 
simultaneously – and covertly – initiating at least the planning for intervention-ready 
military forces.95 Up to the late fall of 1941, for obvious political reasons, he balked at 
charging his chiefs with preparing their forces for the global war he foresaw.96 Finally, 
on July 9, 1941, he confidentially addressed the issue of the demands the Army of 
the United States had to meet in order to be able to defeat all its potential enemies in 
the event of American entry into the war.97 For Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, that 
was the conclusive indication that he should, in actual fact, prepare the Army of the 
United States for renewed war in Europe. 
4.2 Grand design: George Catlett Marshall 
I’m not always able to approve his recommendations and history may prove me 
wrong. But when I disapprove them, I don’t have to look over my shoulder to see … 
whether he’s going to the Capitol, to lobby against me, or whether he’s going back 
to the War Department. I know he’s going back to the War Department, to give me 
the most loyal support as chief of staff that any President could wish. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt98 
He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause. Of every man who ever testified 
before any committee on which I served, there is no one of them who has the 
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influence with a committee of the House that General Marshall has. The reason 
was simple. It is because when he takes the witness stand, we forget whether we 
are Republicans or Democrats. We remember that we are in the presence of a 
man who is telling the truth, as he sees it, about the problems he is discussing. 
Speaker of the House Samuel Rayburn99 
A builder of armies and statesman … the true organizer of victory 
Winston Spencer Churchill 
Puritanism, sense of duty and responsibility, character, integrity, competence, 
incorruptibility and tolerance. These Victorian virtues paint a background in the 
literature on George C. Marshall, acknowledged even today as one of the most 
important U.S. military leaders and statesmen. The later Chief of Staff of the Army of 
the United States and Secretary of Defense and State was born December 31, 1880 
in Uniontown, Pennsylvania. After graduating from Virginia Military Institute in 1901, 
Marshall rapidly earned a reputation in the Regular Army as an extraordinary officer 
and teacher. In World War I, he served as G-3100 with the 1st Infantry Division and, 
after 1918, as Assistant Chief of Planning for the American Expeditionary Forces. 
Apart from his war service, Marshall worked both before and after the First World 
War as an instructor at the Army School101 at Fort Leavenworth and, from 1907 to 
1912 and again from 1933 to 1936, as instructor of various National Guard units. 
Between 1919 and 1924, he served General John J. Pershing102 as his adjutant, 
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100 G-3 – Chief of Operations and Training. In this capacity, Marshall attracted the attention of General 
John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (see footnote 102). Pershing had 
criticized the 1st Infantry Division during a visit to the front, and Marshall had rejected the criticism of 
his senior commander as uninformed. As a result, his fellow staff officers in the 1st Infantry bade their 
farewells to Marshall, expecting him to be relieved of his duties. However, Pershing was better able to 
take criticism than they supposed, allowed himself to be convinced of his incorrect evaluation of the 
division’s performance, and from then on, asked for Marshall’s informal advice on matters involving the 
1st Infantry. (Charles F. Brower, George C. Marshall: A Study in Character, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/brower99.htm [most recent access: August 9, 2009].) 
101 Now called the Command and General Staff College. 
102 John J. Black Jack Pershing is one of the most prominent figures in the mythology of the U.S. 
military. In 1917, he was assigned to organize and build up the American Expeditionary Forces, the 
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supervised three districts of the Civilian Conservation Corps103 in the 1930s and, as 






Fig. 1   Fifty Fifty104 
                                                                                                                                        
body of over two million men that in 1917/18 was deployed to the western front of the First World War. 
After the war, he served as Chief of Staff between 1921 and 1924. 
103 The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was created by President Roosevelt only two days after his 
inauguration in 1933. At that time, the nadir of the Great Depression, over 13 million Americans were 
without work. The CCC hired over three million of them to work on public infrastructure projects. No 
independent bureaucracy was created to organize and operate the CCC, which was subdivided into 
camps. Instead, the Army was assigned this function. Although Army leadership only accepted the 
task unwillingly – they believed that it distracted the military from its central mission – many officers 
profited from their assignments with the CCC because they never would have had the opportunity in 
the Regular Army in the interwar period to gain experience in coordinating and supervising large 
organizational units. (Stewart, American Military History II, p. 64.) 
104 As District Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Marshall adopted the practice of writing 
reference letters for deserving staff in order to assist them in finding positions in the civilian sector. 
When he was posted to the War Department in 1938, the staff of the Vancouver Barracks CCC District 
reciprocated by publishing a commendation for Marshall in the form of a cartoon in their newspaper. 
As two CCC staff members at the right of the image hurry in the direction of an industrial job with a 
recommendation letter from Marshall, the text over Marshall’s car, heading for Washington, reads: 
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Vancouver District CCC Newspaper, June 1, 1938 
 
Aside from the fact that Marshall distinguished himself in all his assignments and 
displayed the capacity for larger tasks, a specific skill set resulted from the mix of his 
assignments through the end of the 1930s that, along with his personality, made him 
the obvious choice to become Chief of Staff. Through his posting to the staff of the 
American Expeditionary Forces as well as his assignment as the right-hand man of 
General Pershing, the Army Chief of Staff, he was familiar with the handling of large 
formations, had deployment experience, and knew first-hand the political and military 
functions of the Chief of Staff. In his experience as instructor of National Guard units, 
he developed a reputation as a friend of the guardsmen, a quality that was – as we 
have mentioned – rarely seen in the Regular Army and that led, more smoothly than 
expected, to the National Guard’s placement under federal command and its 
integration into the Army of the United States. Lastly, through his assignments at the 
Army School and Infantry School, Marshall knew a great many of the most promising 
young officers in the Regular Army. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, 
Courtney Hodges, Mark W. Clark, Walter B. Smith, William H. Simpson, J. Lawton 
Collins, Lucian Truscott and Matthew B. Ridgeway105 were, without exception, 
officers who owed their careers in large measure to Marshall’s support, proved their 
value as commanders of key formations in the ETO, and, apart from that, 
distinguished themselves through the human qualities they displayed to their 
subordinates.106  
While Marshall had already made a name for himself in Army circles by the end of 
the 1930s decade as a competent, moral and farsighted officer, he became a 
                                                                                                                                        
LETTER OF COMMENDATION / DEAR GEN. MARSHALL: WE KNOW YOU ALWAYS PLACED OUR 
WELFARE FIRST. / SIGNED: ENROLLERS OF VANCOUVER CCC DISTRICT (Vancouver District 
CCC Newspaper, June 1, 1938, depicted in: Brower, Marshall). 
105 Eisenhower was Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces Europe, and W. B. Smith his 
Chief of Staff. Bradley commanded 12th Army Group in northwestern Europe, with approximately 1.3 
million men the largest American force ever commanded by a single individual. Hodges, Clark and 
Simpson were, respectively, the commanders of the 1st, 5th and 9th U.S. Armies in the ETO. Collins, 
Truscott and Ridgeway each ended their wartime service as Corps Commanders. 
106 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall. Organizer of Victory. 1943–1945 (New York 1993), p. xii ff. 
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national and international institution between 1939 and 1945.107 Roosevelt 
considered him his closest advisor next to Harry Hopkins, without whose presence in 
Washington he could not sleep.108 In the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee,109 he 
was accepted as primus inter pares. Of the many American and international 
accolades that were offered him throughout World War II, he declined them all 
because he believed that he deserved no honors as long as Allied soldiers still had to 
die. He regularly showed his Commander in Chief photographs of the American dead 
with the intent of keeping the war from completely degenerating into abstract 
statistics. His aim was to make the human price of the war quite clear to him 
(Roosevelt) because you get hardened to these things.110 The Republican Party 
importuned him to be their candidate against Roosevelt in the 1944 presidential 
election; Marshall declined in principle, and this action earned him the singular 
respect of the President, the Congress and the American public.111 
By no later than the spring of 1941, the internationalists among Washington’s political 
and military elites had come to the conclusion that an American entry into the 
European war could be possibly delayed but by no means prevented. With no 
statement coming from the President on this issue, however, Marshall could not 
predict with any specificity what the future would bring for the American forces, 
                                            
107 Larry I. Bland, George C. Marshall and the Education of Army Leaders (Fort Leavenworth 1988). 
108 “I could not sleep with you out of the country.” Cited in: Larry I. Bland, George Catlett Marshall, in: 
Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia of War and American Society (New York 2005), p. 451. 
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although he was sure that all the Army’s mobilization and expansion plans to that 
point were insufficient. The 1939 version of the Protective Mobilization Plan still 
focused exclusively on defending the American continent and the Western 
Hemisphere, and the strategies of the Armed Forces for industrial procurement and 
mobilization had been completely disrupted and made obsolete by the unexpected 
demands of the Lend-Lease Program.112 Instead of continuing to expand the forces 
on an ad hoc basis, he charged his staff with developing a strategic analysis of the 
country’s situation on which to base a plan for expansion. Shortly after Marshall’s 
order, Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson, who held responsibility for Army 
procurement and lend-lease, inquired as to the extent to which the American 
economy would have to be mobilized in order to satisfy the demands of lend-lease 
and a superior army. This tasking of the War Plans Division would shortly receive 
reinforcement from the highest level when FDR’s own request of July 9, 1941 arrived. 
The President called for a response by September 10, and insiders asked 
themselves whom Marshall would entrust with this scarcely achievable task. In the 
end, the Chief of Staff announced his surprising choice of a completely unknown 
middle-ranking infantry officer, Major Albert C. Wedemeyer. 
4.3 Strategic conception: Albert Wedemeyer 
… strategy, properly conceived, thus seemed to me to require a transcendence of 
the narrowly military perspectives that the term traditionally implied. Strategy 
required a systematic consideration and use of all the so-called instruments of 
policy – political, economic, psychological, et cetera, as well as military – in 
pursuing national objectives. Indeed the nonmilitary factors deserved unequivocal 
priority over the military, the latter to be employed only as the last resort. 
Albert C. Wedemeyer113 
Albert Wedemeyer’s career up to the mid-1930s was typical of the Regular Army in 
the interwar period. Promotions in this army were rare and generally the result of 
personal connection rather than individual performance. Only in 1940, after over 21 
years of service, was Wedemeyer promoted to major, a rank that only a few years 
later, during the war, would commonly be held by soldiers in their late 20s or early 
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30s. The only occasion on which Wedemeyer had achieved notice was a court-
martial for being drunk on duty. He spent an inordinate amount of his military career 
as adjutant to different generals, eventually marrying the daughter of one of them, but 
by 1940 had not commanded so much as a battalion, the customary command 
function for his rank. Wedemeyer’s father-in-law sparked his interest in the economic 
aspects of warfare and military theoreticians of the past.114 
After Wedemeyer graduated with distinction from Command and General Staff 
College in 1936, he took advantage of an opportunity through a bilateral exchange 
program to study for two years at the Kriegsakademie, the German general staff 
school. For several months between the end of his studies at Command and General 
Staff College and the start of the semester at the Kriegsakademie, he was posted to 
the G-2 division115 of the General Staff in Washington. During this time, he became 
acquainted with Oberst Friedrich von Boettcher, the German military attaché in 
Washington. Boettcher befriended the young American and sent a number of 
recommendation letters to Germany that opened doors for Wedemeyer at the highest 
levels of German military society. 
Like few other factors, the two years at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin shaped 
Wedemeyer’s strategic thinking and eventually the American history of the Second 
World War. The Kriegsakademie’s elaborate curriculum provided a comprehensive 
and academic approach to war that went far beyond anything taught at general staff 
schools in other countries. It viewed war as something to be waged with not only 
military forces but all resources available to the nation. The triangular paradigm of 
flexibility, technology and mobility that would transform the armies of Nazi Germany 
into apparently invincible foes in the first years of the war was internalized by a 
generation of young commanding officers at the Kriegsakademie. Instead of focusing 
on tactical and operational problems, students at the Kriegsakademie were 
encouraged to view these problems from a broader perspective and to weave them 
into a comprehensive national strategy. 
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After the frozen trenchlines of World War I, developers of military doctrine concluded 
that the revolutionary technologies that would drive wars of the industrialized 20th 
Century would continue to favor defense, and they evolved their concepts along 
those lines. At the Kriegsakademie, however, investigations were exploring how to 
increase battle tempo again by employing mobile tank formations combined with 
tactical air support, thus avoiding the heavy losses and fruitless trench warfare of the 
First World War. 
Classmates who became friendly with Wedemeyer included, among others, Claus 
Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, who later became one of the plotters in the attempt to 
assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, and Ferdinand Jodl, younger brother of Alfred 
Jodl, the eventual Chief Operations Officer of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW). A recommendation letter from Boettcher led to an acquaintance with Ludwig 
Beck, Chief of Staff of the German army, likewise a July 20 co-conspirator. Beck 
astounded Wedemeyer by the comprehensive understanding of economic and social 
conditions inherent in his military thinking and his extensive knowledge of the 
political, economic and social nature and military doctrines of the countries 
neighboring Germany as well as others in the region.116 
Following his return to the U.S. in 1938, Wedemeyer was ordered to provide Chief of 
Staff Malin Craig with a written report of his experiences in Germany. Craig circulated 
the report to the heads of his staff divisions for review. The only one to demonstrate 
profound interest in Wedemeyer’s report was the then-chief of the War Plans 
Division, Brigadier General George C. Marshall.117 
4.4 Victory Program 
I wish that you or appropriate representatives designated by you would join with the 
Secretary of the Navy [or War] and his representatives in exploring at once the 
overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, July 9, 1941118 
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We must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating 
her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat … Air and sea forces 
will make important contributions, but effective and adequate ground forces must 
be available to close with and destroy the enemy in his citadel. 
Albert C. Wedemeyer119 
A detailed description of the expansion and mobilization of American forces in 
preparation for World War II would far exceed the scope of this study, as would 
Wedemeyer’s Victory Program, the strategic policy paper upon which this program is 
based, and it is not essential for a further understanding. Some basic information and 
data are needed, however, in order to demonstrate the sheer size of this project that 
would come to have such serious consequences, not least on American civilian 
society. 
The Victory Program was not merely a war plan like the previously mentioned 
rainbow plans. It was, rather, a comparative strategic study of the industrial, 
manpower and military capacities of the Axis powers and the United States. Its merit 
lay in explaining to its readership, the country’s military and political elites, the 
monumental nature of the task ahead of them. Lacking, for political reasons, any 
precise direction from FDR to indicate what the principal lines of national strategy 
should be and exactly what preparations needed to be accomplished by the Armed 
Forces,120 Marshall directed his staff to create a list of anticipated national policy 
elements in the event of the country’s entry into the war. Based on these, they were 
to develop principles for American action in terms of the time factor and the 
objectives to be accomplished. Wedemeyer and the War Plans Division received 
from Chief of Staff Marshall the following guidelines on which the Victory Program 
was to be constructed: 
… assumptions of national policy: 
• Monroe Doctrine: Resist with all means Axis penetration in Western 
Hemisphere 
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• Aid to Britain: Limited only by U.S. needs and abilities of the British to 
utilize; insure delivery of this aid 
• Aid to other Axis-opposed nations: Limited by U.S. and British 
requirements 
• Far Eastern Policy: To disapprove strongly Japanese aggression and to 
convey to Japan determination of U.S. to take positive action. To avoid 
major military and naval commitments in the Far East at this time. 
• Freedom of the Seas: The U.S. would permit no abridgement. 
• Eventually the U.S. will employ all armed forces necessary to accomplish 
national objectives. 
• The principal theater of operations is Europe, but other possible theaters 
may later appear desirable. 
• The defeat of our potential enemies is primarily dependent on the defeat 
of Germany. 
• Field forces (air and/or ground) will not be prepared for ultimate decisive 
modern combat before July 1, 1943 due to shortage of essential 
equipment. 
… phases of American activity: 
• 1st Phase (Until M Day121 or when hostilities begin). Objective: Insure 
delivery of supplies to the British Isles and provide munitions for other 
nations fighting the Axis, in order to preclude a diminution of their war 
effort, and concurrently to prepare U.S. forces for active participation in 
the war. 
• 2nd Phase (M Day until prepared for final offensive action). Objective: 
Prepare the way for the eventual defeat of Germany by active 
participation as Associate of Great Britain and other nations fighting the 
Axis powers. 
                                            
121 M Day stands for Mobilization Day: Prior to World War I, elaborate mobilization plans were already 
in the desk drawers of the Great Powers, ready to guide the processes of deployment and the start of 
fighting from M Day forward. World War II unfolded in a more muddled fashion, but at the outset, 
reference was sometimes made to M Days. 
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• Final Phase. Objective: Total defeat of Germany.122 
This assessment by Marshall of the core components of American national strategy 
proved correct in every instance. All key elements of the eventual Allied strategy, 
including prioritizing the defeat of Nazi Germany over Japan, lending support to Allied 
powers and keeping the North Atlantic sea routes open for pragmatic reasons, are 
already to be found in this report. Military intelligence services calculated that in the 
summer of 1941, Nazi Germany and its satellites had approximately 11 million men in 
300 equipped and trained divisions in the field and that this number could increase to 
400 by the projected start of American offensive operations. Conventional operational 
thinking was based on the basic principle that for offensive operations a 3:1 ratio in 
favor of the attacker was necessary.123 In the summer and fall of 1941, as the 
newspapers reported daily on the latest German victories in Russia, one could only 
assume that the Soviet Union would quickly collapse and that Great Britain and the 
United States would be left to win the war on their own. For the Anglo-American 
Alliance, it was unthinkable to build an army of over 20 million. In modern industrial 
societies, no more than 10 percent of the total population can be removed from the 
economy without completely wrecking the country’s economic foundation. 
Wedemeyer therefore discarded the 3:1 concept and began to plan on the basis of 
maximum deployable force. Subtracting the number needed by the Navy, there 
remained available, according to Wedemeyer’s calculations, approximately 8.8 
million men for the Army of the United States. This numerically inferior force plus the 
Western Allies, Wedemeyer proposed, should surround the European Axis powers, 
which should then be steadily driven toward defeat by superior local task forces at 
critical points before the Allies would take up the decisive battle for the Reich itself.124 
While at the Kriegsakademie, Wedemeyer had become familiar with the geopolitical 
theories of Karl Haushofer and Halford Mackinder. In essence, they maintained that a 
state’s power is ultimately dependent on its geographic situation. According to 
Mackinder, Europe, Asia and Africa make up the so-called ῾World-Island.᾽ Its 
῾Heartland᾽, the region that must be conquered in any quest for global dominance, is 
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European Russia. This is where the tank armies of the German Wehrmacht 
conquered deep corridors of territory in the summer and fall of 1941. In the past, 
seafaring nations like Great Britain or the Netherlands were able to exercise strategic 
influence on the World-Island that far exceeded the size of their population by moving 
armies and supplies by sea along the periphery faster than the continental powers 
could manage by land. The technological developments of the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries – primarily railroads, aircraft and motor vehicles – had begun to tip the 
balance in favor of the continental powers.125 This theory was impressively confirmed 
by the armies of Nazi Germany in the years from 1939 to 1942. In a stroke of 
supreme irony, as John Keegan characterizes it, the Kriegsakademie had, in 
Wedemeyer’s case, unintentionally conveyed a strategic concept to someone within 
the nerve center of his future enemy that complemented his own. Wedemeyer’s time 
studying in Berlin had developed him into a land-minded strategist who harbored little 
doubt about how to deal with the Wehrmacht. The United States needed to confront 
the Wehrmacht with a mirror image of itself that would challenge it to a decisive battle 
on the land mass of western Europe.126 
Details of the Victory Program planning, such as the precise composition of the three 
branches of the Army of the United States, are not important in this context and are 
therefore not under consideration here. The composition plans underwent many 
subsequent revisions, especially because Soviet resistance, contrary to all 
expectations, did not break. Wedemeyer᾽s calculations regarding the final size of the 
land forces turned out, however, to be exactly correct. While the Victory Program as 
a task still constituted theoretical planning, soon enough the course of events 
provided its practical application. Following the Japanese assault on the Pacific Fleet 
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and Hitler’s war declaration immediately thereafter, the U.S. 
found itself at war against the Axis powers. For the U.S. electorate and its political 
representatives, all opposition to military buildup was at an end. America was 
unanimously determined to win this war on both sides of the world as quickly as 
possible and with all the resources it could muster. 
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After key civilian agencies for the mobilization of the American economy had been 
created in spring and summer 1941, namely the Office of Production Management, 
the Office of Price Administration, the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
and the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, the First War Powers Act of 
December 18 of that year empowered the President to assign new legal 
responsibilities to cabinet departments and administration agencies. With the 
establishment of the War Production Board, the War Shipping Administration and the 
War Manpower Commission in the spring of 1942, the legal and administrative 
foundations were laid for the American nation to commit all available resources 
toward an all-embracing conduct of the war.127 
As a result, 45 new Army communities were created for the land forces alone, each 
with a capacity of between 10,000 and 63,000 residents. A total of 29 reception 
centers for the intake and classification of draftees and 21 replacement training 
centers were constructed. In total, costs for Army construction programs amounted to 
9.2 billion dollars by the end of March 1943. Land occupied by the Army rose from 
2,117,000 to 45,871,000 acres between the summer of 1940 and the end of the war. 
At the apex of building construction in summer 1942, nearly one million civilian 
workers were active in Army construction projects.128 Expenses for the entire Armed 
Forces accounted for 9 billion dollars between 1940 and 1941, more than in the 
whole period between 1920 and 1940.129 Department of the Army expenses alone 
rose from around 900 million dollars in 1940 to over 42.5 billion dollars in 1943. To 
transport the expeditionary force of 5 million men projected by Wedemeyer to Europe 
and to provide for them there required the new construction of 7 million gross register 
tons of shipping space – or 1000 ships.130 Apart from that, it became necessary to 
create out of nothing an arms and war materiel industry able to equip this force with 
all essential articles, from soap and clothing to tanks and ordnance. Most importantly, 
however, it was necessary to create this army in the first place from a staffing 
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perspective. Apart from the utterly unbelievable demands on American industry, the 
8.8 million-man American land force projected by Wedemeyer had to be recruited 
and trained before anyone could think about the practical implementation of its 
strategic training. This equally audacious enterprise is the subject of the next chapter. 
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5 The right way, the wrong way, the Army way 
… the American Soldier is a much more complicated character than he is given 
credit for being. He cannot be written into a script as though he were a civilian 
wearing a brown suit with metal buttons, nor can he be regarded as a ‘soldier’, a 
being whose reactions are completely divorced from civilian emotions. 
Arthur Miller131 
The G.I. was in a very real sense suspended between two ways of life and held in 
that state of suspension as long as he wore a uniform. Physically he left civilian life, 
yet mentally he never joined the Army; he was in the service but not of it. He spent 
part of his time thinking about what was for him the present – that is, his Army 
existence – and fully as much time thinking about his past – and what he hoped to 
be his future – in the civilian world. So if we are to understand the G.I., his attitudes 
toward these two worlds are the places to start. 
Lee Kennett132 
On September 5, 1940, legislators and gallery visitors at the U.S. Capitol witnessed a 
fierce fist-fight between two representatives, the most violent episode that the 
longtime doorkeeper of the U.S. House of Representatives could ever remember. 
The cause of this ferocious outbreak was the heated discussion regarding the 
introduction of compulsory military service, the so-called Selective Service System. 
There is nothing more to find out regarding the winner of this specific argument, 
however, since both the House of Representatives and the Senate accepted the 
legitimacy of Roosevelt’s policy and, on September 16, 1940, passed the first draft in 
nominal peacetime in the United States into law. In its wake, over 7 million of the 8.8 
million members of the Army of the United States became available for military duty 
through the Selective Service System. In the first two years, while the Regular Army 
and National Guard components brought much needed know-how to the Army of the 
United States. However, the draftees were, as Lee Kennett points out, 
… the basic metal in the alloy, the one that determined its characteristics and 
above all its temper.133 
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In this chapter, we will concern ourselves with who the future dogface soldiers were, 
where they came from and how the methods of industrial mass production were 
brought to bear to create the army of citizen soldiers that entered the battlefield 
against the German Wehrmacht in the fall of 1942 and dealt it a crushing defeat in 
1944/45 in northwestern Europe. 
5.1 The draft 
…I noticed that the crooner Sinatra has been deferred because of a punctured ear 
drum. The ears are vital to a musician, vocal or instrumental; therefore if we judge 
by the salaries paid, Sinatra’s ears are reasonably effective. Please have this 
looked into right away. If an Army doctor deferred him I want to know just why. 
George C. Marshall, Memorandum to General McNarney, December 27, 1943134 
It is apparent from the fist-fight episode that the original implementation of the system 
of compulsory service was in no way uncontroversial. The cultural leanings already 
discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3, grounded in federalism, liberalism, and 
isolationism, led a large portion of the American public – and thus also their political 
representatives in Washington – to be extremely skeptical, if not openly hostile, to the 
idea of putting such an instrument of power as a conscript army into the hands of the 
administration during peacetime. For this reason, Congress limited the terms of the 
original Selective Service and Training Act to a recruitment of 900,000 men between 
21 and 31 years of age for a maximum of 12 months. With the end of the 12-month 
service period of the first conscripts coming into sight in the summer of 1941, just as 
the worsening international political situation suggested that they should in fact be 
remaining longer than 12 months in service, signs of disintegration and hints of an 
imminent mutiny among the draftees were in evidence. The acronym OHIO, standing 
for Over the Hill In October, began to appear on countless barracks walls as advance 
notice of a mass desertion that the Army, in view of public opinion, could not afford. 
An article in LIFE Magazine about the army grievances went to the heart of one of 
the fundamental problems of the Army of the United States:  
The Army does not know whether it is going to fight, or when or where.135 
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Everything changed with the Japanese attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. 
Congress adapted the Selective Service and Training Act to require draftees to 
remain in service for the length of the war plus six months. All public reservations 
about the system itself dissipated and the American nation became unified around 
the common goal of defeating its enemies. Army life was not particularly smooth, 
however. A kind of generational problem beset the Army of the United States, as 
New York Times reporter Hilton H. Riley wrote in an ultimately unpublished review of 
all that was wrong with the Army. Riley, who had served as an officer in World War I, 
described the innate difficulty as follows: 
Command, vintage of 1917 (pretty general), appears naively and disconcertingly 
unaware that its men, vintage of 1940, are a different breed of cat … The present 
breed (mark well) is questioning everything from God Almighty to themselves.136 
Two features of this generation gap are especially striking: education and media. 
While only 9 percent of World War I troops had a high school diploma, that proportion 
rose to 41 percent for the 1940/41 draftee generation. Marshall’s army could be 
trained and instructed for more complex tasks than could Pershing’s 20 years earlier. 
It was, however, also more critical about what it was required to do. The second 
factor to bring about a revolutionary change within a generation involved media and 
exposure to it. Riley found in his study that 95 percent of the draftees he interviewed 
had read the LIFE Magazine article mentioned earlier. The generation of 1940/41 
had grown up in the breakthrough period of classic magazine journalism, it was 
interested in the events of the day, and it was informed about these events. Even 
more significant than the influence of print media were, for this generation of regular 
moviegoers, the newsreels that were shown as a prelude to the feature film.137 The 
combination of these influences provided Army leadership with troops who were 
informed about relevant issues, raised critical questions about their role in relation to 
the Army, and often expressed displeasure when they felt the need to do so. George 
C. Marshall was aware of the changes that had taken place since the last war. His 
task was to adapt the institution of the Army of the United States before sending it to 
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fight against the Axis powers so that its success on the battlefield would not be 
threatened by inner tensions. 
Exactly how did the Selective Service System operate? From which institutions and 
in what manner were the Armed Forces ultimately supplied with manpower? 
Following the establishment of the Selective Service System under the law, the first 
of what would become seven draft registrations – universally known for short as the 
draft – was announced on October 16, 1940, requiring all male U.S. citizens between 
the ages of 21 and 31 to register for compulsory military service. The conscription of 
inductees took the form of a lottery in which the registrants were required to report to 
their local Selective Service (draft) boards in the order of the number drawn. All fears 
that the first draft would fail to bring in a sufficient number of registrants proved 
unfounded, however, and by the evening over 16 million men had registered. On 
October 29, 1940, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, in the presence of President 
Roosevelt, drew the first number: 158. Across the country, 6175 young men who had 
received this number at registration were now required to report to their local draft 
boards. Later draft registration campaigns targeted either older age cohorts or males 
who had reached draft age in the interim. In the run-up to the first registration, the 
individual state governors and the President himself launched a massive information 
campaign to ensure that the draftees would respond to the call.138 
The central administration of the program and the determination of the monthly 
recruitment quotas were provided by the Selective Service System in Arlington, 
Virginia. The implementation of these requirements, however – further evidence of 
America’s mistrust of any kind of central authority – was carried out by over 6500 
local draft boards. Each draft board was responsible for a pool of approximately 3000 
registrants. Boards were made up of locally prominent honorary members such as 
businessmen, attorneys, World War I veterans and others. It was assumed that 
registrants would be more compliant if the decisions regarding induction were made 
at the local level. Under certain conditions, the draft boards were subject to 
requirements governing which registrants would be available for conscription. In this 
way, those employed in agriculture or in other jobs seen as important to the war effort 
were nearly always exempted from military. Objection on grounds of conscience was 
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recognized in the system but only in very specific cases accepted as a reason for 
exemption. A total of 37,000 men were granted exemptions as conscientious 
objectors and allowed to perform alternate service in medical facilities or fire 
protection.139 Especially at the beginning of the war, an attempt was made to assign 
those with an objection to the use of arms at least to perform alternate service 
outside combat units. Consideration was also given in the early days of the Selective 
Service System to married men and fathers, although, as the need for manpower 
grew, such sensitivities eventually could no longer be indulged. Apart from such 
stipulations, however, the draft boards were free to make their own decisions and 
were responsible to no one. In this way, they had a not insignificant influence on the 
social and cultural composition of the U.S. Armed Forces.140 Over the duration of the 
war, the Selective Service System, from its turbulent and difficult birth, managed to 
achieve resounding success. By the time the guns fell silent in 1945, a total of 45 
million Americans between the ages of 18 and 64 had registered for the Selective 
Service System. Of the almost 16 million people who served in all branches of the 
American military, over 10 million were provided through the Selective Service 
System. Individuals who wanted to avoid the Selective Service System in one way or 
another were in the minority. All told, the Department of Justice processed 300,000 
cases of draft evasion, resulting in only 16,000 convictions for violations of the 
Selective Service and Training Act.141 
5.2 Mobilization of the Army of the United States within the 
framework of the Mobilization Training Program 
Six days a week, from reveille around 6:00 A.M. in most camps, through training 
from 8:00 in the morning to 5:30 P.M., right through to the officially regulated “free 
time” before lights out at 9:45 P.M. – the soldier’s time belonged to Uncle Sam. 
When to eat, when to wash, when to sleep – everything was prescribed. Like his 
clothing and provisions, a man was simply “Government Issue” – G.I. 
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For all future dogface soldiers as well as all other registrants in the Selective Service 
System, each day’s trip to the mailbox was filled with tension. If it contained the 
induction order in the name of the President of the United States, colloquially known 
as the Greetings, they were to report to one of the induction centers scattered across 
the U.S., where their fitness for army service would be determined.  
Induction 
GREETING: 
Having submitted yourself to a Local Board composed of your neighbors for the 
purpose of determining your availability for training and service in the armed forces 
of the United States, you are hereby notified that you have now been selected for 
training and service in the Army.143 
Following a one-day physical examination in the induction centers, draftees were 
given two weeks to put their personal affairs in order before they were required to 
report to one of the reception centers, where their life in the Army truly began. The 
process started with a medical examination, conducted in the fashion of an assembly 
line. The draftees were brought to a large room and instructed to remove all their 
clothes, after which they proceeded through various stations, undergoing a different 
examination at each of these. For most of the men, who had grown up during the 
meager times of the Great Depression, these exams represented by far the most 
extensive assessment of their physical health that they had ever received. The 
draftees᾽ minimum height and weight to join the Army were, respectively, five feet 
and 105 pounds. In view of the fact that, when the soldiers landed on the North 
African coast in November 1942, they were forced to carry packs with an average 
weight of 132 pounds, it cannot be said that these requirements were too stringent.144 
Inductees who intentionally failed the examinations by giving false information or 
through other deceptive means were the exception. Most draftees were anxious to 
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pass the test, whether for the sake of wanting to do their duty out of patriotic pride or 
simply because they did not wish to be shown up as less fit than the others. After the 
physical examination, a second test was conducted by the Army psychiatric service 
to evaluate the inductee’s psychological makeup. By today’s standards, this 
examination was simple. It consisted entirely of a short interview in which the 
psychiatrist asked a few questions, probing whenever the inductee’s answer was 
seen as suspect. In the early 1940s, however, the existence of a psychological 
examination for military service was a novelty, and the testing methods innovative. Of 
the 15 million men who underwent examination in the induction centers, the 
psychiatric service failed 1,846,000 on psychological grounds, while another 250,000 
men were later relieved of duty for the same reasons.145 
The experience revealed that draftees frequently went straight from the induction 
examination to a Navy or Marine Corps recruiting center to enlist there, due to the 
relatively low prestige of the land forces. As a consequence, the Army initiated the 
practice of conducting the swearing-in process immediately following the inductees᾽ 
examination. As a last step, they were informed of the Articles of War, specifically 
Articles 58 and 61 dealing with desertion and absence without leave, and were then 
given two weeks᾽ leave as sworn soldiers in the Army of the United States. 
Reporting for duty 
The Sergeant asked if everyone had a lovely fit. Those who did not were to take 
three steps forward. Then the Sergeant said if something could be buttoned it was 
not too tight. If it stayed when you stepped forward it was not too loose.146 
After the two weeks had elapsed, the recruits were to report to one of the many 
reception centers located throughout the U.S. Here they left their life as civilians 
behind them and entered the alien world of the Army. In the reception centers, the 
future soldiers were administratively conveyed into the enormous, steadily expanding 
system of the Army of the United States, issued their personal equipment, classified 
and assigned their future duties. The experience lasted from a few days to several 
weeks and was ultimately dependent on how long the military bureaucracy needed in 
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order to determine how it planned to make further use of the recruit. The average 
time spent in the reception centers amounted to nine days.147 
Here as well, a short initial medical examination of the recruits was conducted, 
including testing for venereal disease. The rectal examination that, incidentally, was 
repeated at each new duty station was infamously known among recruits as the short 
arm. With the confirmation of their good health, the recruits were allowed to don their 
uniforms. At the beginning of the expansion, as American war production was 
ramping up, military uniforms were a scarce commodity and frequently in short 
supply. It was not uncommon for recruits to be issued so-called ῾World War I-vintage᾽ 
heavy, impractical uniforms and leggings along with the characteristic steel helmets 
known in the First World War as ῾tin hats᾽. Special attention was given to footwear. 
Because of a lack of adequate transport in the interwar years, the Regular Army of 
that period was literally on the march much of the time. For example, when the 20th 
Infantry Regiment took part in the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941, it marched from Fort 
Leonard Wood, Missouri to Louisiana and back, a round-trip distance totaling 1000 
miles.148 Recruits tested their boots by using both hands to hold a pail filled with sand 
representing the weight of their gear. Then a futuristic x-ray machine would assess 
whether the boots passed muster. In general, the Army of the United States invested 
a great deal of energy at both the induction and reception centers to give recruits a 
sense that they were joining a highly professional and technologically sophisticated 
organization. To this end, much attention was paid to seeing that the reception 
centers operated in an organized and expeditious manner. 
Once outfitted, the soldiers sat through lectures on various subjects including, among 
others, the Articles of War and military courtesy. Lastly, they had to complete the 
Army General Classification Test (AGCT) and the PULHES evaluation. The AGCT 
was a comprehensive 150-question machine-scored multiple-choice test to assess 
the recruit’s general intelligence and ability to concentrate. Test results were 
classified according to their total score into five categories that would be of use in 
determining the further utilization of the recruits. Those scoring highest on the test 
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were then pulled out to be sent into the Army Specialized Training Program 
(ASTP)149, Officer Candidate School (OCS) or the Army Air Forces (AAF).150 
The PULHES evaluation151 was a modified Canadian army testing process that 
gauged the subjects’ physical and mental capabilities. The purpose of the evaluation 
was to separate out combat soldiers, in other words, the basic pool that would 
include the future dogface soldiers. Each of six components in the PULHES 
evaluation had a value between 1 and 4, yielding a factor that the military hoped 
would quickly determine a recruit’s placement possibilities.152 For the duration of the 
war, the offices responsible for classification deliberated over the question of what, 
apart from good physical conditioning, constitutes a combat soldier, never reaching 
agreement on universally recognized parameters. Apart from the obvious assumption 
that a good physical constitution was advantageous, they were not especially 
proficient in identifying the personal or psychological qualities one should watch for in 
selecting a combat soldier. In the end, the Army psychiatric service made a 
somewhat general recommendation to look for individuals with a spirit of adventure, 
affinity for competition and love for blood sports.153 
Lastly, recruits had to pass an interview with a classification specialist that would 
determine their future assignment in the Army of the United States. After receiving 
this assignment, the recruit would await transport to one of the training centers. 
Training 
I cannot picture everything clearly to you for I cannot send you a box of Texas dust 
to pour liberally over your whole body. I cannot send you a long hot road and a fine 
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set of blisters or a pair of heavy G.I. shoes to be broken in. I cannot send you an 
overcoat which you will not be allowed to wear at reveille when it is freezing, but 
which you will be required to wear during the sweltering afternoon. 
Letters from Fighting Hoosiers154 
 
In the spring of 1945, a total of 242 training camps and replacement training camps 
of the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces were active, including immense 
facilities like Fort Jackson, South Carolina, with a 65,000-man capacity, Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, with 76,000 men, Fort Knox, Kentucky, with 53,000 men, Camp 
Blanding, Florida, with 54,000 men, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, with 55,000 men, 
Camp Hood, Texas, with 68,000 men or Camp Shelby, Mississippi, with a capacity of 
86,000 men. It should be mentioned in passing that the designation of ῾fort᾽ versus 
῾camp᾽ depended on whether the location was in permanent use by U.S. land forces 
or whether it was either a temporary facility or one used by the National Guard. 
During the mobilization years, however, most of these camps did not yet exist, and 
considerable efforts were expended to find appropriate locations and to build facilities 
there. The southeast of the United States was suited to that purpose for two reasons: 
first, the region’s moderate climate meant that training operations could take place 
throughout the year; and second, the cost of land was lower than in most other U.S. 
regions. In terms of topography and infrastructure, potential site locations needed to 
offer reliable water supply, good connections to road and rail networks, over 40,000 
acres of varied terrain and a stream where troops could train in bridge construction 
techniques. 
Like the Army Construction Program, the Mobilization Training Program suffered from 
a hasty and therefore error-prone expansion following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor. This meant, over the course of 1942, that it was not unusual to assign 
draftees to a facility before construction work had concluded, obliging them to go 
without such elementary infrastructure as latrines, running water or electricity.155 
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As the program reached full stride in summer 1942, as many as 14,000 men per day 
streamed into training centers across the U.S. Training curricula of the Army Ground 
Forces and Army Service Forces naturally differed from each other, as was the case 
within the various AGF branches. In view of the focus of the present volume, the 
dogface soldiers, we will furnish somewhat more detail in the forthcoming 
descriptions of the training routine for infantry units. 
First, though, it is important to stress that training in the Army of the United States 
was carried out at the divisional level, in other words, within the framework of those 
formations that would eventually make up the tactical building blocks of the Allied 
armies. In their implementation, these methods were not as efficient as training the 
different divisional components in facilities specially designed for their particular 
preparation. Considering the critical time factor in this case, however, training at the 
level of the division offered the advantage of providing the different units with an 
opportunity to get to know one another during the training period. In this way, 
commanders hoped to achieve better results from the soldiers later in their crucially 
important teamwork as a division. 
The standard training program for all military branches prescribed a total duration of 
52 weeks in order for a division to become combat ready. The first 17 weeks were 
devoted to so-called ῾basic and advanced individual training᾽. The next 13 weeks 
consisted of unit training activities from the company to regimental levels. In the 
succeeding 14 weeks, which concluded actual training, the entire division practiced 
combined arms training involving all its combat, combat service support and service 
support elements. The year and training cycle concluded with a final eight weeks of 
maneuvers within the scope of formations above division level.156 
In basic and advanced individual training, recruits absorbed the fundamentals of life 
as a soldier. The main priorities were daily conditioning, exercise, weapons use, 
learning how to conduct themselves as soldiers, and military courtesies as well as 
seemingly endless marching. The most difficult physical challenge for recruits, and 
the only part of training that was more despised than marching, was posed by the 
obstacle courses. While the form of the courses varied, one example from Camp 
Gruber, Oklahoma offers a good picture of what recruits had to cope with. That 
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course’s challenge was to complete the 1500-foot-long distance in three and a half 
minutes, a task that called for recruits to overcome the following obstacles: 
… [to] mount an eight foot wall, slide down a ten foot pole, leap a flaming trench, 
weave through a series of pickets, crawl through a water main, climb a ten foot 
rope, clamber over a five foot fence, swing by a rope over a seven foot ditch, 
mount a twelve foot ladder and descend on the other side, charge over a four foot 
breastwork, walk a twenty foot catwalk some twelve inches wide and seven feet 
over the ground, swing hand over hand along a five foot horizontal ladder, slither 
under a fence, climb another, and cross the finish line at a sprint.157 
After recruits had spent 17 weeks mastering the fundamental verities of the soldier’s 
life, the next 13 weeks were spent applying this knowledge within the framework of 
the infantry units of a division: the squad, platoon, company, battalion and lastly, the 
regiment.158 From squad to regiment, the respective infantry tactics, basically ῾fire 
and maneuver᾽159, were taught and practiced, as well as the interaction between 
subordinate units and their respective superior formations. The conclusion and high 
point of the training cycle, strictly speaking, was provided by the remaining 14 training 
weeks, which were devoted to combined arms activities. The divisional units were 
expected to have mastered their respective roles by that point. The goal of this 
segment of the Mobilization Training Program was to coalesce the division’s combat, 
combat service support and service support elements into an organically functioning 
formation. After the 44-week training cycle had been completed by the respective 
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divisions, the final 8 weeks of maneuver exercises concluded the Mobilization 
Training Program, at which point the force was declared combat ready. 
Field maneuvers 
The maneuvers, at my level, were a huge uncomfortable, motorized camping trip. 
The antitank platoon, now equipped with inadequate 50-caliber machine guns, 
shifted from place to place, ostensibly protecting the 2nd Battalion from trucks 
bearing signs designating them as “tanks”, which never appeared. The top 
commanders and staffs that supplied and ordered us about may have received 
useful training, but I learned nothing I did not already know breathing dust and 
sleeping on the ground.160 
In 1940, in Louisiana, the Army of the United States conducted the first corps- and 
army-level161 maneuvers in U.S. Armed Forces history as a preparation for the 
coming conflict with the armies of the Axis powers and to learn something about its 
own combat readiness. For all participants, the result could be euphemistically 
described as sobering. A generation of staff officers with absolutely no experience in 
leading formations of that size, if one does not count theoretical war games and map 
exercises, commanded two opposing field armies made up of citizen soldiers who 
had just finished basic training and who were forced to fight with completely 
inadequate and simulated weaponry. 
The participating staffs reaped from the Louisiana maneuvers the limited benefit of 
being able, for the first time, to practice handling actual large formations. Apart from 
that, the only useful result was that the maneuvers had cast a spotlight on the many 
weaknesses of the Army of the United States in the areas of manpower, organization 
and training. During the mobilization phase, the dual task of training existing 
formations while simultaneously activating and building a steadily increasing number 
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of new ones had overextended the Army’s personnel resources. Many officers and 
NCOs from the interwar-era Regular Army and National Guard were behind the times 
and not equal to the physical and intellectual challenges of modern combined arms 
warfare.162 
Chief of Staff Marshall and General Leslie McNair, Commander of Army Ground 
Forces, concluded from the unacceptable staff performance that only a rational 
personnel reorganization without regard for rank and privilege could solve the 
leadership problem of the Army of the United States. The Louisiana maneuvers thus 
became, as John Keegan put it, the graveyard and seedbed of many careers.163 A 
large number of general officers were sent into retirement or transferred into positions 
where they would be unable to cause serious damage. Conversely, a generation of 
relatively middle-ranking officers – the list mostly reads like a Who’s Who of 
Marshall᾽s students, colleagues and subordinates from his various deployments in 
the U.S. Army’s training system – experienced meteoric advancements that would 
bring them, within a short time, into key positions in the Army of the United States. 
Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Clark and many others who had first attracted 
Marshall’s attention during the interwar period laid the foundations for their careers 
through their performance in the Louisiana maneuvers. 
For the troops who took part in the maneuvers, the experience of the field exercises 
was less valuable. The great bulk of new weapons produced up to that point had 
been shipped to Europe and the Soviet Union under lend-lease.164 As a result, 
substitutes for actual equipment – a grotesque display in hindsight – were used for 
the Louisiana maneuvers. 
Sacks of flour served as hand grenades, while handcarts with angle-mounted 
stovepipes took the place of artillery that did not yet exist. Because of a shortage of 
small arms, these were replaced by replicas made of painted wood, similar to the 
toys children used in playing cowboys and Indians. Fully obsolete World War I 
biplanes recreated the horror of modern air power. Even the bulk of the modern 
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equipment that could be utilized in the Louisiana maneuvers soon proved to be 
already obsolete and ineffective against the Enemy when it reached the battlefields 
of North Africa. The War Department forbade the use of real ammunition, in the first 
place because it was in such short supply, and in the second because of the fear that 
the inexperienced troops might slaughter one another with it.165 
The leaders of the maneuvers, completely without actual wartime leadership 
experience, tended to employ textbook solutions in making their battlefield decisions, 
failed to consider important factors, and were most accurately characterized in a 
report that General Bradley sent to Chief of Staff Marshall following the Allied 
campaign in Tunisia: 
It seems to me that our large-scale maneuvers [in the States] are partially 
responsible for one frame of mind which must be corrected by special methods. 
In maneuvers, when two forces meet, the umpires invariably decide that the 
smaller force must withdraw, or if greatly outnumbered, it must surrender. And 
while the umpires deliberate, the men simply stand or sit about idly. No means 
are provided for giving proportionate weight to the many intangibles of warfare, 
such as morale, training, leadership, conditioning.166 
The most striking example of the ignorance and naïveté that could sometimes be 
displayed by the bureaucracy of the Army of the United States in approaching the 
tasks it faced was this: while the tank armies of the German Wehrmacht in Russia 
were demonstrating textbook examples of mechanized maneuver warfare, the U.S. 
Army was buying 20,000 horses for the cavalry, the largest purchase since the 1861-
65 Civil War.167 
The only real benefit that the troops derived from the Louisiana maneuvers was to 
achieve a certain level of experience in tactical movements and some familiarity with 
the hardships of living under field conditions. Marshall and McNair were aware of the 
obvious shortcomings of the Louisiana exercises, and they subsequently introduced 
measures to improve the quality and realism of maneuvers. In the years to come, 
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large-scale maneuvers held in various states profited greatly from these steps. As the 
American war materiel industry began to achieve higher production levels, it became 
possible to utilize realistic equipment and real ammunition in the exercises. Still, the 
crucial difference would come only after the Allied invasion of North Africa in the fall 
of 1942, when experience regarding the actualities of war could be gathered and 
brought back to the U.S. For this reason, General McNair dispatched AGF advisers 
to the various American fronts who then adapted back-home training based on their 
observations, in this way bringing a higher level of realism to maneuver operations.168 
5.3 Army of the United States: vintage 1941/42 
In this army of democracy, you had to feel that all of your soldiers were readers of 
Time magazine. 
George C. Marshall169 
The army never reflected American society, unless a centralized, stratified, 
cohesive, authoritarian institution that has stressed obedience and sacrifice can 
reflect a decentralized, heterogeneous, individualistic, democratic, capitalist 
society. 
Richard H. Kohn170 
Now that we are on the way to having an image of the distance covered by the future 
dogface soldiers in the course of their recruitment and training in the U.S., it is time to 
ask the question: what was the resulting mix? What were the elements that produced 
this different breed of cat that Hilton Riley perceived? 
Two factors that shaped the character of the Army of the United States and conveyed 
it beyond earlier American armies have already been mentioned at the start of this 
chapter: education and media. On average, U.S. soldiers were better educated than 
were their fathers, who fought in the trenches of France in 1917/18. As a result, they 
were on the one hand more self-critical but above all more critical of the institutions, 
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legitimacy and rituals of their army than their precursors in the uniform of the United 
States had ever been. 
An additional factor determining the consciousness of many prospective dogface 
soldiers was that in the Army, they came face to face for the first time with the sheer 
size and cultural diversity of the U.S. Geographical mobility was severely limited for 
the American populace in the 1930s. Many young men had never left their home 
county until they made the trip to the reception center. It was often the case that they 
had to pass through a large expanse of territory on the way, becoming aware for the 
first time of the size of their country. Arriving at the reception center, many of them 
were overwhelmed by the cultural diversity they discovered. The first encounter with 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) from New England, Californian Hispanics, 
rednecks and sons of plantation owners from the South, hayshakers from rural 
regions, Irish Catholics from Boston or Chicago and the inevitable Italian-Americans 
from New York or New Jersey shocked them into an awareness of all that the term 
‘America’ could mean.171 
In the next section, we will review more of the external and internal factors that can 
be used to portray the Army of the United States, vintage 1941/42. 
Demography of the Army of the United States 
The following demographic breakdown of the Army of the United States is limited to 
two enlisted rank groups. The data refer only to the Army’s junior enlisted soldiers 
and NCOs. As was stated at the outset, the dogface phenomenon developed 
exclusively within these two levels; as a result, any inclusion of officers would distort 
the picture. Data on the situation of African Americans as a group within the Army of 
the United States will be separately examined later, and these soldiers are therefore 
not given specific consideration here. 
Viewed by ethnicity, the Army quite closely reflects the overall breakdown of 
American society in the relevant age group of 18 to 44. Puerto Ricans made up 0.5 
percent of the ranks, Native Americans 0.3 percent, Japanese Americans and 
Chinese Americans each 0.2 percent, and Filipinos 0.1 percent. All other nonwhite 
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groups, predominantly Hawaiians and Mexican Americans, made up 0.3 percent of 
Army forces.172 
It will come as little surprise that the average serviceman in the Army of the United 
States was young. While 29 percent of the overall male population was under 26 
years old in 1940, this age group made up nearly 50 percent of the Army of the 
United States. In total, 38.2 percent of males in the broader society were between 26 
and 37 years old, yet this age group contributed 42.6 percent of the Army ranks. For 
males aged 38 and older, the difference was similarly wide, with 32.8 percent in the 
country at large and 7.5 percent in the military.173 
In relation to their civilian occupations, urban manual workers were overrepresented 
in the Army of the United States, professional and managerial workers 
underrepresented. Because of the importance of their work to the war effort, farmers 
were greatly underrepresented, while those workers employed in industrial 
production were slightly overrepresented. Self-employed individuals and members of 
the service sector were underrepresented, while those not self-employed were 
overrepresented.174 
For obvious reasons, U.S. armies have always given preference to unmarried men. 
During World War II, this attitude also formed the basic principle of Selective Service 
policy. As conscription began in 1940 following the Selective Service Act, married 
men were exempted to the greatest possible extent. Even so, because of the 
enormous demand for manpower, it became impossible to maintain this policy for the 
duration of the war, and it was gradually abandoned. The effects of this earlier 
preferential treatment of married men are clearly quantifiable in the total picture, 
however. The three million married men in the Army of the United States made up 
25 percent of its overall troop strength. In the comparable age bracket in the 
population at large, 56.3 percent were married. Besides married soldiers, the Army 
consisted of 69.6 percent single men, 2.5 percent separated, 2.4 percent divorced 
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and 0.5 percent widowed, in comparison to 38.9 percent singles, 2.9 percent 
separated, 1.1 percent divorced and 0.8 percent widowers within the relevant age 
range of the broader population.175 
With respect to the geographic distribution of the servicemen by place of residence, 
the Selective Service System was structured such that each state’s proportional 
contribution of manpower to the Army of the United States substantially matched its 
share of the relevant age groups in the overall male population. A few highly 
populated industrial states like New York, Pennsylvania, California, Massachusetts 
and New Jersey contributed a disproportionately large number of conscripts in 
comparison to the figures mandated by the Selective Service System. On the other 
hand, Alabama, Georgia, the Carolinas and Virginia were underrepresented. This is 
explained in part by a migration to industrial states and as well by the large proportion 
of farm workers in agrarian states and their higher likelihood to be classified as 
physically unfit – an effect of the Great Depression, which had a more severe impact 
on Southern states than it did in the North.176 
A final factor of interest is that members of the Army of the United States had, on 
average, a higher level of education than did males of the same age level in the 
general population. This schooling gap is seen across all levels, but it becomes more 
pronounced as older age groups are reviewed.177 A possible explanation of this 
phenomenon lies in the increasingly advanced utilization of technological warfare 
techniques in the 1930s and 1940s. Simply put, one could argue that it takes less 
education for industrial workers to build a tank on a modern mass production line 
than for soldiers to operate it on the battlefield. 
The Great Depression 
I like the Army so far. They let you sleep till 5:30. 
My shoes hurt my feet because I haven’t been used to wearing shoes. 
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One hayshaker from Maine was delighted with his new outfit and babbled his 
delight to anyone who would listen to him. He was even delighted with his 
overcoat, the bottom of which was almost dragging the ground. 
Extracts from letters by draftees at reception centers178 
In spite of all the challenges, hard work and difficulties of adaptation, the integration 
of the new recruits into the alien world of the Army was not an entirely negative 
development. The common bond among most of the new soldiers was their 
experience as children of the Great Depression of the 1930s. For them, entry into the 
Armed Forces also signified material and social certainty, something that many in this 
generation had never known. 
In 1930, roughly 60 percent of American families, over 70 thousand people, lived on 
less than 2000 dollars per year, placing them distinctly below the poverty level at that 
time. Since this mass poverty was concentrated in the rural areas of the United 
States, it could be ignored with relative ease in the cities, where American attention 
was focused. One quarter of the U.S. population lived on farms where income 
sources dissolved into nothingness as prices of agricultural products went into 
freefall. Grain and cotton, two of the most widely planted crops, respectively lost one 
half and two thirds of their value in a short time, and 54 percent of farm families, 
amounting to 17 million people, earned less than 1000 dollars in 1930. In contrast to 
Germany, Great Britain or Sweden, the United States had no social security system 
at all to mitigate the effects of the crisis.179 Caught in spiraling debt, many farmers 
saw no option other than to abandon their land and wander through the country as 
homeless itinerant workers. The Joad family in John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of 
Wrath and Dorothea Lange’s stunning photographs for the Farm Security 
Administration provide unsurpassed literary and photographic images of this period. 
For most soldiers serving in World War II, the Depression was the key experience of 
their lives to that point. Approximately 60 percent of U.S. troops in the war had been 
born between 1918 and 1927. Those born during this period – those who reached 
their adulthood in spite of the dreadful circumstances of the times, we should add – 
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constituted two thirds of American forces in the war. Put another way, a twenty-year-
old inducted in 1941 had been eight years old when the Great Depression began. His 
entire conscious life had been marked by this experience, with no relief in sight for 
years on end. 
In many ways, the Army of the United States was the first stable institution in the life 
of a typical draftee. Secure accommodation, clothing, regular meals and medical care 
were in no way taken for granted in 1930s America. In the Army, at least in these 
respects, the generation of dogface soldiers no longer needed to worry. The spartan 
infrastructure in camps that had been built under time pressure offered draftees 
amenities that most of them had not previously experienced. Running water, 
buildings with central heating, and indoor toilets offer just a few examples. 
The Selective Service physicians who conducted the fitness examinations detected in 
most conscripts the effects of child labor and the signs of chronic malnutrition. The 
poor diet of the Depression years had left its mark particularly on draftees’ teeth. As a 
result, the Army of the United States increased the number of its dentists from 250 in 
1939 to 25,000 in 1945; during this same period, these dentists extracted 15 million 
teeth and made 2.5 million dentures. The Army’s optometry service had fitted 2.25 
million pairs of eyeglasses by the end of the war.180 
Another problem, caused in part by the Great Depression, was illiteracy. Basic 
reading and writing ability was a fitness requirement for the Army of the United 
States. Many inductees who had spent their adolescence in the Depression years, as 
well as those from immigrant families, were illiterate. In the initial phase of the 
Selective Service System, this condition resulted in their classification as unfit. 
Starting in summer 1942, the Army of the United States began to set up ‘special 
training units’ to teach these basic skills. Through textbooks like Meet Private Pete or 
Private Pete Eats His Dinner, 800,000 illiterates ultimately achieved basic 
competence in reading and writing the English language.181 
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This graphic description, used both as noun and adjective, signifies what is mean, 
petty and annoying, especially as applied to regulations. Thus, when an 
infantryman in a rest area finds himself restricted because his dogtags are not worn 
around his neck, or his shoes are unshined, or he has been detected in the act of 
robbing the village bank, he complains that there is too damned much chickenshit 
around. If he puts the gripe in a letter to the B-Bag, or otherwise feels it advisable 
to watch his language, the word is contracted to chicken. As an adjective it 
sometimes connotes cowardice, perhaps by confusion with chicken-livered or 
chicken-hearted I have recently seen a quotation from a soldier newspaper 
published in 1919 by the then Army of Occupation which employed the word in its 
modern sense, but this seems to have been exceptional. 
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.182 
An important step toward achieving a deeper understanding of the Army of the 
United States is not only to look at the common traits possibly shared by its individual 
members but also to perceive the Army itself in light of its constitution as a profoundly 
diverse entity. A glance at the divisive factors, tensions and conflicts reveals much 
about its nature that would remain hidden if one focused exclusively on its 
homogeneity. 
The primary source of tension in the Army of the United States during its 
development phase is to be found in the contrast among its individual components. 
The tension-filled and mutually mistrustful relationship between the Regular Army 
and the National Guard has already been discussed in Chapter 2.1. As hordes of 
draftees began to swarm into the Army’s branches in 1940/41, a clash of civilizations 
occurred that made the problems between regulars and guardsmen seem like 
friendly squabbling. While draftees and guardsmen sprang from essentially 
comparable socio-cultural backgrounds, the regulars were from another world in this 
respect. 
Prior to the great expansion that took place in 1940/41, the Regular Army faced a 
serious image problem. Composed of offenders183 and elements of America’s most 
                                            
182 Bishop, Army Speech, p. 248 ff. 
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socially disadvantaged classes, underfinanced and widely disregarded by the civilian 
populace, leading a shadowy existence at the proverbial and geographical fringes of 
the country, it had developed into a cloistered parallel community, disconnected from 
the broader society, that visibly turned inward and magnified its own cultural 
traditions into an obsession. The Army offered its members a solid roof over their 
heads, three meals a day, clothing and a meager but regular income – benefits that 
were no small matter during the Great Depression, as we have seen. The price of all 
this was absolute loyalty, conformity and slavish observance of the elaborate 
regulations and practices of military courtesy, especially toward the officer class. 
Many regulars were bachelors, either out of conviction or due to unfortunate external 
circumstances, and in addition, they were often by no means averse to alcohol, a trait 
that rightly contributed to their reputation as hard-drinking womanizers. 
When mobilization of the Army of the United States began, this close-knit society was 
flooded with draftees who came from another universe in every respect and who 
called into question the cornerstones of the regular’s world, when not dismissing 
them altogether as chickenshit. A sergeant named Henry Giles, who had joined the 
Regular Army in 1939 after a poverty-stricken adolescence, summed up what many 
regulars felt: 
Nobody knows what the Army meant to me – security and pride and something 
good … Putting on that uniform not only meant that for the first time in my life I 
had clothes I wasn’t ashamed of, but also for the first time in my life I was 
somebody. [Then] …they [the draftees] came in bitching about this and that, 
regulations, the food, a cot instead of an innerspring mattress, barracks instead 
of private rooms.184 
The draftees, for their part, held a specific opinion about the regulars from the ῾old 
army’, as they called it. A draftee named Robert Welker observed the following: 
                                                                                                                                        
183 It was a not uncommon practice in the period prior to the war to give first offenders (unless they 
were guilty of capital crimes) the choice between a prison sentence and a tour of duty in the Regular 
Army. 
184 Cited in: Kennett, G.I., p. 80. 
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[The regulars] seemed to take a truculent pride out of their own submission to the 
officer class and the system, and in their minor competences and little claims to 
caste among their fellow plebeians.185 
Yank, the weekly magazine of the Army of the United States, about which we will 
learn more shortly, defined ῾old army’ in the following way in September 2, 1942: 
…a large group of first-three-graders who spent the pre-war years thinking up 
sentences beginning with ‘By God, it wasn’t like this in the _______.’186 
In the pre-war Army, a veritable uniform cult was maintained that was so pronounced 
that many regulars spent a not insignificant portion of their meager salary to buy 
specially produced uniform accouterments such as buttons, belts or insignia that 
were qualitatively or optically superior to those that came with the uniform itself. It 
was not an uncommon occurrence that company commanders would determine 
which brand of shoe polish was to be used by their subordinates in order to achieve a 
uniformly perfect result. The citizen soldiers, on the other hand, appeared to feel 
most comfortable when dressing their shabbiest. In a 1943 letter to General Marshall, 
Dwight Eisenhower declared that the manifestly natural tendencies of American 
soldiers with respect to their uniforms made any group of his troops look like an 
armed mob. 
Obeying a pragmatic and humiliating logic, enlisted men and NCOs in the Regular 
Army could only marry with permission of their commanding officer.187 Similar 
severities and injustices inherent in the Regular Army system, such as the unequal 
division of amenities and privileges between enlisted soldiers and officers, were 
silently if grudgingly accepted by the regulars of the old army. The number boys, as 
the draftees were known to the regulars, were unwilling to subordinate themselves 
without objection to this system, and vented their anger at every opportunity. In the 
                                            
185 Cited in: ibid., p. 80. 
186 Ibid., p. 80. 
187 In order not to become another Depression-era welfare institution, the Regular Army required 
married applicants to certify that they would be able to support their family on their Army salary and 
any possible supplementary income. For the same reasons, enlisted men and NCOs wishing to marry 
were required to obtain advance approval from their commanding officers. (Cf. Reynolds, Rich 
Relations, p. 209.) 
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expanding army of 1940/41, the generally less educated enlisted men of the Regular 
Army188 now saw themselves promoted to NCOs and instructors of often better 
educated draftees, a situation that left them in a position to react to this attack on 
their world with still more chickenshit. 
This vicious circle only came to a gradual and partial end at the point when the 
murderous reality of war forced regulars and draftees to share in a common and 
traumatizing experience. Like the adage that there are no atheists in foxholes, the 
killing fields of World War II similarly blurred the lines separating regulars, guardsmen 
and draftees. 
5.4 Overseas deployment 
We’ll win this damn war but I can’t face that trip back. 
Extract from a letter to the Army’s Yank Magazine189 
 
After the soldiers had completed their training cycle, sooner or later they underwent a 
process that the acronym-loving Army of the United States called POM – 
Preparations for Overseas Movement. They were normally granted ten days of pre-
embarkation furlough prior to departure. This leave substantially delayed the units᾽ 
travel. The Army had learned, however, that a short period of pre-departure home 
leave was so important to the soldiers that many of them simply went absent without 
leave (AWOL) if they failed to receive official permission to go home. Following 
another medical examination, the GIs were transferred to so-called ‘embarkation 
camps᾽ where they remained for two weeks on average prior to shipping out from 
one of the POEs – Ports of Embarkation.190 If they were lucky, the soldiers made the 
transatlantic voyage aboard one of the two huge British ocean liners, the Queen 
Mary or the Queen Elizabeth. These two ships could complete the passage in six 
days. If they were not so lucky and shipped out in a convoy of liberty ships, the 
                                            
188 While 40 percent of draftees possessed a high school diploma, the proportion of high school 
graduates among pre-war regulars was only 25 percent (Reynolds, Rich Relations, S. 74). 
189 Cite in: Kennett, G.I., p. 116. 
190 Ibid., p. 111 ff. 
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voyage took several weeks. For the troops, the difference in travel time was one of 
the significant differences between the two transport options. The other was that 
because of their size, the two Queens were considerably more stable in the water 
than, for example, the liberty ships or other freighters that had been converted into 
troop transports. Seasickness was, consequently, a less pronounced problem aboard 
the two liners. Due to their design, designated troop ships and converted freighters 
offered nothing that even a well-intentioned observer might confuse with luxury. 
Likewise, the two Queens had been reconfigured to allow maximum transport 
capacity, leaving no room for comfort. While they had been designed to carry 2000 
passengers under normal operation, between 1942 and 1945 they transported 15 
thousand at a stretch across the Atlantic. Every possible space was freed up to 
accommodate more soldiers. For this purpose, sailcloth-and-piping bunks measuring 
6 by 2 feet were stacked up to six high, with two feet of vertical space between 
them.191 These berths were then used in two or three shifts. While one shift was 
sleeping, the other(s) remained on deck or elsewhere. The ventilation systems of all 
utilized ships had not been designed for such a capacity, and after a short time the 
air below decks was barely tolerable, mixed with the smell of the vomit that, 
according to several descriptions, sloshed knuckle-deep across the surface of the 
lower deck.192 Under such miserable external conditions during the entire crossing, 
the troops had time to reflect on their destination and to consider the likelihood of 
their being attacked by a wolfpack193. In addition, they engaged in the universal and 
timeless favorite pastime of military forces: starting, distorting and passing on rumors. 
For most GIs, after these days or weeks at sea, marked by boredom, uncomfortable 
                                            
191 Ibid., p. 115. 
192 Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 242 ff. 
193 The commandant of the German submarine fleet in World War II, Karl Dönitz, had developed the 
so-called wolfpack tactic originally for fast patrol boats during the period between the wars, since the 
German Navy was forbidden under the terms of the Versailles Treaty to maintain a seagoing fleet or a 
submarine fleet. Modified for submarines during the war, it was based on the following principles: if a 
U-boat discovered a convoy or troopship, whether accidentally, by means of a variety of information-
gathering techniques or through communication from intelligence services, it was to shadow its target 
(due to their low visibility, submarines were able to maintain visual contact with their targets without 
being detected by them). It would then notify other submarines that would join in the pursuit. Once a 
group – or pack – had formed, the target would be attacked by night. 
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conditions, seasickness and the latent threat of U-boat attacks, their arrival in Great 
Britain became an unforgettable moment. The experience was both profoundly 
exciting and deeply alienating. It marked the end of the familiar, and established 
Britain, for all its similarities, as irrevocably foreign.194 
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6 Digression: African Americans in the Army of the United 
States 
I was drafted in 1943, right after the Chicago and Detroit riots. We had this influx of 
war workers, both white and black, from the South, especially in Detroit. The 
tensions continued to mount until they exploded … My father said, “What the hell 
are you goin’ to fight in Europe for. The fight is here. You should be goin’ up to 
Detroit.” 
Timuel Black195 
Of course, the Negroes whooped because here was a white man tellin’ the 
Negroes to shoot white people. Well, that really tore us up. 
Charles A. Gates196 
The history of the dogface soldiers is almost entirely a white one, as we will see in 
the pages to follow. In spite of the fact that African Americans, therefore, have only 
marginal significance for the central theme of this work, any treatment of the 
formation and history of the Army of the United States in World War II would be 
incomplete if it did not contain at least a brief reference to the history of those 
Americans of African origin. 
Although African Americans served in most of the American wars prior to 1941, they 
were, in the Army, exactly what they were in civilian life: second-class citizens. In 
June 1940, approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population was of African origin; in 
the Regular Army, however, they made up only a 1.5 percent share. Just five black 
officers served in the Army; three of those were military chaplains. The two black 
officers who held combat commands came from the same family. In the Regular 
Army, the racist view was widely held that African Americans, having naturally lower 
intelligence and lacking mental and moral qualities, constituted only second-class 
soldier material.197  
                                            
195 Studs Terkel, “The Good War”. An Oral History of World War Two (New York / London 1984), p. 
278. 
196 Ibid., p. 266. 
197 Cited in: Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 82. 
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In the era between the wars, the 92nd Infantry Division’s performance in World War I 
was intended as supposed confirmation of this thesis. The 92nd was one of two black 
divisions in the American Expeditionary Force that, according to a custom still being 
followed in the Second World War, were commanded primarily by white officers.198 
Service in the 92nd was unpopular with white officers and, consequently, most of the 
officers in this division were transfers who had been judged undesirable in other units 
for a variety of reasons. The resulting unimpressive performance of the division was 
exclusively attributed to the African Americans᾽ poor aptitude as soldiers rather than 
to any factors related to command. 
The Army General Classification Test to which World War II draftees were subjected 
further served to confirm this judgment. Designed to measure formal schooling and 
social acquired skills, it regularly placed African Americans at clearly inferior 
performance levels compared to white draftees. The reason for this certainly lies in 
the fact that most black draftees came from the South, where discrimination against 
the black population was most pronounced and good formal education for African 
Americans was virtually unknown. In spite of these factors, (white) officers felt 
justified in reaching the conclusion that they had always believed, namely that dark-
skinned GIs were intrinsically inferior to whites as soldier material.199 
In 1940 as before in 1917, as the United States began to mobilize for war, a social 
movement developed in favor of granting equal opportunity for blacks within the 
Armed Forces. Well-known New Dealers, the most prominent of whom was Eleanor 
Roosevelt, supported the campaign. Franklin Roosevelt found himself in a political 
dilemma, caught between not wanting to offend his Democratic Party allies in the 
South and needing to accommodate the African Americans on whose votes he would 
be relying in the fall presidential election. 
As a result, Roosevelt made a number of cautious concessions to the black 
community while leaving other fundamental injustices unaddressed. Benjamin O. 
Davis, Sr., one of the two black army commanders of the interwar period, was 
                                            
198 Robert W. Kesting, Conspiracy to discredit the Black Buffaloes: The 92nd Infantry in World War II, 
in: The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 72, No. 1/2 (1987), p. 4. 
199 John H. Morrow, Jr., African Americans in the Military, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia of War 
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promoted to become the first African American to reach the rank of general. The War 
Department created a position of Special Adviser on Race Relations. Lastly, in 
October 1940, the official War Department policy was released in the form of a 
directive. African Americans should be represented in the Armed Forces according to 
their proportion in the overall population and should serve in all its branches in both 
combat and non-combat functions. Unprepared to move on the matter of segregation, 
the War Department continued to follow a separate but equal course on this matter. 
African Americans were provided with the same equipment, accommodations and 
supplies as white soldiers, but allowing them to serve together with whites in the 
same regimental units went beyond the imagination of the elites in the War 
Department, who instead asserted the fig leaf of equal treatment – rarely provided in 
practice – in order to conceal the injustice of segregation.200 
The War Department’s argument for this policy, advanced at every opportunity and 
not entirely without substance, was that it was fundamentally responsible for planning 
and conducting a global two front coalition war, not advancing societal reform. This 
position obviously changed little about the reality of discrimination, although it must 
be acknowledged that such a function is fundamentally one for civilian society and a 
task that would overextend the Armed Forces, particularly during times of war. Chief 
of Staff Marshall, pragmatic to the core, supported the department’s position and 
stated in a memorandum: 
[A policy of Integration] … would be tantamount to solving a social problem which 
has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation. The 
Army cannot accomplish such a solution, and should not be charged with the 
undertaking … [To do so would] complicate the tremendous task of the War 
Department and thereby jeopardize discipline and morale.201 
Over time, the concession made to admit African Americans into the Armed Forces in 
proportion to their representation in the U.S. population was actually achieved.202 In 
                                            
200 George Q. Flynn, Selective Service and American Blacks in World War II, in: The Journal of Negro 
History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (1984), p. 14. 
201 Cited in: Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 83 ff. 
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1945, of 9,840,216 servicemen who had been recruited under the auspices of the 
Selective Service System, 1,058,006 were African Americans, roughly corresponding 
to their proportions within the population (12.8 million out of 132 million).203  
Within the Army of the United States, however, the African Americans᾽ distribution 
was as marked as ever by racial prejudices. Under the alleged fact that they were not 
suitable for work as soldiers, they were significantly overrepresented in the Army 
Service Forces, underrepresented in the Army Ground Forces and, for a lengthy 
time, as good as nonexistent in the Army Air Forces. In the European Theater of 
Operations, the Army Ground Forces at the corps level deployed various black 
combat support units such as tank and tank destroyer battalions along with nine 
artillery battalions.204 African American infantrymen were engaged in only two 
circumstances: in Italy in the reactivated 92nd Infantry Division and in the European 
Theater of Operations as improvised replacement platoons during the manpower 
crisis that occurred in winter 1944/45. 205 
                                                                                                                                        
proportion to their relative numbers in the overall population was an important -- even if controversial -- 
sign of equal treatment. (Cf. Flynn, Selective Service, p. 17 ff.) 
203 Flynn, Selective Service, p. 18. 
204 Cf. Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II. Special Studies. The Employment of Negro 
Troops (Washington, D.C. 2000), Chapter XXI: Artillery and Armored Units in the ETO, pp. 644–687. 
205 The manpower crisis of 1944/45: As Allied invasion forces broke out of their beachhead along the 
Normandy coast at the end of July and beginning of August 1944, their front lines became more 
extended with every mile of their success in pushing the Wehrmacht back toward the German borders, 
and their consequent need for infantrymen increased. As summer turned to fall, two factors 
accelerated this development. First, German resistance became increasingly hardened as fighting 
approached the frontiers of the homeland, transforming fall 1944 into one large and extremely costly 
battle of attrition. Second, the bitterly cold northern European weather took its toll particularly on the 
ranks of the infantry, whose troops were most exposed to the elements. On December 8, 1944, the 
European Theater of Operations forecast a shortage of 29,000 infantry riflemen by the end of the 
month. (Lee, Employment, p. 688.) 
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6.1 Case study: Black Buffaloes – 92nd Infantry Division206 
They cannot be expected to do as well in any Army function as white troops unless 
they have absolutely first-class leadership from their officers … After all, when a 
man knows that the color of his skin will automatically disqualify him for reaping the 
fruits of attainment it is no wonder that he sees little point in trying very hard to 
excel anybody else. To me, the most extraordinary thing is that such people 
continue trying at all … We cannot expect to make first-class soldiers out of second 
or third or fourth class citizens. 
Walter L. Wright, Jr., Chief Army Historian, Summer 1945207 
On October 15, 1942 – significantly, in Fort McClellan, Alabama – the 92nd Infantry 
Division was reactivated as the only black formation of its kind in the Army of the 
United States. With respect to the division’s organization, the Army Ground Forces 
drew its conclusions from the disappointing experience with the 92nd Infantry during 
World War I … although these were fundamentally wrong. 
In the First World War, command positions up through company level had been filled 
by African Americans and, above that point, with white officers. After looking for the 
reasons for the poor performance of the forerunner division naturally among the 
ranks of the African Americans, the Army revised these command positions to 
include even rifle companies among the units to be led by white officers.208 Using a 
perverse logic that defies any comprehension, it then made the assumption that white 
Southern officers, because of their experience in close contact with African 
Americans and their special understanding of their ways, were therefore the ideal 
candidates to command black units.209 
                                            
206 The Black Buffaloes᾽ name originated with Native Americans. Following the Civil War, black army 
units were, for the first time on a regular basis, trained primarily to carry out protective duties. During 
the winter months, the black troopers hunted buffalo in order to produce cold-weather clothing from 
their hides, causing the Indians to refer to them as ῾black buffaloes᾽. (Kesting, Conspiracy, p. 2.) 
207 Cited in: Lee, Employment, p. 704 ff. 
208 Kesting, Conspiracy, p. 4. 
209 Lee, Employment, p. 180. 
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The division spent the time between its activation and the summer of 1944 in the 
United States, where it completed the Army Ground Forces training program. 
Besides the technical and organizational difficulties with which all units had to 
contend in the frenetic mobilization period, the 92nd Division also had to endure the 
latent or open racism of many of its Southern white officers. Command assignments 
were determined, as already mentioned, by skin color rather than qualification, and a 
bias-inspired climate of mutual mistrust permeated the formation. Although the 
division’s training results were anything but auspicious, after June 26, 1944 it was 
deployed to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations not as a single formation, but 
dismembered into its component parts.210 
From June to October 1944, the 370th Regimental Combat Team (RCT)211 served as 
spearhead of the 92nd Division in many Fifth Army operations in northern Italy. The 
370th Infantry Regiment, the core element around which the RCT was formed, had 
distinguished itself through its outstanding performance in the division’s training 
phase and, for this reason, it was the first unit to be deployed at the Apennine front. 
Between August 24 and October 5, 1944, the RCT took part in VI Corps offensive 
operations around the Arno River and the northern Italian city of Lucca. The RCT 
accomplished its missions in these operations, although it must be noted that it 
encountered almost no serious German resistance.212 
When the remaining elements of the Black Buffaloes arrived at the Apennine front at 
the start of October 1944, the 92nd Infantry was deployed in its planned configuration 
and, in an influential series of calamities and missteps, it confirmed all the biases that 
had been advanced regarding black infantry units. In all parameters used to measure 
the combat effectiveness of military forces, the division turned in an appalling 
performance. The entire deployment history of the 92nd Infantry Division was – 
                                            
210 Kesting, Conspiracy, p. 5 ff. 
211 A Regimental Combat Team was a mixed formation consisting of one regiment from one division 
along with a number of service support and combat service support units that allowed the regiment to 
conduct autonomous operations. In the case of the 370th RCT, this referred to the eponymous 370th 
Infantry Regiment along with the 598th Field Artillery Battalion and elements of all organizational units 
of the superordinate division (cf. Lee, Employment, p. 536). 
212 Kesting, Conspiracy, p. 8. 
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without entering into operational details that have no relevance here – marked by 
desertions, signs of rapid disintegration under fire, uncoordinated and unauthorized 
retreats and military courts-martial for violations of the Articles of War.213 Instead of 
conducting a detailed probe to understand the reasons behind the disastrous 
performance of the 92nd Infantry Division, most of the responsible commanders once 
again saw themselves persuaded by the racist assumption that African Americans 
had neither the aggressiveness nor the intellectual or mental capacity required to 
conduct modern warfare. 
If African Americans in the European Theater of Operations had not simultaneously 
offered a diametrically opposite picture of their soldierly abilities, these prejudices and 
racially motivated misperceptions might have been fixed in place for decades to 
come. 
6.2 Case study: manpower crisis 1944/45 
Morale: Excellent. Manner of performance: Superior. Men are very eager to close 
with the enemy and to destroy him. Strict attention to duty, aggressiveness, 
common sense and judgment under fire has won the admiration of all the men in 
the company … The Company Commander, officers, and men of Company “F” all 
agree that the colored platoon has a calibre of men equal to any veteran platoon. 
Several decorations for bravery are in the process of being awarded to the 
members of colored platoons. 
G1, 104th Infantry Division214 
While the 92nd Infantry Division in Italy provided high quantities of grist for the mill of 
white supremacists in the Army of the United States, a crisis culminated at the start of 
December 1944 in the European Theater of Operations that had been a latent 
concern for Dwight Eisenhower and the Army Ground Forces leadership since the 
summer. The Allied armies were facing a critical shortage of infantry riflemen. When 
the German Wehrmacht began its final major western offensive on December 16, the 
critical situation became a desperate one. After combing through all possible white 
service units in the ETO for infantry replacements, Lieutenant General John C. H. 
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Lee, Commander of the European Theater’s Communications Zone215 (COMZ), 
approached Supreme Commander Eisenhower and suggested looking among the 
COMZ black service units for volunteers meeting the physical requirements for the 
infantry who could be retrained as infantrymen.216 
After Eisenhower accepted the suggestion, Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, 
Ike’s Special Advisor and Coordinator to the Theater Commander on Negro Troops, 
developed a system along with Ground Forces Replacement Command to train these 
volunteers to become infantrymen and to integrate into white companies as black 
platoons. Shortly thereafter, SHAEF217 sent the following notice to the COMZ units: 
1. The Supreme Commander desires to destroy the enemy forces and end 
hostilities in this theater without delay. Every available weapon at our disposal 
must be brought to bear upon the enemy. To this end the Theater Commander 
has directed the Communications Zone Commander to make the greatest 
possible use of limited service men within service units and to survey our entire 
organization in an effort to produce able bodied men for the front lines. This 
process of selection has been going on for some time but it is entirely possible 
that many men themselves, desiring to volunteer for front line service, may be 
able to point out methods in which they can be replaced in their present jobs. 
Consequently, Commanders of all grades will receive voluntary applications for 
transfer to the Infantry and forward them to higher authority with 
recommendations for appropriate type of replacement. This opportunity to 
volunteer will be extended to all soldiers without regard to color or race, but 
preference will normally be given to individuals who have had some basic training 
in Infantry. Normally, also, transfers will be limited to the grade of Private and 
Private First Class unless a noncommissioned officer requests a reduction. 
2. In the event that the number of suitable Negro volunteers exceeds the 
replacement needs of Negro combat units, these men will be suitably 
                                            
215 In their organization, theaters of operations were split into a combat zone in which combat forces 
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incorporated in other organizations so that their service and their fighting spirit 
may be efficiently utilized. 
3. This letter may be read confidentially to the troops and made available in 
Orderly Rooms. Every assistance must be promptly given qualified men who 
volunteer for this service.218 
By February 1945, more than 4500 African Americans had volunteered, many of 
them non-commissioned officers who took a loss in rank. After these troops had been 
trained at the 16th Reinforcement Depot in Compiègne, on March 1, 1945 they were 
among the first 37 platoons to be assigned to their new units in First and Seventh 
Army.219 The two armies utilized their black replacement platoons in different ways 
and, in doing so, achieved slightly different results. 
The First Army assigned its replacement platoons respectively as an extra fourth 
platoon with white rifle companies. Although these units had received only very 
abbreviated infantry training, they made an extremely good impression on their white 
brothers in arms. Most First Army divisions that were assigned black replacement 
platoons were veteran units that had been in action since the Normandy landings. 
Nonetheless, all of them were impressed by the commitment and achievements of 
the black replacement platoons. In the course of their ultimately short deployment as 
combat infantrymen, the African Americans selected for this assignment earned 
countless military decorations, promotions and the respect of the white soldiers and 
commanders with whom they served. The greatest recognition of their 
accomplishments was that many white platoons greatly appreciated the deployment 
of black replacements alongside them, since they had come to appreciate their 
qualities independently of their skin color.220 They were often presented with the 
respective division arm patch to be sewed onto the left sleeve of their uniform. That 
act signified official acceptance into the brotherhood of a division, and its importance 
as an expression of the highest recognition cannot be overestimated. A white 
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commander who had incorporated a black platoon into his battalion ended the report 
of his experiences with the African Americans with the following words: 
I know I did not receive a superior representation of the colored race as the 
average AGCT221 was Class IV. I do know, however, that in courage, coolness, 
dependability and pride, they are on a par with any white troops I have ever had 
occasion to work with. In addition, they were, during combat, possessed with a 
fierce desire to meet with and kill the enemy, the equal of which I have never 
witnessed in white troops.222 
The Seventh Army went in a different direction in this respect, combining its 
replacement platoons to form black companies. Given the time pressure of the 
operation, the training of the black replacements had been rudimentary at best. 
Because of this, they were not sufficiently prepared to cope with the additional 
logistical and administrative demands of maintaining a company. This fact, in turn, 
diminished the enthusiasm and zeal that had characterized the First Army 
replacements and led to somewhat more moderate results within Seventh Army 
although, even in this case, they left a more positive impression on the white units 
than had been expected.223 
In both field armies, practical experience showed that the principle of segregation, 
having been eroded by the admission of the black platoons and companies, would 
not survive for long. Combat losses that could not be fully recouped by individual 
replacements soon created an ad hoc need to form mixed units, a practice that would 
have been rejected in normal times as absolute sacrilege. Even here, however, it 
turned out that the racist fears and prejudices regarding the incompatibility between 
the two skin shades were essentially unfounded in most cases. The deathly reality of 
the battlefields presented the (mostly white) soldiers with other concerns and 
problems, leaving little room for feverish fantasies of white supremacy and similar 
nonsense. Few tensions were in evidence in most of these mixed companies, and 
both black and white dogfaces fought for the same towns, waited in the same chow 
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lines and joined in the same prohibited games of chance. As a white company 
commander commented: 
The premise that no soldier will hold black skin against a man if he can shoot his 
rifle and does not run away proved to be substantially true. Most of the white men 
of the company soon became highly appreciative of the Negroes’ help and 
warmly applauded their more colorful individual and combat exploits.224 
Even though such situations represented the rule for the black replacement platoons 
to a very great extent, they were viewed as exceptions in the Army at large. Unless 
measures of this sort were deemed necessary under emergency conditions, the 
principle of segregation was maintained, and African Americans remained what they 
had always been in the United States and the American Army: second-, third- or 
fourth-class citizens. In spite of this, a precedent had been created and the seed 
planted for the integration of U.S. Armed Forces within a few years.
                                            
224 Ibid., p. 702 ff. 
93 
 
7 The American occupation of Great Britain 
YOU are going to Great Britain as part of an Allied offensive – to meet Hitler and 
beat him on his own ground. For the time being you will be Britain’s guest. The 
purpose of this guide is to get you acquainted with the British, their country, and 
their ways. America and Britain are allies. Hitler knows that they are both powerful 
countries, tough and resourceful. He knows that they, with the other United 
Nations, mean his crushing defeat in the end. 
So it is only common sense that the first and major duty Hitler has given his 
propaganda chiefs is to separate Britain and America and spread distrust between 
them. If he can do that, his chance of winning might return. 
A Short Guide to Great Britain, 1943225 
Yankee Doodle came to Europe just to whip the Germans, 
Stopped a while in England, before he took on Hermann, 
Yankee Doodle keep it up, Yankee Doodle Dandy, 
Mind the music and the step, and with the girls be handy. 
GI marching song, 1944 
It is difficult to go anywhere in London without having the feeling that Britain is now 
Occupied Territory. 
George Orwell, Tribune, December 3, 1943 
Numerically, the U.S. troop presence in Great Britain was – to repeat – made up of 
Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces and Army Ground Forces. It began with Air 
Force units that set up their bases in the eastern part of the country starting in the 
spring of 1942. Here was the center of the strategic air operations against Nazi 
Germany, carried out by the Eighth Army Air Force (8th USAAF) together with the 
British Bomber Command. Except for a brief drop in numbers between October and 
November 1942226, 8th USAAF troop strength rose from an initial 12,000 to over 
420,000 in May 1944. Starting in June 1944 after the launch of ground operations in 
northwestern Europe, units were successively deployed to the continent and the 
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number of AAF soldiers stationed in Great Britain dropped to approximately 220,000 
by the end of the war. The personnel strength of Army Service Forces essentially 
followed the same cycle, reaching a maximum of around 460,000 in May 1944, falling 
thereafter to approximately 110,000 by war’s end.227, 228 
Except for the already mentioned wrinkle caused by the lead-up to TORCH, AAF and 
ASF presence in Great Britain essentially underwent a steady progression from initial 
buildup through subsequent cutback. The experience of Army Ground Forces, the 
institutional home of the dogface soldiers, portrays a different scene. U.S. ground 
troops amassed in Britain in two phases. Between May and October 1942, a little 
more than 90,000 ground troops in total were sent to the United Kingdom. During this 
period, the policy decision was made to pursue Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy 
and land Allied troops in North Africa. As a result, most AGF units had to redeploy 
away from Great Britain in preparation for Operation TORCH. From November 1942 
to September 1943, the AGF presence rose again gradually from 5,000 to 60,000 
troops. The actual invasion and occupation of Great Britain that constitutes the focus 
of our interest took place in the eight months between September 1943 and May 
1944, when nearly 600,000 AGF troops gathered in the southwestern portion of 
Great Britain. In total, almost 1.7 million American servicemen were barracked in the 
United Kingdom in May 1944.229, 230 They were spread throughout England, Wales 
and the six counties of Ulster Province in Northern Ireland. The vast majority, 
however, were to be found in the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex along Great 
Britain’s east coast, where the bases of the 8th USAAF were located, and in an area 
of the southwest coast delimited by the counties of Devon and Hampshire from west 
to east and Gloucester and Dorset from north to south. The bulk of the AGF troops 
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that concern the present study were concentrated in this region in preparation for the 
invasion of northwestern France.231 
Although U.S. troops had also been in Great Britain during the American participation 
in World War I in 1917/18, the presence of the Army of the United States in the 
Second World War, especially up to the summer of 1944, had a distinctively new 
quantity and quality. During World War I, Britain had been a rear area in support of 
Allied operations in France. For American soldiers, the United Kingdom was a way 
station on their journey to the front. They landed at the port cities of the western 
approaches and were transported by train to the south coast, from where they 
crossed over to France. Few of them remained in Britain for long, and even fewer 
were permanently stationed there. Between 1940 and 1944, as the armies of Nazi 
Germany dominated the European continent, the front line traced the English 
Channel, with the belligerents facing off against each other from the channel’s 
respective coasts. Beginning in 1942, as the American troop buildup commenced, 
GIs in the south and east of England became a permanent fixture of daily life.232 
They spent substantially more time there than had their predecessors in 1917/18. As 
a result, the U.S. presence in World War II required more detailed official planning 
and had serious socio-cultural consequences for the affected sectors of both military 
and civilian populations. The following sections do not claim to represent a thorough 
recounting of the organizational and cultural history of the Army of the United States 
in Great Britain. Their focus lies on those aspects of this history that relate to the 
theme of the future dogface soldiers. 
7.1 Planning … 
Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get out … 
John Keegan, The Face of Battle 
… three crimes a member of the Air Force [in Great Britain] can commit: murder, 
rape and interference with Anglo-American relations. The first two might 
conceivably be pardoned, but the third one, never. 
Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, 8th USAAF, September 1943 
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As the forces of Napoleon’s elite Garde Impériale retreated from the front under 
heavy fire on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, their action provoked the panicked 
outcry “La Garde recule!” (“The Guard retreats!”) along the French line and led to its 
complete disintegration. John Keegan concludes from this incident that every army 
conceals an anarchic crowd trying to get out. David Reynolds expands on Keegan᾽s 
notion to add that in every soldier there is a civilian similarly attempting to emerge. As 
a result, he maintains: 
This schizophrenic duality of army-crowd and soldier-civilian has been a central 
problem for every military commander throughout history. Yet it is particularly 
pressing for modern mass-conscript armies, in which soldiers are not 
professionals but civilians temporarily denied their civilian status and rights. And 
countries where there is no peacetime conscription find it even harder to 
habituate the civilian to the shocks of military life.233 
With respect to its central function, an active army can mitigate this tendency through 
a combination of propaganda, training and discipline. The U.S. Army Ground Forces 
in Great Britain amounted to an inactive army completely lacking the option to occupy 
its citizen soldiers in a rigorous training program. Besides the internal tensions that 
could result from such idleness, the Army feared that such a huge mass of 
underutilized soldiers could provoke dangerous animosity among the civilian 
population. While it would be a rather easy task for an inactive army in enemy 
territory to isolate its troops from the civilian populace, the Army of the United States 
found itself among culturally related allies who spoke the same language.234 Against 
this backdrop, it is important to understand the only partially successful pattern of 
political and institutional planning for these Anglo-American contacts as well as their 
actual on-the-ground results. 
The military planners of the U.S. presence in Great Britain in 1942/43 were aware of 
the risks posed by mobs like those suggested by Keegan, and thus they attempted to 
keep their troops as far away as possible from the civilian population. If there were to 
be contacts between GIs and Britons, these should occur under controlled and 
controllable conditions in order to prevent possible incidents that could damage Allied 
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relations. This restrictive and negative approach is one of three broad patterns that 
can be detected in the planning and organization of the American military presence in 
Great Britain. In contrast, the British and American diplomatic services along with the 
British Ministry of Information (MOI) and the American Office of War Information 
(OWI) offered a positive approach to the topic, one that was oriented toward Winston 
Churchill’s goal of establishing a long-term special relationship between the two 
English-speaking nations. Lastly, a shift in political focus over time is apparent that 
should be understood as closely tied to the two phases in the buildup of American 
AGF troops that has already been mentioned. In 1942/43, the principle aim was to 
achieve a legislative and organizational framework for the presence of U.S. troops in 
Great Britain. In the twelve months leading up to OVERLORD235, the focus became 
one of fostering positive relations between Britons and GIs. The cause of this change 
is, on the one hand, a joint directive by Roosevelt and Churchill.236 On the other 
hand, Eisenhower, who had been charged with local implementation of the policy, 
was an enthusiastic champion of Anglo-American friendship who took literally the 
assignment from the heads of the two governments. 
The implementation of the negative military approach to Anglo-American relations 
represented an attempt to keep American soldiers at arms᾽ length from British 
civilians by means of a combination of strict discipline and generous military benefits. 
Furloughs to leave the base were only issued on a very limited basis, and violators 
incurred draconian punishment. On the other hand, the Army went to considerable 
expense to provide soldiers an extensive selection of on-base leisure activities that 
were as American as possible, minimizing the desire for outings into the civilian 
world. Army post exchanges (PXs) 237 offered a variety of American goods that left 
nothing to be desired and, in comparison to the rationed and reduced range of local 
goods available since 1939 under the British war economy, must have seemed like 
something out of a dream. Every base had a movie theater where soldiers could see 
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the latest Hollywood films at no cost, as well as many other leisure establishments 
such as bars, recreational areas, libraries and athletic facilities. Most American army 
bases featured regular concerts and theater evenings in order to give soldiers as little 
reason as possible to want to spend their free time away from the base.238 
In February 1942, representatives of the Army of the United States in Great Britain 
and responsible authorities of the American Red Cross in London and Washington 
agreed that the Army and Red Cross would jointly take over support for American 
soldiers in the United Kingdom. While the Army would be in charge of soldiers on 
base, the Red Cross held responsibility for off-base or on-leave support. As a result, 
Red Cross clubs were opened throughout Great Britain where soldiers in transit or on 
furlough could spend their time. All such clubs were furnished with lounges, a 
restaurant and a tourist information office, and most of these also featured sleeping 
accommodations. The clubs᾽ interior decor and menu selections were designed to be 
as American as possible, in order to offer the troops a little bit of home in their 
overseas environment. American donations covered most of the costs of operating 
these facilities.239 After it emerged that most donors preferred to see their money 
spent only on U.S. troops, it was decided that the Red Cross clubs would be open 
solely to American soldiers and their guests.240 GIs had to submit a reservation 
confirmation from one of these hotels as a part of their request for leave. The first 
Red Cross club was opened in Londonderry in May 1942, and by the end of that 
year, the number of clubs had grown to over 50 with a total bed capacity of almost 
10,000, leading the Red Cross to characterize the operation as the largest hotel 
chain in the world.241  
In retrospect, one of the most important and successful American Red Cross 
initiatives in achieving mutual understanding was the Home Hospitality Program. In 
November 1943, the so-called Home Hospitality Division was created at American 
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Red Cross headquarters in London as the program’s main coordinating body. It 
oriented local hospitality supervisors in keeping lists of families in their district who 
were interested in “adopting” American soldiers. These files contained a personal 
profile of the applicant in order to foster the most harmonious pairing; thus, for 
example, an American devotee of Thomas Hardy novels could spend a weekend with 
a family who lived in the author’s former house. The British hosts were encouraged to 
become foster parents to the GI and to provide him with a second home that he could 
regularly visit. The soldiers, who were housed in old British army barracks or tent 
cities, apparently had need of some cozy normality, and the program proved to be a 
success. In this way, more than one million visits to British families had been 
organized by the summer of 1945.242 
Another form of home hospitality was to billet soldiers in privately rented rooms. 
During the initial years of the U.S. military presence in Great Britain, this homestay 
option was avoided as far as possible, since the Army was sure that it could only lead 
to a serious crisis for the popularity of the Army of the United States. Such 
accommodations were reserved exclusively for senior officers who, it was felt, knew 
how to behave themselves. As the mass of AGF troops began to stream into the 
United Kingdom starting in fall 1943 in preparation for the invasion of France, the 
principle of barracking soldiers solely in military facilities reached its limits. Beginning 
in the winter of 1943/44, the uncertain experiment to provide approximately 100,000 
soldiers with lodging in private homes was finally attempted, and it proved to carry no 
risk at all. A War Office internal report in April 1944 stated: 
… these misgivings had proved completely unfounded. Excellent relations had 
prevailed throughout between hosts and guests, and the system had evidently 
led to a much friendlier attitude on both sides than had previously existed. A 
census showed that complaints had been received in the case of only one out of 
every thousand men billeted.243 
In addition to these measures to support U.S. soldiers in Great Britain, which could 
be broadly characterized as internal, there were also a number of official and semi-
official British initiatives that were dedicated to similar goals. These included so-
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called ῾welcome clubs᾽ to which young local women could apply for membership. If 
they fit the official concept of a presentable British girl, they were allowed to share 
snacks or play games with American soldiers under the watchful eye of a chaperone, 
or to engage them in supervised dancing.244 The Joint Anglo American (Army) 
Relations Committee, created at the end of 1943, operated an exchange program 
that allowed British and American soldiers to spend a couple days in a unit of each 
other’s army in order to bring about improved mutual understanding.245 
Lastly, 329 regional hospitality committees were set up by the summer of 1944 that 
carried out a wide range of projects and events to promote Anglo-American relations 
under the sponsorship of local politicians and representatives of various volunteer 
organizations and with the financial support of the Ministry of Information.246 
Naturally the many relationships between Britons and GIs were not always marked 
by mutual harmony and not always as innocent as those described to this point. The 
following section concerns those effects of the American occupation of Great Britain 
that largely eluded the elaborate planning and grasp of the two governments and 
armies. To a significant extent, they are linked to the fact that the Army of the United 
States brought nearly two million young men in their late teens and early 20s into a 
country where almost all males of comparable age were stationed abroad. 
7.2 Realities 
The problem with you Yanks is you’re oversexed, overpaid, overfed and over here. 
Contemporary British saying247 
Have you heard about the new utility knickers? One Yank and they’re off! 
ETO joke248 
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How different they [the American enlisted men] looked from our own jumble-sale 
champions, beautifully clothed in smooth khaki, as fine in cut and quality as a 
British officer’s – an American private, we confided to each other at school, was 
paid as much as a British captain, major, colonel – and armed with glistening, 
modern, automatic weapons … More striking still were the number, size and 
elegance of the vehicles in which they paraded about the countryside in stately 
convoy. The British army’s transport was a sad collection of underpowered 
makeshifts, whose dun paint flaked from their tin-pot bodywork. The Americans 
travelled in magnificent, gleaming, olive-green, pressed steel, four-wheel-drive 
juggernauts, decked with what car salesmen would call optional extras of a sort 
never seen on their domestic equivalents … Standing one day at the roadside, 
dismounted from my bicycle to let one such convoy by, I was assaulted from the 
back of each truck as it passed by a volley of small missiles … when I burrowed in 
the dead leaves to discover the cause I unearthed not walnuts but a little treasure 
of Hershey bars, Chelsea candy and Jack Frost sugar-cubes, a week’s, perhaps a 
month’s ration, of sweet things casually disbursed in a few seconds. There was, I 
reflected as I crammed the spoil into my pockets, something going on in the west of 
England about which Hitler should be very worried indeed. 
John Keegan249 
There is of course no single experience shared by all members of the Army of the 
United States following their arrival in the United Kingdom. The nearly two million 
U.S. soldiers stationed in Great Britain during World War II were individuals, each 
with his (or her) own sociocultural background. A student of English literature from 
Maine will perceive Great Britain differently than will a Kentucky farmer or an Italian-
American from the Bronx. In spite of these differences, and setting aside individual 
characteristics and combinations, a number of almost universal patterns emerge that 
describe the nature and course of the American occupation of Great Britain and its 
cultural connotations for local inhabitants who interacted with the GIs. 
Their first view of bombed houses in the ports where they landed on the west coast of 
Britain made many GIs aware for the first time that they were about to become 
involved in a deadly business in a very short time. Disembarking from the troop ship, 
they entered a world that was clearly different from the one they had known up until 
that moment, in spite of all its linguistic and cultural affinity. Cars were tiny in 
comparison to the American road cruisers and, besides that, they drove on the wrong 
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side of the road. Like the motor vehicles, Great Britain itself appeared surprisingly 
small and crowded, with 47 million inhabitants, more than a third the U.S. population, 
squeezed into one-thirtieth the territory of the United States, with 85 percent of them 
living in England.250 English cuisine was too strange and boring for the average 
American taste. The beer was comparatively weak because, as a product not 
essential to the war effort, it was diluted with water. In addition, it was served at room 
temperature. GIs who drank the watered-down beer anyway then encountered, when 
they answered the call of their physical necessities, rather archaic sanitary facilities. 
Especially in the countryside where the bulk of the troops were stationed, bathtubs 
were not particularly common, and showers were virtually unknown.251 The harsh 
North Sea climate with its almost continual rains was all the more uncomfortable for 
the GIs, since central heating was an exception and rooms were normally warmed by 
small, inefficient gas stoves. 
In practice, British speech usage presented itself as much more complicated for 
speakers of American English than the facts of what is basically a common language 
might suggest. While words like tobacconist, hairdresser – a place where, for 
incomprehensible reasons, condoms were sold – or chemist’s shop provided clues 
for the observant GI as to their meanings, terms such as tram, rubbish, mackintosh or 
minerals represented the limits of linguistic interpolation.252 As if the language they 
found to be extremely odd were not already confusing for them, the young future 
conquerors found themselves confronted by British understatement and irony, neither 
of these traits an inherent part of American speech patterns.253 In a way, this 
paragraph could be summed up by the well-known saying attributed (without 
verification) to George Bernard Shaw: England and America are two countries 
divided by a common language.254 British coinage was another case to which the GIs 
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needed to give their full concentration in order not to be cheated – or not to cheat 
themselves. The penny-pence-shilling-pound system itself, with its unique calculation 
demands, would have sufficed to create confusion. Added to this, however, the GIs᾽ 
new temporary home offered an impressive collection of cryptically named coins, 
including the farthing, ha’penny, thruppence, thrupenny bit, florin and crown, serving 
only to increase American bafflement.255 
Gals 
A completely different surprise that was much easier to accept was the fact that the 
GIs were very sympathetically welcomed by a not insignificant proportion of the 
female population of Great Britain. In order to understand the proper significance of 
this phenomenon, we must give some attention initially to the circumstances of the 
players concerned. As already mentioned, the average age within the Army of the 
United States was a young one; the Armed Forces were largely comprised of single 
young men. From any point of view that was at all realistic, these soldiers in their late 
teens and early twenties could not assume they would long survive in the oncoming 
battles in the Mediterranean and northwestern Europe. They had, therefore, a 
marked interest in worldly pleasures during their time in Great Britain. Paul Fussell, 
literary scholar and GI in the European Theater of Operations, describes the situation 
as follows: 
Almost two and a half years passed between the arrival of the first American 
troops and their nervous, serious departure for Normandy. Although their main 
business in the United Kingdom was training and toughening, their recreation 
(drinking aside) was largely women, both innocents and prostitutes. And for 
British women, the Yanks were nothing short of a gift.256 
How did it happen that these GIs were looked on as a gift? First, as already 
described earlier, young British men in the age group comparable to the GIs were a 
disappearing act. They were serving in the British forces in Burma, Malaya, North 
Africa, on the Italian Peninsula or in the North Atlantic, and they were not available to 
the females of this bracket. Another key reason is that the Yanks were, in the eyes of 
many Britons (including the young women), the lads from the movie theater. The 
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period of the 1920s to the 1940s represented the golden years of Hollywood cinema, 
a time in which the United States was routinely portrayed as the rich and progressive 
land of the future. British filmgoers, who numbered around 20 million per week during 
the 1930s, most of these young, urban, working-class and female, were socialized by 
this image of America and drawn to it, leading the Daily Express to publish the 
following lament as early as 1927: 
… the bulk of our picture-goers are Americanised … They talk America, think 
America, and dream America. We have several million people, mostly women, 
who, to all intent and purpose, are temporary American citizens.257 
During the war, the number of movie theater visits in Great Britain jumped again, 
rising from one billion tickets sold in 1940 to 1.6 billion in 1944. Approximately 
95 percent of these tickets were for American films. Besides Hollywood, the other 
fascination of British young people with America was for the exciting, exuberant, 
romantic and modern big band sounds of Artie Shaw, Tommy Dorsey and, above all, 
Glenn Miller, as well as for new dance steps like the jitterbug or the jive that 
expressed a wild joie de vivre and sometimes involved downright indecent contact 
between the two partners.258 Starting in 1942, this blissful, romanticized and idealized 
land of hopes and dreams began to arrive in the United Kingdom in the person of the 
GIs. Up until that moment, Yanks were something that young British women knew 
only from the cinema, stereotypes surrounded by an extraordinary and magical aura. 
Suddenly, they were standing at the proverbial door, speaking the same daring and 
thrilling slang heard in the movies. The GIs were eager for dates, and what was 
more, they turned out to be well off, generous and often good-looking.259 It goes 
without saying, of course, that the soldiers made a powerful impression. 
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In essence, the effect of this specific set of personal qualities that the GIs brought 
with them into the United Kingdom can be assessed in four areas: sexually 
transmitted disease, prostitution, out-of-wedlock pregnancies and Anglo-American 
marriages.  
Piccadilly Commandos 
Prostitution thrives in proximity to large concentrations of troops, and the U.S. 
occupation of Great Britain is no exception to this rule. In the United Kingdom, this 
phenomenon was more urban than rural. It focused on locations that were favorite 
leisure destinations for the GIs. The cultural epicenter could be found at Piccadilly 
Circus in London, where nonstop activity involving prostitutes, thieves and drunken 
GIs was a concern for Anglo-American authorities right up to the end of the war.260 
British officials held an ambivalent position regarding prostitution: they prohibited 
bordellos – although in practice, this ban was unevenly carried out, depending on 
both the region and the time – while, on the other hand, giving freer rein to the 
flourishing streetwalking business. The accepted statistic for measuring the extent to 
which GIs engaged the services of the Piccadilly Commandos261 was the yearly 
incidence of venereal disease. The Army of the United States considered a rate of 25 
cases of VD per 1000 men as satisfactory and anything beyond 30 per 1000 as 
excessive behavior. No data are available regarding this matter for 1942 and 1943. 
Figures for 1944 show an average incidence of only 20 prior to OVERLORD. This 
rate can be explained by the fact that permission to leave base was highly restricted 
in the lead-up to D-Day and that the troops were filling their time with exercises and 
other preparations for the Normandy invasion. Beginning in June 1944, the VD rate 
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once again rose until it reached a high mark of 53. Due to the manpower crisis262 in 
the winter of 1944/45, all available troops were involved in intensive training, already 
at the front or on their way there, and the VD rate dropped back to 40. When the war 
ended in Europe in the early summer of 1945, incidence of venereal disease spiked 
to all-time highs of 62 in May and 66 in June.263 
Illegitimates 
With respect to children born out of wedlock who were not subsequently legitimized – 
as the practice was then called – through the marriage of their parents, no 
comparative data are available. The extent to which the fathers of such children bore 
British, American or some other nationality can no longer be determined. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the absolute number of children born to 
unmarried mothers and not later legitimized was dramatically higher than it had been 
in the 1930s. While approximately 70 percent of children born outside marriage prior 
to the war were ultimately legitimized when their parents were wed, this percentage 
hit a low mark of 37 percent by 1945. In England and Wales alone, 65,000 children 
were born out of wedlock in 1945, 22,000 of these presumably to American 
fathers.264 
There are three reasons that provide the primary explanation for such statistics. The 
first is the obvious one: that the child’s father was not interested in marriage and left 
the expectant mother. The second is no less tragic: the possibility that the child’s 
father was in fact willing to marry the woman but died in the war before the wedding 
ceremony could be arranged. The third reason reveals the greatest duplicity, since it 
is linked to the official position of the Army of the United States regarding the 
marriage of its soldiers to local women. 
Wives 
It was mentioned in an earlier chapter that, during the period before the war, the 
Regular Army required its enlisted soldiers and NCOs to obtain their commanding 
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officer’s permission in order to marry.265 Such harsh measures were possible in the 
small, underfinanced volunteer army of those times. In the Army of the United States, 
which was made up of millions of draftees, such a system could not be maintained, 
and the corresponding regulations were lifted. When the first U.S. troops arrived on 
British soil in 1942 by landing in Northern Ireland, it was only a matter of weeks 
before the first American-Northern Irish weddings took place. Shortly thereafter, in a 
reference to a similar situation at the American marine base in Trinidad, the principle 
of requiring the CO’s permission for such solemnities was reinstated for all U.S. 
overseas troops through War Department Circular 179 (WD-C 179): 
No military personnel on duty in any foreign country may marry without the 
approval of the commanding officer of the United States Army forces stationed in 
such foreign country or possession.266 
A U.S. officer in the ETO explained the background of War Department Circular 179 
… [as to be] designed to protect soldiers from hasty marriages in countries where 
the bulk of the population was negro and socially and mentally inferior to the 
average American soldier.267 
A less racist and more universally applicable explanation was that the GIs needed to 
be protected from deliberately provoked marriages with overseas prostitutes. 
Whatever the intentions that lay behind the War Department᾽s Circular 179, it 
became the cornerstone of a widespread policy implemented in the European 
Theater of Operations by many commanders to use all means to obstruct marriages 
between GIs and British women. Two valid justifications were that soldiers would be 
too easily distracted from their mission by wives who lived near the bases, and that 
marriages to British women were considered unfair in comparison to soldiers who 
had married in the United States, since the latter were not allowed to bring their 
spouses into the United Kingdom.268 
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Interestingly, it was the otherwise liberal and kind Ike Eisenhower who was an 
enthusiastic proponent of this policy. His ETO Circular 20 (ETO-C 20) expanded on 
WD-C 179 by adding a condition that the intent to marry had to be declared three 
months in advance and was required to be, curiously, in the interest of these [ETO] 
forces in particular and the military service in general269. Violators were subject to 
proceedings under the 96th Article of War, conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon 
the military service. GIs seeking to wed were instructed that they could expect no 
preferential treatment from the Army of the United States as a result of their 
marriage. Their future spouses had no claim of any kind to benefits under the Army’s 
welfare system, did not automatically become American citizens by marriage, and 
would have to go through the regular U.S. immigration process in order to become 
citizens. 
In the end, however, it was up to each commander to determine how to apply WD-C 
179 and ETO-C 20. General J. C. H. Lee270, commander of Services of Supply in the 
ETO, instructed his subordinate commanders to approve marriages only if the 
woman was pregnant. When Eisenhower was appointed commander of the new 
North African Theater of Operations in the lead-up to TORCH, his replacement in the 
ETO, General Frank Andrews, introduced a more liberal policy. Andrews died in an 
accident in May 1943, and his successor, General Russel P. Hartle, updated the 
reforms yet again.271 
Ultimately, however, it must be acknowledged that neither strict interpretation of the 
relevant War Department requirements nor recurrent individual discrimination could 
keep lovers from finding each other and advancing their interests. Records of the 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service show that 627 women from Great Britain 
were naturalized as American citizens between 1941 and 1945. It may be assumed 
that these incidents were due at least in part to such marriages. Between December 
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28, 1945 and June 30, 1950, another 334,528 British females and 42 British males 
immigrated to the United States under the War Brides Act.272  
Allies 
The same combination of social advantages, personal qualities and cultural 
stereotypes conveyed via mass media that had proven so attractive for British 
women also created extremely tense relations between the ranks (especially the 
lower ranks) of the Anglo-American armies. In addition to their significantly higher pay 
levels, American soldiers benefited from the comprehensive Army welfare system, 
something that was unknown in the British army. In comparison to the British NAAFI 
shops, American PXs offered a far more extensive range of wares at much lower 
prices. American cigarettes, qualitatively superior to those sold in Britain, cost a tenth 
of what British soldiers paid at NAAFI. While Tommies had to pay thruppence for a 
cup of tea and two scones as a second breakfast, the GIs normally received coffee 
and doughnuts free at Red Cross clubs, mobile club canteens and donut dugouts.273 
Related to the observation made earlier that understatement was a characteristic 
rarely observed in the U.S., many GIs were simply lacking in humility regarding their 
privileged situation when in the company of their British counterparts. A British War 
Office Censorship Report of 1942 cited the following from a letter by a British soldier: 
One of them turned to one of our Lance Corporals and said: “Say, Tommy, what 
do they pay you a day?” Fred replied: “Three and six.” At this he laughs loud and 
calls to all his gang … says that British soldiers would work for a dime if the big 
shots paid it to ‘em. When we came outside after the place had closed there was 
an army lorry waiting for the Yanks. We stood there and watched them piled in. 
Then the one who had been doing all the shouting put his hand in his pocket and 
as the lorry pulled away, threw out a bob’s worth of coppers at us and shouted 
above the others’ laughter “Get y’self a cup of tea each of you poor little 
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______.”274 If I could have laid my hands on him, I, like many more, would have 
busted his pan. I think they stink.275 
Tommies resented the Americans, who had delayed by 27 months their entry into the 
war on the side of the British, becoming actively involved only after Hitler had 
declared war on the United States. GIs, in turn, were little impressed by the British 
army’s military performance to that point276, nor were they prone to keeping such 
feelings to themselves. Gimme a beer as quick as you guys got out of Dunkirk277 was 
a common GI method of ordering a beer.278 Many GIs were of the opinion that Great 
Britain would display too little collective will to win the war compared to the U.S.279 As 
a result, they often publicly expressed the sentiment that America was now obligated 
to come to Europe for the second time in a generation to put British (and French) 
affairs in order. Because of their longer participation in the war, Tommies claimed 
senior partner status over the other Allies, a position that went unacknowledged by 
the Americans. Until events occurred in 1943 to prove the contrary, the British troops 
did not hold a high opinion of the soldierly qualities of the GIs, an attitude that was 
reflected in a number of ways, including popular witticisms: 
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Have you heard about the three Yanks who went to a war film? Well, one 
immediately fainted and the other two got a medal for carrying him out.280 
The topic of perceived British seniority over the American allies also resulted in 
ongoing tension at higher levels, particularly in the selection of Dwight D. Eisenhower 
as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces for the all-important 
invasion of northwestern Europe. Viewed pragmatically, the political decision to name 
a U.S. general as Supreme Commander clearly reflected the reality that the Army of 
the United States would be supplying by far the largest share of troops for 
OVERLORD. In spite of this situation, the opinion held by all sectors of British civilian 
and military society was that this position should go to one of their own generals. 
Eisenhower enjoyed great personal popularity among the British as well as 
Americans, and he was respected for his successful unification efforts within the 
Grand Alliance. Nevertheless, Great Britain tended toward the view that 
Eisenhower’s position was virtually a diplomatic command and that his British 
subordinate, General Bernard Montgomery, was actually in command of 
OVERLORD.281 As the invasion of northwestern Europe – and with it the embarking 
of most GIs on an uncertain future – loomed in spring 1944, the focus of Anglo-
American perceptions in turn shifted, from what divided each group from the other to 
what united them all. 
Despite general relief that the Americans were gone, there was now an 
unavoidable understanding of what these alien boys were there for and what was 
going to happen to a great many of them.282 
In sum, it can be stated that many of the tensions that were present during the 
occupation of the United Kingdom may be ultimately traced, in this case, to an 
encounter between two empires, one of them in decline, the other on its way to 
achieving unprecedented power. In spite of all its unpleasantness, the occupation of 
Great Britain was a culturally fruitful experience for Yanks and Brits alike. It was far 
from being the harmonious operation portrayed by the contemporary Anglo-American 
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propaganda machines, but at many levels, it initiated a stimulating exchange 
between the two sides. GIs who had been overwhelmed at the AGF training centers 
by America’s diversity developed, during their stay in Great Britain, a strong sense of 
their identity as Americans. At the training camps, it had been of prime importance 
whether a draftee came from the North or the South, whether he was Jewish, Polish, 
Italian, Irish or of German background. Regional, religious and ethnic differences 
tended to lose their meaning overseas, and the soldiers began to view themselves as 
Yanks – the same way that the British viewed them. Regarding the influence of the 
Army of the United States in Great Britain, the declaration of former GI Sandy Conti – 
I like to say the Victorian era in England ended when we arrived283 – is certainly an 
exaggeration. It can be said, however, that the presence of the Army of the United 
States had a significant and ultimately modernizing influence, if not on British society 
in general, then at least on a large proportion of young Britons, both male and 
female. Without intending to suggest any of the negative connotations inherent in 
today’s understanding of American cultural imperialism, it may be concluded that the 
occupation of Great Britain was its first campaign. 
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8 Dogface soldiers 
If I had time and anything like your ability to study war, I think I should concentrate 
almost entirely on the “actualities of war” – the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, 
lack of sleep, weather. The principles of strategy and tactics, and the logistics of 
war are really absurdly simple: it is the actualities that make war so complicated 
and so difficult, and are usually so neglected by historians. 
Field Marshal Lord Wavell to Sir Basil Liddell Hart.284 
To this point, we have concerned ourselves in some detail with the various factors 
that determined the external appearance and internal composition of the Army of the 
United States between 1943 and 1945. In the course of this examination, we have 
ascertained that the defining conditions took multiple forms. On one hand, they were 
derivatives and consequences of American tradition and history such as the three 
dialectical pairs presented in Chapter 2285 that controlled the organizational and 
cultural development of the U.S. Armed Forces. In part, these resulted from political, 
strategic and personal decisions made by key players. Roosevelt’s determination to 
intervene in the European crisis can be cited here as a primary example; likewise, his 
selection of Marshall as Chief of Staff, a choice that, for its part, had multiple cultural, 
personal and organizational implications for the Army of the United States. In 
addition, they were partly due to pure historical good fortune, like installing Albert 
Wedemeyer, a former student of the German Kriegsakademie, at the nerve center of 
strategic U.S. planning, a typical example of the unpredictability with which history 
continually unfolds. Lastly, they could take the form of technical and logistical 
imperatives like the Wedemeyer-conceived mobilization of the Army of the United 
States by means of the conveyor-belt techniques of industrial mass production. 
Closely linked to this point are the influences of the GIs᾽ way stations on the road to 
their theaters of operations, from passing through the induction, reception and 
training centers, continuing through parade grounds, ports of embarkation and days 
or weeks at sea, to eventually taking up residence in the United Kingdom, in some 
cases for many months. 
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In what reality did the infantry riflemen of the Army of the United States find 
themselves when they finally reached the war proper, the endpoint of their journey? 
What were the conditions that turned citizen soldiers into dogface soldiers? In order 
to answer such questions, we need to shift from the general to the specific and 
examine three distinct types of basic conditions. 
The first type can be subsumed under man-made conditions in the broadest sense. 
These include social standing, the nature of military duties and the living conditions of 
the infantry riflemen within the Army of the United States, as well as their perception 
of themselves in relation to the millions of non-infantry servicemen. The second type 
includes, of course, conditions that are beyond human influence. For these, we must 
devote a separate section to geography/topography, the key factor in the origin of the 
dogfaces. The more self-explanatory effects of climate will enter the analysis at the 
end of the chapter. Finally, two highly important catalytic factors related to this 
question make up the third type. First, we reflect on the person and the work of Bill 
Mauldin. Without Willie and Joe, the two prototypical dogfaces, and their integrative 
effect, this phenomenon would be unrecognizable as such, and this study would not 
be viable. Then we take up Stars and Stripes, the publication that in a literal sense 
coupled Mauldin’s cultural-creative energy with the soldiers who were simultaneously 
his audience and the source of his inspiration. 
In the final section of this chapter, we analyze the origin of the dogfaces in the 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations based on the information dealt with here. We 
will see how the various basic conditions under our review combined to create the 
foundations of a self-perception that in the end gave the dogface soldiers their final 
form. 
8.1 On the front lines 
… no women to be heroes in front of, damn little wine to drink, precious little song, 
cold and fairly dirty, just toiling from day to day in a world full of insecurity, 
discomfort, homesickness and a dulled sense of danger. 
Ernie Pyle286 
We were the Willie [sic] Lomans of the war. 
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Harold P. Leinbaugh, The Men of Company K.287 
We were the Willie [sic] Lomans of the war. Harold Leinbaugh᾽s allusion to the 
protagonist of Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman contains much that is true about 
the self-conception of the dogface soldiers. Like Miller’s sales representative, who 
broke down under the demands of the American dream, they discovered themselves 
in a reality where death and the often mentioned but rarely occurring million-dollar 
wound288 constituted the only exits from a world bereft of humanity, dignity and 
civilization. 
Within the Armed Forces, the dogfaces occupied the low end of the food chain. 
Among the combat elements of the Army of the United States, for example, airborne 
troopers and rangers could draw on their self-awareness as elites. The prestige of 
flying, much greater in the 1940s than it is today, accrued to aviators of the Army Air 
Forces. Armored Corps289 members personified the horror but also the fascination of 
mechanized warfare that had astonished the world when it was introduced into the 
vocabulary of military history by the German Wehrmacht between 1939 and 1941 
under the name ῾blitzkrieg᾽. Non-combat elements of the Army of the United States 
had to be content with less prestigious roles, of course, but these assignments 
allowed them to live under the comparatively greater security and relative comfort of 
the rear echelon. 
Service in the infantry involved none of these attributes. The infantry was not high-
tech, nor did its soldiers constitute an elite force. It was made up, for the most part, of 
(often reluctant) draftees, and it – or service in it – ran little risk of being perceived as 
something glamorous. Each branch of the Armed Forces had specific battlefield 
tasks. The Air Forces, tank formations and artillery were charged with preparation 
and support. Their tasks were directed against their exact enemy counterparts or 
were of a specific nature, such as tank operations deep within enemy territory. The 
central mission of any army at war, to close with and destroy the [main] Enemy, was 
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reserved to the infantry, known in an astonishing euphemism as the Queen of Battle. 
If there was an organization designed to live (and indeed to die) under inhuman 
conditions, this was the infantry. Its riflemen were the war’s expendables, the wear 
parts in a giant death machine. 
Naturally, the war was also a dangerous and ultimately deadly affair for the other 
combat services and the non-infantry components of the Army Ground Forces. Air or 
ship crews, for example, were as much in danger of losing their lives. In fact, over 
much of the war, it was the bomber crews of the 8th and 15th USAAF that experienced 
the comparatively highest losses; this was the problem confronting Yossarian, 
Joseph Heller’s hero in Catch-22. In spite of this, service in the Army Air Forces, the 
Navy and the other fighting elements of the Army Ground Forces was distinctively 
different from infantry service. At the conclusion of their missions, air crews and 
sailors returned to a structured environment where they regularly received hot meals, 
showered and slept in beds. Warfare for them, while still deadly, was a nine-to-five 
job, one that featured breaks and the recuperation that goes with them, and at least a 
bit of separation from the battle. For most dogfaces, the only way to withdraw from 
the front lines was in a body bag or on a stretcher. They endured long stretches 
unprotected from the elements, slept – when sleep was at all possible – in foxholes 
under the stars at all seasons of the year, and rarely had an opportunity to change 
their uniform or even take their shoes off for a short time; in sum, they rarely had the 
possibility to lead a life worthy of a human being. 
Author and literary scholar Paul Fussell served as a young infantry officer in 
southeastern France in 1944. His memoir Doing Battle: The Making of a Skeptic is an 
outstanding source for those interested in learning about the absurdity, suffering and 
humiliation intrinsic to the infantry experience. Among his descriptions is an account 
of a situation in the winter of 1944 that took on increasingly epidemic proportions due 
to poor hygienic conditions, circumstances that, in various forms, were known to 
virtually every dogface: 
One night I was marching with my platoon toward a town where we were to be 
billeted. Suddenly, with no warning at all, my stomach churned and terrible 
cramps forced out a cascade of liquid shit before I could scuttle to the side of the 
road and drop my trousers … I spent fifteen minutes in a rutabaga patch trying to 
clean myself up. I first used my trench knife to cut off my soaking, stinking long 
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underwear. I then tried to wipe off my legs, not with toilet paper, which I’d not yet 
learned never to be without, but with the only paper I had, some fancy stationary 
I’d bought in a town we’d passed through … This cleanup was only barely 
successful: socks and shoes were still wet, brown, and offensive … In the next 
few days, I somehow found some washing water and a few clean articles of 
uniform.290 
It should come as a surprise to few that Fussell describes war as a theater of terror, 
mortality, humiliation [and] the absurd291. The most absurd external circumstances, 
no realistic chance of improvement within sight, and the constantly present danger of 
losing one’s life were the cornerstones of the dogface’s existence. Finally, Bill 
Mauldin’s short instruction to readers back home on how to approximate the infantry 
experience is, in equal measure, impressive in its simplicity and revealing: 
Dig a hole in your back yard while it is raining. Sit in the hole until the water 
climbs up around your ankles. Pour cold mud down your shirt collar. Sit there for 
forty-eight hours, and, so there is no danger of your dozing off, imagine that a guy 
is sneaking around waiting for a chance to club you on the head or set your 
house on fire. 
Get out of the hole, fill a suitcase full of rocks, pick it up, put a shotgun in your 
other hand, and walk on the muddiest road you can find. Fall flat on your face 
every few minutes as you imagine big meteors streaking down to sock you. After 
ten or twelve miles (remember – you are still carrying the shotgun and suitcase) 
start sneaking through the wet bush. Imagine that someone has booby-trapped 
your route with rattlesnakes which will bite you if you step on them. Give some 
friend a rifle and have him blast in your direction once in awhile.  
Snoop around until you find a bull. Try to figure out a way to sneak around him 
without letting him see you. When he does see you, run like hell all the way back 
to your hole in the back yard, drop the suitcase and shotgun, and get in. If you 
repeat this performance every three days for several months, you may begin to 
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understand why an infantryman sometimes gets out of breath. But you still won’t 
understand how he feels when things get tough.292 
When things got tough 
The state of exhaustion, latent fear of death, hunger, lack of sleep and weather 
conditions to which the dogfaces were exposed on an almost continual basis 
represented, in a way, the hazy background of their existence as they periodically 
engaged in battles and skirmishes. To paraphrase John Keegan, I am in the 
fortunate situation to be able to say that I was never in a battle or even near one, 
never heard one in the distance or saw its direct impact.293 I have read about battles, 
seen and read interviews with participants, and studied photographs and films of 
battles. Nevertheless, the attempt to construct a picture from a distance, as it were, 
using available sources and reflective processes in order to describe the reality of a 
battle to an acceptable degree can only end in euphemism. 
The arsenal of weapons systems that confronted the infantry in World War II had an 
applicable range and volume of destructive power against the human physique that 
would have been inconceivable in the 19th Century. In The Face of Battle, his 
reference work on the nature and character of battles, Keegan examines the effects 
of anti-infantry weaponry during World War I. Apart from the fact that precision and 
destructive power had become even greater in World War II, the dogfaces essentially 
faced the same risks. 
Shell wounds were the most to be feared, because of the multiple effects shell 
explosion could produce in the human body. At its worst it could disintegrate a 
human being, so that nothing recognizable – sometimes apparently nothing at all 
– remained of him … shell blast could create over-pressures or vacuums in the 
body’s organs, rupturing the lungs and producing hemorrhages in the brain and 
spinal cord … Much the most common wounding by shell fire, however, was by 
splinter or shrapnel ball … they often travelled in clusters, which would inflict 
several large or many small wounds on the same person. The splinters were 
irregular in shape, so producing a very rough wound with a great deal of tissue 
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damage, and they frequently carried fragments of clothing or other foreign matter 
into the body, which made infection almost inevitable. Very large fragments could 
… amputate limbs, decapitate, bisect or otherwise grossly mutilate the human 
frame … As a killing agent over long as well as short ranges, however, the bullet 
was champion … the high-velocity conical bullet, spinning quickly about his long 
axis, could produce inside the human body a variety of extremely unpleasant 
results … Should it be caused to ‘tumble’ inside the body, however, either hitting 
bone or for some ballistic reason, its path beyond the point of tumble became 
very much enlarged and the exit wound … ‘explosive’ in appearance. The effects 
of a tumble produced by striking bone were enhanced by the bone’s splintering 
under the impact, its own fragments the becoming secondary projectiles which 
produced massive damage to tissue round about. Some bullets also set up 
hydraulic effects, their passage driving body fluids away from the wound track at 
pressures which the surrounding tissues could not withstand.294 
It is possible to describe in detail the catastrophic casualties that World War II 
weaponry inflicted on the human body, or to discuss the physical implications of this 
experience for troops on the battlefield. I am convinced, however, that it is impossible 
to conceive the reality of a battle. Even if one stresses how specific actions, whether 
proper or not, are immaterial to a person’s own survival, how brutally arbitrary death 
can be in claiming one victim but not the next, or how terror, mortal fear, exhaustion, 
aggression, hatred and panic dominate the physical and psychological landscape, 
these observations remain merely an anemic description of a battle’s isolated effects 
on individuals. Their concentrated effects must be felt, not merely read in a book. In 
this regard, the outstanding opening sequence of Steven Spielberg᾽s otherwise 
mediocre Saving Private Ryan295 is highly recommendable. Its portrayal of the 
infernal slaughter on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944 expands the limits of 
audiovisual reproducibility of battles and shows how closely one can approximate 
such an experience without actually being present. 
Another way to achieve at least an idea of the hell humans can create on the modern 
battlefield is to focus on the image of a battle’s aftermath. In Crusade in Europe, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s memoir of his performance as Supreme Commander Allied 
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Expeditionary Forces, describes what he saw in summer 1944 near Falaise, the site 
of the Western Allies’ decisive maneuver in the fight for France: 
Roads, highways, and fields were so choked with destroyed equipment and with 
dead men that passage through that area was extremely difficult … I was 
conducted through it on foot, to encounter scenes that could only be described by 
Dante. It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards, stepping on nothing 
but dead and decaying flesh.296 
What Eisenhower leaves out of his account of this scene, possibly out of 
consideration for his readers, is the stench of (summer) battlefields. The author 
Kingsley Amis, who, as a soldier of the British army, took part in the same battle at 
Falaise, allows his readers the following description: 
I saw a lot of people whom that [being killed] happened to around Falaise, so 
recently that there had been no time to bulldoze some to the roadside. Like life-
sized dolls, everyone said, as everyone always has. The horses … seemed 
almost more pitiful, rigid in the shafts with their upper lips drawn above their teeth 
as if in continuing pain. The dead cows smelled even worse. The stench of rotting 
human and animal bodies was so overpowering that the pilots of the spotter 
planes flying above the scene to direct more and more artillery damage 
vomited.297 
In 1945, Stars and Stripes, the daily newspaper of the Army of the United States, 
published a compilation of poetry sent to it by soldiers during the war. In this volume, 
Puptent Poets of the “Stars and Stripes Mediterranean”, two poems in particular 
stand out that describe the heavy fighting in Italy that was a key element in the origin 
of the dogface soldiers. They give witness to the devastating yet non-scarring effects 
of the war, thus concluding our attempted excursion into the realities of battle: 
BATTLE (Sergeant S. Colker)298 
The blackness was in me, 
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Such fate and fury as I had never known: 
Complete amnesia from love and spring, 
And tenderness of home. 
Surging through me, I could feel it rise 
And lift me with it. 
I was free, to lust for blood, 
And I could use my hands 
To tear and smash. 
My eyes to sight for killing! 
The noises, whistling, wooming 
In the blackness 
Became a part of me, 
Spurred my passion, lashed me on, 
Became fused with my mind’s unwholesomeness: 
I would caress, with savagery, 
And put them all in hell forever. 
I willed to butcher as they had butchered, 
Destroy as they had destroyed. 
I sobbed aloud as no man has ever cried: 
Someone screamed, maybe me. I could smell 
Powder, burnt flesh, maybe mine. 
I think I died then. 
I don’t want to remember any more. 
God knows – I wish I could forget. 
 
HOME FROM WAR (Corporal Anthony Carlin)299 
Who can say at war’s end 
“We are lucky living men?” 
After so much of us has died 
How can we be satisfied 
That we, the so-called living men, 
Will find a way to live again? 
For when a man has daily faced 
The brute within him, low, debased, 
Can he look forward to the light, 
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Wipe out the memories of the fight 
Forget the strange erotic bliss 
That comes with some cheap purchased kiss? 
Ah, no! And it will be his fateful lot 
To live on and find that he lives not 
Though like the living we’ll behave 
We’ll be the dead without a grave. 
8.2 Critical factor: topography 
This mountain country varies from low hills covered with olive orchards and 
terraced fields to barren rocky peaks about six thousand feet high. Villages of 
tightly crowded gray stone houses cling to the steep slopes, and crumbling ruins of 
ancient castles here and there look down on the green valleys below. The rugged 
mountains are a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops, and the Volturno 
and Calore rivers reinforce the barrier. The Volturno, rising in the high mountains 
north of Venafro, follows an erratic course southeast to Amorosi, where it is joined 
by the Calore. Then, turning west, it cuts through a narrow gap in the mountains at 
Triflisco and flows out into the coastal plain. The Calore rises in the mountains 
southeast of Benevento and flows generally westward to its junction with the 
Volturno. The lower reaches of the Volturno and Calore form a continuous 
obstacle, almost sixty miles long, lying directly in the path of any advance on Rome 
from the south. 
From the Volturno to the Winter Line300 
In addition to the factors described in the previous sections, geographical space and 
its topographical properties form part of the general conditions affecting the genesis 
of the dogface soldiers. In order to find our way around this space in coming sections, 
but above all to understand its significance, we first have to go back briefly to the 
early 20th Century to review how the war evolved operationally and to consider the 
events of World War II against the backdrop of the first global conflict, from 1914 to 
1918. 
As Europe’s Great Powers began to mobilize in summer 1914, their military planning 
bodies were unaware of how profoundly the Industrial Revolution had influenced the 
conduct of war. The techniques of mass production made it possible to equip and 
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field armies of unprecedented size. In addition, the development of the machine gun 
and enhancements in the area of artillery had altered the strategic balance between 
military offense and defense decidedly in favor of the latter. The military doctrines of 
the warring nations did not take such advancements into consideration, however, and 
this failure caused the fronts of World War I to solidify into trenches.  
In the process, gigantic armies on both sides hemorrhaged from frontal attacks on 
fortified defensive lines, sustaining preposterous losses. On July 1, 1916, for 
example, the first day of its Somme offensive, the British army suffered 60,000 
casualties without gaining any significant ground. When the offensive concluded in 
November, British forces had advanced just over two miles at a cost of 420,000 
casualties.301 World War I history is rife with comparable examples. 
Most of the participating nations accepted this defensive advantage as unalterable, 
adapting their respective doctrines accordingly. In contrast, Germany developed 
tactical and operational concepts to enable itself to break the deadlock and regain 
pace and vigor in battles. These considerations resulted in mechanized, motorized 
formations and the operational concepts of combined arms warfare, concentration302 
and deep penetrating maneuvers. This type of combat, subsumed under the term 
῾blitzkrieg᾽, typically focused on the opponent’s supply infrastructure, means of 
communications and leadership structures as initial targets. In this way, it was 
possible to strip the Enemy of the ability to mount organized resistance right at the 
beginning of the battle, thus minimizing one’s own losses and hastening the 
successful conclusion of operations. Airplanes as well as state-of-the-art tank models 
and trucks became the iconic embodiments of this revolutionary development. They 
gave military forces the necessary mobility and firepower to carry out the blitzkrieg 
concept. After the world had witnessed (in 1939 in Poland, 1940 in France and 1941 
in the Soviet Union) the superiority of these innovations on the battlefield, however, 
the Allies began to modify their own doctrines and adapt a form of blitzkrieg for their 
armies. 
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With respect to the development of the dogfaces, the determining fact is the absence 
of these operational icons of World War II – and, as a result, the absence of 
movement. They came into being in spaces characterized by geographical or 
topographical conditions that rendered the doctrinaire deployment of maneuver 
warfare weapons systems difficult or impossible.303 Robbed of these assets, the 
dogfaces found themselves once again in the bloody operational reality of the First 
World War, with static lines, frontal attacks on fortified positions and surroundings 
that conferred great advantages on the defender. 
8.3 Catalyst: Bill Mauldin 
Some day a Thucydides will arise among us, one who will be a historian and a 
philosophical moralist, an appraiser of essential values and a spokesman of the 
spiritual ideal; one with a discerning mind and in love with eternal things, and he 
will give us the measure of the struggle (which we call the Second World War) in 
prose whose majesty will match the majesty of his theme and its fateful import for 
mankind. There is something of this majesty in Churchill’s monumental work – the 
dramatic sweep of the world-shaking events he is depicting is almost audible in the 
rhythms of his language and is awe-inspiring in the stark directness of his 
statement, and it is almost as if the events themselves were speaking. Both 
Mauldin and Churchill are, in a sense, historians; Mauldin’s is the still small voice 
that Elijah heard on the mountain, and Churchill’s is the thunder that pealed forth 
from Sinai. And the historian, yet to come, who will also be a philosopher and a 
moralist, will turn to Mauldin as well as to Churchill when he searches out and 
sums up for us the imperishable meaning of the conflict and the opposing 
conceptions of man’s status and worth that were pitted against each other. 
Israel Knox304 
In April 2002, 57 years after the former GI had read Up Front305 as he lay severely 
wounded in a sick bay, he felt a desire to express the attachment and esteem he felt 
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for the cartoonist. From the son, he learned that his father, who suffered from 
Alzheimer’s, was near death. Following a day-long visit with the cartoonist, the old 
soldier wrote letters to newspapers and veterans organizations to encourage other 
World War II GIs to visit him in order to show him how important his work had been 
for them and to assure him that they had not forgotten him. In July and August of the 
same year, two journalists from the Orange County Register and the Chicago 
Tribune, upon becoming aware of the by now steadily growing grass-roots 
movement, wrote about it in their respective newspaper columns. Shortly afterward, 
sacks of letters, postcards and packages addressed to the cartoonist began to arrive 
at his nursing home. By the start of the fall, he had received over 10,000 pieces of 
correspondence. Large numbers of former GIs traveled from all over the United 
States to be at the cartoonist’s bedside. The nursing home had to turn most of them 
away, as it was feared he would not live long enough to receive them all.306 
Life 
“My first recollection of this world,” I said, “is of sitting on the bank of a little river in 
Parral, Chihuahua, Mexico, in 1924, at the age of three, finishing the last of a pack 
of Chesterfields which, according to three witnesses, I’d smoked in a little more 
than an hour.” 
Bill Mauldin, A Sort of a Saga307 
William Henry “Bill” Mauldin was born in 1921, the second son of day laborer Sidney 
Mauldin and his wife Katrina, on a farm in New Mexico. Due to illness and the poor 
diet of depression-plagued rural America, he grew into a fragile teenager. Unable to 
participate in most of the cowboy activities that were the usual pastimes for boys in 
his area, he soon discovered his talent and passion for drawing, a skill that his 
mother both recognized and encouraged.308 
In 1936, following the separation of his parents, Bill and his brother Sid left home. 
Like many other youths during the Great Depression, they sought their fortune in 
distant places; for the Mauldin brothers, the location was Phoenix, Arizona. While Sid 
                                            
306 DePastino, A Life Up Front, p. 2 f. 
307 Bill Mauldin, A Sort of a Saga (New York 1949), p. 11 ff. 
308 DePastino, A Life Up Front, p. 7 ff. 
126 
 
found work using the auto mechanic skills he had learned from his father, Bill 
attended (very occasionally) Phoenix Union High School, earning a bit of money 
designing posters and as a school cartoonist. Already convinced by this time of his 
artistic future, he focused exclusively on art-related subjects. The only exception to 
this was the Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC), in which he was an 
enthusiastic participant. In addition to satisfying a youthful fascination for military 
pomp and circumstance, his participation also carried a financial advantage. As an 
ROTC student, he was issued a complete dress uniform, thereby easing the strain on 
Bill’s limited wardrobe budget.309 
Without graduating from high school, Bill moved to Chicago in June 1939. There he 
gained acceptance into a year of study at the Chicago Academy of Fine Arts, a 
school that had already produced several well-known cartoonists. His studies that 
year nurtured his skills in academic drawing, a proficiency that, for all his talent, had 
previously been lacking. After failing to achieve his hoped-for aspiration to become a 
successful freelance cartoonist in Chicago, however, he returned to Phoenix in June 
1940. There he managed to be hired by both of the candidates for governor as a 
poster artist for their respective electoral campaigns. Neither politician, in fact, knew 
that Mauldin was also working for his opponent. He took advantage of this lack of 
awareness to produce very bold caricatures of each of the rival candidates, but made 
the mistake of signing his work. When this double-dealing came to light, he was 
strongly advised by various parties to leave town.310 
After this latest setback in Bill Mauldin᾽s budding artistic career, he turned to the 
second subject that had long fascinated him and, on September 12, 1940, he 
enlisted in the 120th Quartermaster Regiment of the Arizona National Guard (ANG). 
Only four days later, the ANG was federalized, which meant that it became 
subordinated to the War Department in Washington. Together with national 
guardsmen from Colorado, New Mexico and Oklahoma, the ANG was organized as 
the 45th Infantry Division, one of the poorly equipped and scarcely trained units of the 
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National Guard that were activated in the course of the mobilization of the Army of 
the United States.311 
To Bill’s disappointment, the 120th Quartermaster Regiment was an assemblage of 
failed civilians and petty criminals, described by Todd DePastino as a corrupt corner 
of the United States Army, a fetid backwater of a second-class national guard 
division.312 In this environment, Mauldin᾽s provocative and direct personality forced 
him to spend most of his time assigned to kitchen police, guard duty or latrine 
cleaning. By the beginning of October, however, he achieved prominence with the 
only division-level newspaper project up to that date, the 45th Division News. The 
weekly was published by Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Harrison, the division’s Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Harrison, an editor at the Daily Oklahoman who had 
been called up for active duty and who did battle on many fronts against 
organizational stumbling blocks and in support of his newspaper’s editorial 
independence, allowed Mauldin to talk him into a part-time cartoonist job. On October 
25, 1940, his first army cartoon appeared in the 45th Division News.313 
A textbook example of chickenshit314 provoked Mauldin᾽s next move, one that would 
prove to be crucial to his future as a dogface cartoonist. In spring 1940, every 
member of the Army from general to private was administered an IQ test that was to 
be used in assisting the Army to assign each testee according to his abilities. Mauldin 
achieved a score of 140, the highest in the 120th Quartermasters and second-highest 
in the almost 13,000-man 45th Infantry. Within his immediate surroundings, this 
extraordinary performance was recognized by his being assigned to permanent KP 
duty by the first sergeant315 of his company,316. Following this incident, Mauldin tried 
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to convince Harrison to transfer him into his intelligence section, threatening that he 
would otherwise sign up with the infantry. For administrative reasons, Harrison was 
unable to grant his request for transfer. Mauldin had, in the meantime, become 
fiercely determined to leave the Quartermasters. He made good his threat and filed a 
request for transfer. This is how, shortly thereafter, he found himself again in a 
completely different world, namely in K Company, 180th Infantry Regiment, 45th 
Infantry Division.317 
Mauldin finally found there what had been so sorely lacking with the Quartermasters: 
comradeship, cohesion, a sense of military tradition, and pride in one’s own 
profession. K Company corresponded to his expectation of what military units should 
be: 
When K Company fell out for reveille, we found our officers dressed, shaven, and 
waiting for us, instead of a red-eyed first sergeant wearing bedroom slippers and 
tucking in his shirttail beside a can of foaming quartermaster piss.318 
Although the well-known reputation of the 120th Quartermasters had preceded his 
arrival and most of the skills and techniques of the infantry were a mystery to him, he 
rapidly integrated himself into his new surroundings. He continued to work as a part-
time division cartoonist and still had the physique of a delicate 15-year-old. In spite of 
this, he requested no special status in his unit, something that quickly assured him 
the respect of his fellow soldiers in K Company.319 
In the months that followed, Mauldin led a double life as cartoonist/infantryman until 
the 45th Infantry Division took part in the Louisiana Maneuvers320 in August 1941 and 
he was assigned to the division’s press staff for the duration. When the United States 
itself became a belligerent following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the spiral 
of events began to turn more rapidly for the 45th as well as for Bill Mauldin. In early 
1942, he met an 18-year-old student named Norma Jean Humphries. Nature always 
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seems to step up the mating instinct when killing is afoot321, was his explanation for 
asking for Jean’s hand only a few weeks later, and the two were married on February 
28, 1942. Shortly thereafter, the 45th Infantry received the order to deploy to Fort 
Devens, Massachusetts, where it was to receive its final pre-combat training. Less 
than two months after their wedding, the two newlyweds were separated by war. 
Contrary to widespread expectation, Mauldin᾽s division was to spend the next 13 
months in the United States. It had originally been designated for Operation TORCH, 
the November 8, 1942 invasion of North Africa, but was temporarily held back for 
later deployment. During this period, Mauldin lived through eventful times. The 45th 
Division News was suspended for reasons of secrecy, since it was anticipated that 
the division would soon be deployed to a Theater of Operations. At the same time, a 
demand for army cartoons developed in the civilian newspaper market from which 
Mauldin could profit, if only modestly. 
In early 1942, Chief of Staff Marshall ordered the Army᾽s Information and Education 
Division to develop a news and entertainment magazine by and for the enlisted men. 
The attention of social scientists in the War Department, concerned over emotional 
stability and cohesion as a result of the explosive expansion of the citizen army, was 
drawn to the 45th Division News, and they proposed to Marshall a comparable but 
army-wide project. This led to the launch of Yank, the Army’s weekly magazine. 
Mauldin saw a chance to move up from part-time to full-time cartoonist, and he sent 
Yank a portfolio of work samples and an application. His style, however, at that time 
still comparatively realistic, held little appeal for those responsible for the project.322 
In total, Yank accepted and published only six of his cartoons, which were seen as 
rather childish, probably due to the artist’s hasty submission. In view of the authentic 
quality of his later work, it should be regarded as a stroke of fortune that Mauldin 
ceased his attempts to succeed at Yank. 
The 45th Infantry bounced around various army camps in the succeeding months as it 
completed a number of training programs specific to climate and deployment. The 
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45th Division News was reborn323 during this period, and this time Mauldin succeeded 
in becoming a permanent staff member of the newspaper. At the Casablanca 
Conference in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill reached a final agreement that 
Sicily was to be the next objective of Allied forces once the North African campaign 
had been concluded, and the 45th Infantry Division was slotted to participate in the 
operation. After a brief stopover on the coast of North Africa, the 45th Division landed 
near Scoglitti on the south coast of Sicily on July 10, 1943 as part of Operation 
HUSKY. For Bill Mauldin, this day was the actual start to his career as a cartoonist, 
one that would last for several decades and earn him two Pulitzer Prizes.324 
He accompanied the 45th Infantry Division as a member of its press staff throughout 
the entire Sicilian campaign. Mauldin had relatively free movement around the island 
and could, at his own discretion, visit the force’s various units, where he gathered 
impressions and ideas that he later translated into cartoons. His medium, the 45th 
Division News, was published on a highly improvisational basis. The press staff 
accompanied the division across the island and, lacking its own infrastructure, was 
always on the lookout for working printing presses. Whenever the staff could put 
together infrastructure and materials, a new issue of the newspaper was published. 
This is how, on the night of July 11/12, 1943, the first Allied newspaper to be printed 
on Axis soil – 3000 hand-printed copies of the 45th Division News – came into being. 
The letters K and Y do not exist in the Italian language. When local printers were 
unable to typeset these letters, the staff avoided words containing them as far as 
possible. In the case of the letter W, likewise unknown in Italy, an inverted M was 
used.325 
Mauldin᾽s cartoons, which accompanied the advance of the Allied campaign, quickly 
became enormously popular among the GIs of the Seventh Army in Sicily. As the 
campaign drew to a close, he therefore decided on his own – and notably, on credit – 
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to publish a Sicily Sketchbook featuring a selection of his best cartoons. On 
September 8, 1943, the day the Allies landed on the Italian mainland, Mauldin sold 
out two editions totaling 17,000 copies, earning him fame among U.S. soldiers 
throughout the Mediterranean Theater. His work in Sicily attracted not only the 
admiration of the ordinary soldiers but also the attention of Stars and Stripes326 and 
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., Commander of Seventh Army.327 Colonel 
Egbert White, editor-in-chief of Stars and Stripes, an enthusiastic admirer of 
Mauldin᾽s work, engaged him as a collaborator for the daily newspaper, which had a 
circulation across several theaters of operations. Patton’s interest, on the other hand, 
was based much less on his esteem, and it marked the beginning of a remarkable 
period of hostility at the end of which the three-star general was bested by the three-
stripe sergeant.328 
After Allied forces, with Fifth Army as its American contingent, landed on Italy’s 
Amalfi coast, Bill Mauldin continued his work for the 45th Division News, using Sicily 
as a model. At the beginning of December, however, he was given his release in 
order to work thenceforth for Stars and Stripes, appearing under the banner Up Front 
… with Mauldin329. He joined the Stars and Stripes staff permanently in February 
1944. This change meant that Mauldin’s drawings were published throughout 
Europe. His celebrity among the GIs, up to that point largely of a regional nature, 
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spread to all American troops on and beyond the European continent. In March 1944, 
one of his supporters, Fifth Army Commanding General Mark W. Clark, put a 
personal jeep at Mauldin’s disposal in order to facilitate his search for new inspiration. 
After converting the vehicle into a mobile studio with electric lights and a built-in 
drawing board, Bill Mauldin accompanied the American armies throughout all of Italy 
and France and finally into Germany … along the way, he made the acquaintance of 
Willie and Joe.330 
Cartooning 
I’ve seen too much of the Army to be funny about first sergeants and corporals, 
and I’ve seen too much of the war to be cute and fill it with funny characters. 
Bill Mauldin, Up Front331 
He was one of us. He supported the enlisted man. He was our champion, Mauldin 
was. 
You would have to be part of a combat infantry unit to appreciate what moments of 
relief Bill gave us. You had to be reading a soaking wet Stars and Stripes in a 
water-filled foxhole and then see one of his cartoons. 
WWII combat infantry veterans332 
… the cartoons of Bill Mauldin [are] among the most accurate impressions of the 
war … 
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.333 
One must ask, however, what makes Mauldin’s cartoons at all recommendable as 
specific source materials on the American combat infantry in World War II. Up Front 
… by Mauldin was not the only graphic arts series found in American Army 
publications. Yank, for example, had two regular features, G.I. Joe by Dave Breger 
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and Sad Sack334 by George Baker, both of which gained wide recognition. Neither, 
however, came even close to the popularity and reception of the Bill Mauldin 
cartoons. What distinguishes his graphic work from that of his journalistic colleagues? 
What special quality manifests itself in Mauldin’s cartoons that is not apparent in the 
drawings of rival artists? 
From a technical, art-historical perspective, one apparent difference at least between 
the oeuvres of Baker and Mauldin is that Baker’s works represent classic comic 
strips, while Up Front … by Mauldin fits the classic definition of a cartoon series. The 
Sad Sack series consists of sequential works that develop their action and message 
over several individual frames using methods largely borrowed from cinematography. 
It employs photographic techniques such as establishing shots that are well known 
from film, categories for camera settings such as total, mid shot, American and close 
up, as well as techniques like the ῾shot reverse shot᾽ method, in order to infuse its 
storytelling with dramatic composition and dynamism. This kinship between 
cinematography and comic strips has its most obvious expression in the so-called 
storyboards, de facto comic strips that serve as graphic notations to break down the 
sequence, settings and action of a scene, often used by the director to develop 
action-oriented scenes. 
In contrast to these techniques, cartoons like Up Front or G.I. Joe are commonly 
displayed in a single frame. As a master of his craft, Mauldin repeatedly performs the 
artistry of conveying the essence of his message by reducing graphic and/or verbal 
expression to its barest minimum. The following example, included in the present 
volume as an introduction to Mauldin’s work, shows how this compression ideally 
functions as a stylistic device. While the cartoon falls thematically outside our 
intended focus on the infantry, it nonetheless depicts U.S. Army cavalry forces, an 
object of fundamental change at the time when the cartoon was drawn. 
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Fig. 2  Cavalry sergeant shooting his jeep (1944). Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944) 
Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Mauldin equated a cartoon requiring no subtitling to a home run in a baseball 
game.335 Without intending to offer a full exploration of the content’s deeper meaning, 
the following can be said: 
At the start of the American involvement in the Second World War, U.S. Cavalry 
forces found themselves in the midst of a profound shift with respect to their outward 
appearance and importance within the Armed Forces. On the one hand, their forces 
were gradually becoming mechanized, and it was increasingly necessary to bid 
farewell to the horses that had given them their identity up to that time. On the other 
hand, the beginning of the war represented the final, lowest point in a downward 
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spiral in the importance of the U.S. Cavalry. After the end of the Civil War, the highly 
mobile mounted forces of the border regions embodied United States military power. 
In the era of total industrialized warfare emanating from the thinking of the German 
General Staff, horse-mounted forces had become obsolete, while motorized-
mechanized cavalry had been essentially reduced to a reconnaissance role that, in 
most cases, could be better performed from the air. For the knowledgeable observer, 
any commentary to the present illustration is superfluous. The jeep lying immobile 
with a broken axle and the well-fed first sergeant unable to cope with putting his 
vehicle out of its misery speak volumes about the precarious situation of the U.S. 
Cavalry in World War II and about the information-transfer potential of graphic 
methods. 
In terms of their content, three fundamental features can be established that 
differentiate the three series under discussion: the perspective and position of their 
protagonists, the type of comedy on which each respective series is based, and 
lastly, their claim to having a genuine authenticity. Sad Sack and G.I. Joe might be 
described as draftee cartoons. Their protagonists are in the army but not of it336, as 
were their spiritual fathers, Baker and Breger. The driving force of their action and the 
source of their humor lie in the mutual tension between naive draftees and the 
realities and traditions of army life. In both cases, youthfully portrayed, largely 
incompetent and stubborn privates struggle against the Army’s strictly regulated and 
intellectually immovable environment. The classic personification of the obstacles 
encountered by G.I. Joe and Sad Sack is the prototypical drill sergeant. Both series 
are based on exaggerated stereotypes, civilian preconceptions and slapstick 
methods. One can look in vain for actual authenticity or indications of past (if 
subjectively perceived) reality. 
Mauldin᾽s drawings, in contrast, represent the perspective of an experienced insider. 
His protagonists are old hands in the soldiering business. His cartoons assume a 
familiarity with the operating principles, rules and particularities of the sociocultural 
microcosm that is the Army of the United States. Mauldin᾽s type of comedy (if it is 
even appropriate to classify his works in that genre) derives from the absurdities, 
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tensions and conflicts within a world taken for granted.337 Yet it has an aftertaste. 
Sometimes tragic, mostly absurd, often arousing compassion, and over and over, 
simply deadly. Mauldin᾽s mission was to give voice to the dogfaces. He saw himself 
as their advocate and representative, there to broach the issue of the miserable 
conditions of their existence. The actions on the surface of his cartoons may induce a 
smile. Their deeper truth rarely does.338  
The narrative intensity of Mauldin᾽s cartoons is stylistically exaggerated through his 
application of chiaroscuro technique. Originating in the baroque period, this style 
achieves form and texture primarily through rough strokes that produce contrasts 
between light and dark. It furthers economical working methods and achieves a 
visual effect that is realistic, hard in appearance and high in contrast. In this sense, 
and with very few exceptions, the connecting element of his drawings lies in his deep 
rootedness in the reality of the war at ground level. In their artistic presentation and in 
their subjects, they are authentic above all else. As David Michaelis, the biographer 
of Charles Schulz, described them: 
These were not the square-jawed soldiers of enlistment posters. Pale, densely 
bearded, forested by their own rifles and packs, their huge dirt-caked boots and 
filthy uniforms delineated in heavily shaded brush strokes, Willie and Joe looked 
not just disheveled but mummified by mud. One G.I., a machine-gunner named 
Charles Schulz who went on to do some cartooning of his own, spoke for many 
when he later had Snoopy remark, “He drew great mud.”  
                                            
337 Ibid., p. 67. 
338 Admittedly, this volume deals exclusively with Mauldin’s war cartoons in the narrow sense, 
meaning those that appeared starting with his arrival in Sicily on July 8, 1943. Even his earlier 
drawings were distinguishable in their realism from comparable cartoons. They had, however, a 
lightness and playfulness, a humor based on simple principles that was gradually lost with the war 
cartoons. The cartoons from his time with the 120th Quartermasters were based on a continuous 
narrative and reflected the multiple failings of that unit. With his transfer to the 180th Infantry Regiment, 
Mauldin shifted to individual drawings without continuous action, touching on issues like infantry 
customs and traditions or day-to-day political events. It is little surprising that Mauldin’s entry into the 
shooting war had serious repercussions on his perceptions. Both stylistically and with respect to his 
subjects, this new awareness led to a significant development of his work, from which this study seeks 
to benefit. (Cf. DePastino, A Life Up Front, p. 63 ff.) 
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Real combat soldiers loved Mauldin. His cartoons were well drawn and funny, 
and, as the famed correspondent Ernie Pyle reported to the civilian press, “They 
are also terribly grim and real.” Mauldin won admiration because he worked hard 
to get every detail right; in Willie and Joe he mirrored the American combat 
soldier’s deep respect for professionalism. Mauldin’s foot-slogging pair did not 
Sergeant York339 the enemy’s machine gun nests, nor did they sit on Sad Sack 
haunches, looking helpless and beaten. They dug in and hung on. They put up 
with war. They hated it, but they fought and killed when they had to, as 
professionals do.340 
Mauldin᾽s realism did not just meet with approval, however. It ran counter to the 
clean-cut all-American boy image of the GI abroad that was portrayed in most 
American media. In a letter to the editor of the Daily Oklahoman341, a woman 
objected: Our boys don’t look like the way you draw them. They’re not bearded and 
horrible looking. They’re clean fine Americans.342 Another reader saw in Mauldin᾽s 
                                            
339 Sergeant Alvin C. York was the American hero of World War I. As a member of a pacifist church, 
he had originally requested exemption from military service as a conscientious objector. His objections 
were denied, however, and his superiors eventually convinced him that the United States was carrying 
out a holy campaign in France. Transformed into a model soldier from that point onward, York found 
himself in October 1918 on patrol with his fellow soldiers behind the German lines, where they came 
under heavy fire. With most of his patrol dead or wounded, York went on the offensive completely on 
his own. In the space of a few hours, he killed two dozen German soldiers, captured four officers and 
128 enlisted men, and silenced 35 German machine-gun nests. York was awarded the American 
Medal of Honor and the French Croix de Guerre for his one-man offensive. (David W. Lee, Alvin 
Cullum York, in: Peter Karsten [Ed.], Encyclopedia of War and American Society [New York 2005], p. 
959.) 
340 Michaelis, He Drew Great Mud. 
341 Ernie Pyle became aware of Mauldin᾽s cartoons while in Italy. In his column of January 15, 1944, 
Personalities and Asides, he included the comment that “Sgt. Bill Mauldin appears to us over there as 
the finest cartoonist the war had produced. And that’s not merely because his cartoons are funny, but 
because they are so terribly grim and real …They are about the men in the line – the tiny percentage 
of our vast Army who are actually up there doing the dying. His cartoons are about the war.” (Ernie 
Pyle, Brave Men [London 2001], p. 137 ff.) After this acclaim from America᾽s best-loved 
correspondent, demand in the U.S. for Mauldin᾽s cartoons began to grow. By the end of the war in 
Europe, they were appearing in over 200 publications. (Cf. DePastino, A Life Up Front, p. 126 ff.) 
342 Cited in: DePastino, A Life Up Front, p. 171. 
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dogfaces … prehistoric monsters who had just come out of a cave to see what it was 
all about.343 His cartoons earned an extremely bad reputation among some of the top 
brass344, since they addressed conditions that distorted the clinically clean official 
image of the Army of the United States. Corruption, criminal behavior, incompetence, 
alcoholism, injustice, post-traumatic stress syndrome345 … you name it. Despite all 
this, they appeared with regularity because of individuals within the elites of the Army 
of the United States who recognized their quality and psycho-hygienic effect and 
were ready to protect them against opponents. We have already discussed 
elsewhere Marshall᾽s willingness to cultivate a relatively open relationship with the 
media. Eisenhower, who was equipped with an instinctive talent for public relations, 
developed extraordinarily good connections to both the civilian and military press in 
his command.346 … almost without exception, declared the Supreme Allied 
Commander 1944 in a letter to his brother Milton, the 500 newspaper and radio men 
accredited [to my command] are my friends.347 In his immediate command, Ike was 
of the opinion that the common soldiers in his forces did not receive the attention they 
deserved. In this regard, there were several notable personal intercessions by 
Eisenhower to shield Stars and Stripes from interference by the Army hierarchy.348 
We will now take a look at this soldier-run daily newspaper of the American army. 
8.4 Journalistic connectionrelay: Stars and Stripes 
[The Stars and Stripes] not only carries baseball box scores but has a daily photo 
of some glamour queen, usually a Hollywood star … presumably for the purpose of 
providing ‘pin ups’ to enliven the bare walls of the barracks … he [the American 
Soldier] lacks help in finding the spiritual and moral significance of the titanic 
struggle in which he is engaged. 
                                            
343 Ibid., p. 171. 
344 To refresh the reader’s memory: high-ranking officers and generals. 
345 Of course, this term only entered the vocabulary at a much later time. If the condition was not 
simply dismissed as cowardice, it was referred to as shell shock or combat exhaustion. 
346 Roeder, Censored War, p. 99. 
347 Ibid., p. 12. 
348 Ibid., p. 99. 
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Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr in The Nation, August 21, 1942349 
Dear Adolf, we know your stooges will get this paper into your hands at an early 
date. Suggest you read at once: 
“One-man Army on Bataan”  … Page 3 
“Baseball Season Opens”  … Page 6 
“Pearson and Allen”   … Page 2 
Coming up in the next issue will be a story by Cecil Brown on “Heroes in Far East 
War”. You won’t get any more comfort out of it than you get from the story of United 
States Production from Time Magazine on Page 1 of this issue. 
The Staff 
P.S. – Joe Palooka, Superman and Popeye are coming to our comic page soon. 
Stars and Stripes, inaugural issue, April 18, 1942 
Although during the American Civil War no fewer than four newspapers circulated 
under the name The Stars and Stripes, the origins of Mauldin᾽s future employer date 
to World War I. In spring 1918, Second Lieutenant Guy T. Viskniskki convinced the 
Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, General John J. Pershing, that a 
newspaper for AEF soldiers would have a positive impact on their morale. Pershing 
authorized the project and, between February 8, 1918 and July 13, 1919, 71 weekly 
editions of the original Stars and Stripes appeared. As a publication for the lower 
ranks, it was mainly staffed by enlisted soldiers. In addition to news reports and 
opinion pieces, it also featured sports results, letters to the editor, cartoons and 
poetry. Pershing had ordered that the editorial staff be permitted to work without 
interference from senior officers, thus establishing an important precedent for its 
successor publication.350 
On April 18, 1942, the first issue of the resuscitated Stars and Stripes was published 
in London, and it ran for a short while as a weekly.351 The officer in charge, (Colonel) 
                                            
349 Cited in: Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 172. 
350 Bernard Hagerty, The Stars and Stripes, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia of War and 
American Society (New York 2005), p. 806. 
351 Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 165. 
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Egbert White, who had been a staff member as a private in World War I, guided it in 
the traditions of its forerunner. Like Harrison, Mauldin᾽s editor at the 45th Division 
News, White defended the journalistic independence of Stars and Stripes by all 
available means, and he tolerated no meddling. The editors and staff of the 
newspaper took maximum advantage of this freedom. The published a mélange of 
news, jokes, interviews, commentary and sports reports. There was a section for 
letters to the editor (titled The B-Bag – Blow it out here in later continental editions) 
that sometimes reflected bitter criticism by ordinary soldiers. The daily highlight for 
the readership was of course the cheesecake photo, the scantily clad pinup girl.352 
When the armies of the West began offensive operations in fall 1942, Stars and 
Stripes decentralized its organization. Wherever American troops came ashore, 
teams of Stars and Stripes journalists followed closely behind, ready to put out local 
editions. In Sicily, staff artist Stanley Metzloff, an art and art history professor from 
New York, encountered Mauldin᾽s work in the 45th Division News. Sure that he was 
seeing the most important illustrations of the war, Metzloff urged the responsible 
authorities of Stars and Stripes to hire Mauldin.353 
Without the reach of Stars and Stripes and its consequent benefit to Mauldin, his 
cartoons would not have achieved the cultural feedback effect that resulted in the 
consolidation of the dogface soldiers as a distinctive group. The professional 
attitudes and liberal approach of those responsible for Stars and Stripes enabled him 
to enjoy all necessary support and substantial independence in his work. His 
practice, possibly calculated, of cultivating key friendships with high-ranking officers 
and correspondents kept this freedom from ever being challenged right up to the end 
of the war. Only under these conditions, combined with his extraordinary powers of 
observation and a talent to adapt to any surroundings in his search for creative input, 
could Mauldin᾽s war cartoons emerge,354 a body of work whose importance to the 
history of the dogfaces is unmatched. 
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Our troops were living in almost inconceivable misery. The fertile black valleys 
were knee-deep in mud. Thousands of men had not been dry for weeks. Other 
thousands lay at night in the high mountains with the temperature below freezing 
and the thin snow sifting over them. They dug into the stones and slept in little 
chasms and behind rocks and in half caves … How they survived the dreadful 
winter at all was beyond us who had the opportunity of drier beds in the warmer 
valleys. 
Ernie Pyle, Mountain Fighting355 
The mountains in Italy are horrible; to attack always against heights held by well-
entrenched and well-trained enemy troops is surely the worst sort of war. Nothing 
can help the infantry much in the mountains: Germans dug into the stone sides of 
the cliffs can survive the heaviest shelling. Tanks cannot operate. 
Martha Gellhorn, Visit Italy!356 
With the exception of the Pacific, which does not concern us in this volume, the Army 
of the United States was active in three geographical areas between 1942 and 1945: 
the North African, Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations. What role 
was played by the prevailing conditions specific to these operational areas in 
determining the origin of the dogface soldiers? Why – as has already been 
mentioned – did this history play out exclusively in the Mediterranean and European 
Theaters of Operations? 
North African Theater of Operations 
In this regard, the American campaign in North Africa that started with Operation 
TORCH must be considered in two successive phases. The first of these began with 
the simultaneous amphibious assaults in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers on 
November 8, 1942 and concluded on February 14, 1943. The landings carried out 
under TORCH in Morocco and Algeria met with only token resistance (if any at all) by 
Vichy France’s coastal garrisons. After a brief period involving a few skirmishes, the 
Allies reached a truce with the mostly colonial troops of Vichy.357 From that point to 
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the end of the first phase of our observations, U.S. infantry divisions performed 
training and occupation functions that made this period irrelevant with respect to 
dogface soldiers. On February 14, 1943, Germany’s attack on U.S. forces in 
Tunisia’s Kasserine Pass marked the second phase of active operations in North 
Africa, a period that would last until the surrender of the German Africa Korps on May 
9, 1943. 
With reference to the subject of this study, too few conditions were present in the 
three months of active operations in North Africa to develop a dogface consciousness 
in the American infantry. Topographical features prevented German forces from 
mounting a prolonged resistance except in a few locations. While American 
infantrymen were of course involved in heavy combat in several areas, this 
experience was not widespread enough to bring about the response we are looking 
for in the infantry’s self-perception, due to its short duration and the limited number of 
participating troops. Last and certainly not least, there was not yet a Bill Mauldin to 
catalyze this reaction. 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations 
The conditions necessary for the emergence of the dogface soldiers as a distinctive 
group were almost sufficient in Sicily and fully present in Italy. In these locations, the 
infantry of the Army of the United States struggled against all the topographical, 
climatic, psychological, physical and operational adversities that we have recounted 
earlier in the present chapter. Moreover, Bill Mauldin, who had not seen combat in 
North Africa, was now on the ground in this theater of operations to play his part in 
the genesis of the dogfaces. 
Following the landings on July 8, 1943, the German Wehrmacht discovered the 
perfect conditions in the mountains and hills of Sicily to make the Allied armies pay 
dearly for every foot of territory they captured. Trucks, the key to American mobility in 
World War II, were of very limited utility in numerous parts of Sicily, and mules often 
replaced them as a means of transport. The deployment of tanks, the basic element 
of mobile firepower, was similarly restricted by the terrain. Over a large expanse of 
Sicilian territory, it fell to the infantry to slog, step by step, across the island in a 
seemingly endless chain of attacks against ideal defensive positions. Sicily’s 
midsummer heat, malaria and other febrile diseases took an additional toll. 
Nevertheless, after suffering heavy casualties in a series of battles and maneuvers, 
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the German occupation troops found themselves backed into the northeast corner of 
the island, and they withdrew across the Straits of Messina to the mainland of Italy. 
When American troops entered Messina on August 17, fighting ended in Sicily after 
38 days.358 Because of the campaign’s relatively short duration, Sicily represents 
only the pre-labor stage in the gestation of the dogfaces. Their birth occurred 
following September 9 in Italy. 
The landings at Salerno marked the return of Allied forces to the European mainland 
after an absence of more than three years and the beginning of the campaign to 
drive the German Wehrmacht northward. The Apennine Mountains, running from 
north to south along the middle of the peninsula, dictated that the multinational 
invasion forces could only advance by means of two coastal corridors. Such routes 
made flanking maneuvers, the centerpiece and basic requirement for mobile 
operations, extremely difficult if not impossible. Frontal operations were transformed 
into almost suicidal undertakings by the hilly landscapes and numerous rivers. 
Operating on the defensive, the German Wehrmacht found ideal conditions, as they 
had in Sicily, and their experienced forces skillfully exploited the situation. Shortly 
after the landings along the Amalfi coast, first fall and then winter set in, leaving the 
American infantry to contend with rain, wind, mud, cold and snow in addition to the 
Enemy. In Slightly Out of Focus, Robert Capa describes the role the harsh conditions 
played in the Italian campaign: 
Between Naples and Rome Mr. Winston Churchill’s “soft underbelly of Europe” 
was pregnant with hard mountains and well-placed machine guns. The valleys 
between the mountains were soon filled with hospitals and cemeteries. The rains 
started. The mud got deeper and deeper. Our shoes, designed for walking in 
garrison towns, thirstily drank in the water, and we slid two steps backward for 
each step forward. Our light shirts and trousers gave no protection against the 
wind and the rain. Our Army, the best equipped in the world, was stuck in those 
mountains, and it seemed we were not moving at all … Here Bill Mauldin gave 
birth to his Willie and Joe, those two survivors of the fighting dogfaces of Italy … I 
dragged myself from mountain to mountain, from foxhole to foxhole, taking 
pictures of mud, misery and death.359 
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In addition to topographical considerations, it is important to highlight the time factor 
in connection with the genesis of the dogfaces in Italy. There were various flashpoints 
in North Africa where German forces concentrated their resistance. The key element 
in Sicily was the topography and its consequences for Allied operations. Still, 
although the campaign was waged under difficult conditions in the midsummer heat, 
it was over in a relatively short time. On the Italian peninsula, the dogfaces had to 
endure the same ordeals for many months during the coldest part of the year, and 
these travails were decisive for their self-perception.  
Throughout the spring of 1944, the focus of Allied awareness gradually shifted to 
northwestern Europe. Troop strength in Italy was successively reduced and forces 
were redeployed to Great Britain, having been designated for the campaign that 
would be launched in France to decide the war’s outcome. The landing operations of 
OVERLORD in Normandy on June 6 and DRAGOON on the Riviera on August 15 
resulted in the relocation of most dogfaces to the European Theater of Operations, 
where their story continued. 
We have now established why the emergence of the dogfaces was a phenomenon of 
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Here, over an extended period, all the 
above mentioned conditions were present for these soldiers to crystallize as a distinct 
group. Bill Mauldin’s cartoons should be highlighted as probably the most important 
individual factor in this process. His Up Front contributions integrated and 
consolidated the dogface ideology while at the same time representing a cultural 





9 Up Front … with Mauldin 
Some say the American soldier is the same clean-cut young man who left his 
home; others say morale is sky-high at the front because everybody’s face is 
shining for the great cause. 
They are wrong. The combat man isn’t the same clean cut lad because you don’t 
fight a kraut by Marquis of Queensberry rules. You shoot him in the back, you blow 
him apart with mines, you kill him or maim him the quickest and most effective way 
you can with the least danger to yourself. He does the same to you. He tricks you 
and cheats you, and if you don’t beat him at his own game you don’t live to 
appreciate your own nobleness. 
I haven’t tried to describe the activities of the infantry and its weapons because 
everybody has learned how a BAR man covers a light machine gunner. I don’t 
describe dead guys buried in bloody bed sacks because I can’t imagine anyone 
who has not seen it so often that his mind has become adjusted to it. I’ve simply 
described some of the feelings which the dogfaces have about different things, and 
to describe these things I have drawn cartoons about Willie and Joe. 
Bill Mauldin360 
Up Front … by Mauldin represents a unique source of information on the realities of 
war for the dogfaces. While there exists a wide range of contemporary and 
retrospective treatments of World War II’s political, diplomatic, strategic, operational 
and tactical aspects, good sources and literature dealing with the ground-level reality 
of the conflict are much harder to find. A number of memoirs and accounts by 
ordinary soldiers bear impressive witness to life and death in the infantry. Standing 
out among these are Paul Fussell᾽s Doing Battle, The Boys’ Crusade and Wartime: 
Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War, as well as Before Their Time 
by Robert Kotlowitz. For all their indisputable value, recollections of this type suffer 
from two deficiencies from the perspective of the present study. Firstly, they are – 
simply – remembrances. They necessarily describe and assess the subject of their 
interests by viewing it long afterward through the lens of one life – in the case of each 
example cited here, a life lasting for decades. The fundamental messages are thus 
not open to question although, to a certain degree, a retrospective interpretation 
cannot be excluded. Their second, somewhat limiting disadvantage consists of the 
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fact that their description of the big picture is based on their worm’s-eye view from 
that period. Such a perspective obviously reflects that which remains in their memory 
after several decades. It neglects details and minor occurrences that may then have 
been, but now no longer are, significant. 
The great value of Mauldin᾽s cartoons may be found precisely here. They are based 
on the information of the day. They are also reflective, if over a considerably shorter 
timeframe. They focus on those matters that concerned Mauldin and the dogfaces in 
their own place and time, which means Sicily, Italy and northwestern Europe between 
1943 and 1945. They in no way depict the reflections of an old soldier who recounts 
with omniscience his position and role in the greatest conflict in human history. 
Paradoxically, their value as source material lies in their shadowy nature, in their 
representation of an extremely restricted field of vision. The historian is usually able, 
willing and, as a rule, required to embed factual description within the context of a 
broader picture. The main evidenciary value of Mauldin᾽s cartoons consists firstly in 
the incredibly high-resolution picture they (literally) draw at a micro level, but also in 
how they reveal at a macro level those phenomena that are generally subsumed 
under the ῾fog of war᾽ label. This term, coined by Clausewitz like so many standard 
terms in the history of warfare361, appears in various forms at all levels of analysis.362 
It refers to the fact that participants in military operations are never in possession of 
all the relevant information they need for an adequate assessment of their own 
situation or that of the Enemy. While the upper echelons of the military hierarchy 
strive fiercely to keep this area of uncertainty as small as possible, such efforts 
diminish proportionally as one descends the ranks. The infantry’s lived experience in 
World War II was largely limited to whatever individual soldiers could see or hear as 
well as what others told them. Large-scale operations that could only be appreciated 
from a bird’s-eye perspective were often revealed only to a narrow circle, frequently 
involving a few dozen individuals at the most. In World War I, attack commands were 
commonly signaled simultaneously to tens or even hundreds of thousands of soldiers 
deployed across many miles of trench systems. Many of the large and important 
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World War II battlefields were experienced at the individual level as simply 
depopulated and deserted.363 
In the following pictorial section, this study seeks to explore the potential of the 
Mauldin cartoons as visual-historical source material by examining a selection of 13 
prime examples of these drawings. Arranged in chronological order according to their 
date of publication, they are intended to cover a range of subjects that were of 
importance to their protagonists, and in this way they offer insight into the different 
aspects of the reality of war for the U.S. infantry in the European theater. To derive a 
claim of comprehensiveness from this limited set would be absurd in view of the 
scale of Mauldin’s wartime oeuvre, and the author has no such intention. The more 
than 600 Mauldin pieces from North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France very rarely deal 
with trivialities, normally offering the reader a virtually limitless wealth of thematic 
approaches. 
Willie and Joe, his iconic and prototypical dogface protagonists, are the focus of 
many but by no means all of Mauldin’s cartoons. It is possible, in many of these, to 
discern Willie or Joe as a featured dogface even where Mauldin does not confirm or 
disconfirm this in the caption. A commonality among all his dogfaces, however, are 
the various characteristics of their outward appearance. The hands of Mauldin᾽s 
dogfaces, when not forcibly engaged in some unavoidable task, are thrust deep in 
their pants pockets. Even if it may not appear significant to the inexperienced reader, 
in military organizations this behavior represents an infringement of regulations that, 
by all appearances, ranks only slightly below desertion.364 Two other visual features 
of his figures that cannot be considered less outrageous are the unshaven faces that 
fall far short of military standards and a body posture that David Michaelis of the New 
York Times memorably dubbed melted candle features.365 
General George S. Patton, the dominant American champion and practitioner of 
maneuver warfare, saw Willie and Joe᾽s outward characteristics and inward 
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disposition as a clear subversion of the war effort and resolved to put his personal 
authority on the line in order to ban the rebellious cartoonist from further publication. 
The campaign that followed ended with Patton᾽s only strategic defeat of the Second 
World War. Eisenhower, whose most distinctive feature – in contrast to Patton – was 
a pragmatism uncolored by ideology or hubris, recognized Mauldin’s status within the 
military machine and was not prepared to lose him as an asset. He therefore adopted 
a position in support of the little sergeant of the Arizona National Guard and blocked 
his most talented field commander from banning Mauldin’s cartoons. 
There are two accounts of the only personal encounter between the two antagonists: 
one by Mauldin himself and the other from Captain Harry C. Butcher, a close 
confidant of Eisenhower.366 In a subsequent letter to the editor-in-chief of Stars and 
Stripes, Eisenhower assured the editor that the newspaper could count on his 
support, should anyone question its journalistic integrity. In his journal entry for April 
11, 1945, entitled Three Stripes Lick Three Stars367, Butcher cites another of 
Eisenhower’s letters, this one to his Deputy Theater Commander, General Ben Lear, 
in which Ike reiterates his position: 
A great deal of pressure has been brought on me in the past to abolish such 
things as Mauldin’s cartoons, the “B” Bag, etc. You will make sure that the 
responsible officer [Patton] knows he is not to interfere in matters of this kind. If 
he believes that any specific violation of good sense or good judgement has 
occurred, he may bring it to my personal attention.368 
Eisenhower᾽s behavior in this particular matter has to be seen in light of his overall 
policy of promoting as much candor as possible in his relations with the press. This 
practice was grounded in Eisenhower᾽s personal conviction that military success in a 
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wartime democracy can only be achieved with the greatest possible support from an 
informed public.369 
Let us devote particular attention now to the 13 representative cartoons by Bill 
Mauldin, the disrespectful sergeant who stirred Patton’s concerns over a crisis in 
military morale… 
9.1 Sicily: Bloody Ridge (October 17, 1943) 
However, there were some things which the ancient [Norman] knights [who 
conquered Sicily between 900 and 970 AD] and their ill-smelling companions would 
have understood and have laughed at – that was our improvised mule cavalry. In 
order to move over the terrific country through which we had to fight, we had to 
improvise mounted units. These men rode whatever they could find – mules, 
burros, and occasionally bullocks. The saddles were either of local construction, 





Fig. 3   Bloody Ridge (1943) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1943). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
We see a mountain slope ending in a sheer wall. The ground is rocky and without 
vegetation. A little to the left of the picture’s center, a large exposed rock divides the 
scene. In the foreground to the left of the rock stands a soldier, while a second 
soldier in the background can be seen with a mule. In the right half of the picture, 
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three soldiers and two mules are visible. We are apparently dealing with an 
improvised train of pack mules, a not uncommon sight in the Mediterranean region, 




Fig. 4   Detail 1 from Bloody Ridge (1943) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1943). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
The soldier in the left foreground takes shelter under the center rock. Like the other 
GIs in the image, he wears a helmet and the Army’s summer field uniform of wool 
shirt and pants. A full ammo belt encircles his waist. His weapon is different from 
those of his comrades-in-arms: while they (as far as we can tell from the foreground) 
carry the standard U.S. infantry firearm, the semi-automatic M1 Garand rifle, he is 
holding – in the ready position – an M1903 Springfield rifle, recognizable from its 
manual loading mechanism near his right hand. Mounted at the mouth of the barrel is 
an M9A1 rifle grenade. We see another soldier in the background, leading a mule 








Fig. 5   Detail 2 from Bloody Ridge (1943). Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1943) 
Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
In the right foreground, we see two GIs. They carry their M1 rifles slung over their 
shoulders. Each of them has two canteens attached to his ammo belt, which is also 
equipped with cartridges in the manner just mentioned. The GI at the left climbs up a 
rock onto a flat and narrow space. A jerry can370 is propped on his shoulder while he 
clings to the rock with his right hand. The GI at the right of the image has his hands 
on a case. He looks as if he is about to lift it off the (apparently dead) mule that is 
                                            
370 Germans were referred to by British and American soldiers as Jerry or Jerries, among other 
sobriquets (Cf. Pyle, Brave Men, p. 256.). The five-gallon blitz can, as it was officially known by the 
Motor Transport Division of the Quartermaster Corps, was a modified American copy of a German 
metal container design that had fallen into British hands in 1940 as war booty. The blitz in the official 
designation is an allusion to the ῾Blitzkrieg᾽ (lightning war), a strategy developed by the German 
Wehrmacht in 1939/40. Because its design was greatly superior to the original American model, the 
container was simply copied in order to save development time and costs. While the original German 
version consisted of two hand-soldered pieces, the U.S. model was designed in three parts so that it 
could be mass-produced on conveyor-belt systems. Further modifications included an American-
designed neck to which filler hoses for various vehicle types could be connected and an automatic 
venting device to allow the container to be emptied as rapidly as possible. Although the Quartermaster 
Corps᾽ Fuels and Lubricants Division carried out several other minor modifications to the jerry can 
over the course of the war, the basic 1940 design remained. The GI-provided nickname recalled its 
originator. (Erna Risch, United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. The 




lying on the ground between the two soldiers. This scene repeats in the right 
background, where a third GI is clearly removing another case from a second dead 
mule. From his weapon, it is clear that the soldier belongs to one of the (12-man) rifle 
squads that deliver supplies into the mountains. The rifleman᾽s Springfield, held at 
the ready, indicates to us that he is the squad’s marksman. He is providing cover for 
his fellow squad members as they make their way up the slope. His presence 
provides a clue that these are dogfaces of a rifle squad and not a dedicated transport 
unit, which would not have included a marksman.371 The two dead mules are the 
collateral damage of the supply transport, whether from enemy fire or simple 
exhaustion. 
We know from Bill Mauldin᾽s biography that Bloody Ridge refers to a series of 
mountain combat actions of his previous unit, the 180th Infantry Regiment, around 
Santo Stefano on the Sicilian north coast. In order to understand the context of this 
Bloody Ridge (and, as we shall see, other Bloody Ridges), it is necessary for us to 
review briefly the main features of the Allied campaign in Sicily. 
Strategic setting 
With the successful conclusion of Allied operations in North Africa in sight, Winston 
Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt met in Casablanca in January 1943 along with their 
military advisors. The aim of the conference was to define a military strategy for the 
coming year. The participants broke along predictable fault lines. U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff Marshall argued for a total concentration of effort on an invasion in northern 
France once the North African campaign was wrapped up. He suggested that the 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations go on the defensive in order to free up men 
and materiel for what would be, in his view, the decisive campaign. The rejoinder by 
Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, unsurprisingly, followed the lines of 
their Mediterranean strategy: of course, they recognized, the invasion across the 
English Channel should deal a death-blow to Hitler᾽s domination of Europe … but in 
due time. Their argument for the delay was that the Allied armies were still too 
inexperienced in 1943, and the German Wehrmacht still too strong, for a decisive 
battle for Europe to be successful. Continued implementation of more limited 
operations in the Mediterranean would serve primarily to give the young Army of the 
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United States time to gather experience. Over time, America᾽s steadily increasing 
war production would gradually alter the material relationship in favor of the Allies. 
Eventually, should it become possible to open the Mediterranean Sea to Allied 
shipping, they could free up shipping capacity that was urgently needed for 
OVERLORD.372 
Unlike his Chief of Staff, Roosevelt was open to these arguments. He also 
considered that it would be useful to take advantage of the favorable state of affairs 
that would follow the expected victory in North Africa, and as a result, he took 
Churchill᾽s side in the discussions. In return for continued operations in the 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, the British negotiation team again offered 
reassurance that they fundamentally supported OVERLORD – as soon as conditions 
permitted such an undertaking. Several months later, they agreed on May 1944 for 
the invasion. After reaching a decision in principle in favor of the Mediterranean 
Theater of Operations, the Allies directed their staffs to plan various offensive options 
in the region, including Greece, the Balkans, Crete, Sicily and Sardinia. When the 
selection boiled down to Sicily, the Combined Chiefs of Staff named Dwight 
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander and charged him with planning and 
carrying out Operation HUSKY, the Sicilian invasion.373 
Planning 
The port of Messina in the northeast corner of Sicily was the obvious objective of an 
Allied invasion of the island. Axis forces were supplied through Messina, which was 
situated only a few miles across from the Italian mainland. If these supply lines could 
be cut, they would not be able to hold Sicily for long. There were two reasons, 
however, why an amphibious landing in or around Messina was not feasible. In the 
first place, the beaches around the city were too narrow and the terrain behind the 
                                            
372 Since the Mediterranean Sea was under Axis control, British convoys bound for the Middle East 
and Asia were required to sail around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa rather than 
through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. According to British calculations made at that time, 
the reduction in shipping time by using the Suez route would result in a yearly savings of one million 
gross registered tons of shipping space. (Alex Danchev / Daniel Todman (Eds.), Field Marshal Lord 
Alanbrooke. War Diaries 1939–1945. [Berkeley / Los Angeles 2001], p. 406.) 
373 Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II. The War Department. Strategic Planning for 
Coalition Warfare. 1943–1944 (Washington, D.C. 1959), p. 18 ff. 
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beaches too rugged. It would have been an impossible task to land large formations 
there and keep them supplied. In addition, Messina lay outside the range of Allied air 
forces based on the North African coast. Since the success of an amphibious landing 
would be dependent upon effective air support, Messina was discarded as a landing 
objective. 
Sicily’s northwest and southeast costs offered the desired combination of favorable 
topographical features and nearby ports and airfields that could be quickly reached 
by Allied forces. At the insistence of General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, one of 
HUSKY’s two field army commanders, a British-conceived plan was ultimately 
accepted. It provided for both field armies, the Seventh U.S. and Eighth British, to 
land along a 100-mile stretch of coastline in the southeast. The Eighth British Army 
would come ashore between Syracuse and Pachino in the Gulf of Noto and advance 
along the east coast toward Messina. The Seventh Army, led by Lieutenant General 
George S. Patton, Jr., would make its landing further to the west, between Licata and 
Scoglitti in the Gulf of Gela, proceeding to occupy two predetermined lines in the 
north. From there, it could protect the flank of the British advance. 
General Sir Harold Alexander, whose 15th Army Group commanded both armies, did 
not prepare a detailed plan for post-landing operations, since he would not want to 
see his day-to-day direction of operations limited by predetermined planning. The 
(British) plan assigned American forces a clearly secondary supporting role.374 
Referring to this plan, Martin Blumenson called Patton’s army … the shield in 
Alexander’s left hand. … Montgomery’s army the sword in his right.375 The 
disproportionate division of responsibility reflected British skepticism regarding the 
quality of the Army of the United States, an attitude that had its origins in the U.S. 
debacle at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.376 This skepticism, along with Alexander’s 
                                            
374 Albert N. Garland / Howard McGaw Smyth / Martin Blumenson, United States Army in World War 
II. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, D.C. 
1993), p. 89 ff. 
375 Ibid., p. 91. 
376 In the first months after TORCH, the U.S. Army had to contend with Vichy troops in Morocco and 
Algeria that offered only as much resistance as their French national pride demanded. In Tunisia in the 
spring of 1943, they faced the German Wehrmacht, which was superior to the young American troops 
individually, tactically and with respect to its leadership. As a consequence, the first American 
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diffuse command situation, ultimately resulted in the first duel between the two great 
prima donnas among the Allied generals: Montgomery and Patton. 
In the summer of 1943, there were approximately 200,000 Italian troops on Sicily, 
along with two German divisions totaling 30,000 men. The Italian VI Army was of 
questionable value, since it consisted mainly of immobile formations that were poorly 
trained and equipped. Apart from that, Mussolini’s soldiers no longer believed in the 
Duce’s imperial vision, and they were inclined to surrender at the first opportunity, as 
their North African experience had shown.377 Axis strategists quickly concluded, 
therefore, that they could not successfully defend the island once the Anglo-
American Alliance had established a bridgehead on the Sicilian coast. The Axis plan, 
accordingly, was to launch immediate countermeasures to push the invaders back 
into the sea. Should this strategy – as they expected – not be met with success, their 
forces would stage a fighting withdrawal back to the so-called Aetna Line. This 
defensive line ran from Catania on Sicily’s east coast along Mount Aetna’s southern 
slope, past Troina in the interior of the island to San Fratello on the north coast. 
There, in the mountainous northeast, they would find ideal conditions allowing them 
to provide cover for a slow fallback of their forces and an evacuation from Messina. 
Operations 
Allied troops under Operation HUSKY began to come ashore in the early morning 
hours of July 10, 1943. While the Eighth Army initially met with very little resistance in 
the east, Seventh Army, landing in the west, had to defend against intermittent stiff 
counterattacks in the center of their bridgehead. Within a few days, however, the 
bridgehead was established and the two field armies began to advance as planned. 
Patton, for whom a purely defensive role was simply unthinkable, interpreted 
Alexander᾽s somewhat vague instructions as permitting Seventh Army to make its 
own advance on Messina as soon as the Eighth Army’s flank had been secured. He 
                                                                                                                                        
encounter with the German Wehrmacht ended in a string of humbling defeats for the U.S. troops. 
These debacles came to an end only when the German troops, sustaining a British attack at their rear, 
had to refocus and let up on their near defenseless victims. These clashes became known collectively 
as the Kasserine Pass Battles, after the region where they took place. (The U.S. Army Campaigns of 
World War II, Tunisia. 17 November 1942–13 May 1943 [Center of Military History Publication 72-12], 
p. 27 ff.) 
377 Garland, Sicily, p. 80. 
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was taught a lesson on July 13. There were very few roads in the interior of the island 
that could accommodate the movement of large military formations. The 
administrative boundaries between the two field armies that had been stipulated by 
Alexander left the American Army with only one possible way to reach Messina: 
Highway 124, the route between Vizzini in the southeast and Enna, the junction at 
the center of the island that connected to a road to the northeast. Several days after 
the landing, Montgomery᾽s Eighth Army encountered strong resistance along the 
Catania–Gerbini line. When the General found himself unable to break through this 
position, he convinced Alexander to shift the boundaries between the field armies to 
allow him to detour via Highway 124 and Enna. When Patton received these 
instructions shortly before midnight on July 13, he could recognize that his implicit 
role, as originally laid out in the plans for HUSKY, was now explicit: he and Seventh 
Army were to serve as Montgomery’s stirrup holder in the conquest of Sicily, being 
assigned a clearly secondary objective. 
Patton, however, who had been convinced since his youth that he was destined 
someday to become a great general, was not a man for secondary objectives. On 
July 15 he importuned Alexander to allow him to send a reconnaissance mission 
toward Agrigent, a few miles to the northwest of his position. With Alexander᾽s 
authorization in his pocket, he ordered Major General Lucian Truscott᾽s 3rd Infantry 
Division to capture the city immediately. From that location, Agrigent᾽s road links put 
Seventh Army in a position first to maneuver in the direction of Palermo and then to 
split the island by advancing northward. After the fall of Agrigent, Alexander agreed 
to Patton᾽s request to carry out such a move, albeit unwillingly. Shortly afterward, 
when he again changed his mind and sent Patton a revised set of instructions, Patton 
ignored the order. His headquarters claimed that the telexed order was illegible, 
having become garbled in transmission, and it requested that the order be resent. By 
the time these “communications problems” were resolved, Patton’s units were 
standing at the gates of Palermo. On July 23, 1943, eight days after initiating its 
reconnaissance mission toward Palermo, Seventh Army held Marsala, Trapani and 
Palermo in northwest Sicily as well as various communities along the north coast. In 
the meantime, the Eighth Army was still pinned down outside Catania. It now 
appeared likely that Montgomery would not be able to take Messina on his own. On 
July 18, he failed in a final, all-out effort to break through the German positions. 
Alexander reacted to the situation on the ground by clearing the way for Patton to 
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enter Messina.378 He assigned each field army two of the four passable roads into 
port city, thus starting what Patton characterized to Major General Troy Middleton, 
commander of Mauldin᾽s 45th Infantry Division, as a horserace in which the prestige 
of the U.S. Army is at stake.379 
Eighth Army was assigned roads on both flanks of Mount Aetna, while Patton᾽s 
Seventh was authorized to advance along an interior route via Enna, Nicosia and 
Troona as well as Highway 113 on the north coast. Two factors made Seventh 
Army’s march to Messina incomparably more difficult than its advance on Palermo 
and the north coast had been. The road to Palermo and the north coast had been 
guarded primarily by Italian forces who, as has been mentioned, were relatively open 
to the idea of surrender. The routes to Messina, on the other hand, were defended by 
German troops of the newly strengthened Sicily garrison, which was better trained 
and equipped. Above all, the Germans were determined to exact a heavy price 
before giving up their positions. The second factor involves the topography of 
northeast Sicily. While the island’s southern and western areas range from flat to 
hilly, the routes toward the northeast cross a mountain range dominated by Mount 
Aetna, the volcano on the east coast. In such rugged terrain, Seventh Army, far from 
being able to launch a cavalry-style attack like the one it staged at Palermo, could not 
take advantage of its superior mobility. Flanking maneuvers were impossible in the 
mountains. In the narrow valleys, tanks made easy targets for the German artillery 
that controlled all the access routes from their mountaintop observation posts. The 
only option left to the dogfaces was to fight, step by step, through a series of 
mountain fortifications where all participating formations went through their own 
Bloody Ridges. The 1st Infantry Division had such an experience in the island’s 
interior near Troina, one of the main anchor points of the Aetna Line, where it 
engaged in heavy fighting with the German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
(motorized or mechanized infantry) lasting over a week. Third Infantry and Bill 
Mauldin᾽s 45th Infantry Division, advancing toward Messina along the coast on 
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Highway 113, fought their Bloody Ridges in San Fratello and Brolo, with Mauldin᾽s 
180th Infantry Regiment specifically engaged at Santo Stefano. 
In addition to battling the Wehrmacht and the pitfalls of the terrain, the dogfaces also 
had to contend with the heat of the Sicilian summer. While average temperatures 
hovered around 40 degrees Celsius, water supply in the mountains was difficult and 
thus sporadic. Besides the many cases of dehydration and heat-related exhaustion 
that resulted from these conditions, the troops experienced more than 10,000 cases 
of malaria and other febrile diseases.380 In view of the tactical situation in the 
mountains, it was impossible to feed the troops by means of mobile kitchens. Days 
and weeks of eating field rations produced harmless but extremely unpleasant 
gastrointestinal illnesses that caused nausea, diarrhea and vomiting.381 When 
dogfaces obtained food locally in order to vary their monotonous diet, the epidemics 
of diarrhea recurred. Ernie Pyle, who accompanied Seventh Army through Sicily, 
provided a vivid description of the travails of the midsummer campaign: 
… [besides the actual horrors of combat] I believe the outstanding trait in any 
campaign is the terrible weariness that gradually comes over everybody. Soldiers 
become exhausted in mind and in soul as well as physically. They acquire a 
weariness that is mixed up with boredom and lack of all gaiety. To sum it all up: A 
man just gets damned sick of it all. 
The infantry reaches a stage of exhaustion that is incomprehensible to folks back 
home. The men in the First Division, for instance, were in the lines twenty-eight 
days – walking and fighting all the time, day and night …They keep going largely 
because the other fellow does and because they can’t really do anything else … 
it’s the ceaselessness, the endlessness of everything that finally worms its way 
through us and starts to devour us. 
… It’s the perpetual, choking dust, the muscle-racking hard ground, the snatched 
food sitting ill on the stomach, the heat and the flies and dirty feet and the 
constant roar of engines and the perpetual moving and never settling down and 
the go, go, go, night and day, and on through the night again. Eventually it works 
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itself into an emotional tapestry of one dull, dead pattern – yesterday is tomorrow 
and Troina is Randazzo and when will we ever stop and, God, I’m so tired.382 
General Hube, the German commander on the island, ordered his units to carry out a 
fighting withdrawal from the Aetna Line. The island’s shape had the effect of 
shortening the German lines as they came closer to Messina. This allowed an 
increasing number of forces to be pulled out of the front lines and evacuated across 
the Straits of Messina to the mainland of Italy until eventually the entire garrison was 
out of harm’s way.383 Because of the difficult terrain and the skillful tactical 
implementation of the German retreat, neither the Seventh nor Eighth Army was able 
to penetrate the German lines. On August 17, shortly after the last German troops 
had been evacuated, units of Seventh Army reached Messina. Patton had won his 
horserace against Montgomery. Since neither field army had been able to cut off the 
German retreat route, however, the defenders of Sicily were now in position in Italy to 
renew their combat against the Allies, whose Sicilian victory had a bitter aftertaste. 
Mule cavalry 
In contrast to the German Wehrmacht384, the American Army was designed to be 100 
percent motorized. As laid out in the Tables of Organization and Equipment, each 
respective formation in its forces was sufficiently equipped with its own means of 
motorized transport to ensure its mobility. While thousands of horses and mules had 
been in use prior to the start of World War II as riding, pack and draft animals, these 
numbers underwent a dramatic reduction at the time the Army of the United States 
was mobilized.385 While this proved to be a permanent development with respect to 
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384 Contrary to the impression given by the mechanized blitzkrieg armies, the mobility of German land 
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horses, the history of mules in the American Army had not yet been fully written. In 
winter 1942/43, once U.S. forces had commenced active operations against the Axis 
powers as a part of Operation TORCH, the need to acquire mules for supply 
purposes quickly made itself felt. Initial encounters with the Enemy had shown that 
there was still a need for draft animals to supply fighting units in impassable terrains, 
particularly mountain country. Trucks carried out regular road transport duties and 
were used in simple off-road situations, and jeeps could negotiate the narrow, 
twisting paths in more remote mountainous regions. In still more difficult areas, 
however, where most fighting took place, the Army was dependent on pack animals 
or bearers in order to ferry supplies to the mountain deployments that were used as a 
base from which the troops were sent out to do battle with the Enemy. Mules were 
preferable to horses for such tasks, since they were more surefooted, needed less 
feed and were generally more resistant.386 
In North Africa, the need for mules as a means of transport had been limited. In 
northeast Sicily, on the other hand, where the German Wehrmacht had erected the 
Aetna Line high in the mountains, demand for mules became many times greater. 
Utilization of mules also took place, however, under somewhat improvised conditions, 
where spontaneously formed units were supplied by locally procured animals.387 This 
explains how infantry soldiers at Bloody Ridge came to be guiding mules. In Italy, the 
use of mules for supply purposes was ultimately systematized to an extent. The 
animals were imported from North Africa and Sicily or procured on-site. It was 
suggested that every division, corps and army headquarters should have between 
300 and 500 mules available to guarantee that its supply needs could be met.388 
In total, over 15,000 pack animals – most of them mules – were employed in the 
Italian campaign, 11,000 of which were utilized by units of Army Ground Forces and 
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the rest by the Quartermaster Corps. Fifth Army standardized so-called pack units 
consisting of 260 mules, twelve horses, eleven officers and 320 enlisted soldiers. 
These units eventually took over the lion’s share of mountain supply duties.389 Mule 
trains predominantly carried ammunition, water and food into the mountains. To a 
lesser extent, they were also used to transport heavy weapons and the wounded. 
After Italy had come over to the Allied side, Italian soldiers were preferentially used in 
the pack mule units. On one hand, this frequently allowed the use of men with 
knowledge of the local area, a particular advantage in the mountains. On the other 
hand, however, Italian troops were, in principle, put to use behind the front lines 
since, if captured by their former German brothers-in-arms, they were more likely to 
be treated as deserters than as prisoners of war.390 Initially, American enlisted 
personnel frequently overloaded the animals, since they did not take into 
consideration that Italian mules were smaller and weaker, on average, than those in 
the U.S.391 
Except in emergencies, ascent into the mountains was normally made under the 
protection of darkness. In daylight, the mule trains were, in most cases, detectable by 
German observation posts (and thus susceptible to artillery fire). For the same 
reason, use of white mules by pack units was soon discontinued. They were too 
easily seen by moonlight, thus provoking shelling from German artillery. In general, 
trucks moved supplies by day to depots located near the front, at the end of the 
passable roads, and stored them there. With the onset of darkness, the mules were 
loaded and the pack trains dispatched. Each animal in the caravan was assigned a 
driver. Proceeding behind the animals were soldiers whose task was to assist fallen 
animals, as well as to take over their load in the event that they were killed by enemy 
fire or simply died from exhaustion. In extreme cases, when even mules were unable 
to negotiate the trails, the soldiers had to bear the entire burden themselves.392 If 
they were lucky, they were equipped with carrying frames for this purpose … 
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Bloody Ridge is a key image in two distinctive ways. Seen in a narrower context, it 
represents a turning point in Mauldin’s artistic – and probably his personal – 
development. The battles that Mauldin experienced at Santo Stefano were among 
the first in an endless series of ferocious battles for mountain positions all over the 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations. What intensified his impressions was that he 
was witnessing his own unit, the 180th Infantry Regiment, as it was being worn down 
by the attacks on German defensive positions around Santo Stefano. The specific 
result is a work of art that has little to do with the ordinary, with what one would 
normally perceive to be a cartoon. In general, Bloody Ridge constituted a milestone 
in Mauldin’s transformation into a chronicler of dogfaces. Seen from a wider angle, it 
is an image symbolic of the entire Mediterranean Theater of Operations. It negotiates 
murderous mountain fighting as well as the travails of sustaining these operations 
that gave the Mediterranean campaign its distinctive character. Dogfaces battled 
along countless Bloody Ridges throughout the entire Theater of Operations, the next 
one already looming ahead. Nicosia, Troina, San Fratello, Monte Pantano, Monte 
Camino, San Pietro Infine and Monte Sammucro among many other places in Sicily 
and Italy still haunt the memories of survivors of these struggles as their own 
personal Bloody Ridges. 
9.2 5-in-1s (December 11, 1943) 
Food must be adequate in quantity, varied enough to provide all the ingredients of 
a properly balanced diet, and acceptable to the soldier. To furnish energy his diet 
must contain fats and carbohydrates; to build and repair his body it must provide 
proteins and minerals. At the same time his food must have sufficient vitamins and 
bulk to foster health. The regular serving of palatable food is the greatest single 
factor in building and maintaining high spirit and morale. 
Erna Risch, The Development of Subsistence393 
                                            





Fig. 6   “Honest, fellers … next trip I’ll bring 5-in-1’s.“ (1943) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1943). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Four GIs stand around a mule. While one holds the reins, the other three appear to 
be busy with the mule. The one farthest to the right, leaning slightly forward, is 
touching the mule’s left haunch with his right hand. In his left, he holds a bayonet. 
The soldier kneeling at the right side of the mule is interested in his its belly. He is 
pointing to a spot between the forelegs. With his right hand, which holds a bayonet, 
he supports himself on the ground. A third soldier with a bayonet stands at the mule’s 
forelegs. He is bent forward as if to speak with the kneeling GI; he strokes his chin 
quizzically with his right hand while his left holds the bayonet. Eyes wide open, the 
mule stares over its shoulder at the GI with his hand on his chin. On its back is a 
pack frame loaded with three cases. The two cases seen along the mule’s left side 
read KS in capital letters. On the third, the words US ARMY “C” RATION can be 
seen. The GI holding the reins stands a bit aloof from this scene. He holds a cigarette 
in his right hand, has a somewhat hapless expression on his face, and assures his 
companions: Honest, fellers … next trip I’ll bring 5-in-1’s. 
The key to understanding this picture is evidently what has been packed in the cases 
on the mule’s back. It contains rations – food packs for soldiers at the front. So what 
are the specific contents of this cases? Why do the three soldiers with their bayonets 
apparently have a culinary interest in the mule? What is there about the 5-in-1s the 
mule driver is willing to sacrifice for the life of his pack animal? To find the answers to 
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such questions, we need to concern ourselves with the field rations system of the 
Army of the United States. 
Rations 
The Army Quartermaster Corps defines a ration as … the allowance of food for 
subsistence of one person for one day.394 Obviously, different situations called for 
different kinds of rations. The most basic distinction was between garrison rations 
and field rations. The garrison rationing system regulated meal provision for the 
peacetime army within the territory of the United States and is therefore irrelevant to 
our purposes here. For the sake of completeness, however: this system allocated a 
specific budget to those responsible for provisioning the troops of a particular 
organization. With these funds, they could obtain perishable foods from local 
sources. Non-perishable foods were made available through the Army’s central 
infrastructure. Responsible officials were required to provide each individual with a 
balanced diet of a specified composition. The system included a so-called ration 
savings privilege that permitted each organization to retain any budgetary savings to 
be used for special expenses – to provide holiday meals, for example.395 While 
feeding the tiny Regular Army in the period between the wars was a relatively simple 
task, the situation became much more difficult with the mobilization and global 
dislocation of the Army of the United States beginning in 1942. In pre-modern wars, it 
was not uncommon that an army would live off the land where it fought. Most modern 
armies, however, including the Army of the United States, found it necessary, for 
logistical reasons, to provision their soldiers with field rations, in part because the 
amount of destruction involved in modern warfare had become so large that the 
output of foodstuffs in areas where the war was being waged was scarcely sufficient 
for the local population, let alone foreign armies. 
Even in the period between the wars, the Quartermaster Corps was already involved 
in developing field and combat rations. Lacking the means to conduct serious 
research and development, however, the corps found it almost impossible to achieve 
any applicable results. By the end of the 1930s decade, in light of the worsening 
international situation, it was finally granted the necessary resources. In 1941, the 
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QMC Subsistence Research Laboratory in Chicago commenced work on developing 
field and combat rations for the Army of the United States. In this task, it had to take 
a multiplicity of requirements into account. Obviously, nutritional content had to meet 
minimum standards. At the same time, however, the rations would need to be 
acceptable to the troops and would have to be able to endure long periods of storage 
under a variety of climatic conditions without losing their nutritional value. Packaging 
would need to be compact yet resistant, allowing the rations to be transported via 
transatlantic freighters and ultimately carried in the field by individual soldiers.396 The 
maxim governing the work of the Subsistence Research Laboratory staff called for: 
… acceptability, nutritional adequacy, stability, and military utility … economy of 
space and weight in transportation and storage, of facilities and labor in 
unloading, carrying, issue, preparation, and consumption.397 
Field rations – combat rations 
As it commenced offensive operations with TORCH, the Army of the United States 
had five different field rations at its disposal, labeled A, B, D, C and K, in addition to a 
number of special rations for a variety of emergencies at sea or in the air. At the end 
of 1942, the so-called U(nit) ration or 5-in-1 ration was added and eventually 
broadened to become a 10-in-1. A and B rations were designated for troops in 
relatively stable surroundings. Freshly prepared in mobile kitchens behind the front 
lines, they were the most comparable to garrison rations in their composition and 
variety. A and B rations differed from each other solely in that A rations were made 
with fresh ingredients, while B rations consisted of foods that were preserved and 
dehydrated in various ways.398 Combat or operational rations D, C and K had been 
developed for consumption under unstable circumstances. Troops in this situation 
included soldiers engaged with the Enemy and those who had become separated 
from their regular source of supply, as well as units that were moving so rapidly that 
their mobile kitchens could not keep up with them.399  
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The D ration was the first modern survival or emergency ration. In order to ensure 
that it would only be consumed in emergency situations, early D ration recipes were 
originally designed to be decidedly unappetizing. These guidelines were later revised 
under a plan to use D bars to supplement other rations. Eventually, a ration 
composed of three bars weighing four ounces each was developed. It consisted of a 
mixture of chocolate, sugar, oatmeal, skimmed milk powder and artificial flavoring. 
With a total calorie content of 1800, it was intended to meet a day’s energy 
requirement under emergency conditions. Experiences showed that D rations 
provoked nausea in some soldiers and made many of them thirsty. Nevertheless, 
even in non-emergency settings, they were welcomed as a more concentrated, 
quicker and more flavorful energy dispenser and often added as an enhancement to 
improvised cocoa drinks and cakes.400 
C 
Though they met the requirements for emergency use, D rations were not designed 
to provide soldiers in unsettled situations with three balanced meals or to relieve their 
dependence on external sources of nutrition. The so-called C ration was developed 
to accomplish these functions. The ration consisted of six 12-ounce cylindrical tin 
cans, three of which (beef stew, pork and beans and meat hash) made up the M(eat) 
unit. The remaining three cans formed the B(read) unit, which included instant coffee, 
sugar and a variety of sweet snacks. The C ration’s average nutritional value 
amounted to around 4500 calories. The B unit was expanded several times, 
eventually coming to include items like cocoa powder, powdered vitamin C drink, 
chewing gum, cigarettes, matches and toilet paper. In summer 1944, the contents of 
the M unit were augmented to incorporate ground meat, spaghetti, chicken and 
vegetables, ham, egg and potato, frankfurters and beans, and ham and lima beans. 
In spite of these efforts to improve the C rations, they enjoyed a justifiably poor 
reputation among the dogfaces. As a packet, they were so large and bulky that it was 
almost impossible for GIs to carry an entire daily ration into the field. For the same 
reasons, they were specifically unsuitable as combat rations. The three initial M unit 
varieties had been considered sufficient because planners assumed that it would be 
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possible to feed troops on A and B rations most of the time. They envisioned that C 
rations would be used only rarely, and even then, not for more than three days in a 
row. Operational and logistical conditions soon indicated, however, that some troops 
would have to be fed on C rations for months at a time. Only part of the projected 
expansion of the various menus in the Tables of Organization and Equipment could 
be actually achieved. Due to delivery problems on the part of producers of some 
ingredients, only certain menus could be provided in the theaters of operation, and 
the greater menu selections that had been theorized remained exactly that: 
theoretical. Cold C rations were universally judged to be inedible and, even when 
heated, they had a taste that thrilled very few soldiers.401 Their most negative feature, 
by far, was the result that most dogfaces, after eating C rations for three to four days, 
had to cope with nausea, vomiting and problems of digestion.402 
K 
The C ration can be called a combat ration, although conditions at the front needed 
to be fairly static and stable if it was to be used there. The K ration was developed for 
utilization in truly precarious circumstances – for example, in a battle’s attack phase. 
In order for it to be more easily transportable, the K ration was distributed in three 
rectangular packages that could each fit into the pocket of a uniform, corresponding 
respectively to the day’s three main meals. Its precise composition (with a caloric 
value between 3100 and 3400) was repeatedly revised, but in essence, all versions 
had the following common features: three main dishes such as meat, meat and egg, 
and processed cheese; biscuits, crackers, dextrose tablets, instant coffee, one fruit 
bar, one chocolate bar, powdered soup, lemon juice crystals, sugar tablets, 
cigarettes, matches, chewing gum and toilet paper.403 
The K ration represented a quantum leap in packaging technology and battlefield 
suitability, but its appeal to the taste buds of the dogfaces and its tolerability were 
little changed from other rations. Quite to the contrary, the later versions of the C 
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ration were preferred over the Ks.404 However, the object of culinary desire for all 
dogfaces was a ration developed during the North African campaign that food service 
planners had never intended for them: the 5-in-1s, along with their later version, the 
10-in-1s. 
5-in-1 (U) 
Towards the end of 1942, the Subsistence Research Laboratory introduced a ration 
that was designed for small, isolated units. This U(nit) ration – normally referred to as 
a 5-in-1 (later 10-in-1), unlike the D, C and K rations that were known by their letter 
designations – was intended to be used by tank crews, artillery teams or members of 
comparable units who could carry a daily group ration with them. The term ῾5-in-1᾽ 
referred to their capacity to serve five men for one day.405 The 5-in-1s involved a 
somewhat greater preparatory effort than did C and K rations, and, in addition, their 
weight of almost 14 kilograms meant that they were extremely impractical for 
infantrymen to carry. The simply unimaginable variety of delicacies they contained, 
however, left the dogfaces totally willing to put up with any inconvenience in order to 
have access to them. They schemed and organized to find ways to savor these 
delights – no effort was too great. The 5-in-1s provided basically the same menu as 
the B rations in the rear echelons. Their ingredients were modified only as far as 
necessary to allow them to be prepared without the infrastructure of a field kitchen.406 
The following listing of a sample 5-in-1 daily ration for one man demonstrates the 
extent of this ration᾽s enticement: 
… a breakfast of dehydrated tomato juice cocktail, whole wheat cereal, canned 
bacon, soluble coffee, sugar and canned milk; a dinner of dehydrated bean soup, 
canned roast beef, dehydrated potatoes, canned peas, evaporated pears, hard 
candy, lemon juice crystals, and sugar; and a supper which included meat and 
vegetable stew, vanilla pudding powder, soluble coffee, sugar and canned milk. A 
supply of salt, biscuits, dehydrated fruit spread, and a processed substitute for 
butter accompanied all cased rations.407 
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… the accessory kit, containing cigarettes, halazone tablets [for drinking water 
purification], matches, can opener, soap, paper towels, and toilet paper … [and] a 
sponge for cleaning mess gear used in cooking.408 
With this information about the field provisioning system of the Army of the United 
States, the meaning of the 5-in-1 cartoon becomes clear with respect to the contents 
of the cases and the behavior of the dogfaces. In light of the delivery of two cases of 
K rations and a case of C rations, they are weighing the alternative of eating the 
means of transport instead of the contents of the cases. The mule driver seeks to 
prevent them from doing this by holding out the prospect of a delivery of 5-in-1s, the 
object of the dogfaces᾽ culinary desire. The cartoon’s publication data – December 
11, 1943 in the 45th Division News – provides an indication of its operational 
reference, namely Fifth Army’s slow and bloody advance from Naples to the Gustav 
Line, the German defensive position at Monte Cassino in the late fall of 1943.409 This 
advance through the mountains precluded provisioning with A or B rations over long 
stretches of their march. 
To illustrate the intensity of the emotions the dogfaces harbored with respect to 
rations, let us examine another cartoon dealing with this subject. Published on 
August 29, 1944 in Stars and Stripes, it similarly deals with the unloved C Rations. 
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Fig. 7   “We gotta blast ‘em out. They found out we feed prisoners C rations.” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
In the foreground, we see three dogfaces wearing the summer field uniform of the 
Army of the United States as they take cover behind the ruins of a house. The soldier 
at the left, on hands and knees, has a canteen and a first aid kit attached to his belt. 
In his right hand, he holds an M1 Garand rifle. He is the speaker of the words in the 
caption below: We gotta blast ᾽em out. They found out we feed prisoners C rations. 
Joe and Willie are crouching at his right. Joe has a canteen and ammo pouch 
attached to his own belt, and he is carrying an M1 bazooka.410 Willie crouches behind 
Joe, and both of them focus their attention on their companion on all fours. Behind 
                                            
410 The bazooka was a recoilless rocket launcher. Developed to provide the infantry with sufficient 
firepower to attack armored or fortified targets, it could deliver 60mm rockets with a high explosive or 
shaped charge. (Cf. Green, Planning Munitions, p. 355 ff.) 
171 
 
Joe and Willie lie four cylindrical objects, carrying tubes for the bazooka’s M6A1 
rockets411. Beyond the house’s collapsed stone wall that serves as cover for the 
dogfaces can be seen a three-story house with a partially exposed roof. 
The cartoon’s (clearly exaggerated) message may be understood from its setup and 
the pronouncement by the dogface kneeling at the left in the picture. German soldiers 
are holed up in the house at the background, and they were apparently preparing to 
surrender or at least negotiate. Unfortunately, the information that the Army of the 
United States is feeding its prisoners of war with C rations has provoked a radical 
change in their intent. They are now resolved to fight, and the three dogfaces have 
no choice other than to use bazooka fire to force a surrender. 
9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944) 
Look at an infantryman’s eyes and you can tell how much war he has seen. 
Bill Mauldin412 
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Fig. 8  “We just landed. Do you know any good war stories?” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
To describe Joe as ‛sitting’ on a chair would be a euphemism. More accurately, he is 
slouched across the chair, wearing a tanker jacket413, barefoot and with the pantlegs 
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of his uniform rolled up. His left elbow rests on the table next to the chair, and he is 
holding a cigarette in his left hand. With his right, which hangs over the chair’s 
backrest, he holds a bottle displaying three stars on its label. In the foreground next 
to the chair are a second, identically labeled bottle, an M1 helmet and a pair of lace-
up boots. A Garand rifle is leaning against the wall behind the chair. Joe᾽s face is 
expressionless, and his eyes are either closed or downcast. 
At the other end of the table, on which two shot glasses can be seen, are two GIs. In 
contrast to Joe, both are cleanly shaven. They are likewise wearing tanker jackets 
and M1 helmets. The one at the left stands, leaning slightly forward, with a rifle slung 
over his shoulder and his right hand on its sling. He is gazing at Joe, his smile and 
raised eyebrows implying interest. The two chevrons on the left sleeve of the GI 
seated at the table identify him as a corporal. Unlike his companion, he correctly 
wears his helmet with its chinstrap fastened.414 He has his hands folded to support 
his chin, while he bends forward toward Joe, and he has a smile on his face. His 
attention is likewise concentrated on our dogface soldier. We see a door at the right 
and a window at the left in the background. The shadows cast on the wall by Joe and 
the standing soldier indicate that the artificially lit scene is playing out at night. 
One presumes that it is the seated GI who speaks in the cartoon’s caption: We just 
landed. Do you know any good war stories? The theme and importance of the 
cartoon may be deduced from the statement, the image’s overall setup, and above all 
the characters᾽ differences in gesture, facial expression and appearance. The two 
GIs are apparently replacements, soldiers freshly arrived from training camp to fill 
voids in the ranks caused by losses on the battlefield. We devote space to such 
soldiers in Chapter 9.3. From the two shot glasses on the table, we can conclude 
                                                                                                                                        
issued solely to Armored Corps personnel, many dogfaces also contrived to acquire them. They were 
preferred over the actual winter infantry uniform for their sporty appearance and comfort. (Shelby 
Stanton, U.S. Army Uniforms of World War II [Mechanicsburg, PA 1991], p. 193 ff.) 
414 In spite of all official assurances to the contrary, a number of more or less absurd rumors constantly 
ran through the ranks of infantry soldiers right up to the end of the war. One of the most persistent 
involved the regulation use of the chinstrap on a soldier’s helmet. If he were to fasten it under his chin 
as required, so the story goes, an exploding bomb or hand grenade would snap his head and helmet 
backward and break his neck. If the strap remained unfastened, it was naively assumed, the helmet 
would simply fly off the soldier’s head, which would remain otherwise unharmed. 
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that the substance in the bottles has a high alcohol content and that Joe is either 
already drunk or on his way to such a condition. Our attention is in no way drawn to 
the call for good war stories, but instead to Joe’s implicit psychological state. In the 
early 20th Century, this condition was either simply called cowardice or otherwise 
referred to by various euphemisms such as shell shock, war neurosis, combat 
neurosis, combat exhaustion, nervous exhaustion, battle fatigue, operational fatigue 
or combat fatigue.415 The section to follow addresses this phenomenon and its 
history. 
NERVOUSSHELLCOMBATEXHAUSTIONFATIGUESHOCK 
It may be assumed with virtual certainty (of course impossible to verify) that there 
have been prototypical forms of psychological damage ever since humans began to 
kill each other in a fairly organized way. In retrospect, evidence for its existence can 
be traced back to the wars of the 19th Century. The first time it was contemporarily 
recognized and documented was during World War I, essentially because of two 
simple facts. First, it was only at the time of this conflict that psychiatry became 
accepted to some degree as a scientific discipline. Additionally, this first industrialized 
war confronted its victims with a measure of physical and psychological stress, death, 
destruction and devastation that was beyond human coping capacity, leading to an 
initial epidemic of psychological injuries. We would be well advised, however, to 
place the emphasis in the penultimate sentence on the words to some degree. At the 
turn of the 20th Century, psychiatry was practiced discreetly for the most part, often in 
out-of-the-way sanatoriums and psychiatric institutions. Psychiatrists were not 
uncommonly judged as only a little less strange than their patients. Somewhat 
disdainfully, many physicians considered psychiatry and its rarely scientific 
methodologies as pseudo-science.416  
World War I 
Not surprisingly, military organizations were no more progressive in this regard, and 
thus the first efforts to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon were 
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grounded in neurological analysis. When the British army registered an increasing 
number of psychologically induced casualties in the trenches of France, pathologist 
Colonel Frederick Mott coined the expression ῾shell shock᾽ to describe the condition. 
He maintained that the shock waves of exploding artillery grenades were producing 
traumas and microscopic bleeding in the brain. He saw such wounds as causing the 
symptoms of shell shock – uncontrolled trembling, panic attacks, temporary loss of 
sight or hearing, and paralysis. His neurological theory was refuted even before the 
end of the war, however, and prior to the entry of the U.S. into combat, military 
medicine came to the unanimous view that this was in fact a purely psychiatric 
problem, known rather vaguely as war neurosis, combat neurosis or traumatic 
neurosis.417 
Under the leadership of psychologist Colonel Thomas Salmon, the military psychiatric 
service of the American Expeditionary Forces achieved good results in the treatment 
of neuro-psychiatric cases. Even prior to the AEF deployment to France, Salmon had 
studied methods of treatment in British and French field hospitals. He adapted this 
experience to create a three-stage treatment model for the AEF. The premise of this 
concept was that patients should be treated in the closest possible proximity to the 
front. This idea was based on providing traumatized students with protracted rest, a 
healthy diet and psychiatric care. At the same time, however, military discipline was 
to be maintained and the patient’s daily routines strictly governed according to 
military formality, in order to minimize the patient’s mental separation from military 
service. In the event that treatment at the frontline facility should prove unsuccessful, 
the patient would be taken to another institution further to the rear. There a similar 
routine of rest, food and treatment would be prescribed, giving a larger role to the 
psychiatric component. If none of the three treatment stages resulted in progress, the 
patient could possibly be excused from military service.418 
Combat neuroses were very far from gaining general acceptance as the inevitable 
consequences of the war, however. While progressive scholars conjectured that 
every human being has a stress limit that is regularly exceeded in industrialized war, 
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others exclusively saw behind it personal weaknesses and character flaws, and 
harbored suspicions about patients᾽ intentions to dodge service.419 
World War II 
Unfortunately, the theoretical findings by World War I-era American military 
psychologists were forgotten in the two decades of peace that followed. As we 
learned at the beginning of this volume, the Regular Army of the period between the 
wars was largely ignored by society and kept under tight financial control, resulting in 
serious consequences for military psychology. The necessity of studying the 
psychological causes of war casualties and developing options for treating victims 
was considered of little importance. During this period, The Military Surgeon, the 
specialized medical magazine of the Armed Forces, published more articles on 
veterinary medicine than military psychiatry. In the Handbook for the Medical Soldier, 
published in 1927, medical staff members were primarily trained to be alert to 
malingerers and so-called cases of shell shock. In the manual’s second edition, 
published a decade later, only one of the volume’s 685 pages was devoted to the 
topic of psychological health.420 While Salmon strove to highlight potential synergies 
between civilian and military psychiatry in order to keep his profession alive, he 
achieved few results from this effort. Outside the Army, researchers like Adolf Meyer, 
whose psychological theories had a decisive influence on the field of psychology 
during this period, developed a simple psychological equation according to which the 
individual plus the situation equals the personal performance. The Army applied this 
finding to its World War I experiences – namely, that combat neuroses did not occur 
in all soldiers who went through similar situations – and came to the conclusion that 
the causes of psychological damage were to be found in individual psychological 
deficiencies.421 
When Army of the United States began to mobilize in 1940, the intended role of 
military psychiatry was largely preventative. Psychiatrists were to work in the 
induction centers to segregate those individuals in whom neuropsychiatric disorders 
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could be observed, thus preventing combat neuroses before they could become a 
problem. In this way, they flagged 12 percent of the 15 million inductees into the 
American World War II Armed Forces as unfit for service.422 By 1943, when the Army 
of the United States commenced offensive operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, 
these methods had proven to be ineffective. Field doctors noted that even soldiers 
who, up to that point, had been unremarkable (as well as those who had indeed 
distinguished themselves with their bravery) were increasingly displaying symptoms 
of combat neurosis. The result was a gradual recognition that external forces were 
present in wartime surroundings that sapped soldiers᾽ ability to resist physical and 
psychological stresses. As a consequence, the official terminology was revised to be 
consistent with the new findings. From mid-1943 onward, the diagnosis of combat 
neurosis was replaced by either combat (battle) fatigue or battle (combat) exhaustion 
in order to take account of a diminishing capability to cope with the war.423 The point 
had finally been reached where at least official schools of thought could now 
recognize that the causes of combat fatigue lay in the exposure of normal individuals 
to a fundamentally abnormal situation.424 
It is common to the literature on the subject that it somewhat indiscriminately 
intermixes the various terms referring to psychological war wounds. A chronology of 
the phenomenon from its earliest appearance up to the period that concerns this 
study reveals, however, three terminologically and etiologically distinct phases. In the 
shell shock phase, due to a lack of trust in psychological models, an attempt had 
been made to find a neurological basis to explain the phenomenon. During the war or 
combat neurosis phase, researchers established the psychological nature of the 
phenomenon and sought its origins in the afflicted individual’s personal deficiencies. 
The transition to the exhaustion or fatigue phase (whether battle, combat, operational 
or nervous is a distinction of little importance) marked the moment when the horror of 
war was recognized as a causational element of neuro-psychiatric casualties. A U.S. 
study of combat exhaustion concluded that 
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… there is no such thing as “getting used to combat” ... Each moment of combat 
imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the 
intensity and duration of their exposure ... psychiatric casualties are as inevitable 
as gunshot and shrapnel wounds in warfare.425 
Old sergeants … 
During World War II, combat fatigue in the Army Ground Forces normally took one of 
three different forms. In its mild version, combat fatigue was a routine occurrence in 
most infantry units. Its symptoms included increased emotionality, sleep 
disturbances, jittery reactions to nearby or sudden movements or sounds, and 
moderate physical ailments. Dramatic but temporary combat fatigue – often on the 
eve of the first combat mission – expressed itself in strong tremors and quivering, 
crying fits and panic attacks, blindness and paralysis, as well as serious stomach 
ailments. Joe᾽s implied condition in the present chapter’s cartoon was the curse of 
long-serving veterans, a dramatic and permanent type of combat fatigue that 
appeared after long, uninterrupted stretches on the front lines. The phenomenon 
known to dogfaces as ῾old sergeant syndrome᾽ was a severe form of physical and 
psychological burnout. Its symptoms included apathy, slowed reactions, mild tremors, 
weak survival instinct, fixation on detail, increased aggression, extreme exhaustion, 
chronic diarrhea and vomiting, acute insomnia, states of anxiety, phobias, fatalistic 
views, social withdrawal and depression.426 
Joe᾽s old sergeant syndrome – also known as the thousand-yard stare or ETO 
happiness – was a fate that became unavoidable for most soldiers after a certain 
amount of time spent on the front lines. The Army was aware of this condition, as its 
internal study of the subject documented: 
Most men were ineffective after 180 or even 140 days. The general consensus 
was that a man reached his peak effectiveness in the first 90 days of combat, that 
after that his efficiency began to fall off, and that he became steadily less 
valuable thereafter until he was completely useless … The number of men on 
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duty after 200 to 240 days of combat was small and their value to their units 
negligible.427 
It comes as no surprise that the principal causes of combat fatigue were identified as 
battle losses and the length of time an individual was exposed to fighting. Factors 
correlating with these incidents were death or injury involving a close companion, 
loss of unit commanders and loss of confidence in leadership or in one᾽s own unit, 
impotence to respond actively to a threat (in the event of artillery or air attacks), lack 
of information, weather conditions, poor diet and permanent lack of sleep.428 Basic to 
all these factors was, of course, the amount of exposure to combat. Spacing this out 
would have been the only sustainable way to prevent combat fatigue, but such action 
was impossible for reasons related to staffing. As already mentioned in the 
introduction, for technical reasons, the composition of Army Ground Forces 
presented an unfavorable tooth-to-tail ratio.429 This meant that, in spite of its troop 
strength in absolute terms in the ETO, only a relatively small number of infantry 
divisions (42, to be precise) were available. With these very limited means in 
comparison to their tasks, it was impossible to take effective measures430 to prevent 
combat fatigue. For the dogface soldiers in the European and Mediterranean 
Theaters of Operations right up to the end of the war, only German capitulation, their 
own death or a serious injury offered any possible relief from the horrors of war. 
Although Army authorities informally recognized the basic existence of combat 
fatigue, whether and how to treat the psychologically wounded dogfaces frequently 
depended on each commander’s personal attitude. More than a few of them held the 
opinion that institutions for the treatment of combat fatigue would only serve to 
encourage the phenomenon. Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. voiced his 
displeasure in his memoir, War As I Knew It, concerning the shameful use of “battle 
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fatigue” as an excuse for cowardice.431 Only when casualties related to combat 
fatigue reached significant levels (something that happened in nearly all formations 
sooner or later) did the commanders (including Patton) revise their opinion and call 
for psychiatric support.432 Over the course of the war, most armies, corps and infantry 
divisions created so-called ῾exhaustion centers᾽ where combat fatigue patients were 
treated using essentially the same principles as in World War I. 
As a result, return-to-duty rates rose from approximately five percent to between 60 
and 90 percent depending on the individual unit. For example, the First Army 
maintained two exhaustion centers, each with a capacity of 1000 beds, following the 
particularly dreadful Battle of the Bocage433, while additional treatment centers at 
First Army’s division level operated with up to 250 beds each during the same time 
period. A total of 11,150 combat fatigue patients were seen during this battle that 
lasted more than two weeks. Of these, 62 percent returned to their units following 
treatment, 13 percent were transferred to non-combat units, and the rest were 
evacuated to Great Britain.434 The extent to which returnees to the front were fully 
healed and the tally of those who experienced another breakdown (John Keegan 
speaks of an average of five percent even during the same battle435) is a different 
matter.436 
According to official statistics, the various treatment institutions in the Army of the 
United States (including Army Air Forces) received approximately one million combat 
exhaustion cases in World War II. Of this number, 300,000 were given their release 
from military service for psychological reasons following treatment. It is estimated that 
there were, in fact, twice that number of cases, since statistics only take into 
                                            
431 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 382. 
432 Chermol, Wounds without Scars, p. 10. 
433 Cf. Chapter 9.9 Northern France: a quartermaster’s purgatory (September 15, 1944). 
434 Graham A. Cosmas / Albert E. Cowdrey, United States Army in World War II. The Technical 
Services. The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations 
(Washington, D.C. 1992), p. 236. 
435 Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 328. 
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consideration cases where treatment was received at the division level or above. All 
patients successfully treated at units below the divisional medical facility were not 
counted. Apart from that, efforts were made to keep combat fatigue figures artificially 
low, and intake diagnoses often involved entries suggesting physical injury.437 It can 
be assumed that the above figures represent only the most serious cases of combat 
fatigue and that a far greater number of unknown cases existed. 
By today’s standards, as inadequate as the handling of combat fatigue and the 
equally incomprehensible hesitation by some commanders to acknowledge the 
phenomenon may seem, it is important to place this subject in its contemporary and 
international context. Soldiers fighting for Hitler or Stalin who experienced 
psychological breakdown were treated exclusively by a firing squad. The existence of 
a German or Soviet equivalent for combat exhaustion was recognized neither in the 
Wehrmacht nor in the Red Army, quite in contrast to the well established “fact” of 
cowardice before the Enemy in the malicious vocabulary of the two dictators. In total, 
135,000 Red Army soldiers were executed for cowardice (and for multiple other 
presumed offenses) between 1941 and 1945.438 On the German eastern front alone, 
drumhead courts-martial sentenced 30,000 individuals to death in the final year of the 
war for cowardice before the Enemy, two thirds of whom were actually executed. In 
the Battle of Berlin in 1945, 10,000 German soldiers and civilians were murdered for 
defeatism by summary courts-martial and National Socialist security services.439 
Good war stories 
Let us briefly return to the cartoon that is the object of our consideration. It deals with 
the discrepancy between a youthful, propagandized impression of the war and its 
physically and psychologically destructive reality. The two replacements represent 
and expect a war that is accompanied by fanfare and assured of victory like the one 
shown in the movie newsreels. They stand for an adolescent fervor that, according to 
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Robert Kotlowitz, the Army must understand to make use of it.440 Joe represents the 
war as it actually was for countless dogfaces: a grueling mix of boredom and 
excitement; of unending exhaustion, mortal fear and panic; of hunger, thirst and 
constant discomfort; of loss, indescribable brutality, aggression and hopelessness. It 
cannot be assumed that he is expecting anything … 
9.4 Cold injury, ground type (March 2, 1944) 
…the most serious menace confronting us today is not the German Army, which 
we have practically destroyed, but the weather which, if we do not exert ourselves, 
may well destroy us through the incidence of trench foot. 
General George S. Patton, Jr.441 
 
                                            
440 Robert Kotlowitz, Before Their Time. A Memoir (New York 1997), p. 194. 
441 In a memorandum to corps and division commanders of Third Army. Cited in: Cosmas, Medical 






Fig. 9   “Joe, yestiddy ya saved my life an’ I swore I’d pay ya back. Here’s me last pair of dry socks.” 
(1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Willie442 and Joe sit on the ground in – by all appearances – a field of reeds. Both of 
them have their feet submersed in water. Each wears an Army M1 helmet and a 
tanker jacket.443 Joe has stood his Garand rifle on end between his legs with the butt 
down, and it is leaning against his right shoulder. Willie carries his own rifle slung 
over his left shoulder. He has draped his right arm around Joe’s shoulders. In his left 
                                            
442 The soldier who is speaking has Willie᾽s facial features but not his characteristic hook nose. Either 
this is Willie, who for some reason sports another nose in this instance, or it is another dogface soldier 
who – apart from the nose– looks very much like him. The identity of Joe’s compansion is not essential 
to the meaning of the cartoon, and therefore we assume that it is Willie. 
443 Cf. Chapter 9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944). 
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hand is a pair of socks. He says: Joe, yestiddy ya saved my life an’ I swore I’d pay ya 
back. Here’s me last pair of dry socks. 
At first glance, the relationship between favor and returned favor in the above cartoon 
appears far out of balance. In return for Joe’s having saved his life on the previous 
day, Willie offers him his last pair of dry socks. In a review of Todd DePastino’s 
biography of Bill Mauldin, David Michaelis extols this act, ignorant of its full 
significance, as small gesture of humanity444. As we shall see shortly, the dry socks 
in the present case represent a thoroughly appropriate response. 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations 1943/44 
In mid-November 1943, Fifth Army medical facilities in Italy began to fill with dogfaces 
whose condition was to become known under the name of trenchfoot (designated in 
the Army’s bureaucratic terminology as cold injury, ground type445). In the savage 
mountain fighting within sight of Monte Cassino446, cold, rain and snow were 
omnipresent. In such circumstances, it was impossible for the dogfaces to keep their 
feet warm and dry. These soldiers were simply not adequately equipped for the 
climatic conditions under which they had to do soldiering.447 Their light wool socks 
and combat boots offered protection from neither cold nor dampness. Warmer socks 
were in short supply during most of the winter, and when they were finally able to be 
delivered, they were useless to many soldiers because the larger sizes were 
missing.448 The first winter in which the young Army of the United States went into 
combat in field army strength revealed serious logistical shortcomings in its supply 
system. In the constant cold and damp that plagued the dogfaces᾽ lower extremities, 
                                            
444 Michaelis, He Drew Great Mud. 
445 In contrast, air crews were afflicted with cold injury, high altitude type. 
446 Cf. Chapter 9.6 Italy: SHINGLE – A Stranded Whale (June 5, 1944). 
447 Charles M. Wiltse, United States Army in World War II. The Technical Services. The Medical 
Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters (Washington, D.C. 1987), p. 
262. 
448 In October 1943, the Quartermaster Corps could only fill 10 percent of Fifth Army’s need for socks. 
In one case, when Bill Mauldin᾽s 45th Infantry Division ordered 16,000 pairs, no more than 500 pairs 
were actually delivered. (Ross, Operations, p. 189.) 
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blood vessels became constricted and caused circulatory disorders that, for their 
part, produced an oxygen deficiency in the tissue. The resulting ailments included 
numbness, swelling and very painful feet. If these conditions were not treated, or 
were treated too late, they could lead to irreversible damage to arteries and nerve 
endings, infections, dying tissue, gangrene and blood poisoning. In the worst cases, 
dogfaces were threatened with foot amputation or death.449 Concerning winter 
1943/44 in Italy, Bill Mauldin wrote: 
There was a lot of it [trenchfoot] that first winter in Italy. The doggies found it 
difficult to keep their feet dry, and they had to stay in their foxholes for days and 
weeks at a time. If they couldn’t stand the pain they crawled out of their holes and 
stumbled and crawled (they couldn’t walk) down the mountains until they reached 
the aid station. Their shoes were cut off, and their feet swelled like balloons. 
Sometimes the feet had to be amputated. But most often the men had to make 
their way back up the mountains and crawl into their holes again because there 
were no replacements and the line had to be held.450 
Other than keeping their feet reasonably dry and warm through regularly changing 
their socks, soldiers could try to stimulate circulation through movement and regular 
foot massages. Movement, which implied leaving one’s position of cover, was not 
possible in many cases. Foot massage was likewise a dangerous matter. On one 
hand, soldiers had to reckon with the possibility of surprise attacks at any time, and to 
repel such advances without boots would be unthinkable. On the other hand, they 
also faced the danger that their feet, once removed from the boots, would quickly 
swell up, making it impossible for them to put the boots back on. 
This already significant problem intensified when Fifth Army put VI Corps ashore at 
Anzio on January 22, 1944.451 The bridgehead south of Rome was largely situated in 
the reclaimed marshes of the Pontine Plain, which Mussoli had equipped with a 
drainage system. The water table remained very high in the landing zone, however. 
As a result, the bottoms of all trenches, bunkers and foxholes in the bridgehead filled 
with water even before soldiers had finished digging them. The German Wehrmacht 
                                            
449 Cosmas, Medical Service, p. 489. 
450 Mauldin, Up Front, p. 37 ff. 
451 Cf. Chapter 9.6 Italy: SHINGLE – A Stranded Whale (June 5, 1944). 
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had established observation posts atop the surrounding hills, and thus could direct its 
artillery fire within the entire bridgehead at will. This left the dogfaces with no option 
other than to remain motionless in their positions for long stretches at a time, 
magnifying the trenchfoot problem to epidemic proportions.452 
The Annual Report, Surgeon, Fifth Army reported 5710 cases of trenchfoot during the 
period between November 1943 and March 1944.453 These were concentrated 
among the dogfaces of the infantry divisions, who were forced to endure conditions 
(including long periods of exposure to the elements without dry clothing as well as 
continual immobility under enemy fire) that were highly conducive to the emergence 
of this syndrome.454 Besides the individual consequences for all those affected, the 
epidemic represented a serious impairment for Allied operations, considering that 
5700 trenchfoot victims (most of them dogfaces) represented the rifle strength of two 
infantry divisions. Over the winter, Fifth Army identified three causes for the epidemic: 
U.S. Army footgear was poorly adapted to winter conditions; the Quartermaster 
Corps was unable to handle the logistic challenges involved in distributing more 
suitable equipment or even, as a stopgap, additional socks in sufficient quantity; and 
lastly, there was a lack of awareness among troops in affected frontline formations of 
the importance of instituting disciplined self-help actions under such conditions – 
such as changing socks daily455 and performing exercises to stimulate circulation. 
When greater attention was paid to these matters in the following winter, Fifth Army 
was able, through heightened foot care awareness and superior equipment456, to 
                                            
452 Wiltse, Medical Service, p. 285 ff. 
453 Ibid., p. 262. 
454 Cosmas, Medical Service, p. 489. 
455 One trick to having a pair of dry socks to wear each day was to drape a used pair around one’s 
neck like a shawl. By the time of the next change of socks, these had usually dried out. 
456 For winter 1944/45, thick wool socks and so-called ῾shoepacs᾽ (moccasin-like shoes with rubber 
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reduce the incidence of trenchfoot to 1572, almost a 75 percent drop in a single 
year.457 
European Theater of Operations 
For unknown reasons, the lessons learned in the Mediterranean Theater of 
Operations in 1943 did not carry over into the ETO in 1944. When the winter of 
1944/45 proved to be one of Europe’s wettest and coldest in decades, trenchfoot 
reemerged as an epidemic. By the spring, the overloaded supply lines were giving 
priority to channeling ammunition and equipment, and delivery of winter gear was 
deemphasized. This meant that the dogfaces in the trenches had to endure a second 
winter with barely adequate cold-weather protection. Omar N. Bradley, Commander 
of 12th Army Group, recalls: 
When the rains first came in November with a blast of wintry air, our troops were 
ill prepared for winter-time campaigning. This was traceable in part to the 
September crisis in supply for, during our race to the Rhine, I had deliberately by-
passed shipments of winter clothing in favor of ammunition and gasoline. As a 
consequence, we now found ourselves caught short, particularly in bad-weather 
footgear. We had gambled in our choice and now were paying for the bad 
guess.458 
The cost of Bradley᾽s gamble, which of course had to be paid primarily by the 
dogfaces, was high indeed. In October and November alone, the major American 
hospitals around Paris saw 11,000 cases of trenchfoot. In November, the percentage 
of trenchfoot patients recorded in hospital intake statistics rose weekly, from 1.3 
percent of the first-week total to 4 percent, then 20 percent and finally to 24 percent 
of total intake in the last week in November.459 In the units of General Patton᾽s Third 
Army, reported losses due to trenchfoot varied in November between 10 and 15 
percent of total troop strength. Losses of this magnitude threatened the formations᾽ 
combat readiness and caused Patton to issue an urgent appeal to his corps and 
division commanders: 
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… the most serious menace confronting us today is not the German Army, which 
we have practically destroyed, but the weather which, if we do not exert 
ourselves, may well destroy us through the incidence of trench foot.460 
At ground level, dogfaces tried out improvised solutions. They wore two pairs of 
socks with a wrapping of paper interspersed between them, a strategy that failed to 
produce the desired effect, apart from the fact that, in most cases, their feet no longer 
fit into their combat boots. Wearing rubber galoshes over the combat boots made 
them not only waterproof but also fully airtight, causing the feet to perspire to such an 
extent that the effect equaled that produced by waterlogged boots. The most 
common method of preventing this predicament turned out to be abandoning the 
boots altogether to wear the galoshes directly, either layering multiple pairs of socks 
or inserting bits of blanketing, cloth and straw into them. While such makeshift 
footgear succeeded in keeping the feet reasonably dry and warm, it reduced mobility 
to the point where this technique represented a serious risk on the battlefield.461 
In January 1945, with no end in sight to the epidemic and still no weather-appropriate 
equipment on hand, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces initiated a 
campaign to prevent trenchfoot. In a communiqué, Eisenhower personally 
emphasized the need for commanders to pay unremitting attention to the problem.462 
Army publications began to feature articles and reports on how to prevent trenchfoot 
through regular foot care. Armed Forces Network Radio broadcast the same 
message to the front lines. Millions of copies of a trenchfoot brochure were circulated, 
and replacements were informed about the malady in information sessions. Field 
armies formed trenchfoot control teams to address the problem in collaboration with 
their responsible medical officer.463 As necessary and helpful as these steps were, 
they came too late to have a significant effect. The decrease in trenchfoot incidence 
after February 1945 was due more to the reduced intensity of combat operations 
during this period as well as to the onset of spring than it was to the launch of 
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preventive measures. Between October 1944 and April 1945, a total of 46,107 cases 
of trenchfoot were recorded in medical facilities in the European Theater of 
Operations. They constituted 9.25 percent of all American losses in the campaign in 
northwestern Europe.464 At the high command level, such statistics meant victory or 
defeat in battles and campaigns. At the ground level, they represented tens of 
thousands of dogfaces who were forced to endure, in the best of cases, a very 
painful and protracted condition. For those among them who were not so lucky, 
trenchfoot resulted in amputation or even death. 
9.5 Lili Marleen … (March 31, 1944) 
“Lilli” [sic] is immortal 
John Steinbeck465 
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Fig. 10   “Th’ Krauts ain’t followin’ ya so good on ‘Lilli Marleen’ tonight, Joe. Ya think maybe somethin’ 
happned to their tenor?“ (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
We see Willie and Joe in a fortified emplacement. It is night. At the edge of the 
fortification’s trench is a tangle of barbed wire. The two dogfaces wear tanker 
jackets.466 Joe is seated at the left with his back against the wall of the trench. He is 
wearing his M1 helmet while he plays a harmonica. His pants are torn at the right 
knee. Willie stands at his left. His forearms rest on the edge of the trench and his left 
knee presses against the trench wall. He too is wearing an M1 helmet. His tanker 
jacket is torn at the back and on the left arm. Unlike Joe, Willie wears a hip belt with a 
knife attached on the left. To the right of the knife are three ammo pouches and, 
beneath the middle pouch, a first aid kit. A canteen hangs beneath the right pouch. 
                                            
466 Cf. Chapter 9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944). 
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Willie looks down at Joe and says, Th’ krauts ain’t followin’ ya so good on “Lilli 
Marleen” tonight, Joe. Ya think maybe somethin’ happened to their tenor?467 
Acquaintances 
The cartoon deals with two different phenomena. The first of these is communicated 
by the fact that Joe is concerned about the well-being of the German tenor on the 
enemy side.468 An explanation is found in the imminent operational realities in the 
area in question. At the end of March 1944, the amphibious assault across the 
English Channel still lay two months in the future, and the Mediterranean Theater of 
Operations remained the only area where the Army of the United States was 
conducting offensive operations. When Operation SHINGLE bogged down in a 
stalemate after a short time, opposing forces both at both Anzio and the Gustav Line 
lay immobile across from one another.469 In this trench warfare situation resembling 
World War I, sometimes long periods of time would pass when nothing happened 
other than combat patrols470 and occasional artillery skirmishes; above all, there was 
no shift in the front line. As a result, the same formations sometimes faced off against 
each other over long stretches of time, getting to know one another in the process. 
On occasion, conversations (not often friendly ones) were struck up across the front 
lines. In Up Front, Mauldin describes an exchange between a German soldier and a 
dogface regarding Italian troops. Following Italy’s switch to the side of the Allies, its 
soldiers were in a doubly difficult situation. Their new partners mistrusted them as 
                                            
467 In Todd DePastino’s catalog of Mauldin’s WWII cartoons, which this study references in regard to 
the artwork, the accompanying text is depicted as beginning with “Fritz ain’t followin’ ya…”. In the 1944 
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 468 Krauts indicates the Germans in the opposite trench. While the German foe was generally known 
in World War I as the Hun, American army slang in World War II referred to the Enemy variously as 
Kraut, Jerry or Fritz. (Cf. Bishop, Army Speech, p. 246; Pyle, Brave Men, p. 256.) 
469 Cf. Chapter 9.6 Italy: SHINGLE – a stranded whale (June 5, 1944). 
470 In the 1940s, preceding the invention and development of various means of electronic 
reconnaissance, regular combat patrols served the purpose of updating the exact position of the front 
line, identifying enemy formations on the opposite side, detecting troop movements at an early stage, 
establishing forward observation posts and capturing opponents for interrogation purposes. (Cf. 
Antony Beevor, D-Day. The Battle for Normandy [London 2010], p. 257.) 
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former opponents and turncoats, while their previous confederates saw them as 
traitors and deserters, treating them as such whenever they were taken prisoner. 
“How do you like your new ally?” yelled the German to the American in passable 
English. 
“You kin have ‘em back,” said our guy, having come from a region where 
diplomacy bows to honesty. 
“We don’t want them,” shouted Jerry, and lobbed a grenade up the hill. It fell far 
short. The American splattered the sniper’s rocks with a burst. 
“Swine!” jeered the German. 
“Horse’s ass!” snorted the American, and all was quiet again.471 
Not all these acquaintanceships were necessarily of an irreconcilable nature. Elliott 
Johnson, an artillery spotter in the 4th Infantry Division, recalled a front-line encounter 
at two opposing forestry towers during the particularly bloody fighting at the Hürtgen 
forest during winter 1944: 
The second day I was there, I saw another forester’s tower. There was a German 
lieutenant looking right at me. We waved at each other. I marked him on the map. 
I got my guns zeroed in on him, and I know in my heart he did the same thing to 
me. He was also an artillery observer. Along my ridge was a road. German tanks 
rolled along there. My target. He would watch my shooting. He was interested in 
my effectiveness. 
I was bringing the artillery in. One day there came several German vehicles in 
line. Three ambulances were in the middle. That was hands off. I was just 
watching them go by. Suddenly somebody started shooting artillery at them. I 
looked over at the lieutenant right away. I shook my head as hard as I could. He 
thought I called the fire on those ambulances. I saw him pick up his telephone 
and I hit the ladder. I barely got in my house and he laid it on us. Almost knocked 
the tower down. Just his precision shooting. After he lifted his fire, I went tearing 
up the ladder again. I had my hands up and I was waving and shaking my head: 
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not me. He looked at me. Then he took off his helmet. That was his apology to 
me.472 
It could also happen – and this is the transition to the second phenomenon we 
analyze here – that, in rare cases, opponents would make music together. The 
obvious and frequently cited example is the moment when the Christmas carol Stille 
Nacht/Silent Night was spontaneously and simultaneously sung in both languages 
across the front lines. Much more interesting, however, is the case of a young woman 
– usually portrayed as waiting under a lamppost – who enchanted both Allied and 
German soldiers. 
Song of a young soldier on guard duty 
The inaugural radio transmission of the ῾Soldatensender Belgrad᾽ [Belgrade soldiers᾽ 
station] occurred on April 26, 1941, following the German occupation of Yugoslavia. 
The broadcaster’s playlist included a song recorded in 1939 by vocalist Lale 
Andersen on the Electrola label under serial number EG 6993. The disk’s B side 
featured the song Lied eines jungen Wachpostens [Song of a Young Guard], 
subtitled Lili Marleen. Only 700 copies of the record had been sold. The lyrics were 
from a poem by Hans Leip entitled Lied eines jungen Soldaten auf der Wacht [Song 
of a Young Soldier on Guard Duty], to which composer Norbert Schultze had added 
music. Andersen, who had been romantically involved with Schultze, featured the 
song in her stage program for some time before she recorded it for Electrola.473 The 
text by Leip reads as follows: 
Vor der Kaserne, vor dem großen Tor, stand eine Laterne und steht sie noch 
davor. So wollen wir uns wiederseh’n, bei der Laterne woll’n wir steh’n, wie einst 
Lili Marleen, wie einst Lili Marleen. 
Unsre beiden Schatten, sie seh’n wie einer aus. Dass wir so lieb uns hatten, das 
sah man gleich daraus. Und alle Leute soll’n es sehn, wenn wir bei der Laterne 
steh’n, wie einst Lili Marleen, wie einst Lili Marleen. 
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Schon rief der Posten: „Sie blasen Zapfenstreich! Es kann drei Tage kosten!“ – 
„Kamerad, ich komm ja gleich!“ Da sagten wir auf Wiederseh’n, wie gerne wollt 
ich mit dir geh’n, mit dir, Lili Marleen, mit dir, Lili Marleen. 
Deine Schritte kennt sie, deinen zieren Gang, alle Abend brennt sie, doch mich 
vergaß sie lang. Und sollte mir ein Leids gescheh’n, wer wird bei der Laterne 
steh’n, wie einst Lili Marleen, wie einst Lili Marleen? 
Aus dem stillen Raume, aus der Erde Grund, hebt mich wie im Träume dein 
verliebter Mund. Wenn sich die späten Nebel dreh’n, werd’ ich bei der Laterne 
steh’n, wie einst Lili Marleen, wie einst Lili Marleen.474 
Lili Marleen (the real title was immediately dropped by the listening public) instantly 
found its way into the hearts of German soldiers and triggered a wave of enthusiasm 
that spread as far as North Africa, thanks to the powerful transmitter used by 
Soldatensender Belgrad. It was there, among the troops of the German Afrika Korps, 
that the mania over the song began. Listeners were apparently not at all disturbed by 
the fact that the story was told from the perspective of the young man posted on 
guard duty. On the contrary, male vocalists who also recorded the song encountered 
a notable lack of any success.475 Those responsible at the Belgrade station first 
became aware of the extent of the song’s popularity when the station director, 
Lieutenant Karl-Heinz Reintgen, tired of hearing it on his airwaves, forbade it to be 
played. The resulting storm of indignation on the part of a furious listening audience 
left no doubt that Lili Marleen had struck a sentimental nerve among German 
soldiers. As a consequence, it was reinstated into the repertoire, earning a 
permanent slot as the closing number of the broadcast Wir grüßen unsere Hörer 
                                            
474 Lili Marleen (1938), words by Hans Leip and music by Norbert Schultze. 
475Joseph Goebbels himself, among other National Socialist cultural authorities, reacted 
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[Greetings to our Listeners], in which letters from home were read over the air for 
soldiers at the front.476 
The real surprise, however, was that Lili Marleen provoked the same effect on the 
Allied side of the front that it had produced in the German camp. British soldiers in 
North Africa, hearing the song initially in the German original version, became the 
first Allied enthusiasts. In 1942, the Reich’s broadcasting company transmitted an 
English version translated by Norman Baillie-Stewart, a Briton working for Germany’s 
foreign broadcasting service. Once the Army of the United States had landed in North 
Africa in November 1942, it did not take long for the GIs to adopt Lili Marleen as well. 
It became a symbol for homesickness, separation and yearning as well as the hope 
of reunion. According to Bill Mauldin: 
Our musical geniuses at home never did get around to working up a good, 
honest, acceptable war song, and so they forced us to share “Lili Marlene” with 
the enemy. Even if we did get it from the krauts it’s a beautiful song …477 
Ernie Pyle testified: … we all loved [Lili Marleen] and … we practically took [her] 
away from the Germans as our national overseas song. Even the German 
propaganda machine recognized Lili᾽s potential, and the song was accordingly 
approved to be played for Allied soldiers over the Reich᾽s propaganda broadcasts.478 
In order to prevent any hint of sympathy for the Enemy that the song in German 
might generate479, an Allied version was soon recorded by Anne Shelton, at that time 
the moderator of a radio broadcast for British soldiers in North Africa. Ultimately, in 
May 1943, the Chappel label in the U.S. released the song in its definitive English 
version as My Lilli of the Lamplight:480 
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Underneath the lantern, by the barrack gate, Darling I remember the way you 
used to wait. T’was that you whispered tenderly, that you loved me, you’d always 
be, my Lilli of the Lamplight, my own Lilli Marlene. 
Time would come for roll call, time for us to part, Darling I’d caress you and press 
you to my heart, and there ‘neath that far off lantern light, I’d hold you tight, we’d 
kiss good night, my Lilli of the Lamplight, my own Lilli Marlene. 
Orders come for sailing, somewhere over there. All confined to barracks was 
more than I could bear. I knew you were waiting in the street I heard your feet, 
but could not meet, my Lilli of the Lamplight, my own Lilli Marlene. 
Resting in our billets, just behind the lines, even tho’ we’re parted, your lips are 
close to mine. You wait where that lantern softly gleams, your sweet face seems 
to haunt my dreams, my Lilli of the Lamplight, my own Lilli Marlene.481 
In short order, various English-language renditions of the song appeared, including 
one by the British Forces’ Sweetheart, Vera Lynn. The version by Marlene Dietrich, 
the American GIs᾽ superstar of World War II, is often mistakenly assumed to have 
been the original recording, an error that presumably has something to do with the 
similarity between her name and the title of the song. Lilli Marleen was translated into 
at least 48 languages. One RCA Victor recording reached #13 on the American 
Billboard charts in June 1944.482 
John Steinbeck, who worked as a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, 
devoted his entire column of July 12, 1943 to Lilli Marlene, her magic and her 
success on both sides of the war front. Curiously, his quotation of the song’s lyrics 
was completely at variance with the official version. He cites the beginning of the first 
verse as: Underneath the lanterns, by the barracks square, I used to meet Marlene 
and she was young and fair. He then describes Marlene as a young woman … who 
first liked stripes and then shoulder bars.483 In the course of the song, according to 
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Steinbeck, she meets a series of soldiers of steadily increasing rank until she finally 
works her way up to a brigadier general, who proves to be the one she has been 
looking for from the start.484 
Steinbeck’s first verse and his description of the song’s remaining lyrics are 
consistent with neither the Hans Leip original text nor the English-language Chappel 
translation. The latter is a cautious adaptation of the Leip lyrics, written to conform to 
the reality of the GIs. The version described by Steinbeck has nothing in common 
with either of these texts. It is a theoretical possibility that he based his column on the 
translation by Norman Baillie-Stewart.485 In fact, however, this concept is unlikely. It 
is difficult to explain why German propaganda would have wanted to portray Lilli 
Marleen, its cultural double agent, as a promiscuous gold-digger interested in 
snagging the highest-ranking officer possible. It would be more reasonable to 
suppose that Steinbeck᾽s text refers to an independent translation by Allied soldiers 
that retains the melody, meter, Lili Marleen herself and the lanterns, but otherwise 
simply recounts a disreputable and promiscuous story. 
Steinbeck clearly takes considerable liberties in his creative recounting of the events 
surrounding the dissemination of Lili Marleen. He describes Soldatensender Belgrad 
as playing the record because most other records had been destroyed by a bombing 
attack. Then, in Steinberg’s telling, after news of Lili Marleen᾽s success in North 
Africa had reached Berlin, it was performed before a select audience of Nazi elites by 
Madame Goering, who was a former opera singer. This sparked a wave of popular 
interest in the song that waned only temporarily when Hermann Goering grew weary 
of hearing it, detecting an inconsistency between Lili’s lifestyle and the conservative 
values of National Socialist ideology. By this point, Steinbeck maintained, the song’s 
triumph had propelled it beyond Nazi control.486 
We can conclude that Axel Jockwer, whose dissertation on popular music during the 
Third Reich contains a discussion of the myth of Lili Marleen, conducted his research 
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more thoroughly than did Steinbeck. According to Jockwer, Lale Andersen became 
persona non grata to the Nazi regime in the latter half of 1942. She was reputed to 
have declined a visit the Warsaw Ghetto earlier that year, and this refusal had 
awakened the first suspicions as to her integrity. In September, the Gestapo had 
intercepted a letter that Andersen had written from Italy to the principal playwright of 
the Zurich Schauspielhaus, Kurt Hirschfeld, a Jew living in Switzerland. When 
additional contacts with Jews abroad subsequently became known, she was banned 
by the Reichskulturkammer, the committee overseeing cultural matters.487 It was 
determined that she should vanish from public artistic life but that no action should be 
taken against her personally or to limit her personal freedom in view of her 
international celebrity.488 The BBC then picked up on rumors in circulation, reporting 
that Lale Andersen had committed suicide in order to escape threatened detention in 
a concentration camp. Goebbels himself personally exposed the lying Allied 
propaganda by allowing Andersen to appear publicly as proof of the falsehood. The 
international attention that the singer gained in this incident served to protect her 
against further sanctions by the Nazis. The ban on her appearances was relaxed in 
May 1943, although she remained forbidden by the Hitler regime to perform Lili 
Marleen in public or to have any contact with the song.489 
 
9.6 Italy: SHINGLE – a stranded whale (June 5, 1944) 
Keep on giving all you have, and Rome will be ours and more beyond. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to General Mark W. Clark490 
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Fig. 11   “My God. There we wuz an’ here they wuz.” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
A mountain road winds around a curve. At the upper left, we see a distant coastline 
with a town a bit further on and some isolated buildings in the foreground. Ships are 
lying at anchor in the waters beyond the town, and a column of smoke rises from one 
of them. A destroyed tank fills the image᾽s lower right quadrant. Its left track has been 
blown off its rollers and its gun is inclined upward. The marking on the turret indicates 
that it is a German tank. Perched on a rock above the tank are two soldiers who, from 
their helmets and ammo belts, can be identified as Americans. The one standing at 
the right, behind the other, smokes a cigarette, his hands on his hips. To his left, the 
second soldier gestures with his left hand toward the panorama. He is the one, 
apparently, who says: My God. There we wuz an’ here they wuz. A milestone at the 




After the Anglo-American Allies᾽conquest of Sicily in August 1943, Churchill, 
Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to carry the Mediterranean 
campaign to the Italian mainland. In their order to Supreme Commander Eisenhower, 
the Chiefs laid out two strategic objectives for operations on the Italian peninsula: in 
the first place, Italy should be driven to capitulation and thus eliminated from Hitler’s 
Axis; and secondly, offensive operations should keep the largest possible contingent 
of German troops occupied in Italy, so that these forces would not be available to 
fight against either the Soviet Union or the projected 1944 invasion of northwestern 
Europe. The Allies achieved the first goal even as the landings in Italy were still being 
planned. In secret negotiations on September 9, 1943, the Badoglio regime 
capitulated on the eve of the American landings at Salerno on the Amalfi coast. 
Although the Combined Chiefs had not defined a geographical objective for the 
operation, Allied commanders were, in fact, aware that the attention of Churchill and 
Roosevelt was focused on Rome. Both viewed the conquest of the Eternal City – one 
of Hitler᾽s Axis capitals – as a psychological victory of the first order.491 Apart from 
that, there were also military reasons that argued for a march on Rome. Its airports 
could be used to launch strategic air operations over southern Germany. Rome was 
the hub of the Italian transport network, through which German forces in Italy were 
supplied logistically. Lastly, the mountainous areas south of Rome constituted a 
formidable defensive terrain; in the north, the Allies would face no natural barriers 
until arriving at the Pisa-Rimini line, which would mean a major leap forward in the 
direction of Germany. For all these reasons, Rome was the objective. 
After Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark had consolidated its 
bridgehead around Salerno, it began to advance in the direction of Naples on 
September 15. In order to supply its Italian operations, it first had to secure a port 
with sufficient capacity (such as Naples), a mission that was accomplished on 
October 2. North of Naples, the Allied advance was stalled by increasingly more 
difficult terrain and a continuous series of defensive positions, designated in the 
German military geography of Italy as the Barbara and Bernhardt Lines. 
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Allied units engaged in arduous fighting and sustained high casualties as they battled 
from one mountain to the next, from one medieval town to the next. Meanwhile, the 
Wehrmacht and the Todt Organization were constructing the Gustav Line, the 
centerpiece of Germany’s defense of Italy.492 It stretched from Minturno on the 
Mediterranean coast to the vicinity of Ortona on the Adriatic. Near the western coast, 
it blocked entry into the Liri Valley, the only route to Rome suitable for large 
formations. Toward the end of 1943, Fifth Army’s weary spearheads approached the 
valley’s entrance where, in the meantime, the Gustav Line had been converted into 
an elaborate string of defensive positions. In the Liri Valley it made use of the Rapido 
and Garigliano Rivers, was anchored on its flanks in the mountains (and thus not 
vulnerable to a flanking attack), and featured a complex system of caves, bunkers, 
tunnels, minefields, barbed wire fences and fortifications. At its northern limits, 1,700-
foot-high Monte Cassino provided an overview of the entire area while, to the south, 
the valley was bounded by the heights of Sant’Ambrogio.493 Certainty dawned on 
Fifth Army command that these fortifications could certainly not be broken by 
available forces and conventional methods. While searching for a solution to the 
developing stalemate, planners recalled an option that had been discussed by staffs 
across the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in the previous fall: an amphibious 
landing behind German lines. 
Planning 
Already in October, Clark had established a special amphibious planning staff within 
his command that would review possible landing sites along the western coast of 
Italy. This way of proceeding was obvious. The western coast represented an 
exposed flank for the defense of Italy, impossible to secure and monitor in its entirety. 
On the other hand, the Anglo-American Allies controlled the Mediterranean Sea and 
could determine the time and location of a landing operation in the hope of achieving 
and utilizing the moment of surprise. What stymied the planning of an amphibious 
operation at the end of 1943 was, in addition to U.S. unwillingness to become 
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involved in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations494, a critical shortage of landing 
craft. The bulk of these specially constructed transport boats was in Great Britain – or 
on the way there – to be available for the invasion of northwestern France that was 
planned for early summer. After it became clear that Fifth Army would not be able to 
achieve a breakthrough into the Liri Valley (and thus on to Rome) without support, 
the consequences of Eisenhower᾽s transfer to the ETO began to work in favor of a 
landing south of Rome.495 As a result, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave the green 
light to prioritizing a number of amphibious craft for use in the MTO. The landing 
operation to which the boats were allocated was given the code name SHINGLE.496 
It became evident relatively early during the short planning phase that SHINGLE, in 
contrast to the more limited amphibious plans drawn up in fall 1943, would become 
an autonomous operation of considerable size. VI Corps was replaced at Fifth Army’s 
front to prepare for the mission of coming ashore at Anzio, approximately 30 miles 
south of Rome. The landing area along the Roman coastal plain bordered on the 
marshes of the Pontine Plain, which had been drained and made arable in a 
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Mussolini-sponsored land reclamation project.497 From that position, roughly 60 miles 
behind the German lines, SHINGLE was intended to serve two aims. The mere 
presence of VI Corps so far behind the front would constitute a significant threat to 
German supply lines and – it was conjectured – force Kesselring498 to retreat from 
the Gustav Line. At a minimum, however, he would have to pull individual formations 
out of the front line in order to confront this threat in his rear, which was much more 
strategic than tactical. Fifth Army, which would have launched an offensive against 
the Gustav Line a few days before SHINGLE, would then use all available forces to 
break through and march toward Rome. The second objective involved the Colli-
Laziali Massif (the Alban Hills). Situated approximately 20 miles north of Anzio and 
16 miles southeast of Rome at the northern extremity of the Liri Valley, this chain of 
mountains up to 3,000 feet in height represented the final geographical barrier on the 
path to Rome. From this position, it would be possible to control the major transit 
routes that ran from southern Italy to Rome, which were used by the Germans to 
supply the Gustav Line but over which Fifth Army also planned to advance to Rome. 
If these routes fell under Allied control, German forces south of that point would be 
cut off and the Allies᾽ march into Rome could no longer be driven back. British 
General Sir Harold Alexander, to whose 15th Army Group Fifth Army was 
subordinated, summed up SHINGLE’s objectives this way: 
… to cut the enemy’s main communications in the Colli Laziali area Southeast of 
Rome, and to threaten the rear of the 14 German Corps [at the entrance to the 
Liri valley opposite Fifth Army]. The enemy will be compelled to react to the threat 
of his communications and rear, and advantage must be taken of this to break 
through his main defences [at the Gustav Line], and to insure that the two forces 
operating under Comd Fifth Army join hands on the earliest possible moment.499 
Clark interpreted Alexander᾽s instructions in the following order to VI Corps: 
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Mission: Fifth Army will launch attacks in the Anzio area … a) To seize and 
secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio. b) Advance on Colli Laziali500 
Does point b) constitute an instruction only to advance toward Colli Laziali or to 
occupy the mountain chain? The instruction in Alexander᾽s order to cut the German 
connecting lines in the Colli-Laziali area actually presupposes taking the heights. It 
must be assumed that Clark left his statement intentionally vague in order not to send 
VI Corps into battle with just one single, inflexible direction. Although he had been an 
enthusiastic backer of SHINGLE in the early planning stages, there were indications 
over time that Clark had become increasingly skeptical about the operation’s chances 
for success.501 In this particular case, with VI Corps commander Major General John 
P. Lucas assigned to carry out the vague order cited in point b) above, the resulting 
tactical course of action ended in a nightmare for the troops fighting in Anzio. 
 
 
Fig. 12   Allied Strategy in Italy 1944 
U.S. Army Center of Military History 
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As mentioned earlier, the resort of Anzio is situated along the Roman coastal plain in 
the area of the former malarial marshes of the Pontine Plain. The Mussolini-backed 
project to reclaim the land resulted in a network of drainages and canals, the largest 
of which, the Mussolini Canal, ran from north to south approximately 9 miles east of 
the city. Its plain rises gradually from the beach in a northerly direction until it reaches 
the Colli-Laziali Massif. In early 1944, still only sparsely developed, it was used 
primarily for agriculture.  
After two days on shipboard, VI Corps began to come ashore at Anzio in the early 
morning hours of January 22, 1944. As the first landing craft set off for the beaches, 
Lucas was confronted with a situation that even daring planners had not considered. 
SHINGLE had achieved one of the most complete moments of surprise in the history 
of war. Although German forces were well aware of the obvious possibility of an 
amphibious landing, they were privy to neither the preparations for the operation nor 
VI Corps᾽ transfer to Anzio. Fifty thousand soldiers and 5200 vehicles had been 
transported to the target area from Naples in a convoy of over 200 ships without 
arousing the Enemy’s attention. With the intention of inducing the southward 
redeployment of rear-echelon German reserves, Clark had begun a Fifth Army 
offensive at the entrance to the Liri Valley a few days prior to SHINGLE. In response, 
two German panzer divisions that had been in reserve in the vicinity of Rome had 
moved south to the Gustav Line. As VI Corps landed, it encountered only small, 
isolated units and individual artillery batteries that presented no threat to the 
operation. The German Wehrmacht had no formations left in the entire area between 
Anzio and Rome that could have jeopardized SHINGLE’s success in its initial 
stages.502 
Lucas, for his part, should have reacted quickly to this situation. Obviously, in 
hindsight, he should have occupied the heights of Colli-Laziali with the first wave of 
his landed troops. The German 14 Korps in the Liri Valley would have been cut off 
from its supply lines and threatened in its rear, having no option but retreat. The likely 
result would have been the complete collapse of the strategy for the defense of 
southern Italy. Instead, Lucas delayed for seven days while he consolidated his 
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bridgehead at Anzio, personally supervised the startup of port operations and 
ordered his units to take up defensive positions around the perimeter of the landing 
area.503 While he was amassing troops and materiel on the beaches for an eventual 
breakout, Kesselring ordered every available German unit in the wider area to take 
up positions in the hills around the bridgehead. On January 29, when Lucas was 
satisfied with his consolidation measures, he ordered VI Corps to attempt a breakout. 
The tactical situation had fundamentally changed, however, and the opportunity to 
take the Colli-Laziali heights literally without opposition had been lost. During the 
seven days Lucas lingered on the beaches, German units had set up defensive 
positions in the hills surrounding the Anzio lowlands that would be able to contain any 
attempts to break out. The question was even raised, in the weeks and months that 
followed, whether the German siege might in fact succeed in driving Lucas’ VI Corps 
back into the Mediterranean.504 Between the middle and end of February, the 
German 14th Army mounted a large-scale offensive to push VI Corps back into the 
sea, an achievement that was narrowly averted amid heavy losses on both sides. 
Casualties from the February fighting left both adversaries unable to conduct further 
offensive operations. As a consequence, the Anzio front developed into a battle of 
attrition in which the opposing forces sought to determine which of them could better 
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sustain the loss of human life. SHINGLE would have no further effect on the static 
front at the Gustav Line. In the months that followed, the bridgehead at Anzio would 
instead develop into a second static front. Only at the end of May 1944, after a four-
month German siege, could the now massively expanded VI Corps break out from its 
bridgehead in a coordinated offensive with Fifth Army in order to carry out Allied 
plans for the conquest of Rome.505 The original plans had estimated that this event 
would occur no later than one week after the landing. 
Anzio beachhead 
The key to understanding this image lies in the caption My God. There we wuz an’ 
here they wuz! From their opponent’s perspective, the two dogfaces survey the area 
where they had been bottled up for the previous four months. They can see how 
exposed to German guns the VI Corps bridgehead had been. As the Wehrmacht was 
cordoning it off, it had an unrestricted view over the entire coastal plain from its 
observation posts in the Colli-Laziali Massif. Furthermore, since the entire bridgehead 
area lay within easy reach of its artillery, it could choose targets at will. This was an 
ability that produced, over the four-month siege, what Martin Blumenson recognized 
as Anzio’s special quality of terror: 
… the constant, yet hidden presence of death. Casualties were never [after the 
first month] numerous at any one time. But the continual waiting and expectancy 
produced strain, for every part of the beachhead was vulnerable to enemy guns 
and planes.506 
These characteristics turned Anzio into World War II’s most egalitarian front. There 
was no secure rear area. Troops that normally carried out their logistical duties far 
behind the front lines died under German fire just like dogfaces. The bridgehead, 
during its entire four-month existence, took continual fire from the German 
Wehrmacht. At no time and in no place could troops consider themselves safe from 
the German shells of various calibers. They hit cooks and bakers, medical personnel 
and typists, staff of the Army’s giant supply system and mechanics – in short, 
everyone in the bridgehead. Because of the difficult supply situation among the 
Wehrmacht units in Italy, shooting was often sporadic. The Germans made a 
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perverted virtue out of this necessity, however, creating a psychological weapon by 
firing randomly into different sectors of the bridgehead. 
During the February fighting, VI Corps suffered 20,000 casualties among the 100,000 
troops that had landed by that point. Half of these were directly battle-related: dead, 
wounded and missing, the so-called combat casualties. The other half were non-
combat casualties, including cases of illness and exhaustion as well as incidents of 
trenchfoot507 caused by having to spend countless winter days and nights in trenches 
half-filled with water.508 In order to conceal itself from German artillery observers, VI 
Corps began to cloak the bridgehead in artificial fog. The limited space and ever-
increasing density of troops and materiel meant, however, that even untargeted firing 
nearly always scored a hit.509 Unless they were directly on the front lines, the troops 
spent their time in improvised underground bunkers, leaving these subterranean 
dwellings only when it was absolutely necessary to do so. The adverse weather 
conditions of the first months – constant cold, rain and snow – and the challenges of 
living in cold, perpetually wet holes in the ground accounted for a consistently large 
proportion of non-battle casualties. When spring arrived, swarms of mosquitoes from 
the area south of the Mussolini Canal beset VI Corps, turning malaria into a 
significant and commonplace problem.510 
Regular ferry service from Naples to supply the bridgehead gave Bill Mauldin the 
opportunity to make several visits to Anzio. His observations describe the 
atmosphere of the bridgehead with a profundity that few other first-hand accounts 
can match: 
Anzio was unique. 
It was the only place in Europe which held an entire corps of infantry, a British 
division, all kinds of artillery and special units, and maintained an immense 
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supply and administration setup without a rear echelon. As a matter of fact, there 
wasn’t any rear; there was no place in the entire beachhead where enemy shells 
couldn’t seek you out. 
Sometimes it was worse at the front; sometimes worse at the harbor. 
Quartermasters buried their dead and amphibious duck511 drivers went down with 
their craft. Infantrymen, dug into the Mussolini Canal, had the canal pushed in on 
top of them by armor piercing shells, and Jerry bombers circled as they directed 
glider bombs into LST’s512 and Liberty ships. Wounded men got oak leaf clusters 
on their Purple Hearts513 when shell fragments riddled them as they lay on 
hospital beds. Nurses died …514 
During the four-month existence of the Anzio bridgehead, medical personnel losses 
amounted to 92 dead (among them six nurses), 367 wounded and 79 missing or 
taken prisoner.515 
…The krauts launched a suicidal attack which almost drove through to the sea. 
Evacuation was already beginning in the harbor when a single American battalion 
broke the point of the attack, then was engulfed and died. Bodies of fanatical 
young Germans piled up in front of the machine guns, and when the guns ran out 
of ammunition the Wehrmacht came through and was stopped only by point 
plank artillery …516 
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The above description of ῾fanatical young Germans᾽ certainly refers to the Berlin-
Spandau Infanterie-Lehrregiment517. Hitler himself ordered the regiment’s transfer 
from Germany to Italy so that it could participate in a large-scale German offensive in 
mid-February. As the name suggests, it was a demonstration unit, formed to teach 
conscripts the proper way to carry out tactical maneuvers on the battlefield. It had no 
actual combat experience at all. Hitler was convinced of its qualities nonetheless, and 
he insisted on deploying the regiment at a focal point of the attack. Unsurprisingly, 
the Infanterie-Lehrregiment attacked with unparalleled élan that could not 
compensate, however, for its total lack of battlefield experience. After suffering 
devastating losses, the unit saw its discipline and morale disintegrate, and the few 
survivors fled in panic. Since, at the express direction of the Führer, it constituted a 
key element within the German plan of attack, the failure of the Berlin-Spandau 
Infantrie-Lehrregiment contributed significantly to the failure of the entire offensive.518 
… You couldn’t stand up in the swamps without being cut down, and you couldn’t 
sleep if you sat down. Guys stayed in those swamps for days and weeks. Every 
hole had to be covered, because the “popcorn man” came over every night and 
shoveled hundreds of little butterfly bombs519 down on your head by the light of 
flares and exploding ack ack …520 
At the front lines, German and Allied troops were positioned a few hundred yards 
from each other. Because of the rise in terrain, as seen from the Allied side, the 
Germans held the advantage of higher ground everywhere along the lines. There 
were scarcely any trees or other topographical features that could provide cover to 
move through the trenches or away from them. By daylight, the simple movement of 
                                            
517 In German: Instructional Infantry Regiment 
518 Blumenson, Salerno, p. 419 ff. 
519 ῾Butterfly bomb᾽ was the popular name for the German SD2 (Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg – a 
two-kilogram thick-walled high-explosive bomb) with submunitions. Today this type of ammunition is 
known as a cluster bomb. A container with a certain number of submunitions is launched, opens, and 
spreads the submunitions across an area. The SD2 had three different means of detonation: upon 
impact, time-delayed, or as a kind of booby trap in which the detonator was activated upon impact and 
then exploded when touched. 
520 Mauldin, Up Front, p. 162. 
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a soldier’s head could elicit fire. Wounded troops had to wait until darkness had set in 
before they could be evacuated. The ground in the bridgehead was marshy, forcing 
soldiers to stand up to two feet deep in water. This meant that trenches could only be 
dug deep enough to accommodate a prone or sitting position at the most, and even 
then, they still filled with water within a short time. In addition to the ground water, the 
frequent spring rains and low temperatures sapped the energy of the dogfaces. 
Sleeping under such conditions was almost inconceivable. After repeatedly falling 
asleep in a sitting position only to be awakened by falling over into the ground water, 
soldiers lashed themselves to boulders or fallen trees while sitting.521 
… You wondered how Jerry could see you and throw a shell at you every time 
you stuck your head out, until you climbed into the mountains after it was all over 
and were able to count every tree and every house in the area we had held … 
This wasn’t a beachhead that was secured and enlarged until it eventually 
became a port for supplies coming in to supplement those being expended as the 
troops pushed inland. Everything was expended right here. It was a constant 
hellish nightmare, because when you weren’t getting something you were 
expecting something, and it lasted for five [sic] months.522 
By the time the four-month siege of Anzio was over, VI Corps had suffered more than 
29,000 combat casualties: 4400 dead, 18,000 wounded and 6800 missing or taken 
prisoner. To those figures were added over 37,000 non-combat casualties: soldiers 
who were lost due to illness, accidents or trenchfoot – or who were simply unable to 
endure any more mental strain.523 Winston Churchill for his part – who, besides 
serving as British Prime Minister and co-architect of the Grand Alliance, was also 
destiny’s gift to World War II historians on the prowl for catchy one-liners – lamented 
to his chiefs of staff on January 31, 1944: 
                                            
521 Pyle, Brave Men, p. 266 ff. 
522 Mauldin, Up Front, p. 162 ff. 
523 CMH, Anzio, p. 25 ff. 
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I had hoped that we were hurling a wild cat on to the shore, but all we got was a 
stranded whale.524 
A mountain road winds around a curve. In the background, we see a coastline and a 
town. Ships are lying at anchor in a bay, and a column of smoke rises from one of 
them. From an elevation, two Americans survey the panorama, and one says: My 
God. There we wuz an’ here they wuz … 
 
9.7 A door that opens only one way (July 15, 1944) 
One problem with the replacements was that they hadn’t yet accepted the virtual 
inevitability of forthcoming damage to their flesh … 
Paul Fussell525 
 
                                            
524 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Volume V. Closing The Ring (New York 1985), p. 
432. 





Fig. 13   “I’m depending on you old men to be a steadying influence for the replacements.” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Joe sits on the floor, leaning against a wall. He is wearing the shirt, pants and boots 
of the American summer field uniform, with his sleeves pushed up to the elbows. His 
M1 helmet is tilted to the side of his head. A bayonet is fastened at the right side of 
his belt. Joe is holding a paper cutting that shows a series of figures holding hands. 
His tired-looking gaze is fixed on the paper. Next to Joe, Willie is (apparently) 
squatting between the wall and a three-drawer dresser. His own shirtsleeves are 
similarly pushed up, and he too is wearing an M1 helmet. In his right hand, Willie is 
holding a bottle that reads COGNAC and, in his left, a bottle with a three-star label. 
Beside Willie᾽s left lower arm, an M1 Garand rifle is leaning against the dresser. A 
cigarette hangs from Willie’s mouth, and his apparently disinterested attention is 
focused on an open window behind Joe, where we see a third soldier, likewise 
wearing a helmet. He sports a pencil-thin mustache and has his sleeves pushed up 
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like the others. Captain’s rank badges, two parallel bars in a vertical position, appear 
on his collar and the front of his helmet. The captain addresses the two dogfaces: I’m 
depending on you old men to be a steadying influence for the replacements. Since 
the only captain in the organizational chart of American rifle companies in World War 
II was their commander, we can be virtually certain that this one is Willie and Joe’s 
company commander, here to request their support. 
This cartoon is the thematic twin to the one from Chapter 9.3526. Like that earlier 
image, it deals with two different phenomena: first, implied by the presentation of the 
two dogfaces, the psychological effects of war on individuals who are exposed to it 
over time, and second, in absentia, replacements. In Chapter 9.3, we have already 
discussed the history of psychological casualties of war, the various characteristics of 
the condition, and the methods used by the Army of the United States to come to 
grips with it. In the present chapter, our concern is, rather, with the second topic of 
the pair of cartoons: namely, infantry replacements. 
In Chapter 8.1, we concluded that infantry riflemen represented the expendables to 
the Army of the United States’ enterprise of war. How – the metaphor is too tempting 
not to extend it a bit further – did the processes and procedures of production, 
distribution and incorporation into the machinery of these expendables work? How 
did they function? 
Replacement system 
A basic reality of any army in combat is that it sustains casualties. These include 
soldiers who suffer fatal or nonfatal wounds from enemy fire as well as those who are 
captured, have accidents, or are unable to fulfill their military duties due to physical or 
psychological illness or self-mutilation. This reality engenders one of the fundamental 
tasks of any army at war: namely, to compensate for its losses through a predefined 
system that can supply a sufficient number of trained replacements at the required 
moment at the location where they are needed. The replacement system of the Army 
of the United States in World War II, like the mobilization of its combat divisions, was 
organized around the concepts of industrial mass production. Replacements received 
13 weeks of basic and weapons training (extended to 17 weeks in mid-1943) in so-
called replacement training centers in the United States. After this very short training 
                                            
526 Chapter 9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944). 
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period (in comparison to the 52-week infantry training given by the mobilization 
training program), they were transfered to replacement depots in the U.S. where they 
awaited their posting to an overseas theater of operations.527 
In the case of the European Theater of Operations, most replacements shipped out, 
either directly or with a layover in Great Britain, to Le Havre. There they were 
distributed to infantry divisions, passing through an average of four stations on their 
way. The 15th Replacement Depot at the port of Le Havre served exclusively as a 
transit station where soldiers generally remained no longer than 24 hours while 
waiting for their transport toward the front. The next stage was an intermediate or 
stockage depot under the jurisdiction of ComZ, the Communications Zone, where the 
process of feeding the replacements into the system began. Here they received their 
weaponry and were given the opportunity to fill any gaps in their personal equipment. 
Their personal information was updated and, for the first time since their departure 
from the United States, they had a payday. They were briefed on the current state of 
operations on the Continent and required to participate in various other training 
activities. The intermediate depots received replacement requests from the different 
field armies that were based on short-term casualty forecasts from their respective 
divisions. Based on these requirements, the replacements were then sent to 
replacement depots within the area of responsibility of the respective field armies, 
where they underwent further administrative procedures and received additional 
training. At the conclusion of this process, the soldiers then proceeded to the so-
called forward battalions, where they were individually assigned to specific rifle 
companies.528 The entire procedure could take several months to move a 
replacement soldier through the various replacement depots – or repple depples529, 
as they were commonly known among the dogfaces – until finally arriving at a rifle 
company.  
In contrast to the procedure described above, a textbook example of a replacement 
system would, ideally, pull an entire division out of the front lines and substitute a 
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528 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support II, p. 338 ff. 
529 Cf. Mauldin, Up Front, p. 122. 
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replacement division. The withdrawn division would then be brought back to full troop 
strength behind the front, devote time to exercises as a formation, and finally return 
to the front to replace another decimated division. Unfortunately, the Army of the 
United States had too few infantry divisions at its disposal to put this rotation principle 
into practice. To an extent, the replacement system as actually executed certainly 
made sense, and it facilitated efficient personnel management by replacing losses on 
an individual basis while formations continued to operate at the front. Left 
unconsidered in the system’s design, however, were the psychological 
consequences, which had a devastating effect over long periods during the war. An 
understanding of these ramifications requires a brief look at social psychology. 
Primary groups 
In their groundbreaking 1948 research, sociologists Edward A. Shils and Morris 
Janowitz recognized that the so-called ῾primary group᾽ was a significant factor 
associated with motivation and performance in military units. Soldiers were provided 
with the essential resources they needed for survival in the first instance by their 
immediate primary group, which the authors considered to be the 12-man squad, and 
collaterally, by their company of approximately 200 men. This assistance provided 
them with a framework for mutual respect and affection and regulated their 
relationship to the military and civilian circles outside the primary group.530 It formed 
their common living environment, the military equivalent to the family. GIs in general 
and dogfaces in particular were caught between a powerful, impersonal military 
bureaucracy on one side and the forces of opposition on the other. The dogfaces᾽ 
primary group, the immediate physical surroundings in which they lived, and not 
least, their buddies represented the only human elements in their existence. Outside 
this temporary support structure, they were little more than tiny cogs in a vast and 
impersonal military-bureaucratic machine.531 Within it, they belonged to a social 
system in which they had real meaning, value and purpose. 
Members of a functioning primary group felt a strong sense of obligation to satisfy the 
expectations, demands and needs of the other group members that normally 
                                            
530 Shils / Janowitz, Cohesion, p. 280 ff. 
531 Thomas E. Rodgers, Billy Yank and G.I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the Sociopolitical 
Dimensions of Soldier Motivation, in: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2005), p. 113 ff. 
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translated into their military performance. Infantry riflemen, whose duties by definition 
involved a constant, acute risk of death, obviously developed extraordinarily intense 
relationships with the members of their primary group.532 Ideological motives, 
however, were found to be comparatively unimportant. The American Soldier, a four-
volume sociopsychological study of American soldiers in World War II published at 
the end of the 1940s, revealed a starkly nonideological image of the GIs.533 Apart 
from an unsubstantiated sense of being on the right side of the conflict (after all, 
America had been attacked by Japan and Germany had declared war on America), 
most GIs knew almost nothing about fascism – at least, not until 1945, when they 
finally witnessed the ultimate meaning of National Socialism at Dachau and 
Buchenwald.534 
Replacement realities 
When they arrived at their units, American infantry replacements were, as a rule, 
poorly trained for their duties and completely unprepared for what lay before them. 
Their relatively short preparatory period in the United States only included individual 
training. Unit exercises or maneuvers in larger formations were not carried out. Up 
until late summer 1944, all replacements were slotted into the infantry, no matter 
what the nature of their training had been. The replacement training centers still 
prepared soldiers according to the requirements of the mobilization phase535, but not 
                                            
532 Shils / Janowitz, Cohesion, p. 284. 
533 Cf. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The Military, in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2 (1976), p. 61. 
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reliable conclusions in this context. Cf. Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier. Volume II. 
Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton 1949), p. 64 ff. 
534 Arnold Rose, Bases of American Military Morale in World War II, in: Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 
9, No. 4 (1945–1946), p. 413. 
535 In September 1943, trainee capacity of the replacement training centers in the U.S. with respect to 
specialization was still distributed in the following manner: 8.6 percent anti-aircraft artillery, 6.1 percent 
armored, 2.3 percent cavalry, 11,9 percent field artillery, 3,7 percent tank destroyers, and 67.4 percent 
infantry. Anti-aircraft artillerymen, for example, especially replacements, were by this point no longer 
needed, however, since Allied air forces already had achieved unlimited control over European air 
space. A contrasting example is presented by the 22,858 battle casualties sustained by the 9th 
Infantry Division during the war, 96 percent of which were borne by the division’s three infantry 
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in proportion to actual losses.536 A good many of the infantry replacements, lamented 
an officer of the 4th Infantry Division during the Battle of the Bocage537 in July 1944, 
had not been trained as combat infantry … I have found men trained as mail 
orderlies, cooks, officers’ orderlies, truck drivers etc. … who had been sent over, 
assigned to a combat unit, and thrust into combat within 24 hours … These men 
were definitely inadequately prepared, both psychological and militarily, for 
combat duty.538 
Even dedicated infantry replacements, however, were in fact little better prepared for 
the shock of their first combat. During the sometimes excessively prolonged time they 
spent in the replacement pipeline, many of them could only distantly recall the 
knowledge gained in their (at any rate short and inadequate) training. The most 
profound effect was due to the complete absence of formation-level exercises as part 
of their training. Effective functioning as a formation, the smoothest possible 
interaction among the various units on the battlefield, spelled the critical difference 
between victory and defeat and thus between life and death. Because of their 
rudimentary training, infantry replacements were not in a position to meet these 
demands. In comparison to the soldiers prepared by the mobilization training 
program, an above-average number of infantry replacements became frozen in a 
state of shock when they experienced their first combat situation. Because of their 
lack of simulation training, they were completely taken by surprise by the realities of 
the battlefield. The cacophony of deafening noise, concussions caused by 
explosions, smoke, fire and overall confusion – all this overwhelmed their ability to 
rationalize and left them staring and motionless. In countless instances, it meant their 
death.539 
                                                                                                                                        
regiments. After Eisenhower strongly argued for an adaption of the allocations among the various 
specializations to match actual casualty proportions, the infantry’s share was increased at the training 
centers. (Cf. Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 251 ff.) 
536 Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 251. 
537 Battle of the Bocage: Cf. Chapter 9.9 Northern France: a quartermaster’s purgatory (September 
15, 1944). 
538 Cited in: Beevor, D-Day, p. 258. 
539 Beevor, D-Day, p. 258. 
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For the infantry replacements, by far the greatest influence on soldierly performance, 
going hand in hand with life expectancy, was exerted by the psycho-social effects of 
the decision to replace losses individually and in the midst of ongoing operations.540 
Upon the conclusion of their training in the United States, they were sent individually 
through the logistical pipeline of the replacement system. Social networks that had 
developed in the replacement training centers were broken up and the replacements᾽ 
primary groups were dispersed. Detached from their social reference system – 
consisting of companions but also officers and NCOs as symbols and representatives 
of the authorities – they proceeded to the front as part of an anonymous mass of 
strangers. As we discussed in Chapter 9.3, dramatic temporary combat fatigue541, a 
common occurrence prior to one῾s first combat mission, was absorbed socially under 
the conditions of an intact primary group.542 In the social vacuum in which the 
replacements found themselves, their fears multiplied as a consequence of their 
isolation, and it meant that infantry replacements experienced by far the highest rates 
of suicide and self-mutilation in the Army of the United States. Just before they went 
over to France, recalled an American Red Cross nurse who served aboard a troop 
ship in the English Channel, belts and ties were removed from these young men. 
They were very, very young.543 
Front 
Only in the rarest cases did arrival at one᾽s rifle company on the front improve the lot 
of an infantry replacement. If he was lucky, according to Paul Fussell, a company 
                                            
540 As the catastrophic consequences of the replacement system on individuals became clearer, the 
infantry divisions, working at their level, attempted to achieve better integration of the replacements 
into the rifle companies. They tried, whenever possible, to fill out companies only in the rear areas and 
to give them time to coalesce their troops, achieving in this way a significant improvement in the 
situation. This approach was only possible, however, when the operational situation permitted. 
Adapting the replacement system in itself remained impossible throughout the war for reasons of 
manpower economics. (Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 254 ff.) 
541 Cf. Chapter 9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944). 
542 Research Memorandum 53-26. Sociometry of the Armed Forces. Effect on Morale of Infantry Team 
Replacement and Individual Replacement Systems (The Adjutant General’s Office / Department of the 
Army 1953), p. 331. 
543 Cited in: Beevor, D-Day, p. 258. 
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commander gave him a hurried welcome and urged him to keep his head down and 
obey his squad and platoon leaders.544 As a rule, the replacement was not so lucky. 
For security reasons, replacements could normally be brought forward to their 
platoons only during the darkness of night. There they were assigned to an 
abandoned foxhole, told from which direction to expect the Enemy and, for the time 
being, left to themselves and their thoughts. Charles Reis Felix summed up his initial 
experiences in such a situation: 
Nobody gets out of a rifle company. It’s a door that opens only one way, in. You 
leave when they carry you out, if you’re unlucky, dead, or if you’re lucky, 
wounded. But nobody just walks away.545 
If they survived this first night, the morning inevitably brought them face to face with a 
platoon that had recently taken casualties. It was easily possible that the surviving 
dogface soldiers were poorly equipped to offer a borderline panic-stricken newcomer 
an environment in which he could acclimate himself. In most cases, they themselves 
were afflicted with a variety of clearly pronounced traumas and cases of combat 
exhaustion. They were more in need of (psychiatric) attention for themselves than in 
a position to accord it to others. At any rate, the group᾽s interest in welcoming new 
comrades was greatly limited for diverse reasons. On one hand, a complicated basic 
mechanism exists in the human psyche that makes it difficult for a man (in this case) 
to open up to a new acquaintance after having just lost a person he has known and 
trusted. On the other hand, it was highly probable anyway that the inexperienced 
replacement, unfamiliar with the reality of industrialized warfare, would be the first to 
lose his life in the next encounter with the Enemy. In this community, where survival 
ultimately was associated only with luck, to be doomed to die was viewed as 
infectious.546 As a rule, therefore, infantry replacements were a solitary and 
extremely pitiable group, privately and often openly despised by their veteran 
comrades. They were poorly trained, most of the time deeply shocked by the brutality 
of the front lines, and often completely useless for combat operations. A staff 
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sergeant who commanded a platoon at Anzio offered the following pragmatic 
explanation: 
One day at Anzio we got eight new replacements into my platoon. We were 
supposed to make a little feeling attack that same day. Well, by the next day, all 
eight of them replacements were dead … But none of us old guys were. We 
weren’t going to send our own guys out on point in a damnfool situation like that. 
We had been together since Africa, and Sicily, and Salerno. We sent the 
replacements out ahead.547 
Hauling ass 
Countless infantry replacements confronted their almost inevitable fate in one way or 
another. Some of them were not aware of their slim chances for survival, and some 
recognized their plight but were in a form of shock and saw no possibility of affecting 
the course of events. Others, in turn, saw an opportunity and took it. In the dogfaces᾽ 
idiom: they took off or they hauled ass. The official terminology of the Army of the 
United States assigned such behavior into one of three categories: absence without 
official leave (AWOL), misbehavior in the face of the Enemy and desertion. Martin 
Blumenson makes no effort to gloss over such acts in his official report of a battle 
involving the 90th Infantry Division548, which was foundering at that time. He is 
creative, however, in describing the physical act of running off. 
With the descent of darkness, the troops … began to experience a sense of 
insecurity. In the pitchblack darkness, some of the demoralized troops began 
furtive movement to the rear [sic]. Stragglers, individually and in groups, drifted 
unobtrusively out of the battle area. Soldiers pretended to help evacuate 
                                            
547 Cited in: Fussell, Crusade, p. 98. 
548 Immediately following the 90th Infantry Division᾽s first battlefront action on June 10, 1944, it fell into 
a vicious circle of ineffective leadership, heavy casualties, a high proportion of inexperienced 
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Raymond S. McLain, the division᾽s third commander in a few weeks, managed to resolve the dilemma. 
His competent direction provided the cornerstone for rebuilding division morale. Peter Mansoor wrote 
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(Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 72 ff.). 
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wounded, departed under the guise of messengers, or sought medical aid for 
their own imagined wounds. German fire and the dark night encouraged this 
unauthorized hegira and added to the problems of unit commanders in 
recognizing and controlling their recently arrived replacements.549 
The regulations of the Army of the United States define absence without leave as: 
The status of a person subject to military law who has failed to repair at the fixed 
time to the properly appointed place of duty, or has gone from the same without 
proper leave, or has absented himself from his command, guard, quarters, 
stations, or camp without proper leave.550 
Obviously, desertion and misbehavior in the face of the Enemy carried more severe 
punishment than unauthorized absence. In practice, however, the difference among 
the various offenses was arbitrary and ambiguous. In the case of desertion, [to] have 
taken leave without intention of returning, or … beyond an indefinite length of time, or 
… when his outfit is in a critical situation, the Articles of War prescribed the death 
penalty. Away from the front, a finding of AWOL resulted in imprisonment, while the 
same offense at the front lines and misbehavior in the face of the Enemy were each 
punishable by death.551 Ultimately, the decision of how to classify furtive movements 
to the rear was left to the immediate commander. The author of the present volume is 
unaware of any specific analysis of infantry replacements in this context. It can be 
generally stated, however, that all three offenses were normally treated to a certain 
extent with great understanding. As the primary disciplinary authority, company 
commanders had a major responsibility to determine how and whether an individual 
case would be considered. Available information leads to the conclusion that they 
and higher authorities tended to be very accommodating regarding the various 
consequences of such offenses. Of the approximately 19,000 deserters in the Army 
of the United States in World War II, 552 only one was sentenced to death.553 
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If the infantry replacements managed, whether by individual ability or simply through 
luck or coincidence, to survive their first stint at the front, they themselves quickly 
became veterans and dogface soldiers. Given time, they assimilated into existing 
primary groups, earning first the acceptance of their comrades and then later, 
perhaps, their recognition and affection. They developed basic abilities to survive on 
the field of combat: how to use cover and camouflage; adjusting their ear and 
reflexes to the noises of battle; discerning between enemy and friendly fire; 
calculating the proximity of an incoming shell from its sound.554 At the same time, 
they underwent a transformation, as described by Donald J. Willis in the winter of 
1944/45: 
These young [replacement] boys will know in a few days the horrible fatigue of 
the front-line soldier. Also the dragging step and the glazed eyes that see only 
enemy … The clean, sharp boy with new clothes … will be changed. In his place 
will be a man who at times will not look and act human at all. 
Like the rest of the spearhead soldiers, Willis continued, they will be dirty, frostbitten, 
and tired as they have never been before555. Then the vicious circle characterized in 
Mauldin᾽s cartoon would begin all over again with the next new group of infantry 
replacements. 
9.8 The shorn women (summer 1944) 
… their look, in the hands of their tormentors, was that of a hunted animal. 
Forrest Pogue, August 31, 1944556 
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Fig. 14   “I’m gonna send this home an’ scare my gal outta foolin around wit’ garrison sojers …” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
A French street scene. In the background, buildings jut into both sides of the image. 
On the house at the right, we see a shuttered second-floor window and a shingled 
roof. Only a balcony can be seen on the house at the left. At its corner, two flags – 
the Stars and Stripes and (apparently) the French Tricoleur – hang at an angle from 
their short flagpoles over the paved street. Leaning over the balcony is a man with his 
shirtsleeves pushed up to the elbows. It is hard to make out whether he is wearing 
something on his head, but he has a pipe in his mouth. The man’s interest is 
apparently focused on the events in the street below him. In the center foreground, a 
man pulls a hand cart. He wears a short-sleeved shirt and a visored cap, sports a 
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pipe in his mouth, and has a contented and happy expression on his face. Two 
women, both of them with heads shaven, are sitting in the cart. The one at the left 
wears a short-sleeved summer dress in a flower print, earrings, a necklace, and a 
bracelet on her right wrist. She appears to be pursing her lips as she looks over the 
left shoulder of the man pulling the cart, her eyebrows raised. The second woman, 
sitting at her right, wears a sleeveless polka-dotted summer dress with straps. Its cut 
is lower than that of the first woman’s dress, and its straps have slipped off her 
shoulders. She appears to be the younger of the two and, like her companion, she is 
wearing earrings. With a frown, she gazes downward. Behind her, a sign reading 
COLLABORATRICES is displayed above the cart. 
Besides the pipe-smoker on the balcony, two different groups are observing the 
events from the edge of the street. To the right of the hand cart stand three 
individuals. At the front of the group is a man wearing a jacket, shirt, tie and beret. He 
has a moustache, and a cigarette hangs from the corner of his closed mouth as he 
observes the scene, showing no apparent emotion. Between his right shoulder and 
the right upper arm of the man pulling the hand cart can be seen the shirt-clad torso 
of another man, who is smiling. Behind the beret, the dark sleeve of an arm, its hand 
holding a hat, is raised into the air. Willie and Joe are standing behind the hand cart. 
Both are wearing the summer field uniform of the Army of the United States, 
consisting of wool shirt and pants. Each also wears an M1 helmet and has an ammo 
belt around his waist. Willie᾽s helmet is dented above his right eye. Joe carries his 
gun slung over his right shoulder. A bayonet is fastened to his ammo belt. He is 
holding a bellows camera in the vertical position. Both are unshaven. Willie wears a 
neckerchief, and his face reveals a closed mouth and a difficult-to-decipher, almost 
neutral expression. Joe leans forward slightly and pays close attention to the scene, 
his mouth open. He comments to Willie: I’m gonna send this home an’ scare my gal 
outta foolin around wit’ garrison sojers … 
The drawing in Fig. 14 is from an undated facsimile of Mauldin’s original work. Above 
the picture is a note from the cartoonist (Ed. note for Unifeature – they do this to little 
gals who “collaborate” with Jerry. You can put it a little milder –), giving rise to various 
questions in connection with the image. We have already established that Jerry 
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refers to German soldiers.557 But: who are they, what exactly is this and what 
meaning are we supposed to derive from the word collaborate in the caption? The 
instruction – You can put it a little milder – at the end of the note can be overlooked in 
this context, as it is probably an editing or print suggestion. 
The savage purification 
As the Allied Expeditionary Forces advanced across France in summer 1944, they 
left a power vacuum in their wake that set off a vast wave of violent recriminations, 
thousands of them with fatal consequences, in the liberated areas. In general, the 
local Vichy governments had collaborated with the German occupation forces. The 
anarchical conditions that emerged as a result of their liberation were used by the 
various political wings of the Résistance to take revenge on actual (as well as 
alleged) collaborators. As the general public vented its fury on all those who in any 
way reminded it of the humiliating four-year German occupation, some of them also 
took advantage of the situation to settle personal and political scores. These included 
putting private accounts to rights and sidelining political rivals for power in a post-war 
France. At least 14,000 individuals were murdered during this spontaneous national 
cleansing that entered French history under the name épuration sauvage.558 
Historian Stanley Hoffmann insisted that a history of French collaboration needs to be 
highly discriminating in its approach. It could, he maintained, even limit itself to 
presenting a lengthy series of individual case studies, since there were almost as 
many kinds of collaboration as there were individual collaborators.559 Hoffmann᾽s 
argument, even if exaggerated, is basically irrefutable. It is, in fact, essential to 
distinguish among a variety of forms of collaboration that, in turn, were motivated by 
a number of circumstances. We will now focus on one of these ways of collaborating 
with the German foe, along with the motives for, and causes of, such collaboration. 
Horizontal collaboration  
In keeping with the Mauldin drawing, we are concerned here with attacks on French 
women who were accused of engaging in collaboration horizontale, as it was called - 
                                            
557 Cf. footnote 374: Jerry / jerry can 
558 Beevor, D-Day, p. 447 ff. 
559 Stanley Hoffmann, Collaborationism in France during World War II, in: The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1968), p. 375. 
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intimate relations with German occupiers. Even in the case of this particular form of 
collaboration, we can identify various motives and causes. Many of those who 
subsequently became victims were prostitutes who had done nothing more than 
expand their commercial operations during the occupation to include the Wehrmacht. 
While, in some regions, this act was accepted as a business decision, people in other 
parts of France persecuted such women as political traitors against the Grande 
Nation. Other objects of similar scorn were teenage girls who had quite simply fallen 
in love with German soldiers of their own age group or formed liaisons due to 
boredom, rebellion or other reasons. Thousands of young mothers whose husbands 
were prisoners of war or forced laborers, or had even died, had few options in 
wartime to feed themselves and their children other than to strike up a relationship 
with a German soldier. As Ernst Jünger observed while he indulged in the luxurious 
decadence of the Parisian restaurant La Tour d’Argent, food was power.560 In other 
cases, a mere suspicion was enough to call a woman to account for collaboration 
horizontale. In Villedieu, such an accusation was leveled against a woman whose 
crime consisted of working as a cleaning lady at the headquarters of the local 
German garrison. Single women who billeted occupation troops in their homes, 
whether or not of their own volition, were accused of being mattresses for the 
Boches. It was assumed that women suspected of having undergone abortions were 
likewise associating with Boches.561 
The tondues 
For all the varied circumstances, causes and motives behind (actual or assumed) 
collaboration horizontale, the ordeal that faced these women following liberation was 
similar in most cases. As soon as the Allies had liberated a town or village, an 
eruption of self-righteous anger began against all real or suspected beneficiaries of 
the German occupation. In most cases, it was the women – as the easiest and most 
vulnerable scapegoats – who became the first targets of a violent moral outrage that 
                                            
560 Beevor, D-Day, p. 449. 
561 Antony Beevor, An ugly carnival, in: The Guardian (June 5, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jun/05/women-victims-d-day-landings-second-world-war 
(date of most recent access: June 25, 2015). 
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often masked plain envy and a desire to create a distraction.562 Mobs rounded them 
up in public squares. In many cases, their outer garments were torn from their bodies 
before their heads were shaved in a repugnant and humiliating procedure.563 While 
they were being forced to endure this torture, they were cursed and spit upon; some 
were trampled and beaten; others were smeared with tar, or their foreheads were 
painted with swastikas. There were known cases in Paris where prostitutes who had 
served a German clientele were beaten to death by mobs. As a final act to this 
perverted festival, the tondues, the shorn women, were paraded through the streets 
of town to display their public degradation to the widest possible local audience.564 
In mid-June, on the first market day in Carentan after the 101st Airborne Division had 
liberated the town, 12 women were publicly shorn in the main square. In Cherbourg, 
an open truck packed with tondues, mostly teenagers, paraded them through the 
streets on Bastille Day, July 14. Many of the French as well as Allies were disgusted 
by the display, but they perceived either (in the French case) that they were not in a 
position to intervene or (in the Allied case) that they were not qualified (or eager) to 
                                            
562 The envy involves the material advantages that accrued to a woman who took up a liaison with a 
German, such as access to food in greater quality and quantity than that available to the average 
citizen during the exploitation of France. In 1992, in the midst of many eulogies occasioned by the 
death of the French actress Arletty, it was not overlooked that she had carried on an affair with a 
German Luftwaffe officer. A certain air of bitterness still prevailed even after almost 50 years, less 
because she had slept with the Enemy than because she had dined with him at the Ritz while the rest 
of France went hungry. Following liberation, many Frenchmen tried to hide the fact that they had not 
actively participated in the Résistance by eagerly joining in the hunt for collaboratrices. (Cf. Beevor, D-
Day, p. 450.) 
563 The public head shaving of women has a long and inglorious tradition in Europe. In the Middle 
Ages, the practice was employed as a punishment for unfaithfulness, since it presumably robbed the 
woman of her most seductive quality. In the 20th Century, this form of retribution and humiliation 
underwent a renaissance. German women who engaged in liaisons during the French occupation of 
the Rhineland in the 1920s were punished in this way following Germany᾽s remilitarization. In the 
Spanish Civil War, Falangist women from republican families were shaved and forced into prostitution 
under the insane assumption that the left, at any rate, practiced free love. The most famous (fictional) 
victim in the Spanish Civil War is María, Robert Jordan᾽s lover in in Hemingway᾽s For Whom the Bell 
Tolls. In Nazi Germany during World War II, an edict was issued that women accused of sleeping with 
non-Aryans or forced laborers should be publicly punished in this manner (Beevor, An ugly carnival). 
564 Beevor, D-Day, p. 448 ff. 
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judge the event for themselves. John Colville, Winston Churchill᾽s private secretary, 
witnessed the spectacle in Bayeux: 
I watched an open lorry drive past, to the accompaniment of boos and cat-calls 
from the French populace, with a dozen miserable women in the back, every hair 
on their heads shaven off. They were in tears, hanging their heads in shame. 
While disgusted by this cruelty, I reflected that we British had known no invasion 
or occupation for some nine hundred years. So we were not the best judges.565 
Sergeant Forrest C. Pogue had studied at the Sorbonne between 1937 and 1939 
before returning to the U.S. following the German invasion of Poland. His time in 
Paris had turned him into an incurable francophile, and it was a great day and a 
sentimental journey when he returned to the scene of his studies on August 31, 1944 
as one of the historians of the American V Corps. Near Saint-Denis, his jeep was 
blocked by a crowd: 
… [we] found a group taunting a girl who had been friendly to German soldiers. 
Her head has just been shaved and Free French soldiers were escorting her 
down the streets while the crowd hooted. She, and her sister sufferers we saw 
later, got our sympathy no matter what they had done. For their look, in the hands 
of their tormentors, was that of a hunted animal. It seemed to that nothing made a 
person look so naked in the world, nothing was so overwhelmingly brutal in its 
humiliation, than this forcible shaving of heads. Rather to be pilloried all the day 
than to be ridden through the crowd like this. Neither did I like the placards on 
nearby shops that said “here is the house of a Boche,” or “supplier of the Boche.” 
It smelled too much of the “Here is a Jew” signs I had seen in Germany in 
1938.566 
To the leaders of the Résistance in Paris, these actions represented a thorn in their 
side, but they lacked the means and possibility to end the anarchy. Colonel Henri 
Rol-Tanguy posted warning notices in the hope that threatening the tondeurs (head-
shavers) with retaliatory measures would deter them. René Porte was another 
Resistance leader in the capital, widely known for his enormous strength. He was 
reported to have personally cracked the heads of youthful perpretators in an effort to 
                                            
565 Cited in: ibid., p. 449. 
566 Pogue, Pogue’s War, p. 199. 
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stop them from tormenting a young woman.567 Apart from general calls for order and 
individual measures, however, even the Résistance leadership could do little. It was 
too decentralized and its command structure largely too voluntary to be able to 
enforce a ban. In total, at least 20,000 cases are known where French women were 
forced to suffer this fate. In the face of some estimates that 80,000 French children 
had German fathers, the actual number could be much greater. 
Sociological digression 
Sociologist Joane Nagel describes a case from 1944 in which a young French 
woman whose father was in the Résistance suffered the same fate as other 
collaboratrices horizontales: 
The war was not finished, but in Paris it assumed another form – more perverse, 
more degrading … The “shorn woman” of rue Petit-Musc … walked along with 
her wedge-soled shoes tied around her neck, stiff like those undergoing a major 
initiation. Her face was frozen like a Buddha, her carriage tense and superb in the 
midst of a shouting, screeching mob of faces contorted by hatred, groping and 
opportunistic hands, eyes congested by excitement, festivity, sexuality, 
sadism.568 
Using this example and two photographs (two tondues being led through the streets 
by a mob and a blindfolded male collaborator awaiting the firing squad), Nagel 
advances the thesis that the punishment of female sexual collaborators succeeding 
in reinstating the sexual and nationalistic hegemony of the French patriarchy. 
National sexual order was restored.569 Her comparison of the two photos reveals … 
the gendered nature of patriotism, treason, betrayal, and the relation and relative 
importance of men and women to the nation.570 It is undeniable that patriotism and 
especially treason and deceit had meanings that differed by gender in a patriarchal 
and occupied society like that of 1940s France. What is not apparent to the author of 
                                            
567 Beevor, An ugly carnival. 
568 Cited in: Joane Nagel, Ethnicity and Sexuality, in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (2000), p. 
107. 
569 Ibid., p. 109. 
570 Joane Nagel, Sexualizing the Sociological: Queering and Querying the Intimate Substructure of 
Social Life, in: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 2000), p. 3. 
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the present work, however, is whether Nagel, in the example she cites, assigns a 
relatively greater nationalistic importance to the male collaborator, because he is the 
one being executed. Against this, one could argue that women and men were killed 
in roughly equal proportions during the épuration sauvage. In Brittany, for example, 
two times more women than men were put to death during the cleansings. How does 
one incorporate that particular fact into this reasoning? A regional phenomenon of 
nationalistic regard for the importance of womanhood, perhaps?  
Furthermore, to make the gendered confusion complete, it also occasionally 
happened that men were shorn of their hair for having worked voluntarily in German 
factories. 571 
I am convinced that these events should naturally be viewed in the context of the 
patriarchial society within which they took place. Discovery of a sexist-patriarchal 
conspiracy in thousands of more or less individual incidents can only be either 
illusional or agenda-driven. Nagel’s theory draws from two fragments of source 
material to analyze a highly complex system of multicausally intertwined events. On 
closer examination, questions immediately arise. I would rather make the case for an 
approach that is more mainstream but still firmly rooted in the realities of 1940s 
France: namely, that within the patriarchal mindset negotiated above, collaboration 
horizontale was the principal activity, among the few available to women, by which 
they could be accused of collaboration. There are several explanations why the 
tondues were more often humiliated than murdered: first, because (pure) sexual 
collaboration as an insult against the French nation did at best immaterial damage. 
From a pragmatic Resistance perspective, it could even be viewed as a distraction 
and a potential source for exploitable individual vulnerabilities to the German 
occupation force, while male- dominated fields of collaboration like politics, 
economics and intelligence had a price tag measurable in influence, blood and raw 
power. As a result, collaboration horizontale (in the inherent rationale) did not merit 
capital punishment. Second, the perverted logic that a traditional punishment for 
sexual misconduct was appropriate in these cases. Third, that putting women to 
death was considered to be a more of a taboo in patriarchal-conservative and pre-
emancipation France than might be the case these days. 
                                            




Let us return now to Bill Mauldin᾽s cartoon. The questions we posed at the start of 
this chapter have now been sufficiently answered: they – refers to the perpetrators, 
this – to the deed, yielding the specific definition of collaborate in Mauldin᾽s note. All 
this reveals as well the meaning of Joe’s captioned observation: I’m gonna send this 
home an’ scare my gal outta foolin around wit’ garrison sojers … 
Following the logic of Nagel’s approach, Joe intends to send his girlfriend a photo of 
the scene being played out in front of him. Through this implicit threat of comparable 
punishment, Joe seeks to communicate his manifest claim to sexual hegemony over 
her. Furthermore, this scenario of intimidation reveals his intention to prevent any 
unilateral emancipation from his sexual hegemony facilitated by a garrison sojer572. 
In actuality, the importance of letters from the homefront, and particularly their 
positive effect on the compass that guided the dogfaces᾽ general morale, should not 
be underestimated. Such correspondence represented the only possibility for soldiers 
abroad to remain in touch with family, friends or a wife or girlfriend in the United 
States. A particular kind of communiqué known as the Dear John letter was the major 
exception. This was the dogfaces᾽ vernacular expression designating a letter from a 
wife or girlfriend in which she informed her soldier of her intention to end the 
relationship in order to take up with another man.573 The reality of spending months 
or years apart exerted great stress on both participants in a partnership and the 
circumstances under which they had to keep relationships with homefront partners 
alive gave rise to profound concern on the part of many dogfaces. 
They themselves were confronting the absolutely exceptional circumstances of 
warfare. One way of dealing with this threatening, extraordinary situation was to 
idealize and magnify everything – particularly romantic relationships – that 
represented home. They saw the prospect of going back to their sweetheart as their 
reward for enduring the war’s hardships.574 Those with more flexible moral 
                                            
572 Garrison soldiers served away from the front; the reference in this case is to the Zone of the 
Interior, which was the United States. 
573 Morris Finder, “That’s All She Wrote”, in: American Speech, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1957), p. 239. 
574 Kennett, G.I., p. 71 ff. 
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tendencies viewed the very extraordinary circumstances as an opportunity to engage 
in a dual code of ethics. One set of values applied to contacts with the homeland, 
while the other was valid for the day-to-day realities of war. In most cases, the 
dogfaces᾽ living conditions were far too unstable and constantly changing to allow for 
serious love affairs. In the case of the morally flexible, any short-lived amorous 
adventures were too rare to threaten their back-home relationships.575 
The (in our case always female) partners who remained in the U.S. found themselves 
in another sort of extraordinary circumstances. Six million American women took up 
the industrial jobs left by the men who went to war. They received unequal pay for 
equal work, were passed over for promotion in favor of male co-workers and had to 
endure allegations that they lacked professionalism. With respect to their families, it 
was of course expected that they would keep house as perfectly, and keep their 
children as happy, as they had done before the war. Support facilities like day care 
centers were rare, and workplace relations so inflexible, that shopping and other 
basic household chores could turn into logistical challenges. Fundamentalist 
conservatives in dread over the imminent collapse of the American family sang the 
background tune in this new work-filled life. 576 
In spite (or perhaps exactly because) of these adverse conditions, a new feminine 
self-awareness emerged. Women indeed filled the manpower vacancies in American 
industry. They did their part in the war against the Axis powers. In most cases, they 
discovered a way to overcome the parallel challenges of work, housekeeping and 
family. They earned paychecks and made financial decisions, and they experienced 
a degree of independence and freedom that had been unthinkable up to that point.577 
Embedded in a wholly new daily routine, the absence of their partners could also 
become day-to-day reality, paving the way for psychological separation. With their 
partners – even those who were assiduous in their letter writing – fading into distant 
memory, it was often simply a question of time before women found themselves in 
                                            
575 Mark P. Parillo, World War II, in: Peter Karsten (Ed.), Encyclopedia of War and American Society 
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situations where an opportunity arose to open up to someone new – a garrison sojer, 
for example. 
Mauldin᾽s cartoon touches on feelings of insecurity and powerlessness that soldiers 
experienced thousands of times with respect to life at home, sentiments that only 
truly self-assured dogfaces would have managed to avoid. In sum, he portrayed an 
unwilling captivity in the “wrong” life, while the “right” one back home developed into 
increasing uncertainty from the perspective of the dogfaces. The specific manner in 
which Mauldin conveyed his topic may not appear to be particularly tasteful – in 
hindsight, a comparatively simple judgment. 
 
9.9 Northern France: a quartermaster’s purgatory (September 
15, 1944) 
Port capacity is not what it should be, the roads are already clogged with our 
transport, bridges are out, signal communications are bad; yet these deterrents are 
overshadowed by the frequent headlines of victorious battles. 
Harry C. Butcher, August 31, 1944578 
 
                                            





Fig. 15   “Sorry. Now we’re outta charcoal too.” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Three jerry cans are seen in the foreground of the cartoon.579 On a sign in the 
background at left, an arrow pointing to the right indicates the exit of a GAS DUMP. A 
warning in smaller print below it reads NO SMOKING. Of course, a cigarette is 
hanging out of the corner of the mouth of the T/4580, who is standing in front of the 
                                            
579 Cf. Chapter 9.1 Sicily: Bloody Ridge (October 17, 1943). 
580 T/4 – Technician Fourth Grade: Technicians, who were introduced into the Army at the beginning of 
1942, held specialist ranks. A badge with three yellow stripes worn on the right upper arm was the 
designation for a sergeant. The letter T in the bulge at the bottom of the badge, as shown in the 
cartoon, indicates that the wearer is a T/4. Because of their special qualifications (for example, tank 
driver or combat engineer, but also cook or mechanic), such soldiers received sergeant’s pay without 
having the customary command responsibilities (for example, as a squad leader). T/4s formed part of 
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jerry cans, hands – at least the right one, which is visible to us – in his pants pockets. 
He wears his Army field uniform with the shirt untucked, and a herringbone twill 
cap581. In the background, between the T/4 and the sign, an apparently modified ¼-
ton 4x4 truck582, better known as a jeep583, is idling. Two soldiers in tanker jackets 
                                                                                                                                        
a rank order that included the T/5 (corporal) one rank below and the T/3 (staff sergeant) a rank above. 
The term grade refers to the pay grade for enlisted soldiers and NCOs that extended from 1st Grade 
(first sergeant) down to 7th Grade (private). As a rule, these service grades were addressed not as 
technicians but according to their equivalent NCO service grades of corporal, sergeant or staff 
sergeant. 
581 The short brim herringbone twill cap was originally developed for Armored Corps troops. It was 
subsequently also distributed to mechanics and other technical troops such as filling station personnel 
(Stanton, Army Uniforms, p. 75). 
582 The ¼-ton 4x4 truck – or jeep – joined the motor fleet of the Army of the United States in 1940. 
That summer, the Army, which had been considering a small, fast reconnaissance motor vehicle since 
the 1930s, tested a model built to its specifications by the American Bantam Car Company of Butler, 
Pennsylvania. Robust, powerful and extremely agile, only 10 feet in length and approximately 3 feet in 
height, it fulfilled all expectations, and the first consignment of 1500 vehicles was ordered. The 
Quartermaster Corps objected, however, to giving such a large contract to a relatively small 
manufacturer like Bantam, and thus equivalent orders of 1500 vehicles were placed with Willys 
Overland and Ford, companies that had expressed their interest in the meantime. Ford and Willys 
Overland were authorized to use the Bantam blueprints in constructing their own cars, naturally 
leading to (unsuccessful) protests coming from Butler. Following the testing of all three (very similar) 
models, the Quartermaster Corps selected the Willys Overland version as its standard. When another 
16,000 vehicles were put out for bid, Willys submitted the lowest quote and received the contract to 
build them. Shortly after the start of production, it became clear that Willys would not be able to meet 
the required quota, and Ford was additionally contracted to build the Willys model, using Willys 
construction plans. As a small manufacturing company, Bantam was totally excluded from jeep 
production at this time. While the Butler firm later received Army contracts for trailers, it played no 
further part in the production of the vehicle that it had developed from scratch. After the war, when 
Willys Overland introduced the slogan we created and perfected the jubilant Jeep, Bantam sought and 
was awarded an injunction against its use. An early Bantam jeep model was included in an exhibit at 
the Smithsonian Institution in Washington as a recognition of Bantam’s pioneering role in the vehicle’s 
development (Harry C. Thomson / Lida Mayo, United States Army in World War II. The Technical 
Services. The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply [Washington, D.C. 1991], p. 276 ff.). 
583 A larger ½-ton 4x4 truck was originally designated as ῾jeep᾽, with the ¼-ton 4x4 truck being called 
῾peep᾽. When the ½-ton truck was dropped from the motor fleet of the Army of the United States, the 
name ῾jeep᾽ was transferred to the smaller vehicle. There are two theories as to the etymology of the 
name. The first maintains that the word sounds like the vehicle’s ῾GP᾽ (general purpose) designation. 
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are sitting in the vehicle.584 The bearded face and M1 helmet with camouflage netting 
displayed by the one in the driver’s seat create the impression that he is a dogface 
soldier, while the clean-cut appearance of his closely shaven passenger suggests 
that this is an officer. The barrel of an M1 Garand rifle protrudes from an exterior gun 
case mounted behind the jeep᾽s right front fender. The vehicle has been modified to 
accommodate two cylindrical objects mounted vertically at the front of its grill. Lying 
across the hood, at a right angle to the driving direction, are two smaller cylinders. A 
rectangular object can be recognized in front of the grill attachment, at the lower 
portion of which is a kind of hatch with a bolt handle and grid. Above it are three 
round objects. A gauge-like object protrudes from the left-hand front cylinder. All five 
of the attached elements described above are connected to one another by various 
straight and spiral tubes. Gas or steam is escaping from the right-hand front cylinder, 
and what looks like a steam whistle juts out of the cylinder on the left. 
The two soldiers sitting in the vehicle are looking perplexedly at the T/4 as he tells 
them: Sorry. Now we’re outta charcoal too. The cartoon’s setting, the location 
information in the picture, its caption and date of publication lead to the conclusion 
that the jeep’s modification is a charcoal carburetor. The illustration’s subject thus 
has to be the Allied supply crisis in northern France in late summer and fall of 1944. 
This crisis marked the end of an operational (and, for the dogfaces, emotional and 
physical) tour de force. In order to grasp its full meaning, we need to look back three 
months and review the course and characteristics of the Allied campaign in northern 
France and, not least, its ground-level significance for the dogface soldiers. 
OVERLORD 
Following years of planning, Allied forces crossed the English Channel on June 6, 
1944 and returned to French soil, deploying the invasion force between Le Havre and 
Cherbourg. Under the command of General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery᾽s 21st 
Army Group, units of the Second British Army came ashore west of the Orne River, 
while those of the First Army landed north and east of the mouth of the Vire River at 
the lower end of the Cotentin Peninsula. The landings developed largely according to 
                                                                                                                                        
According to the second explanation, it refers to a character by the same name in a comic strip by E. 
C. Segar (Thomson, Procurement, p. 276). 
584 Cf. Chapter 9.3 An excuse for cowardice (January 19, 1944). 
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plan. In one of the five landing areas, OMAHA beach in the American sector, troops 
encountered particularly heavy opposition and suffered accordingly. Overall, 
however, troop losses were lighter overall than pessimistic planners had predicted. 
After the Allied Expeditionary Forces had secured its initial bridgehead, VII Corps 
sealed off the base of the Cotentin Peninsula and captured Cherbourg by the end of 
June.585 With the port city in their possession, the Allies began to fall behind their 
schedule586 for two reasons. 
In the eastern part of the landing zone, Montgomery had not succeeded in his 
announced objective of occupying Caen on D-Day itself.587 Nonetheless, the city on 
the Orne was the gateway to the so-called tank country to the south from where 
mechanized formations could reach Paris without encountering notable topographical 
barriers. Since the left (British) flank also represented the shortest route to the 
German border, OVERLORD planners (with the crucial support of Montgomery as 
ground commander) had tasked Second British Army with breaking out of the 
bridgehead and commencing mobile operations.588, 589 German high command was, 
                                            
585 Amphibious landing operations took place in a sequence of three phases: breakin – buildup – 
breakout. The breakin phase of course signified gaining a foothold on the enemy coast, establishing a 
bridgehead and securing it against immediate counterattacks. During the buildup, the bridgehead was 
expanded in order to achieve two preconditions for a breakout. On one hand, the expansion served to 
open up space to accumulate forces and supplies for the breakout. On the other hand, the expansion 
needed to establish a topographically favorable jump-off line from which the forces that had 
accumulated during the buildup could break out of the bridgehead and commence maneuver warfare. 
(Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. 
Cross-Channel Attack [Washington, D.C. 1993], p. 79.) The conquest of Cherbourg held a high priority 
in U.S. invasion planning because the city was the largest seaport in the surrounding areas, crucial for 
the supply of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Once the Cotentin Peninsula had been cleared and 
Cherbourg taken, First U.S. Army began to expand in the direction of a jump-off line. (Harrison, Cross-
Channel, p. 438 ff.) 
586 Cf. Fig. 16. 
587 It would in fact take until July 9 before British and Canadian forces occupied Caen. 
588 Cf. Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy. How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945 
(Lawrence 1994), p. 32. 
589 This notion is supported by, among other things, the fact that the first Allied tank formations 
disembarked along the British landing sectors. Several large-scale attempts to take the city in June 
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of course, also aware of both the proximity of the countryside south of Caen to Paris 
and its topography. In addition, since it regarded British troops as the more 
dangerous foe due to their greater experience, it deployed its mechanized formations 
to face Second British Army on the left flank of the invasion area. 
Dirty bush war590 
Starting at the end of June, the dogfaces of First Army, on the right flank of the 
landing area, were forced to battle topographical adversity as well as the Wehrmacht. 
Even in retrospect, it seems difficult to understand: U.S. invasion planners were so 
focused on the multiple problems and dangers of coming ashore and remaining there 
that no one thought much about what would await the dogfaces beyond the 
beaches.591 What lay ahead of them was compared by Major General J. Lawton 
“Lightning Joe” Collins – commander of First Army’s VII Corps and a veteran of 
Guadalcanal in the Pacific – to the jungle warfare waged in his previous theater of 
operations. Omar N. Bradley, his superior at First Army, called it the damnedest 
country I’ve ever seen – the bocage.592 
The bocage is Normandy’s characteristic landscape. It begins approximately 9 miles 
inland from the Normandy coast and stretches in a wide arc from Caumont to the 
western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Its dominant feature consists of countless 
small, irregular parcels of land that were divided by the Celts who farmed the area 
long before the arrival of the Romans. Narrow lanes between these parcels connect 
the individual fields, pastures and orchards. In order to demarcate their own land, 
                                                                                                                                        
failed. Montgomery later maintained that his plan had never been to achieve a breakout, seeking 
instead to focus the attention of the German command on the British sector in order to facilitate a 
breakout by the First U.S. Army in the west. Apart from the topographical and geographical 
arguments, the deployment of tank formations and the fact that Montgomery’s own forecast of 
operations had announced that Second Army would be five miles southeast of Caen by June 14, the 
General’s own personality argues against this interpretation. Neither before nor after the Normandy 
campaign did Montgomery ever exhibit the trait of modesty or determine of his own accord to play a 
supporting role. (Beevor, D-Day, p. 183 ff.)  
590 Wehrmacht soldiers, cited in: Beevor, D-Day, p. 252. 
591 Doubler, Closing, p. 36. 
592 Beevor, D-Day, p. 252. 
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fence their cattle and protect against erosion caused by the severe ocean winds, the 
Celts built earthen embankments along the boundaries of their property, on which 
they planted hedges, trees and bushes. More than a millennium of growth and 
rooting transformed the embankments into solid barriers crowned with impenetrable 
vegetation, hedgerows in Allied parlance, up to 16 feet high. Over the same period of 
time, the hooves of the Norman cattle and the winter rains served to lower the 
surface of the connecting lanes far below the level of the surrounding plots of land.593 
The tactical implications of such topography are striking. The hedgerows separated 
the land into tiny patches and provided the Wehrmacht, which was operating on the 
defensive, with excellent cover and perfect camouflage. Tanks could neither 
maneuver nor fire their main armament in the narrow pathways between the fields, 
and they were easy prey for German antitank weapons. The two operational factors 
securing American superiority over the Wehrmacht, its own mobility and firepower, 
were neutralized in this environment. Taking advantage of the topographical 
restrictions, the German defense of the bocage was designed to rob the American 
attack of leverage and coordination while it exploited the defensive advantages of the 
terrain.594 Each parcel was organized as a separate fortification to be defended by 
means of a lethal mix of fire, both direct (machine guns and anti-tank/anti-aircraft 
guns) and indirect (mortars and artillery).595 Ernie Pyle accompanied the dogfaces 
during the Battle of the Bocage: 
The Germans used these [hedgerow] barriers well. They put snipers in the trees. 
They dug deep trenches behind the hedgerows and covered them with timber, so 
that it was almost impossible for artillery to get at them … They even cut out a 
section of the hedgerow and hid a big gun or a tank in it, covering it with bush. 
                                            
593 Cf. Keegan, Six Armies, p. 152 ff.; Doubler, Closing, p. 34. 
594 The German defensive doctrine in World War II was derived from the tactical experiences of World 
War I. In fall 1916, the German army adapted a new defensive doctrine of elastic, in-depth defense. It 
emphasized flexible utilization of the terrain in sequential lines of defense, maximum use of automatic 
weapons and artillery to destroy attacking forces, and direct counterattacks to take advantage of the 
attacker’s confusion upon capturing a line of defense. By 1944, little had changed to require the 
doctrine’s revision, and the bocage offered ideal conditions for its implementation. (Lupfer, Dynamics 
of Doctrine, p. 12 ff.) 
595 Doubler, Closing, p. 37. 
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Also they tunneled under the hedgerows from the back and made the opening on 
the forward side just large enough to stick a machine gun through. But mostly the 
hedgerow pattern was this: a heavy machine gun hidden at each end of the field 
and infantrymen hidden all along the hedgerow with rifles and machine pistols. 
We had to dig them out.596 
Formations that had already seen action in North Africa, Sicily or Italy at least had the 
benefit of the experiences and instincts of veterans who had survived several 
encounters with the enemy. For the units receiving their baptism of fire in Normandy, 
the Battle of the Bocage became a wholesale traumatic and deadly experience. In 
training, they had learned how to identify targets and then open fire on them. In the 
small, compartmentalized fields and orchards of the bocage, however, the Enemy 
was rarely to be seen. This discrepancy between reality and training cost countless 
lives, as a brigadier general named H. J. Matchett reported in a 1946 article in the 
Infantry Journal: 
In combat we found out that green troops would invariably freeze when first 
coming under fire. They would stop, seek cover, and then try to find the enemy. 
They could not see any clear, distinct targets. Therefore they did not fire. Their 
casualties increased. The conditions under which they had been trained to open 
fire simply did not exist.597 
Their opponents – particularly veterans of the eastern front – were familiar with every 
imaginable stratagem after five years of war, and they exploited the lack of 
experience exhibited by many American soldiers.598 Losses took on alarming 
dimensions. The 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division suffered 729 casualties 
in less than five days in the bocage, including three battalion commanders and five of 
nine company commanders.599 Even more unsettling to the dogfaces than the fact of 
being engaged by a seemingly invisible enemy was the feeling of being alone. The 
small, isolated fieldsgenerated an impression, that every individual group of soldiers 
                                            
596 Pyle, Brave Men, p. 466 ff. 
597 Cited in: Kennett, G.I., p. 134. 
598 Beevor, D-Day, p. 255. 
599 Ibid., p. 250 ff. 
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was up against the entire German Wehrmacht. In his study Men against Fire, S. L. A. 
Marshall commented: 
In such circumstances a man had the terrifying feeling that he was all alone; he 
would cease all motion, all activity. I hold it to one of the simplest truths of war 
that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep moving with his weapon is 
the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade.600 
The inexperienced Tough Ombres601 of the 90th Infantry Division, draftees from 
Texas and Oklahoma who had only arrived in Great Britain at the beginning of April, 
lost 2465 men in June alone. In July, which they spent almost entirely in the bocage, 
their losses rose to 5468; most of these, of course, were dogfaces from the rifle 
companies. A War Department study published in 1946 stressed the particular 
psychological effect of the bocage on inexperienced units: 
For most of the American soldiers, it had been a thankless, miserable, 
disheartening battle. It was, perhaps, particularly hard on fresh divisions, coming 
into their first action with the zest and high morale born of long training and of 
confidence in their unit. Many units were – or felt they were – wrecked by the 
losses that hit them in the course of a few days’ fighting, wiping out key men … 
The close ties within a unit, built up by long association, were broken irreparably; 
new officers and new men had to be assimilated in the midst of battle, sometimes 
on a wholesale scale.602 
But even such veteran formations as the 1st, 4th, 9th and 29th Infantry Divisions paid a 
high price in the Normandy hedgerows. One study indicated that the rifle companies 
of these four divisions lost an average of 60 percent of their enlisted ranks and 68 
                                            
600 Cited in: Kennett, G.I., p. 134 ff. 
601 The insignia of the division was an olive-green square with the letters T and O, representing Texas 
and Oklahoma, superimposed in red. These two states contributed most of the division’s manpower. 
With some creativity, its members derived their nickname of ῾Tough Ombres᾽ from the same initials 
(Office of the Theater Historian, Order of Battle United States Army. World War II. European Theater 
of Operations. Divisions [Paris 1945], p. 331). 
602 Cited in: Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 158. 
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percent of their officers between June 6 and July 31, 1944.603 In absolute figures, the 
July casualties came to 4773 for the 9th Infantry, 4718 in the 29th and 4421 in the 
30th. The heavy losses during the Battle of the Bocage, the isolation in its small fields, 
pastures and orchards and the fear of an invisible foe waging a dirty bush war 
against them led to an extraordinary, hate-filled hardness that characterizes the 
Battle of the Bocage. The only good Jerry soldiers are dead ones, wrote a 1st Infantry 
dogface to his parents in Minnesota. I’ve never really hated anything quite as much. 
And it’s not because of some blustery speech of a brass-hat. I guess I’m probably a 
little off my nut – but who isn’t. Probably that’s the best way to be.604 
For Allied planners, it appeared in the latter half of July as if their worst fears were 
becoming real and the Allied Expeditionary Forces were becoming bogged down in a 
slow and costly war of attrition reminiscent of World War I. By D+48605, the Allied 
forces had advanced to a line their plans had anticipated them reaching at D+5.606 
Few observers at that time would have been able to imagine that triumphant Allied 
armies would be at the frontier of Nazi Germany just six weeks later. 
COBRA 
As the dogfaces of First Army were dying in unacceptably large numbers in the 
bocage, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley and his corps commanders were planning 
a forced transition from this static war of attrition to a classic war of maneuver. 
Proponents of maneuver warfare speak of surfaces, areas where the Enemy is 
present en masse, and gaps, areas where he is not. A military force naturally favors 
attempting its breakthrough via a gap and seeks to avoid surfaces. In Normandy, 
however, there was no gap; it was necessary at the outset for Bradley᾽s First Army to 
create one by employing mass and firepower.607 His plan, dubbed ῾Operation 
                                            
603 The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, Normandy. 6 June–24 July 1944 (Center of Military 
History Publication 72-18), p. 34. 
604 Cited in: Beevor, D-Day, p. 252. 
605 D+48 signifies the 48th day after D-Day, which was June 6, 1944. 
606 Scott B. Cottrell, From Cobra to the Seine, August 1944. A Microcosm of the Operational Art (Fort 
Leavenworth 1986), p. 2 ff. 
607 Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 160. 
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COBRA᾽, was therefore to extend the Normandy bridgehead as far as Saint-Lô. This 
was where, along a straight-line road running from Saint-Lô to Périers, Bradley 
established his jump-off position. From here, First Army was to pierce the German 
line, through which Third Army608, about to be activated under the command of 
Patton, would act as an exploitation force to strike the rear of the German forces. His 
first objectives were the Breton port cities of Brest, Lorient and Saint-Nazaire, which 
had priority for reasons related to supply. In order to provide the COBRA offensive 
with the necessary heft, Bradley concentrated the three infantry and two armored 
divisions of VII Corps along a four and a half-mile stretch west of Saint-Lô. 
Shortly before 10:00 on the morning of July 25, 1944, the members of the German 
Panzer-Lehr and 5th Parachute Divisions, who were positioned (albeit unknowingly) 
opposite Bradley’s jump-off position, heard an increasingly loud humming sound. The 
roar originated from 550 fighter bombers that, together with over 1000 pieces of 
artillery as well as 1500 heavy bombers and 380 medium bombers609, attacked the 
                                            
608 By the end of July 1944, Bradley᾽s First U.S. Army already had control of 21 divisions, while the 
Second British Army had six divisions and the newly activated First Canadian Army (with British 
participation) had ten. Since such a massive number of subordinated forces far outstripped the 
administrative capacity of a field army headquarters, a reorganization of U.S. forces in the ETO was 
implemented as of August 1, 1944. First Army transferred nine of its more mobile divisions to the Third 
U.S. Army, activated on that same date under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. and also 
received a new commander, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges. Bradley, released from his First 
Army command, took over the likewise newly activated Twelfth Army Group which, for its part, directed 
both First and Third Army. (Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 358 ff.) 
609 The tactical use of strategic air forces was unusual if not unique. The OVERLORD landings 
themselves and Montgomery᾽s assaults on Caen were similarly prepared by bombardments carried 
out by strategic air forces. In the case of Operation COBRA, these had tragic consequences for the 
American troops on the jump-off line. Bradley had demanded that the planes make their approach 
parallel to the Saint-Lô–Périers road in order to maximize the precision of the bombardments. Allied air 
commanders rejected this because their squadrons would have had to make their approach run over 
German anti-aircraft defenses. While COBRA was originally scheduled for July 24, its launch was 
cancelled at the last minute because of cloud cover over Saint-Lô that reduced visibility for the 
bombers of the Eighth and Ninth U.S. Air Forces. The radio communication of the cancellation did not 
reach all squadrons already in the air, however, and over 300 planes dropped bombs through the 
cloud layer – short of the target, as it turned out – striking some of their own 30th Infantry Division 
units, which suffered 150 casualties as a result. Although Bradley was furious about this, he did not 
want to give up the element of surprise. He put off the start of the operation by 24 hours and ordered 
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German frontline prior to First Army’s attack. Ernie Pyle, who was, along with other 
correspondents and military observers, an eyewitness to the launch of COBRA, 
described the scene: 
The first planes of the mass onslaught came over a little before 10 A.M. They 
were the fighters and dive bombers. The main road, running crosswise in front of 
us, was their bomb line … We stood and watched them barrel nearly straight 
down out of the sky … They came in groups, diving from every direction, perfectly 
timed, one right after another. Everywhere we looked separate groups of planes 
were on the way down, or on the way back up, or slanting over for a dive, or 
circling, circling, circling over our heads, waiting for their turn. 
The air was full of sharp and distinct sounds of cracking bombs and the heavy 
rips of the planes’ machine guns and the splitting screams of the diving wings. It 
was all fast and furious, yet distinct. And then a new sound gradually droned into 
our ears, a sound deep and all encompassing with no notes in it – just a gigantic 
faraway surge of doomlike sound. It was the heavies … They came in flights of 
twelve, three flights to a group and in groups stretched out all across the sky … 
they came in a constant procession and I thought it would never end. What the 
Germans must have thought is beyond comprehension … I’ve never known a 
storm, or a machine, or any resolve of man that had about it the aura of such 
ghastly relentlessness. 
… And then the bombs came. They began like the crackle of popcorn and almost 
instantly swelled into a monstrous fury of noise that seemed surely to destroy all 
the world ahead of us. From then on for an hour and a half that had in it the 
agonies of centuries, the bombs came down. A wall of smoke and dust erected 
by them grew high in the sky … The bright day grew slowly dark from it. By now 
everything was an indescribable caldron of sounds. Individual noises did not 
exist. The thundering of the motors in the sky and the roar of bombs ahead filled 
                                                                                                                                        
his troops to move further back from the target area for safety reasons. On the next day, individual 
bombers once more released their bombs too early, hitting their own troops yet again. The friendly fire 
of July 25 cost 111 dead and 490 wounded. Among the fatalities was the commander of the Army 
Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, who was present at the launch of COBRA as an 
observer. (Blumenson, Breakout, p. 228 ff.) As a result of the tragedy, the 30th Infantry Division had 
the unenviable reputation of being the most bombed division among U.S. forces. The angry dogfaces 
of the division referred to Eighth and Ninth Air Forces from then on as the Eighth and Ninth Luftwaffe 
(Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 165). 
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all the space for noise on earth. Our own heavy artillery was crashing all around 
us, yet we could hardly hear it.610 
Two hours after the bombardment had ceased, dogfaces who had begun to advance 
to the other side of the Saint-Lô-Périers road found themselves in cratered 
landscape. Across an area of several square miles, the terrain looked as if it had just 
been plowed. Few creatures had survived the bombardment and artillery shelling, 
and the entire area was covered with the grotesquely deformed remains of German 
military hardware. Vehicles, artillery pieces and machines of all varieties used by the 
military protruded from the ruptured ground. Tanks that had been catapulted into the 
air by blast waves lay inverted like turtles on their backs. Fritz Bayerlein, the 
commanding general of the bombed German troops, later wrote that he did not 
imagine hell to be as bad as this inferno. Apart from the raw destructive power of the 
bombardments, its psychological effects were disastrous for the few survivors. An 
American Army doctor noted in his diary: many of [the prisoners taken] were actually 
babbling, knocked silly. Bayerlein wrote that it was impossible to organize a defense; 
his surviving troops were like madmen, incapable of any coordinated action.611 
Bradley could not guess at the time that Operation COBRA would develop into the 
decisive maneuver of the battle for France. For the dogfaces of his infantry divisions, 
it was the start of a campaign that would differ from the Battle of the Bocage in every 
detail. The war of attrition within the hedgerows of Normandy had affected the 
substance of not only the Army of the United States. By July 25, German forces who 
had blocked the Allied bridgehead were strained to the breaking point. As First Army 
began to penetrate the devastated terrain near Saint-Lô, the responsible 
commanders gradually realized that their forces had achieved a decisive 
breakthrough. On July 27, Bradley issued new orders. COBRA was unfolding so 
advantageously that he ordered his forces to race to Avranches, the gateway to 
Brittany. When Third Army was activated on August 1, Patton drove his formations at 
breakneck speed through the now captured traffic junction and into Brittany.612 
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Hitler᾽s left flank in Normandy was at the point of disintegration – in terms of 
operations, a clear signal to fall back and reorganize western defenses on different 
soil. The Führer᾽s typically immutable will613 was to call instead for offensive action. 
The American field armies, which had in the meantime become widely separated 
from one another in Normandy and Brittany, respectively, were only linked by a 
narrow corridor between Avranches and Mortain along the Normandy-Brittany divide. 
Bradley was conscious of the danger that Third Army could be cut off at this point. 
From his Wolf’s Lair in far-off Rastenburg, Hitler too recognized the theoretical 
possibility, sending orders to Kluge614 to counterattack at the Avranches–Mortain 
corridor in order to cut off Third Army. However, the tactical symbols on Hitler᾽s maps 
in East Prussia showed a deceptive picture of German forces in Normandy who, in 
reality, were exhausted and bled dry. Panzer divisions that should have been 
equipped with 150 tanks actually fielded 20; infantry divisions, similarly, were reduced 
to between 10 and 20 percent of their full strength. Kluge was aware of the fact that a 
successful counterattack could not be mounted with the forces available. Being a 
passive confidant of the July 20 plotters615, he was equally mindful that to propose 
retreat after the failed tyrannicide was no longer an option. Following Stauffenberg᾽s 
attempt, the entire German officer corps was dishonored in Hitler’s eyes and under 
general suspicion. Hitler’s commanders could prove their loyalty only through 
unconditional execution of his orders. Kluge was forced to appear loyal in the 
extreme for his own self-protection. For this reason alone, he launched Operation 
LÜTTICH616, the counterattack on the Avranche-Mortain corridor,617 during the night 
of August 6. 
                                            
613 “…mein unabänderlicher Wille…” was a well-used phrase of Hitler’s. 
614 Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, Commander of Heeresgruppe B in northwestern Europe. 
615 Stauffenberg᾽s attempted coup d’etat envisioned assassinating Hitler with a bomb. Subsequently, 
the conspirators planned to use an emergency contingency plan code-named Valkyrie (designed to 
put down an uprising by slave laborers) to seize power in order to make a separate peace with the 
Western Allies. 
616 In Liège, a Belgian city known in German as Lüttich, exactly 30 years (to the day) previously, 
Ludendorff had led the great German maneuver to encircle the French army in August 1914. To the 
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On August 9, two days after the launch of LÜTTICH, Henry Morgenthau618 visited 
Bradley᾽s 12th Army Group headquarters during the course of a tour of the European 
Theater of Operations. In his conversations, the general surprised the secretary with 
his view that the German counterattack would be …an opportunity that comes to a 
commander not more than once in a century. We’re about to destroy an entire hostile 
Army.619 Convinced by his field commanders that they could keep the Avranches-
Mortaine corridor open, he decided on a daring yet promising maneuver. Instead of 
redeploying parts of Third Army back from Brittany in order to reinforce its 
comunications through the corridor, he ordered Patton to perform an all-out turn to 
the east in order to cut off and counter-encircle the German attack. German high 
command could already foresee by this point that Operation LÜTTICH had failed. A 
few days later, situation maps on both sides began to feature the outlines of what 
would soon, under the name ῾Falaise pocket᾽, signify the destruction of 
Heeresgruppe B620 in northern France.621 
Up until then, German forces in northern France still retained the possibility of a 
fighting withdrawal across the Seine to establish new defensive positions along its 
opposite bank. As the ring around Falaise began to close, however, all that was left 
to them was to save as many troops as possible from encirclement and make a run 
for the borders of the Reich. Difficulties in internal coordination kept the Allies from 
completing their encircling maneuver, and thousands of German soldiers were able 
to escape the enclosure. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht was beaten west of the Seine 
and exposed to the vicious circle of an unorganized retreat and disrupted 
communications. Few commanders knew the exact whereabouts of their formations. 
                                                                                                                                        
fate-obsessed Hitler, this was by far too striking a coincidence not to portend success for his own 
counter-encirclement plan. (Keegan, Six Armies, p. 245.) 
617 Keegan, Six Armies, p. 238 ff. 
618 Secretary of the Treasury. 
619 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 375. 
620 Heeresgruppe: Army Group. All German forces in northern France were part of Heeresgruppe B. 
Its subordinate formations were the 7th Army south of the Seine and the 15th Army north of the river. 
621 Beevor, D-Day, p. 441 ff. 
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In their stampede, fragmented divisions clogged eastward road connections. 
Supplies of fuel and ammunition failed to reach units in need, and vehicles had to be 
abandoned.622 At the end of August, the scattered remnants of Heeresgruppe B 
reached prepared defensive positions along the Marne and Somme Rivers. By this 
time, however, they had become too exhausted, disorganized and demoralized to 
hold these positions. Shortly thereafter, in a new encircling maneuver near Mons, 
First Army captured 25,000 prisoners and thus neutralized what was left of 
Heeresgruppe B.623 During 1943 his direction of the war had lost him Armies, writes 
John Keegan of Hitler; in 1944 it had begun to lose him whole Army Groups. With its 
56 infantry and 11 panzer divisions, Heeresgruppe B had once been the 
Wehrmacht᾽s most powerful formation. Following Falaise, it was effectively 
destroyed. Fifty thousand German soldiers had fallen in the 10 weeks since D-Day, 
and at least 200,000 were in Allied captivity, awaiting embarkation for Great Britain or 
the United States. What remained of the Wehrmacht tried to find some way across 
the Seine and back to the Reich, with Allied forces close at their heels. 624 
Touring France with an army625 
The Germans were on the run, wrote Robert Capa in describing the scene following 
mid-August 1944, and the good campaign began. Here the French were full 
happy.626 The food was good, and the first glass of wine was free in the bars.627 
Largely youthful dogfaces pursued the defeated remnants of the Wehrmacht across 
                                            
622 Ibid., p. 357. 
623 CMH, Northern France, p. 24 ff. 
624 Keegan, Six Armies, p. 283. 
625 Touring France with an Army, presumably a word play on Henry James’s A Little Tour in France, is 
the title of the section of Patton᾽s memoirs War As I Knew It that deals with summer 1944 (Cf. Patton, 
War As I Knew It). 
626 Following the heavy fighting of June and July, Normandy was thoroughly devastated. In addition, 
many thousands of Normandy residents lost their lives in the areas where the war raged. It is not 
surprising that the joy the survivors felt at their liberation came with a bitter aftertaste. As the Allies 
chased the remains of the Wehrmacht across France to the German frontier, collateral damage to life 
and property was minimal, and the joy of the liberated French people more absolute. 
627 Capa, Slightly, p. 166. 
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summertime France. In every village and city they entered, they were celebrated as 
heroes and liberators. Edward W. Wood, Jr. described the victory-drunken mood of 
those days: 
To be nineteen years old, to be nineteen and an infantryman, to be nineteen and 
fight for the liberation of France from the Nazis in the summer of 1944! That time 
of hot and cloudless blue days when the honeybees buzzed about our heads and 
we shouted strange phrases in words we did not understand to men and women 
who cheered us as if we were gods. That summer, that strangely glorious 
summer, when we rushed across France, the Nazis fleeing just ahead of us. 
Drive east, drive east. South of Paris the day it was liberated, across the Marne 
to Château-Thierry (battlefields of the war in which my father and uncle had 
fought), then Reims with its cathedral, the most beautiful structure I had ever 
seen in my life, its magical flying buttresses brilliant against the August sky. Each 
village we entered started another party for us, as we shared bottles of wine 
hoarded since 1940 and kisses from wet-mustached men and soft-cheeked 
women while we hurled cigarettes and chocolates from our armored half-track 
and got drunk together and laughed and cried and screamed, for we had freed 
them from evil. For that glorious moment, the dream of freedom lived and we 
were ten feet tall.628 
Paris 
As the Army of the United States approached Paris, the dogfaces were gripped with 
the collective fever to liberate the City of Light. To a generation raised on fanciful 
tales of their fathers in the AEF629, recalled Bradley in his memoirs, Paris beckoned 
with a greater allure than any other objective in Europe.630 Churchill had personally 
assured Eisenhower prior to D-Day that His Majesty’s first minister would consider it 
the greatest victory in modern times if Allied Expeditionary Forces could liberate Paris 
before the winter.631 As Allied columns approached the city in the second half of 
August, the Supreme Commander was in no hurry at all to liberate the city. Paris was 
                                            
628 Cited in: Fussell, Crusade, p. 10 ff. 
629 General John J. Pershing᾽s American Expeditionary Force in World War I. 
630 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 384. 
631 CMH, Northern France, p. 21. 
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insignificant from an operational standpoint. Militarily, the obvious strategy was to 
encircle the city on the Seine and await the inevitable surrender of the isolated 
German garrison. SHAEF632 planners feared that the Allies would become entangled 
in costly street fighting in Paris that would produce considerable destruction as well. 
In addition, the provisioning of the city would further exacerbate the already strained 
supply situation of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.633 
Still, Eisenhower had made his plans without reckoning on de Gaulle and the Paris 
Résistance. Opposition movements in the capital were split politically. Most 
participants could agree on only one common goal: to free the city on their own 
without having to wait for their Anglo-American liberators like the princess in the 
tower. As a result, Gaullists, Communists and various other factions were already 
jockeying to take credit for the eventual liberation. Beyond the city limits, it was 
supremely important to de Gaulle’s postwar position that he go down in history as the 
Liberator of Paris. On August 19, as news spread through the city that Allied forces 
were at the gates, the Résistance began to occupy government buildings, 
newspapers and the city hall. What it lacked, however, was the means to drive out 
the Germans by itself. The German military governor of the city, for his part, did not 
want to battle an urban guerrilla force, agreeing instead to a truce that left each side 
in control of certain parts of Paris. On August 22, emissaries of the Résistance 
alerted Eisenhower to the imminent end of the truce and asked for assistance. De 
Gaulle again insisted on liberating the city immediately. When the emissaries 
persuaded Ike that Choltitz634 was only waiting to be able to surrender to regular 
Allied forces635, the Supreme Commander pragmatically changed his mind with 
respect to Paris. 
                                            
632 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces – Eisenhower᾽s headquarters. 
633 SHAEF calculated that 4000 tons of supplies would need to be brought daily to Paris in the event of 
an occupation. Converted into fuel for Allied divisions, this was equivalent to three days of motorized 
march toward the German frontier. (Blumenson, Breakout, p. 590 ff.) 
634 Lieutenant General Dietrich von Choltitz, the military governor of greater Paris, who received 
Hitler’s order to leave nothing but scorched earth to the Allies. 
635 Regular army units as opposed to an irregular guerrilla movement like the Résistance. 
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… mouvement immédiat sur Paris!636 
Eisenhower had assured de Gaulle that, if possible, he could assign the liberation of 
Paris to a formation of the FFI637. On the evening of the 22nd, in keeping with this 
arrangement, he ordered Major General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc᾽s638 Second 
Armored Division (in French, deuxième Division Blindée, abbreviated 2ème DB)639 to 
march to Paris from the west. In support, 4th Infantry Division would enter the city 
from the south, though it was instructed to give precedence to the 2ème DB. As 
Leclerc set his columns in motion on the morning of the 23rd, they were slowed by 
unexpectedly stiff resistence. For the 4th Infantry, delay usually meant that every 
village on the road to Paris was insisting on celebrating lavishly with its liberators, 
and Bradley simply assumed that Leclerc᾽s division [was] danc[ing] their way to 
Paris.640 As a result, he decided to ignore the interests of the Free French, ordering 
4th Infantry to take the city. Leclerc saw national honor at stake if Americans were to 
beat his men to Paris. To avoid this, he immediately ordered a task force of armored 
vehicles to proceed to the city center as rapidly as possible. On August 24, 1944 at 
9:20 pm, the mission was accomplished when tanks and half-tracks of the 9th 
Company of the 2nd Ad Hoc Regiment of Chad, made up primarily of Spanish 
Republicans, Communists and anarchists under the command of captain Raymond 
Dronne, rumbled into the Place de l’Hôtel-de-Ville.641 On the next day, after the bulk 
of the 2ème DB and parts of 4th Infantry had reached the square, Choltitz surrendered 
                                            
636 Leclerc on August 22, to Captain Gribius, his G3 (Operations Officer), after he had been ordered to 
march to Paris (Blumenson, Breakout, p. 605.). 
637 Forces françaises de l’intérieur, the umbrella organization of the French resistance. 
638 Leclerc was a nom de guerre used by Philippe François Marie de Hauteclocque in order to protect 
his wife and six children in France against German reprisals. Following the fall of France in 1940, 
Leclerc had been flown to London to serve in the FFI forces (Keegan, Six Armies, p. 300 ff.). 
639 At this time, the 2ème DB was the only Free French formation in the Allied Expeditionary Forces. 
Uniformed and equipped by the United States, it included French exiles, Spanish Republicans, foreign 
legionnaires and French colonial troops. 
640 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 392. 
641 Beevor, D-Day, p. 500 ff. 
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to Leclerc. Symbolically, however, Paris had already been liberated on the previous 
evening. 
… the most unforgettable day in the world642 
When the morning fog cleared on August 25, 1944, it heralded a day of summer 
sunshine following a number of rainy days. Throughout the night, news of the arrival 
of French troops in the city had spread. Parisians, many of whom had not slept that 
night, gathered at first light in the streets and squares of the southwestern districts. A 
tense but quiet air of excitement lay over the city. As formations of the 2ème DB and 
U.S. forces crossed into Paris from the west and south, respectively, the tension 
erupted into a mass frenzy without compare. Parisians swarmed around their 
liberators, waving flags they had sewn overnight and flashing Churchill᾽s V for Victory 
sign.643 Ernie Pyle, accompanying a column of 4th Infantry Division, found himself in 
the midst of a monumental outburst of joy and spontaneous affection. His comment 
to Hank Gorrell of United Press summed up the mood: Any G.I. who doesn’t get laid 
tonight is a sissy.644 Naturally, he had to use more euphemistic language in his 
column for the home front in order to convey this insight to his readers: 
I had thought that for me there could never again be any elation in war. But I had 
reckoned without the liberation of Paris … one of the great days of all time. 
… Gradually we entered the suburbs, and soon into the midst of Paris itself and a 
pandemonium of surely the greatest mass joy that has ever happened. The 
streets were lined as they are by Fourth of July parade crowds at home, only this 
crowd was almost hysterical … As our jeep eased through the crowds, thousands 
of people crowded up, leaving only a narrow corridor, and frantic men, women 
and children grabbed us and kissed us and shook our hands and beat on our 
shoulders and slapped our backs and shouted their joy as we passed … We all 
got kissed until we were literally red in the face, and I must say we enjoyed it … 
Everybody, even beautiful girls, insisted on kissing you on both cheeks. 
Somehow I got started kissing babies that were held up by their parents …645 
                                            
642 The liberation of Paris was … (Capa, Slightly, p. 189). 
643 Beevor, D-Day, p. 504 ff. 
644 Cited in: Tobin, Pyle’s War, p. 201. 
645 Pyle, Brave Men, p. 482 ff. 
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The acoustical background to this festive mood consisted of repeated explosions, 
gunshots and machine-gun fire as well as the distinctive scream of tank rounds flying 
overhead. The German garrison had not yet surrendered, and it continued to do 
battle with the city’s liberators from its isolated strongholds. Most of these 
fortifications were located off the main thoroughfares, which explains why the Allies 
directed their triumphal procession through just these routes. But even when sporadic 
gunfire broke out here and there along the edges of the march, it could not disrupt 
the celebratory mood. In such cases, Parisians became interested front-row 
observers (often with no regard at all for their own safety) of how the American and 
FFI troops went about their work.646 Pyle again: 
At any rate, from two in the afternoon until darkness around ten, we few 
Americans in Paris on that first day were kissed and hauled and mauled by 
friendly mobs until we hardly knew where we were. Everybody kissed us – little 
children, old women, grown-up men, beautiful girls. They jumped and squealed 
and pushed in a literal frenzy … As we drove along, gigantic masses of waving 
and screaming humanity clapped their hands as though applauding a 
performance in a theater … Those who couldn’t reach us threw kisses at us, and 
we threw kisses back. 
They sang songs. They sang wonderful French songs we had never heard. And 
they sang “Tipperary” and “Madelon” and “Over There” and the “Marseillaise.” … 
And then some weird cell in the inscrutable human makeup caused people to 
start wanting autographs. It began the first evening, and by the next day had 
grown to unbelievable proportions. Everybody wanted every soldier’s autograph. 
… Paris seemed to have all the beautiful girls we heard it had. The women have 
an art of getting themselves up fascinatingly. Their hair is done crazily, their 
clothes are worn imaginatively. They dress in riotous colors in this lovely warm 
season, and when the flag-draped holiday streets are packed with Parisians the 
color makes everything else in the world seem gray. As one soldier remarked, the 
biggest thrill in getting to Paris is to see people in bright summer clothes again.647 
                                            
646 Ibid., p. 484 ff. 
647 Ibid., p. 484 ff. 
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Although the effect of strong, cheerful colors on men who had spent months and 
years in a world consisting exclusively of olive and khaki should not be 
underestimated, Pyle had his eye on the censor when he wrote these lines. One 
soldier from Robert Kotlowitz᾽s platoon expressed more succinctly the 
dogfaces᾽collective emotions and hopes surrounding a sojourn in Paris. We’re all 
going to get laid! French-style, he exclaimed as his unit648 relocated from Cherbourg 
to its new deployment in Lunéville to relieve 4th Armored Division.649 Presumably the 
biggest thrill in getting to Paris had to do more with hopes as expressed in the 
quotation above, not merely the summer dresses of Parisian women. The reason for 
the high expectations of many dogfaces lay in their often very precise yet not 
necessarily accurate images of France in general and Paris in particular. These ideas 
were fed by Hollywood stereotypes, pulp fiction, and their fathers᾽ stories of 
Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force, rendered ever more colorfully over the 
years. For the dogfaces, France, especially Paris, meant l’amour, le cognac, les 
Folies Bergère and the elegance of Maurice Chevalier.650 It was Montmartre and 
Pigalle, the Moulin Rouge and the scandalous eroticism of Josephine Baker. 
The Army was aware of the potential dangers inherent in a clash between the 
behavior of mostly postpubescent GIs guided by (sexual) stereotypes and the sad 
reality of France following four years of German oppression, exploitation and 
occupation. The G.I. Pocket Guides651 to France and Paris attempted to put these 
concerns into plain language: France has been represented too often in fiction as a 
frivolous nation where sly winks and coy pats on the rear are the accepted form of 
address, counseled the France edition in its chapter entitled Mademoiselle: you’d 
                                            
648 26th Infantry Division (Yankee Division), 104th Infantry Regiment, Company C, Third Platoon. 
649 Kotlowitz, Before Their Time, p. 92 ff. 
650 Kennett, G.I., p. 206. 
651 Pocket Guides were essentially paperback travel guidebooks published by the War Department᾽s 
Information and Education Division for every region where the Army of the United States operated. 
They contained local history, routine tourist tips regarding area attractions and regional cuisine, but 
also information about local political traditions and stories as well as a section devoted to words and 
phrases. An important section of the Pocket Guides concerned local culture, urging soldiers as a rule 




better get rid of such notions right now if you are going to keep out of trouble.652 It 
went on: 
A great many young French girls never go out without a chaperone, day or night. 
It will certainly bring trouble if you base your conduct on any false assumptions. 
France is full of decent women and strict women. Most French girls have less 
freedom than girls back home. If you get a date don’t be surprised if her parents 
want to meet you first, to size you up. French girls have been saying “No” to the 
Nazi soldiers and officers for years now. They expect the men in the American 
Army to act like friends and Allies.653 
The cities edition addressed the hot potato on the very first page of its chapter on 
Paris, proposing cultural enticements as an alternative:  
One of the first ideas you should get out of your head is that Paris is a city of 
wicked and frivolous people. There’s an old French proverb, “Cherchez la 
femme,” which in G.I. language means “Find the woman.” Well, maybe you will 
find the woman, but chances are you may not. At any rate, you’ll find that the real 
Paris is not the Paris of nightlife and wild women. Instead, you will probably find it 
a city of great beauty and culture.654 
Nevertheless, the dogfaces witnessed sights on their tour of wartime France that 
were unimaginable in the prudish and conservative America of the 1940s. Men who 
casually urinated on buildings or even monuments. Dark-skinned people who moved 
about the society apparently unhindered by any institutionalized segregation. French 
women who danced with women; others who were completely at ease dancing with 
dark-skinned men. Men who hugged and kissed each other. For many Americans, 
such behavior was an indication that France had a looser, more flexible approach to 
moral conventions.655 Naturally, the dogfaces trusted their own eyes more than the 
                                            
652 U.S. Army Information and Education Division, A Pocket Guide to France (Washington, D.C. 1944), 
p. 19. 
653 Ibid., p. 19 ff. 
654 U.S. Army Information and Education Division, A Pocket Guide to Paris and the Cities of Northern 
France (Washington, D.C. 1944), p. 1. 
655 Kennett, G.I., p. 206 ff. 
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contrary pronouncements of an Army bureaucracy they had come to doubt in 
principle. As a result, they acted under false assumptions in countless encounters, 
causing problems and tensions. The sole exception was the liberation of Paris. 
A unique set of rules governed this day and the one that followed. The road to Paris 
was open, wrote Robert Capa, and every Parisian was out in the street to touch the 
first tank, to kiss the first man, to sing and cry. In addition, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill656, never were there so many who were so happy so early in the 
morning.657 The advancing Allied columns made very slow progress, continuously 
surrounded by a surging mass of people shouting merci, merci, vive l’Amérique (and 
of course vive la France). At every one of the numerous halts, recalled the 
commanding officer of 12th Infantry Regiment, mothers would hold up their children to 
be kissed, young girls would hug the grinning soldiers and cover them with kisses, 
old men saluted, and young men vigorously shook hands and patted the 
doughboys658 on the back.659 The true men of the hour were, of course, the soldiers 
of Leclerc᾽s 2ème DB who, as French liberators, received particularly frenetic acclaim. 
                                            
656 Capa’s phrase mimics Churchill᾽s famous address to the House of Commons on August 20, 1940, 
a speech that is still remembered today. At that time, the German Luftwaffe sought to bring the British 
air defense system to its knees in a battle of attrition, flying massive sorties against the airstrips and 
control centers of Sir Hugh Dowding᾽s Fighter Command. When indications appeared by late summer 
that the Luftwaffe would not be able to break British resistance, Churchill praised the approximately 
1500 British and international pilots who had fought the now-iconic Battle of Britain, memorably 
proclaiming: Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few (Winston 
Churchill, We Will All Go Down Fighting to the End [London 2010], p. 55). Shortly thereafter, a 
variation of this aphorism appeared in North Africa, where Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor᾽s 
limited Western Desert Force maneuvered numerically far superior Italian formations into surrender 
and imprisonment: Never in the field of human conflict was so much surrendered by so many to so 
few.  
657 Capa, Slightly, S. 179. 
658 In a manner similar to the dogfaces of World War II, infantrymen in World War I were known as 
doughboys. Many soldiers who served between 1914 and 1918 continued to use the expression that 
had become so familiar to them. It can be assumed from his service grade that Colonel Luckett of the 
12th Infantry had in fact served in the AEF in 1917/18; his inclusion of the term ῾doughboy῾ provides 
further evidence of the case. 
659 Beevor, D-Day, p. 506. 
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Witnessing all this, the U.S. troops were magnanimous in their displays of 
understanding. At any rate, there was so much joy and affection in the air on this day 
that they too received their share of it. 
Delights of a night dedicated to Venus 
At the close of the day began certainly the most legendary part of the liberation of 
Paris. In the words of a young officer of the 2ème DB: les délices d’une nuit dédiée à 
Vénus!660 Throughout the day, countless Parisians had called out to their (American) 
liberators in more or less broken English: We’ve waited for you for so long. By 
liberation night, in the dogfaces᾽ tents and armored vehicles, many Parisian women 
offered a physical expression of the unbounded gratitude and affection they felt in 
that moment. Père Roger Fouquer, a Catholic priest, had entered the city with the 
first Allied troops. Returning from a dinner with friends, he took note of the amorous 
goings-on and had a feeling of providential relief when the need to observe a nightly 
order forced him to withdraw from this night of madness.661 
By the following day, August 26, 1944, the entire city appeared to be nursing a 
collective hangover. The combination was enough to wreck one’s constitution662, 
reflected David Bruce in his diary, referring to the alcoholic mix of the previous night, 
consisting of beer, cider, white and red bordeaux, white and red burgundy, 
champagne, rum, cognac, armagnac and calvados. The dogfaces of 4th Infantry 
Division bivouacked in Bois de Vincennes in the eastern part of the city and on the Île 
de la Cité behind the cathedral of Notre-Dame. As the sun rose over Paris, U.S. 
officer John G. Westover recorded: Slowly the tank hatches opened, and bedraggled 
women crawled stiffly out.663 These nights of Venus frequently ended with the 
sharing of a K-ration breakfast664 at the campfire. Then the dogfaces headed back 
into a campaign so unbelievably and unexpectedly successful that it was of 
increasing concern to SHAEF. 
                                            
660 Referring to Venus, the Roman goddess of love. 
661 Ibid., p. 513. 
662 Cited in: Beevor, D-Day, p. 513. 
663 Ibid., p. 513. 
664 Cf. Chapter 9.2 5-in-1s (December 11, 1943). 
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A quartermaster’s purgatory 
A German general is credited with the declaration that blitzkrieg is the tactician’s 
paradise and the quartermaster’s hell. In 1944, Ernie Pyle described the Allied 
campaign in northern France in August and the first days of September as a 
tactician’s hell and a quartermaster’s purgatory.665 We can disregard here and now 
which of the two maxims is more appropriate in regard to the tactician. With respect 
to supply logistics, the two commentators are in basic agreement. In dealing with the 
logistical implications of the Allied ῾blitzkrieg᾽ in France, therefore, we return to the 
opening subject of this chapter: Bill Mauldin᾽s cartoon. 
As previously mentioned, the Allied encircling maneuver at Mons in the beginning of 
September destroyed or captured the remnants of Heeresgruppe B. Because these 
troops represented the last substantial reserves between the front lines and the 
German border, the Allied leadership found reason for great optimism.666 Lieutenant 
General Courtney Hodges, whose First Army had carried out the maneuver, assured 
his staff on September 6 that the war would be over if weather remained favorable for 
another ten days.667 In the days that followed, the Allied Expeditionary Forces 
advanced to the frontier of Nazi Germany and occupied a line extending from the 
Swiss border to Antwerp. That is where the Allied blitzkrieg ended, however, as the 
AEF ground to a halt when fuel and ammunition ran out. 
OVERLORD plans relied on an assumption that the Allied Expeditionary Forces 
would march steadily to the German frontier. So-called phase lines were established 
to indicate what line the AEF would reach by what day: Avranches by D+20, Le Mans 
D+35, D+90 along the Seine668 and the Rhine itself by D+350. The imperatives of 
these plans were based not so much on operations as on logistics. The phase lines 
served the logistical planners as benchmarks for the creation of a supply chain on the 
European continent.669 In reality, the Allies reached the Seine by D+79, but their 
                                            
665 Both cited in: Ruppenthal, Logistical Support I, p. 489. 
666 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 407 ff. 
667 CMH, Northern France, p. 25. 
668 Cf. Fig. 16. 
669 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support I, p. 188. 
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march was anything but continuous. From D+49 to D+79, they covered a distance 
that had been anticipated for the period between D+15 and D+90. While it had been 
calculated that 12 U.S. divisions at the most would require provisioning at the Seine 
by D+90 (September 4), in fact 16 divisions had already pushed 150 miles beyond 
the Seine by that date. One week later, the spearheads of First Army had reached 
the outskirts of Aachen, situated on the German border 200 miles east of Paris. From 
August 25 (D+79) to September 12 (D+98), Allied forces occupied an area that had 
been forecast to be taken between D+90 and D+350.670 Operationally, the wildest 
dreams of OVERLORD᾽s planners had been exceeded by far and wide. Logistically, 





Fig. 16   Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of 
Operations. Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, D.C. 1993), Map III. 
 
In 1944, the Army of the United States was the most mobile army in the world. Its 
mobility was prerequisite to its spectacular achievements in the six weeks following 
COBRA, but this feat also entailed problems. Just one tank consumed an average of 
30,000 liters of fuel in a week, while one armored division used 227,000 liters daily if 
it confined itself to roads.671 General Hodges᾽ First Army reached a daily fuel 
consumption average of 1.9 million liters during one week of maneuver warfare 
starting August 19.672 In addition to fuel, of course, an army also required 
ammunition, food, spare parts and a variety of other supply goods, amounting to an 
average daily replenishment requirement of 600 tons for a single division. By the end 
of August 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Forces counted 37 divisions in the field. This 
meant that ComZ was confronted with the daily task of transporting 22,200 tons of 
supplies to the front along routes that were steadily becoming longer.673 
                                            
670 Greenfield, Command Decisions, p. 422 ff. 
671 Beevor, D-Day, p. 433. 
672 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support I, p. 503. 
673 Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 176. 
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The French rail network, which in theory could have moved the required tonnage, 
was unusable. The lines operating west of Paris had been systematically bombed in 
the run-up to OVERLORD in order to prevent the Wehrmacht from reinforcing its 
forces along the invasion front. Eisenhower᾽s decision to pursue the fleeing German 
armies beyond the Seine forced his logisticians to improvise to a great extent. ComZ 
organized the Red Ball Express674, a one-way triangular circuit through Chartres, La 
Loupe and Dreux that utilized truck convoys in motion around the clock. After August 
25, 118 truck companies were employed on this route to transport supply goods from 
Normandy to Chartres. At the start of September, the Red Ball Express expanded to 
Soissons and Sommesous in order to be able to supply First and Third Armies 
separately. Although the plan was an ambitious one, it only partially met expectations 
because of several reasons. These included a shortage of military police to direct 
traffic, slow loading times for the truck convoys, multiple vehicle breakdowns due to 
the virtual impossibility of 24-hour maintenance service, and the lack of a uniform 
system of traffic management. In addition, the convoys were regularly kidnapped by 
the field armies in order to deliver the supplies beyond their unloading points into the 
depots of the individual divisions.675 Lastly, trucks used for supply transport had the 
obvious disadvantage that they not only transported fuel (the commodity that was 
most urgently needed) but also consumed it in substantial quantities. 
Apart from the Red Ball Express, 26th, 95th and 104th Infantry Divisions were deprived 
of their own transport in order to create 86 truck companies. Two engineer service 
regiments, a chemical smoke-generating battalion, several antiaircraft units676 and 
other elements were reconfigured for transport duty. Even the field armies 
contributed their vehicles to be used for ComZ supply purposes. Bradley ordered his 
formations to leave their heavy artillery behind when crossing the Seine677 in order to 
                                            
674 Cf. Marco Robert Büchl, Shooting War – Kriegsbilder als Bildquellen. Der Zweite Weltkrieg aus 
Sicht der US-Kriegsfotografie (Marburg 2009), p. 75 ff. 
675 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support I, p. 558 ff. 
676 Due to the absolute Allied air superiority, antiaircraft units were seldom needed, and their 
reassignment to other duties could be accomplished without conflict. 
677 The decision was obvious because artillery was, at any rate, of almost no use in a battle of pursuit. 
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free up the artillery trucks for utilization as supply transport.678 Beginning on August 
19, the troop carrier commands of the Allied Expeditionary Forces were freed up for 
supply duties. They were also required for combat operations, however, but following 
August 25, they assumed at least some of the provisioning obligation for Paris. Their 
daily transport tonnage never exceeded 1000 tons and sometimes fell to around 
250.679 Ultimately, the Red Ball Express and the various other measures taken to 
beef up transport capacity enabled the Allies to sustain the momentum of operations 
through the middle of September. Then the system finally reached its limits. 
Necessary truck repairs doubled during September. While an average of 29,000 truck 
tires per month had to be replaced between June and August, this number rose to 
55,000 in September.680 Spare parts, tires and tools were scarce commodities 
throughout the European Theater of Operations. Exhausted to the limit from their 
constant duty, truck drivers were responsible for soaring accident rates. Many of the 
ad hoc transport companies neglected vehicle maintenance so blatantly that they 
were referred to spitefully as ῾truck destroyer battalions᾽.681 Damage and wear to the 
supply system’s equipment and infrastructure occurred to such a degree that even 
minimal requirements could no longer be met. As a result, Allied forces that had lived 
hand to mouth for weeks were left entirely short of supplies. 
During the six-week pursuit of the German Wehrmacht through northern France and 
Belgium, Eisenhower had repeatedly put medium-term logistical needs on a back 
burner in favor of short-term operational possibilities. Although these decisions took 
their toll on the logistical system, they proved correct in the end. The virtually total 
collapse of the Wehrmacht in France offered the unique opportunity to attain the 
borders of Nazi Germany in a short time and with scant casualties. By the middle of 
September, however, this hand had been overplayed, and the existing supply system 
was no longer in a position to perform its tasks. The Allied Expeditionary Forces had 
to halt, consolidate their supply lines and amass the stocks necessary to make a final 
push into Hitler᾽s Reich itself. On one hand, Mauldin᾽s cartoon stands for the frenetic 
                                            
678 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support I, p. 570. 
679 Ibid., p. 576 ff. 
680 Ibid., p. 571. 
681 Ross, Operations, p. 399. 
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efforts and improvisational skills of those days, when each additional mile could be 
won with minimal casualties and collateral damage. On the other hand, it also marks 
the end of this phase. 
9.10 The brass 
We are disciplined, so we lie here (in an artillery barrage) and take it, because in 
the end, we are more afraid of defying the authority of an officer, backed up by the 
whole Army and a court-martial composed of officers like him, than we are of death 
by shell fire. Discipline is fear, not leadership, and we are afraid – not of Peacock 
(the platoon-leading lieutenant) but of the irresistible force that he represents. 
Afraid of our lives, we are more afraid of the system that holds us in thrall, and so 
we lie here and wait to be killed, because an officer tells us to lie here. 
David Kenyon Webster682 
No cultural history of any infantry whatsoever could claim to be comprehensive if it 
did not address the essential relationship between ordinary soldiers and their 
commissioned officers. The history of the dogface soldiers in the Army of the United 
States is no exception here. It could be characterized as the lowest common 
denominator of all armed forces, as well as a prerequisite to becoming operational, 
that commissioned officers hold virtually dictatorial authority. This simple fact alone 
guarantees that no front-line dogface soldier in World War II could afford to remain 
indifferent to the hierarchy of commissioned officers commanding him. No other 
individual factor influenced the life and survival of the dogfaces as the competence, 
personality and, ultimately, good will of their superiors. 
The individual characteristics of this topic require that we leave the beaten path in 
order to approach it formally in a different way. While most of the cartoons examined 
in this study concern a concrete situation or a particular fact grounded in historical 
reality, officer cartoons must, as a rule, be viewed differently. More than the majority 
of Mauldin’s cartoons, they rely on stereotypical images and describe aspects of the 
mutually complex relationship between these military castes. It goes without saying 
that such interactions are defined by the relative positions of the protagonists in the 
hierarchical power structure of the Army of the United States. In their commentary on 
                                            
682 David Kenyon Webster, Parachute Infantry. An American Paratrooper’s Memoir of D-Day and the 
Fall of the Third Reich (New York 2008), p. 167. 
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the various dimensions of this complex relationship, Mauldin’s officer cartoons touch 
the very core of contemporary realities and literally harbor historical emotions, 
(pre)conceptions and significance. In order to lend structure to the following 
considerations, we will shape them around the three divisions of modern 
commissioned officership: in descending order, general officers683, field officers684 
and company officers685. The commentary below will focus on one cartoon relating to 
each of these service-grade groups. In this way, one can become familiar with the 
respective specifics of each of these divisions. Naturally, the three visual analyses 
can only be understood as a cursory overview of this particularly complex, multi-
layered and critical field in the history of the Army of the United States. In any case, 
they indicate the historiographical value of Bill Mauldin’s work regarding the topic 
addressed here within the overall context of the subject. 
Before we get into the middle of things, however, we need to point out the linguistic 
differentiation of terms related to officers. The term ῾officer᾽, while used constantly 
throughout the discussion of this particular group, is misleading in a historiographic 
context because it is not sufficiently discriminating with respect to the topic. 
Specifically, it should be noted that the common term ῾officer᾽ as used in this text 
refers to commissioned officers as opposed to non-commissioned officers or NCOs. 
As a rule, this latter group consisted of enlisted men who were promoted in service 
grade and furnished with a tightly defined authority to exert command according to 
the tasks assigned to them (by commissioned officers). In contrast, commissioned 
                                            
683 General officers included, in ascending order, brigadier generals, major generals and lieutenant 
generals with one, two and three stars as rank insignia as well as (full) generals with four stars to mark 
their authority. Five-star Generals of the Army were (and are) created by special congressional 
resolution only in wartime. Their counterparts were the British rank of field marshal and the German 
Generalfeldmarschall. 
684 Field officers, occupying the service grades of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel, commanded 
batallions and regiments or held staff positions in superordinated formations. 
685 At the lowest hierarchical level of these service-grade groups were the so-called company (or 
junior) officers holding service grades of second lieutenant, first lieutenant and captain. 
Organizationally, as the umbrella term for this category suggests, these service grades were 
predominantly if not exclusively used at the company level. According to the Tables of Organization, 
an infantry company had three second lieutenants as platoon leaders, one first lieutenant as executive 
officer (XO) and a captain as company commander. 
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officers were authorized, in the technical sense of the word, to exercise autonomous 
command over military units and formations. Their command authority stems from 
their being ῾commissioned᾽ in the name of the President (and in the case of the top 
brass, directly by him) through a document that essentially provides certification from 
the highest levels of an officer’s authorization. 
Inspirin’ (December 5, 1944) 
 
The crusty, straight-backed veteran had a reputation for never wavering or 
flinching. When artillery shells landed near the bridge, Anderson stood erect on the 
riverbank, even after several NCOs asked him to take cover. Then a number of 
Luftwaffe airplanes streaked by strafing and bombing, but when the smoke cleared, 
the old colonel still stood in the same spot … Such methods fell into disfavor during 
the war, but many officers still persisted in the dangerous practice. 
Michael D. Doubler.686 
 
                                            





Fig. 17   “Sir, do ya hafta draw fire while yer inspirin’ us?” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Willie and Joe have taken cover against a slope. They man a light, air-cooled 
M1919A4 Browning machine gun687, the standard company-level support weapon, 
positioned behind a bush. Joe lies in a prone position behind the machine gun with 
his legs spread behind him and his left foot in a puddle of water. Willie is sitting 
beside him with his hands buried in his coat pockets. They both wear steel helmets 
and long coats over their field uniforms, while Willie has wrapped a scarf around his 
head, presumably to protect against the cold. Joe’s coat is torn at the right shoulder 
and Willie’s pants at the right knee. Above them on the slope - and thus in full view of 
whoever has caused the two dogfaces to seek cover – stands a brigadier general, 
recognizable from the single star at the front of his steel helmet. His service grade 
                                            
687 Cf. Thomson, Procurement, p. 179. 
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identifies him as an assistant division commander or division artillery commander, or 
possibly a staff officer of a higher organizational unit.688 Like the two dogfaces, he 
wears a long trench coat. With a riding crop pressed under his left arm, he focuses 
his attention on the two soldiers in a look that may indicate astonishment. The reason 
for his presumed surprise is likely Willie, who asks him: Sir, do ya hafta draw fire 
while yer inspirin’ us? 
In the American Army of World War II, general officers were almost exclusively 
regulars and products of Army educational institutions like West Point, Virginia 
Military Institute, the Army Industrial College, the Army War College and lastly, the 
Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A few noteworthy 
exceptions started their careers in the National Guard, and there were still fewer who, 
over decades, rose through promotion from private to a general’s rank.689 Virtually 
without exception, these had been enlisted men or – as mentioned – privates during 
World War I, shaped by the negative public perception of the chateau generalship 
that was very pointedly described by John Keegan: 
The impassive expressions that stare back at us from contemporary photographs 
do not speak of consciences or feelings troubled by the slaughter over which 
those men presided, nor do the circumstances in which they chose to live: the 
distant chateau, the wellpolished entourage, the glittering motor cars, the cavalry 
escorts, the regular routine, the heavy dinners, the uninterrupted hours of sleep. 
Joffre’s two-hour lunch, Hindenburg’s ten-hour night, Haig’s therapeutic daily 
equitation along roads sanded lest his horse slip, the Stavka’s diet of champagne 
and court gossip, seem and were a world away from the cold rations, wet boots, 
sodden uniforms, flooded trenches, ruined billets and plague of lice on, in and 
among which, in winter at least, their subordinates lived.690 
In choosing their physical distance from the events, World War I generals were 
necessarily tied to the logistics of communications; otherwise, it would be very 
difficult to find a reasonable explanation for such strikingly inappropriate conduct. In 
                                            
688 Cf. Order of Battle, p. 26. 
689 These included the controversial Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Terry de la Mesa Allen, 
and Theodore Roosevelt Jr., son of President (1901-1909) Teddy Roosevelt. 
690 John Keegan, The First World War (London 2000), p. 312. 
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order to ensure the ability to communicate, they needed to situate their headquarters 
at the junction of landline telephone connections to subordinate formations under 
their command, connections that could only be maintained at a safe distance from 
the front due to their vulnerability. In a process that John Keegan ranks among the 
great industrial enterprises of Europe in the first years of the twentieth century691, 
larger armies were assembled and equipped throughout Europe than at any 
preceding point in time. Even the smallest formations under the command of a 
general were dispersed over a section of the front that was too wide to be reviewable 
by a general operating near it. While 19th-Century commanders still took care to ride 
back and forth along the front lines within view of the Enemy in order to obtain a clear 
picture of events and to intervene personally where it became necessary, other 
principles applied in the 20th Century. The nearer a World War I general approached 
to the front, the more difficult it became to supply him with all the information needed 
to direct a battle and thus the more poorly situated he was to perform his 
command.692 
No matter what the necessities of communications were in 1914, most of the future 
generals of 1939 through 1945 were deeply affected by their predecessors᾽open 
displays of insensitivity. At least the troop commanders among them were mostly 
inclined to cultivate a fairly close relationship with their men. Many World War II 
general officers expressed their opinions regarding the leadership behavior of their 
forerunners by consciously choosing to return to the killing zones. Montgomery, who 
commanded a formation of several hundred thousand men, insisted on maintaining a 
tactical headquarters within earshot of combat operations. James Slim Jim Gavin, the 
Irish-American commander of 82nd Airborne Division, who – uniquely for a general 
officer – took part in four combat jumps during the war, could frequently be found at 
the front lines if his paratroopers were engaged in battle. Matthew Ridgeway, his 
predecessor, shared this tendency. German generals of the same generation often 
used similar methods to attempt to wash away the sins of their forerunners. In this 
vein, Rommel’s leadership style was to direct battles from an armored vehicle at the 
front. Similarly, Guderian roamed the battlefields in a radio command car, usually 
                                            
691 Ibid., p. 20. 
692 Ibid., p. 312 ff. 
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within range of enemy fire.693 All these examples represent negligent and, from a 
pragmatic point of view, counterproductive behavior compared with the actual 
command responsibilities of a general. Within their own commands, however, it was 
difficult to go against the will of generals who insisted on sallying forth in these ways. 
Although such daredevilry was frowned upon at the highest levels of military 
decisionmaking, superiors could not effectively intervene. As a rule, they were 
geographically too distant from the events to be able to keep a constant eye on the 
forward thrusts of a subordinate. 
A key element of the cartoon under discussion relates to a basic consequence of this 
risky behavior. At the focus of events, witnessed by both his own troops and those of 
the Enemy, the commander is engaging in personal behavior under fire that could 
have potentially far-reaching consequences. From Caesar to Henry V to Napoleon 
and Wellington, the history of organized killing is filled with accounts of great 
commanders whose stoic-heroic behavior in the face of the Enemy has become 
legend. World War II generals had been students of this history in the midst of the 
greatest of all wars, and they were products of a military education system that was 
still guided by 19th-Century virtues. Thus it seemed desirable to many of them that 
they should react to the experience of enemy fire with a particular nonchalance. 
Older career officers especially clung to the belief that a commander’s bold but calm 
presence on the front lines instilled the troops with confidence694, writes Michael 
Doubler. 
Many general officers responded to the escalation of personal endangerment related 
to their proximity to the front in two ways, both viewed at the time as highly eccentric. 
In contrast to the elitist tradition of keeping officers at a distance from the bloody 
business of killing, involving the carrying of only symbolic weapons or often none at 
all, they implemented their own personal rearmament. Patton᾽s obligatory ivory-
handled revolvers are the best-known example. To cite two other well-known 
instances, Gavin customarily carried a carbine, while Ridgeway wore a pair of hand 
grenades.695 On the German side, General Seydlitz-Kurzbach also sported a 
                                            
693 Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 330. 
694 Doubler, Closing, p. 237. 
695 Cf. Keegan, Face of Battle, p. 329 ff. 
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private’s carbine for personal protection. In addition, many generals began to don the 
uniforms of ordinary privates, some of them declining even the star insignias that 
indicated their rank as general. Whether this practice was a quest for simplicity 
appropriate to the deadly business of war or an effort to demonstrate visually a 
closeness to the lowest ranks in their command, it represented a pragmatic 
necessity, given the circumstances. Because of their leadership position and their 
importance to the cohesion and coordination of their formations, officers generally 
represented a priority target for every rifleman (especially sharpshooters) in the front 
lines. Soon after their baptism of fire, a great majority of front-line commanders came 
to realize that they could significantly extend their life expectancy if their visual 
appearance was indistinguishable from that of their troops. Nonetheless, the need to 
study maps and make use of tactical radio communications regularly forced officers 
to identify themselves as such.696 By the same logic, officers on the front lines 
represented targets whose tactical neutralization could lead to operational 
consequences. For this reason, it became a minimal prerequisite for personal 
security to avoid open identification as a general, to whatever extent possible, when 
operating near the front. 
Let us return again to our cartoon. Viewed as a profile of socio-cultural tendencies of 
American general officers in the Army of the United States, there is no case to be 
made against the validity of the above assumptions. In Bill Mauldin’s cartoon, 
however, these self-reflective and history-burdened realities of a high command 
overlap with those of the dogfaces, thereby taking on a new significance that, at 
most, could be described as a farcical distortion. Front line displays of guilt and 
atonement, as well as the reprocessing of the Great War within the present one, 
played a very minor role in the reality of the dogfaces. They found themselves firmly 
in the grip of a phenomenon that philosopher J. Glenn Gray, in his classic study The 
Warriors697, labeled the ῾tyranny of the present᾽. According to his characterization, 
the future and especially the past lose their significance because the present can 
inflict unforeseen and unforeseeable death at any moment. Combat historian Gerald 
F. Linderman also reflects on this phenomenon, describing the forces that arise: 
                                            
696 Max Hastings, Armageddon. The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945 (London 2005), p. 88. 
697 J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors. Reflections on Men in Battle (New York 1998). 
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… the war itself would be without end. As the moment overwhelmed time, 
subjugating past and future; as combat came to control the moment, even when 
soldiers were temporarily freed from fighting; as each clash succeeded the last in 
sheer iteration of tactics and techniques, battle became limitless.698 
In such situations, making oneself visible meant becoming a target; and to be a target 
was something to avoid at all cost. Neither coming to terms psycho-hygienically with 
the past nor making gestures of solidarity held much meaning for the dogfaces, even 
if such acts were performed with the best intentions imaginable. Trapped in an 
incalculable and deadly reality, they sought to protect the only asset left to them: their 
bare lives. No matter whether the brigadier general᾽s behavior may be explainable 
through his own personal conception of heroism, leading by example or actual 
redemption of the sins of earlier generals, it has but one relevant consequence for 
the two dogfaces: namely, attracting a degree of hostile attention to their immediate 
surroundings, a situation that can quickly have lethal consequences at the front lines. 
Mauldin’s cartoon focuses on this senseless display of stoic-heroic pseudo-
leadership behavior by portraying it against the backdrop of a basic law of the front 
lines: that an individual’s visibility and his life expectancy are inversely proportional to 
each other. 
Beautiful View (September 25, 1944) 
 
The Officers ate on tablecloth with waiters and a wine list on the troopship when we 
came overseas, then came below to our tiny, sweaty, steerage mess hall and stood 
over us, shouting, “Hurry up, men, hurry up! There’s another company waiting to 
get in.” 
David Kenyon Webster699 
                                            
698 Gerald F. Linderman, The World within War. America’s Combat Experience in World War II (New 
York 1997), p. 347. 





Fig. 18   “Beautiful view. Is there one for the enlisted men?” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
There is not a great deal of information on physical realia to be elicited by this 
cartoon. In the picture’s background, we see a dramatically illuminated mountain 
panorama. Rays of sunshine stream through gaps in the dark cloud layer, falling on a 
rocky mountainscape. The long shadows seen at right in the foreground suggest that 
this scene is playing out in the morning or late afternoon hours. The shadows in 
question are cast by two American soldiers who stand on a slope in the right 
foreground, contemplating the romantic scenery. Both soldiers are wearing garrison 
caps.700 The one at the left wears a uniform coat with no further identification and has 
his hands in his pants pockets. A circular rank insignia is recognizable on his left 
                                            
700 Cf. Stanton, Army Uniforms, p. 70 ff. 
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shoulder. This would be a stylized oak leaf that, if gold-colored, indicates a major or, 
if silver, a lieutenant colonel. The apparently mustachioed soldier standing at the right 
is identifiable as a captain from the two vertical bars on his garrison cap. He wears a 
trench coat and, in his hands clapsed behind him, holds a baton. As the two officers 
admire the panorama, he comments: Beautiful view. Is there one for the enlisted 
men? 
As we have already stated in this text, the ethos of the officer corps in the American 
Regular Army was conceived along the lines of European military tradition.701 The 
ideological guiding principles of this body of thought were enunciated beginning as 
early as 1802 at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York and are 
reflected in the Academy’s motto: Duty, Honor, Country.702 West Point taught 
prospective officers to see themselves as virtually an aristocratic caste, as ῾officers 
and gentlemen᾽. According to this mindset, NCOs and enlisted men were clearly not 
gentlemen but instead a lower class of virtual pariahs who were necessary to the 
military. Commissioned officers were distinguishable to the eye from their 
subordinates while, in the social arena, they kept to themselves. Service-related 
contacts were reduced to a minimum and, as far as possible, mediated by NCOs. 
Discipline was harshly enforced at all times. They wore uniforms that were distinctly 
different from those of the other ranks, so Scott Hendrix,  
on formal occasions, they carried swords and, for less formal occasions, swagger 
sticks, both traditional symbols of authority. The relationship between officers and 
enlisted men was based upon the European model that saw officers as 
“gentlemen” and enlisted men as distinctly not. Strict subordination was insisted 
upon, and discipline was maintained by severe punishment and regulated by the 
Articles of War, derived from those of the British Army of the 18th century. 
Enlisted men were expected to be deferential and obedient. They made formal 
gestures of submission by standing to attention when an officer spoke to them 
and by saluting.703 
                                            
701 Cf. Chapter 2.1 Regulars – citizen soldiers. 
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American Society (New York 2005), p. 517 ff. 
703 Hendrix, European Military Culture, p. 259. 
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The significance and expression of this social segregation became intensified over 
the long periods of American history when professional officers were effectively 
treated as outcasts in the social circles of the United States. To a society that was 
roundly critical of centralized authority, they were seen as representatives of 
Washington’s potentially dictatorial military power. In order to compensate for this 
lack of prestige and respect in the civilian sector, many officers who had been 
molded by the Regular Army developed a tendency toward an inwardly focused 
orientation. There, in the Regular Army’s de facto parallel society, they could inflate 
their perceived self-worth by considering and treating their subordinates as lesser 
beings. 
The personal memoirs of American soldiers of the Second World War are filled with 
accounts of structural and individual discrimination against the enlisted ranks. Better 
food, more comfortable quarters, a monthly alcohol ration for officers that was denied 
to enlisted men, dining and entertainment facilities that were off limits for the enlisted 
service grades … the list could be extended indefinitely.704  
Zig Boroughs provides a particularly vivid elucidation of this issue. His unit was 
ordered to erect a 25-foot-long tent over the officers᾽ latrine … 
… so that the officers could shit in style. [We] also prepared the conveniences … 
digging the trenches and erecting the boxes over the trenches, each with two 
holes … standard equipment for high-ranking field officers. After the officers’ 
latrine was prepared with the sweat and labor and oaths of the enlisted men, my 
normally happy disposition was rankled every time I had to lower my pants over a 
trench in the rain and the mud.705 
Two letters sent by dogfaces in 1945 to the editor of the weekly magazine Yank 
testify to the fatalistic sense of humor relating to the discriminatory officers᾽ privileges 
as well as the readiness of internal Army institutions like Yank itself to address the 
subject. In the first of these letters, a certain T/5 Napling complains over an incident 
involving two Hershey chocolate bars in the PX of his troop transport during his 
formation’s transfer across the Atlantic: 
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705 Cited in: Linderman, World within War, p. 191 ff. 
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Dear Yank, on the troop carrier I was on, the PX ration chocolate, one day I 
purchased a Hershey Bar with almonds as did the soldier in front of me. It 
developed upon eating our chocolate bars, that his Hershey contained nine 
almonds while mine only seven. Is this fair?706 
A later Yank edition published a reply in the form of a second letter to the editor, 
likewise from members of the enlisted ranks, stating: 
Dear Yank, in a recent issue of Yank, T-5 Napling stated that the man preceding 
him in the chocolate bar ration line received nine almonds in his Hershey Bar 
whereas he himself only received seven. We feel that we can clarify the situation 
by pointing out that through some gross and unpardonable error the other soldier 
undoubtedly received an officer᾽s Hershey Bar.707 
The response letter revealed the conviction shared by many enlisted men that, 
compared to their officers, they lived a very underprivileged existence in every 
respect at the low end of the Army food chain. Naturally, a positive example can be 
found for every negative - for every captain who used his service grade for personal 
advantage, a major who shared his alcohol ration with his men.708 Ultimately, 
however, many of the structural injustices remained, such as the prohibitive alcohol 
restrictions on enlisted service grades that stayed intact to the end of the war and 
many other absurd but unchallenged fantasies of superiority on the part of 
commissioned officers of all service grades. Mauldin᾽s cartoon succinctly conveys 
such unfairness. 
Changes (November 23, 1944) 
 
The Germans we were facing had been in the war for five years. We were all new 
to it, and our inexperience, despite our affectations of adequacy, was the most 
conspicuous thing about us. 
1st Lieutenant Paul Fussell709 
                                            
706 Cited in: Childers, “The Man’s Army”. 
707 Cited in: ibid. 
708 Linderman, World within War, p. 200 ff. 





Fig. 19   “By th’ way, what wuz them changes you wuz gonna make when you took over last month, 
sir?” (1944) 
Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of the Bill Mauldin Estate LLC. 
 
Willie and Joe are sitting in a trench in front of the fortified entrance to a bunker. 
Barbed wire can be seen in the background, spiraling over the excavation and trailing 
off behind what appear to be wooden planks next to the opening. The top of the 
entrance is protected with sandbags, as is the rim of the trench running in front of the 
entrance. On the ground next to the trench fortification is an almost empty bottle, the 
contents of which may be presumed to be high in alcoholic content, judging from the 
three stars on the label. In the image’s foreground, partially submerged at the edge of 
a puddle, lies a sort of crate or box. A soldier who can be identified from the vertical 
bars on his helmet as a second or first lieutenant is sitting between the two dogfaces. 
Unshaven, he hangs a cigarette from the right-hand corner of his mouth as he holds 
a hand of five cards. From the grouping of the protagonists in the image, it is clear 
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that this is Willie and Joe’s platoon leader. The dogfaces likewise have five-card 
hands, suggesting both that the junior officer’s game is poker and that they are 
participants in it. Joe and Willie are unshaven, with cigarettes in their mouths. Joe 
has slung his M1 carbine over his right shoulder, and he is wearing a steel helmet. 
He holds his right hand to his forehead and stares pensively at his cards. Willie, who 
is wearing an M-1943 field cap710, asks his lieutenant: By th’way, what wuz them 
changes you wuz gonna make when you took over last month, sir? 
The previous images have shown us the institutional and cultural rifts that existed 
between officers and enlisted men in the Army of the United States. The present 
cartoon enables us to see where and how this class segregation between the two 
groups reached its limits in the reality of a land war. 
The rapid expansion of the Army of the United States following 1941 created an 
enormous need for company grade officers to serve as lieutenants and captains in 
the dozens of infantry divisions that were activated as a part of Army Ground Forces. 
The traditional training institutions of the American officer corps, West Point Military 
Academy and the Virginia Military Institute, quickly reached the limits of their capacity 
due to the steadily increasing need for manpower. The war brought a period of more 
rapid promotions for promising talent in the ranks of field grade and general 
officers711; as they came open, positions were primarily filled from the lower service 
grades. The ranks of company grade officers, who constituted the basic reservoir 
from which such promotions occurred, needed to be replenished by newly trained 
replacements. This training occurred under the acronyms ROTC and OCS. Cadets of 
the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), who received training at U.S. colleges 
                                            
710 In 1941, the Office of the Quartermaster General commissioned a study of the practicability of head 
protectors in the U.S. Army. This resulted in the development of a new steel helmet model to replace 
the British ῾tin hat᾽ that had been in use up until that time. The new line of helmets, consisting of a 
plastic inner helmet for ceremonial occasions and a steel outer helmet that came to be used as well as 
a wash basin and stool, required separate protection against the cold. After several designs were 
rejected, a project was begun to develop an all-purpose field head covering based on a ski cap. By the 
beginning of 1943, these efforts resulted in a water- and windproof poplin cap with short visor, the M-
1943 model (Risch, Quartermaster I, p. 102). 
711 Eisenhower, to cite the most prominent example, received six promotions between March 1941 and 
December 1944, rising from lieutenant colonel to General of the Army. 
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and universities, had at least a certain amount of army experience as reserves.712 
The bulk of the junior officers, however, came from various Officer Candidate 
Schools (OCS).713 The student body at these training facilities was made up of 
draftees who had exceeded a determined test score during Army recruitment.714 After 
completing general basic training, they were prepared as officers in a twelve-week-
long crash course at the OCS facilities. As the manpower crisis in the European 
Theater of Operations reached its zenith in fall and winter 1944, even students who 
had been deferred from military service under the Army Specialized Training 
Program (ASTP) were now sent to Officer Candidate Schools as a way of addressing 
this particularly acute shortage of junior officers. Literary scholar Paul Fussel, one of 
these ASTP students, found himself suddenly in Europe as an infantry platoon 
leader. His assessment of OCS training at the time is reflected in his later 
retrospective appraisal, where he comments: … our inexperience, despite our 
affectations of adequacy, was the most conspicuous thing about us.715 
When American operations officers began to recieve increasingly substantial casualty 
reports in the aftermath of the landings in northwestern France, a stream of 
replacements began to flow through the North Atlantic supply routes, including 
thousands of quickly and superficially trained young second lieutenants like Paul 
Fussell. They were more likely to be adolescents than leadership figures, and they 
found themselves on the other side of the Atlantic with responsibilities that they could 
barely meet. Obeying the necessities and design of the replacement system, newly 
arrived junior officers were assigned to individual units in need of officers. Thus it was 
unavoidable that the untried 90-day wonders716, as they were colloquially and 
disrepectfully called by veterans, would end up leading platoons that frequently 
                                            
712 Mansoor, G.I. Offensive, p. 50. 
713 Ibid., p. 24. 
714 Cf. Chapter 5.2 Induction. The average score on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) fell 
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possessed considerable experience at the front. Reduced to its most basic outcome, 
this method of staffing rendered a situation that was hardly reassuring to the 
dogfaces. Against their better judgement, they often had to follow senseless and 
dangerous commands issued by incompetent junior officers or else reckon with the 
harsh legal consequences of failure to carry out orders according to the Articles of 
War. It was established earlier that American soldiers in World War II were more 
critical of the Army system than might be the case today. The weaknesses of the 
replacement system did not contribute to allaying this mistrust. In the front lines, the 
habitat of the dogfaces, the junior officers represented the draconian regime of the 
Army of the United States and, whether they were competent or incompetent, were 
criticized accordingly. Max Hastings provides an examination of this phenomenon 
from a British perspective: 
Very many Soldiers respected their NCOs. But in sharp contrast to the British 
army, in which most men looked up to their officers, few American rankers 
admitted to thinking well of theirs … Above all at platoon level … young 
lieutenants upon whom so much depended – seldom won the confidence of their 
soldiers.717 
The 90-day wonders often had no occasion to win the trust and respect of their men. 
The nature of their military tasks in the middle of the killing zones frequently 
contributed to their not surviving long enough to be able to win anyone’s respect. 
Following an ethos that was no longer appropriate in the World War II battlefields, a 
great many junior officers lost their lives while trying to compensate for their lack of 
practical experience through particularly reckless leading by example. The institutions 
of the Army soon recognized that this view of proper leadership behavior was 
necessarily leading to unsustainable losses in a land campaign against the German 
Wehrmacht in northwestern Europe, and they adapted official training guidelines 
accordingly. Nevertheless, junior officers frequently struggled with their duties and 
their place at the front. The erroneous ideas of many junior as well as senior officers 
concerning what was expected of soldiers like themselves could not, however, be 
sustainably corrected. Up to the end of the war, the Army of the United States 
suffered the loss of sometimes even high-ranking officers who carelessly found 
themselves closer to front-line action than their command duties would have 
                                            
717 Ibid., p. 292. 
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required.718 The reality that many older Army officers from the period between the 
wars had a heroic-romantic (though not very empathic) vision of their profession is 
illustrated by the address of a regimental commander to lieutenants newly arrived in 
Normandy: 
As officers, I expect you to lead your men. Men will follow a leader, and I expect 
my platoon leaders to be right up front. Losses could be very high. Use every skill 
you possess. If you survive your first battle, I’ll promote you. Good luck.719 
If 90-day wonders lived through their first days and weeks in the killing zones, they 
generally came to recognize a simple but existential truth: their only chance of 
survival required them to discard all the fantasies of superiority that they had learned 
in officer training. Their best life insurance policy was to learn about life and survival 
from their men in the killing zones. It may be assumed that them changes mentioned 
by Willie to his platoon leader involve what was known as spit and polish: strict formal 
discipline, correct military appearance and routines that were passed on from the 
garrison service. Many junior officers᾽ views of such virtues gradually tended to 
converge with the attitudes of the dogfaces, who considered all this to be 
meaningless chickenshit.720 It may be assumed that more existential issues were 
present on the lieutenants᾽agendas after one month than them changes. 
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719 Cited in: Ibid., p. 238. 
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10 The greatest generation? 
The war is our world and our life … and the other one we know fades away. 
Orval Faubus721 
I’m tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine. War is hell. 
William Tecumseh Sherman722 
At the outset of these concluding observations, it is important to note that the 
collection of visual commentaries contained here can represent only a cursory 
overview of the historiographical potential of Bill Mauldin’s war cartooning. The 
overseas output of this extraordinary artist, cultural anthropologist and social 
commentator amounts to over 600 works. Their systematic appraisal and analysis 
using the techniques established in the present study would honor what this text, at 
its best, can only reveal in their essential features: a precise and exceptionally 
detailed panorama of a complex web of manifest and latent hierarchies, 
dependencies, animosities and sympathies adapted to one specific socio-cultural 
group, as well as the realities specific to the time and place it occupied. Taken 
together, these findings relate to that fabric of interdependent yet individual meanings 
that Clifford Geertz, borrowing from Max Weber, characterizes as ῾interpretation of 
culture᾽. 
                                            
721 Cited in: Linderman, World within War, p. 350. Irrespective of his relevant testimony in this 
connection, it must be pointed out that Faubus, as Governor of Arkansas in 1957, gained notoriety by 
ordering the Arkansas National Guard to block entrance by black students into Little Rock’s Central 
High School, thus denying the implementation of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Brown v. Board of Education that abolished segregation in American schools. In the 
course of the so-called Little Rock Crisis provoked by this incident, President Eisenhower placed the 
Arkansas National Guard under the command of the federal government in Washington, ordered them 
to return to their garrisons and assigned the 101st Airborne Division – which Eisenhower had visited in 
southern England on June 5, 1944 prior to its baptism of fire as part of OVERLORD – to protect the 
free access of African-American students to the school. (Paul Greenberg, Eisenhower Draws the 
Racial Battle Lines with Orval Faubus, in: The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 18 [1997–
1998], p. 120 ff.) 
733 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York 1994) p. 6. 
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Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretative one in search of meaning.723 
In this context, every decision to feature a particular cartoon is simultaneously a 
decision not to include a multiplicity of equally qualified works. For every topic of 
interest that has found its way into this study, the corpus of Mauldin’s drawings offers 
various cartoons, no less worthy of display, that could not be included for lack of 
space. Since the present study represents, so far as I am aware, the first attempt at a 
systematic visual study of the World War II output of Bill Mauldin, I made the 
conceptual decision to select works that permit a broad access to the subject matter. 
The extremely rich potential of such cultural studies can only be adequately and 
meaningfully developed if one transcends the boundaries that separate history᾽s 
chroniclers from its interpreters. Transparency and verifiability are and clearly remain 
central pillars of the historian’s trade. Ultimately, however, we are concerned with a 
myriad of individual and collective manifestations of the human spirit that exist in 
complex connection with one another. Solely trying emulate methods of the sciences 
in the vain hope of gaining a precise measure of historical “truth” can only lead to 
failure. The task at hand for historical scholarship is to bring together a quantity of 
loose ends, distill significance from a flood of information and, in so doing, respect no 
boundaries of time, space, or scholarly discipline. The task of the historian is to 
transform himself into a traditional historian and anthropologist and social scientist 
and psychoanalyst of a given subject matter. 
Culture 
Based on these ambitions, we dedicated ourselves in the first portion of the present 
study to analyzing, in some detail, various aspects of the past history of the United 
States. The underlying intention was clearly not to establish legalistic 
historiographical causal relationships between George Washington’s citizen soldiers 
and the dogface soldiers of Dwight Eisenhower. This exercise was, rather, a 
methodical means to the end of highlighting the countless manifestations of human 
will that became consolidated into an American mentality over time. 
                                            
723 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays (New York 1973), p. 5. 
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The concept of ῾great men᾽ as crucial determinants of historical evolution, so 
commonly employed in the history of historical writing, is as linguistically indistinct as 
it is historiologically deceptive. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached in Chapters 3 
and 4 concerning American isolationism and the U.S. pivot to internationalist policies 
and an offensive security strategy suggest that a somewhat more discerning 
approach should be taken in this context. Even if no ῾great men of destiny᾽ in the 
romantic-historical tradition are to be seen here, the history of the dogface soldiers is 
certainly characterized by ordinary men724 having the utmost significance for the 
genesis of the phenomenon. In order to remain true to the terminology of the topic: 
the tactical cause of the genesis of a distinctive identity and virtual ideology as 
dogfaces was discussed in detail in Chapter 8. What, though, were the strategic 
prerequisites? Over long stretches, these can be constructed around the decisions of 
a handful of individuals who provided decisive impulses to systemic-cultural 
processes at critical moments: 
Wedemeyer is the most interesting example in this context. While at the 
Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he was equipped with the requisite land-minded strategic 
know-how that allowed him to recognize that Germany’s concept of war as an 
absolute national endeavor could realistically only be countered at the maximum level 
by means of a decisive battle waged on the land mass of northwestern Europe. In 
addition, Wedemeyer offers an ideal example of the randomness with which 
subordinate officers have repeatedly exerted a decisive influence on major military 
events; the role of German Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Hentsch in annulling 
the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 is only the most striking example of this phenomenon.725 
                                            
724 The only woman of any major significance in the history of the Army of the United States was 
Eleanor Roosevelt, who lobbied her husband and public opinion for equal treatment for African-
American soldiers. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, however, since African-American GIs played 
only a subordinate role in the phenomenon of the dogface soldiers, the above discussion should not 
be interpreted as gender insensibility but rather as the consequence of the factual historical situation. 
725 In the hypothetical event that the German Reich might conduct a two-front war against Allied 
France and Russia, the Schlieffen Plan envisioned first defeating France with the bulk of the German 
Army in a rapid campaign before Russia could have the chance to complete its mobilization measures. 
In the plan’s next phase, most of the German Army would redeploy to the east in a second campaign 
aimed at defeating Russia as well. Though the plan was based on unrealistic assumptions right from 
the outset (the German rail connections were incapable of transporting troops and machinery from 
284 
 
Of course, the towering figure of George Catlett Marshall needs to be counted in this 
elite group. Marshall, who literally created the Army of the United States, recognized 
the unique quality of the low-ranking Wedemeyer and knew how to make use of it. In 
addition, Marshall was aware of the fact that an army of citizen soldiers was bound to 
be more liberal in spirit and character than one made up of Prussian Junkers726, and 
he ensured through various staffing decisions that this consciousness would spread 
throughout the hierarchies of the Army of the United States. It is similarly important to 
cite Franklin Roosevelt, who challenged populist-isolationist trends in American 
public opinion and declared an economic and de facto, if not de jure, state of war 
against the Third Reich. His demand for unconditional surrender on the part of all 
Allied foes, made jointly with Churchill in Casablanca, defined the strategic 
framework to confront history’s most perfidious ideology militarily. Churchill, the 20th 
Century᾽s uber-Briton and (in a stroke of historic irony) son of an American mother, 
has earned his own listing in this roster. His British tradition of strategic thinking along 
the periphery – rendered over much friction into conventional and executable 
strategy by Chief of the Imperial General Staff Brooke – was only prepared to support 
Wedemeyer’s decisive northwestern European battle if the plan also included a 
Mediterranean campaign that proved to have serious consequences for the history of 
the dogfaces. Within the hierarchies of Army Ground Forces, it was key systemic 
figures like Eisenhower, Bradley, Clark and Truscott who were ready to implement 
Marshall’s liberal concept of the Army of the United States. Their basic willingness to 
allow this relatively liberal atmosphere in their command areas (if not also to play a 
proactive role in encouraging such conditions) formed a basic prerequisite for 
extensive cultural cross-linking to be able to occur at the base of their organizations. 
                                                                                                                                        
west to east in the quantities assumed by Schlieffen) and therefore not executable, it was treated as 
the Holy Grail by the German General Staff until 1914. After the plan’s errors revealed themselves in 
the fall of 1914, Schlieffen’s successor, Moltke the Younger, posted that very lieutenant colonel, 
Richard Hentsch, to the front in order to evaluate its continued feasibility. Hentsch’s negative report 
resulted in the scrapping of the Schlieffen Plan (Keegan, First World War, pp. 29 ff., 120 ff.). 
726 Junkers were mostly lower-class, often impoverished members of the Prussian rural nobility who 
predominantly served in the kingdom᾽s officer corps. From the 1871 German unification until 1945, 
Prussians continued to occupy a significant number of high military command positions, and the 





The next section led us on the track of the dogface soldiers through the complex 
history of the legal foundations and organizational structuring of the Mobilization 
Training Program, the creation of the Army of the United States based on these 
assumptions, and the organization and progression of their transfer to the theaters of 
war in Europe. The history of this Herculean legal, industrial and logistical task is 
significant regarding various aspects of its particular processes as well as in its 
supreme influence in creating the basic alloy of what would then become the dogface 
soldiers. We have traced how, under the watchful eyes of a radical- federalist public, 
the mechanisms of a general mobilization based on the Selective Service System 
evolved; under what conditions and according to which considerations that system 
ultimately conscripted over 16 million Americans into service in the Armed Forces; 
and lastly, with what technical, procedural, logistical and cultural challenges this 
operation, so difficult to imagine in its scope, was confronted. 
Besides the countless narratives of daily life under the Selective Service System, the 
gold dust in history’s systematic quest for meaning, many insights are of particular 
significance in a wider national focus as we seek to comprehend this epochal 
recalibration of America’s national consciousness with respect to self-awareness. 
Armies are universal institutions that turn out to resemble one another closely. In 
spite of this, as John Keegan declares: 
… each is also a mirror of its own society and its values: in some places and at 
some times an agent of national pride or a bulwark against national fears, or 
perhaps even the last symbol of the nation itself; elsewhere and otherwise an 
instrument of national power deprecated, disregarded and of very last resort.727 
The transformation of America᾽s Armed Forces from the Regular Army of the period 
between the wars to the 1945 Army of the United States is a journey from society’s 
margins to its innermost reaches – in the words of Keegan, the transfiguration from a 
deprecated and disregarded institution into an agent of national pride or even 
national identification. A variety of conceptual and procedural decisions of general 
principle formed the foundation for this transformation into the Army of the United 
                                            
727 Keegan, Six Armies, p. xi. 
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States. In this context, the traumatic experiences of the Depression years served as 
a catalyst and gave a decisive twist to this development. 
Regiments as the fundamental building blocks of modern standing armies were 
introduced at the start of the 17th Century. These nuclei of all modern armies, in 
addition to serving their primary purpose of furnishing the state with a permanently 
available means of professional military power, had another function: namely, that of 
isolating freebooters, mercenaries and other societal troublemakers and making use 
of them in a classical political sense. These new social structures soon developed a 
culturally introspective character. Particular traditions and values systems as well as 
strong internal discipline resulted in the Army᾽s tendency to separate itself from 
society at large and to develop parallel social structures.728 The American Regular 
Army found itself in precisely this self-imposed exile at the end of the 1930s decade. 
Marshall was aware of this fact and conscious as well of the genuine resentments of 
the American public against centralized power structures, which they perceived as 
dictatorial. Obeying his democratic ideals and Puritan ethic, he recognized that the 
organization and spirit of the Armed Forces needed to open up to the wider society, 
and not the other way around. 
The result of these convictions and his own personal policies that sprang from them 
was a wartime army of a notably liberal character whose members, while still tightly 
confined by military necessities, did not reject certain fundamental rights. The most 
impressive example of this posture is the following comparison: On the eastern front 
alone in the final year of the war, Hitler᾽s Wehrmacht sentenced approximately 
30,000 soldiers to death for cowardice before the Enemy and desertion, two thirds of 
whom were actually executed.729 During the entire course of the Second World War, 
military courts-martial of the Army of the United States in Europe and the Pacific 
Theater executed 102 soldiers. Of these, 101 had been found guilty of murder or 
rape. The remaining execution of a GI, occurring at the beginning of 1945, was for 
two actual desertions and his written statement of intent to desert again.730 
                                            
728 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (Audiobook), Disk 1, Track 12. 
729 Roberts, Storm of War, p. 553. 
730 Private Eddie Slovik, who arrived in France as a replacement soldier in fall 1944, deserted before 
reaching the front. He spent the next six weeks in the custody of a unit of the Canadian Military Police. 
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The Army’s methods of training, organization and armament were laid out along 
principles of industrial mass production. Division of labor, standardization, 
professional management, assembly-line production, economies of scale and 
interchangeability of parts, all properly subsumed under the heading ῾American 
System of Manufacture᾽, led to the transformation of an absolutist, virtually feudal 
mounted Regular Army stationed in remote border garrisons into a motorized and 
mechanized army led according to the maxims of the Harvard Business School.731 
                                                                                                                                        
After being returned without punishment to his own unit, Slovik inquired of his commander whether 
running away again would be considered desertion. Told that it would, Slovik deserted a second time, 
again ending up in another unit, where he submitted a note declaring: “I, Pvt. Eddie D. Slovik, 
36896415, confess to the desertion of the United States Army. At the time of my desertion we were in 
Albuff [Elbeuf] in France. I come [sic!] to Albuff as a replacement. They were shilling [sic!] the town and 
we were told to dig in for the night. The flowing [sic!] morning they were shilling [sic!] us again. I was 
so scared nerves and trembling that at the time the other replacements moved out I couldn’t move. I 
stayed their [sic!] in my fox hole till it was quite [sic!] and I was able to move. I then walked in town. Not 
seeing any of our troops so I stayed over night at a French hospital. The next morning I turned myself 
over to the Canadian Provost Corp. After being with them six weeks I was turned over to American 
M.P. They turned me lose [sic!]. I told my commanding officer my story. I said that if I had to go out 
their [sic!] again Id run away. He said their [sic!] was nothing he could do for me so I ran away again 
AND ILL RUN AWAY AGAIN IF I HAVE TO GO OUT THEIR [sic!]. – Signed Pvt. Eddie D. Slovik 
A.S.N. 36896415” (cited in: Benedict B. Kimmelman, The Example of Private Slovik, in: American 
Heritage Magazine, Vol. 38, No. 6 [1987]). On November 11, 1944, a military court-martial of the 28th 
Infantry Division preferred a charge of desertion to avoid hazardous duty against Pvt. Slovik. At the 
start of the proceeding, the court offered him the opportunity to recant his written statement and 
thereby avoid the maximum sentence (death). Slovik refused, being consequently (and not 
surprisingly) sentenced to execution by firing squad. A total of 21,000 American soldiers were tried for 
the crime of desertion in World War II, of whom 49 were sentenced to death. The fact that Slovik was 
the only soldier on whom the sentence was actually carried out is based on several considerations, 
including his refusal to recant his written statement, which removed this means of possibly mitigating 
his sentence, as well as the respective decisions handed down by his division commander, Major 
General Norman Cota and Supreme Commander Eisenhower at junctures (November 11 in the case 
of Cota and December 23 for Eisenhower) when the Army of the United States, hard pressed both in 
the Hürtgen Forest and in connection with the German offensive in the Ardennes, was plagued by 
desertions in epidemic proportions. In view of these factors, the singular judgment against Slovik – the 
first death sentence actually carried out by an American army since the Civil War – should be seen as 
setting an example (Kimmelman, Private Slovik). 
731 Cf. Keegan, Six Armies, p. 235. 
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The sheer dimension of the Army’s expansion under the guidelines of Wedemeyer᾽s 
Victory Program triggered an unprecedented economic upswing and ensured rapidly 
rising prosperity following the years of the Great Depression. In addition to the 
obvious material repercussions, the economic crisis of the 1930s had even more 
serious psychological effects. This period, which was characterized by grinding 
poverty, mass unemployment and lack of a realistic outlook for any sort of 
improvement in these conditions, affected U.S. self-awareness by creating a 
profound loss of confidence in the idea of America as a country of unlimited 
possibilities.732 The universal optimism that everyone could make something of him- 
or herself, which was based on the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
enshrined in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, only experienced a rebirth during 
the early years of the 1940s decade, when the country began its ascent toward 
becoming by far the richest and most productive nation on earth. 
It was only when the Army, not least because of its renewal in terms of personnel, 
had emerged from its cultural past, only when it became a true and literal American 
enterprise through its fantastic expansion. Only then could it correspond in its 
missionary-like pioneer spirit to the ideals of the American frontier mentality and 
begin to occupy a place at the heart of U.S. consciousness. 
In addition to its abovementioned movement away from its own past, another highly 
significant achievement of the Army of the United States contributes to our 
understanding of the historical origins of the dogface soldiers: namely, their physical 
transfer across the Atlantic Ocean. Spatial mobility of young males in the United 
States in the early 20th Century had been extremely limited for several reasons. For a 
combination of factors related to infrastructure, culture and the economy, most Army 
draftees had never left their home districts before they made the journey to the 
reception centers, their draft note in their pocket. Once there, many experienced 
outright shock when confronted with American cultural and ethnic diversity. When 
President Roosevelt drew the first number in the draft lottery in September 1940, 
newspapers reported that, in New York alone, that number (158) was held by young 
men named Chon, Cody, Faruggia, Weisblum, Stazzone and Liechtenstein among 
                                            
732 Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 28. 
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others.733 Even beyond New York, the most prototypical of all American melting pots, 
there was enough ethno-cultural diversity across the country from Washington State 
to New Mexico to the states of New England to cause a deep disturbance in the often 
unreflective self-consciousness of young Americans and instill a certain element of 
doubt. 
As a result, the reception and training centers spread across the entire country 
became transformed into institutions of ethno-cultural differentiation – and the 
inductee’s stay in them into a crash course on the subject of American diversity. The 
soldiers᾽ subsequent overseas sojourn had the opposite effect. Their stays in 
England, Scotland, Wales and the Northern Irish counties of Ulster Province734 are of 
particular relevance to this study. Here, amid a population that spoke English (at least 
a kind of English, as the dogfaces would claim), it was not the divisive but rather the 
unifying features of that blend called America that came strikingly to the fore. When 
the fundamentals of a cohesive national consciousness subsequently emerged, the 
foundations were laid for a common micro-identity as dogface soldiers within the 
Army of the United States. 
The Sharp End 
Along with those general prerequisites, in Chapter 8 of the present study we 
highlighted the conditions under which the socio-cultural group of combat infantrymen 
separated themselves both ideologically and culturally from the main body of the 
Army of the United States, giving form and expression to themselves as dogface 
soldiers in relation to the wider war. In the process, we developed three typologically 
discrete sets of framework conditions. The plethora of hellish and degrading living 
circumstances at the front lines constitutes the complex of manmade conditions. 
Under natural conditions, we listed the adverse effects of particular topographical 
realities on the operational practicality of U.S. ground war doctrine. While efforts were 
made to minimize resulting losses through a strong emphasis on mobility and 
firepower, topographical settings presented such difficulties at critical stages of the 
                                            
733 Ibid., p. 84. 
734 To acknowledge an Irish republican sentiment expressed in a popular saying (There is nothing 
great about Britain and the kingdom is not united), I leave aside the pragmatic use of the term ῾Great 
Britain᾽ and present the constituent elements of the Union Jack separately. 
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European ground war that mobility became virtually impossible and firepower 
essentially ineffective. At these stages, the infantry had to fight a war of attrition in no 
way less horrible than the experiences in the trenches of World War I. 
The infantry riflemen were disillusioned over their lot and their status within the Army 
of the United States and deeply traumatized by the realities of industrial war. In order 
for them to emerge as dogfaces, two additional catalytic agents were required: the 
Army’s daily newspaper Stars and Stripes as a link to the wider GI network, and the 
person and oeuvre of Bill Mauldin. His creative output sits not only at the heart of this 
study but also at the hermeneutical core of the dogface phenomenon itself. It was 
Mauldin’s biographical and cultural background that equipped him with the sensors to 
be able to recognize the dogfaces as a distinctive socio-cultural group; in addition, he 
possessed the talent to reproduce his perceptions in artistic form and the 
confrontational character, even in the face of regular opposition, to act as the 
dogfaces᾽ voice and advocate. If his works are to be seen as the graphic form of a 
joke, they possess as such those qualities that Freud identified, recognizing jokes 
under certain conditions as a particular manifestation of aggression, as a weapon 
and means of rebellion against established authority.735 They satirize and ridicule that 
which it is forbidden to criticize. A dialectical drawback of the phenomenon is, of 
course, the fact that the joke can smother in laughter the will to revolt736. Amid all the 
sentiments in favor of freedom and democracy that we justifiably concede as a 
benefit of the doubt to Eisenhower and his key AEF subordinates, it would be naive 
to imagine that they were unaware of the de-escalative effect of Mauldin’s works as a 
pressure valve. It would fit seamlessly into our image of the Supreme Allied 
Commander as a great pragmatician of power that this aspect of Willie and Joe’s 
effect might have played a certain role in his calculations. 
Significance 
In conclusion: where does the history of the dogface soldiers fit into the panorama of 
the American history of World War II? Barely seven decades after the unconditional 
surrender of Nazi Germany (and Austria), the history of American involvement in war 
                                            
735 Sigmund Freud, Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten. Der Humor (Frankfurt am Main 
1996), p. 115 ff. 
736 Ibid., p. 21. 
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is a highly ambivalent one, characterizable in short as militarily indecisive and/or 
morally questionable. For three reasons, the Second World War along with America’s 
role in it is, in comparison, surrounded by the aura of a golden age that appears to 
grow in lustre with the passage of time. 
In the first place, World War II was and is perceived in the United States as an 
absolutely just and necessary war. De jure, National Socialist Germany declared war 
on the U.S. Without much contortion, war against Hitler’s behemoth became 
positively identified as a quest in the service of peace, freedom and human rights, 
even though such terms had not yet been codified at the time. Following the insidious 
attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese empire, parts of U.S. society worked itself up 
into a racist-revanchist frenzy that, supported by pefidious OWI-propaganda, 
tolerated neither opposition nor doubt regarding the righteousness of the war in the 
Pacific. 
In the second place, the war ended for the United States in a triumph that left no 
doubt as to its absolute nature in comparison to all conflicts that followed it. The tepid 
armistice at the 35th Parallel in Korea, to begin with one of the most significant 
examples, is testament to America’s exhausted political and military will in July 1953. 
America᾽s exit from Vietnam in the course of Nixon᾽s Vietnamization policy made 
clear, in spite of this proactive euphemism, that the American Armed Forces could 
not effectively counter the guerrilla tactics of Viet Cong. As a campaign seen in 
isolation, Operation Desert Storm may have been a military victory; however, if the 
time focus is widened and Desert Storm is seen as the beginning of a longer-lasting 
conflict between the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Iraq and, 
between 2003 and 2011, between the U.S. and insurgents/guerrillas/freedom 
fighters, then here too, nothing is identifiable that could by any stretch of imagination 
be described as a victory or success. In the Afghan campaign following the launch of 
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, one only needs to look back on the three 
Anglo-Afghan wars between 1839 and 1919 and the Soviet-Afghan War between 
1979 and 1989 in order to assign a realistic operational valuation to the U.S.-led 
coalition’s chances for decisive victory. With the capitulation of its enemies 
respectively on May 7 and September 2, 1945737, the United States had single-
                                            
737 A German unconditional surrender was signed twice. The first capitulation took place on May 7, 
1945 in Reims, the headquarters of General Eisenhower. Although a representative of Stavka, the 
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handedly defeated the largest military power that had ever existed in the Pacific 
region while simultaneously playing a towering role in North Africa and Europe as the 
key member of the Grand Alliance. In defeating Hitler’s Wehrmacht in the west in 
1944/45, the Army of the United States contributed to vanquishing the remains738 of 
the most professional, efficient and effective military machine the world had seen up 
to that moment.739 
The third and most serious reason, however, is that the United States of America 
emerged from World War II as by far the richest and most powerful nation in the 
history of humankind. America’s participation in the war was estimated in 2010 to 
have cost 296 billion dollars, using dollar values current in 1945740. This was the 
price of achieving production capacities during the war that, in addition to meeting its 
own needs for war materiel, also provided the Allies with lend-lease supplies worth 
                                                                                                                                        
Soviet High Command, was in attendance, Stalin insisted on another surrender ceremony in Berlin-
Karlshorst in which the weapons would be clearly laid down before the Soviet Union. The Japanese 
surrender was signed on September 2, 1945 on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. 
738 On the eve of its criminal war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, the German Wehrmacht 
found itself at the zenith of its professional capacity. The campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, France 
and the Balkans had sustained manageable losses in order that large portions of its troops might gain 
priceless practical experience. As American forces encountered Wehrmacht formations in southern 
and northwestern Europe, many of the experienced blitzkrieg soldiers of 1939 to 1941 were no longer 
alive. It is thanks to the Red Army’s capacity for suffering, brutally enforced by Stalin and difficult to put 
into words, that the Western Allies found themselves in 1944/45 facing a German opponent that they 
could defeat. 
739 At this point, I have to emphasize a personal concern over how to understand terms like 
῾professional᾽, ῾efficient᾽ and ῾effective᾽ – or rather, how NOT to understand them. They should 
expressly not be viewed in the sense of absurd and idiotic fantasies of Teutonic warrior virtues and 
traditions. The reasons for the professional and often impressive performance of the German 
Wehrmacht lie in a combination of a tactical-operational doctrine that was innovative for its time, a 
soldier class whose military training had actually commenced in childhood, and the totalitarian-
malevolent-bellicose ideology of National Socialism that saw no role for humaneness, the individual or 
reason. 
740 Stephen Daggett, Costs of Major U.S. Wars (Congressional Research Service 2010), p. 2. 
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an estimated 48 billion dollars741 at no initial cost to them. Adjusted for inflation, these 
figures result in equivalent 2015 amounts of a staggering 3 trillion 897 billion and 632 
billion dollars, respectively742. The complete absence of war damage in the 
continental United States, the accompanying implications of this increase in 
American productive capacity, the massive effects of economies of scale and the 
extensive devastation borne by most of the other belligerents ensured worldwide 
economic domination of the United States for a quarter century after the end of World 
War II.743 
Under these conditions, the majority of Americans had no reason to view World War 
II and their own role in it as anything other than an out-and-out good thing. The U.S., 
which had been almost completely spared the ravages of the war, catapulted from its 
stature as a Depression-plagued nation of day laborers into a position of 
unprecedented power and wealth. In a war that was widely perceived as just, it had 
achieved a victory on both sides of the globe that could be judged as nothing less 
than absolute. Civilian and military war propaganda institutions had taken care that 
only the most selective information about the true horror of industrial warfare should 
find its way to the home front. Ultimately, such a reduced proportion of the 8 million 
members of the Army of the United States had been directly exposed to the 
destructive effects of the war that their stories (if they even wanted to tell them) 
became lost amid the general and self-satisfied triumphal jubilance. World War II was 
promptly declared to be the good war in the United States, with this concept 
becoming established in the American consciousness as a synthesis of the just 
cause with economic good times. Americans who had fought this ῾good war᾽ at home 
and abroad were transformed into The Greatest Generation, revered by an admiring 
public as virtually a sacrosanct fellowship. In the most simplistic view, they are 
portrayed without exception as ardent (it is tempting to say flawless) servants of 
democracy who understood it as their unequivocal privilege to have taken part in the 
                                            
741 International Aid Statistics, World War II. A Summary of War Department Lend Lease Activities 
(International Branch / Army Service Forces Headquarters / War Department 1945), p. 5. 
742 Calculation according to U.S. Department of Labor (data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl, most recent 
access: February 1, 2016). 
743 Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945 (Berkeley 1979), p. 63. 
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crusade for peace and freedom against the Axis powers.744 George H. Roeder, Jr. 
explains the singularity of World War II in the American 20th Century by asserting 
that, in a century of change characterized more by divisiveness than by unity, it has 
become one of the few moral reference points on which most of the American public 
can agree. 
… Most Americans believe that it affirmed that the United States can serve the 
cause of protecting human dignity, that it can get a job done, and that it is 
possible at least sometimes to see clearly the difference between good and evil 
in the amoral domain of international relations.745 
Since 1945, this combination of a fairly uncontrolled tendency toward simplification 
according to a selective fixation on the moral dimension of parts of its own history of 
war and a belief in an American mission that can still be mobilized again and again 
has led America and the world through an almost uninterrupted series of varied 
conflicts. The history of the dogface soldiers represents both a central aspect of, and 
a corrective to, the origin myth of this bellicose missionary history, and it should be 
understood in this sense as completely relevant. Mauldin’s works equip the dogfaces, 
representatives of a Greatest Generation that has ossified into bloodless iconicism, 
with an urgently needed measure of human qualities. It is a frequently repeated 
truism that war brings out the worst and the best in human nature. At the end of The 
Censored War, his masterful study of American censorship, propaganda and visual 
culture during World War II, Roeder applies this platitude to those who, like Bill 
                                            
744 As a student of American history born in Austria, Hitler’s homeland, I need to exercise particular 
caution in this context. In the last instance, many nation-states of continental Europe in the period 
presently under study were characterized by the fact that they had tolerated or actively enthroned a 
number of fascist and totalitarian dictators, acclaiming the most evil-minded of them all, an Austrian, 
as their chief. While it was widely regarded in Austria and Germany as perfectly opportune to profit 
from murderous wars of conquest and annihilation and the systematic exploitation of an entire 
continent, and while countless Germans and Austrians found few difficulties in personally benefitting 
from what they individually may have known as either the persecution or, in truth, the extermination of 
the Jewish population – during this time it was left to the Anglo-Saxon world to oppose National 
Socialism with all its resources without betraying the democratic foundations on which the 
organizations of its states were based. 
745 Roeder, Censored War, p. 3. 
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Mauldin, tell the story of war with visual means, granting it meaning, direction and 
significance. 
In such a world [of staggering potential for destruction] we cannot ignore, except 
at everyone’s peril, the disturbing yet life-affirming images furnished by those 
photographers, filmmakers, graphic artists, and others who saw in war and 
through war our capacity for brutality and dignity, and who did what they could to 
help us tell the two apart.746 
Mauldin᾽s true achievement is, within the everyday domain of his dogfaces, to have 
advocated on behalf of the ongoing distinction between these two distant poles in the 
human perception of war and, in chronicling events calibrated in black and white, to 
have provided urgently needed shades of gray. He shares this achievement with 
photographers like Robert Capa or George Rodger, authors like Paul Fussell, Robert 
Kotlowitz, J. Glenn Gray and Forrest Pogue, and journalists like Studs Terkel. Among 
the graphic artists who emerged from World War II, Mauldin occupies a unique 
position by dint of the scope and content quality of his output. Mauldin᾽s cartoons 
offer anthropological insights into the military’s tribal societies. Graphically as well as 
artistically, they reproduce and reflect a delicate system of mutual dependencies and 
both manifest and latent hierarchies. They illuminate a complex, fragile and 
multilayered system of particular meanings in the context of an image-oriented 
history of the United States of America, much of which is yet to be told.
                                            
746 Ibid., p. 157. 
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